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E. G. Wakefield and the Beauharnois Canal*

HELEN TAFT MANNING

FORTY YEARS AGO a Canadian scholar, Ursilla MacDonnell, published an interesting article in the *Queen's Quarterly* entitled "Gibbon Wakefield and Canada" in which she pointed out the close resemblance between the "Letters from Canada" which appeared in the *Colonial Gazette*, Edward Gibbon Wakefield's organ in London, and the despatches of Sir Charles Bagot to Lord Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, which were written in the same year—1842. Since the letters in the *Colonial Gazette* were unquestionably written by Wakefield himself, who was in Canada throughout the months of their composition, and since they must have been written before Bagot signed his most famous despatch explaining why Lafontaine and his followers had been made ministers of the crown and members of the Executive Council, it was a very natural deduction on Mrs. MacDonnell's part that Wakefield assisted Bagot in the composition at least of this one despatch and was responsible for a good deal of the wording:

Of this despatch it has been said that it is a work of genius if a despatch can ever deserve that name. The world hardly expected genius from Sir Charles Bagot. But in Canada at that time there *was* a genius, and as one reads the despatch, admiring its breadth, its extraordinary lucidity, the ease and certainty with which many tributary rills are drawn into the main stream of the argument, one is arrested by the recollection that these are the very attributes by which one recognizes Wakefield's work, even unsigned.

Later there is another passage where Mrs. MacDonnell allowed even more scope to her imagination: "I have myself a pleasant if freakish vision of a back room somewhere in Alwington House where Wakefield and Bagot's secretary laboured to present the new move in the

*The author gratefully acknowledges a grant from the American Philosophical Society which made possible a trip to Great Britain to examine the Ellice Papers.

most seductive light (the word is Mr. Vernon Smith's) to Lord Stanley."¹

Not only was Mrs. MacDonnell's surmise natural for an historian who had not had access to Bagot's private papers, but her tentative conclusion was almost identical with vociferous accusations hurled at Bagot's unfortunate head by his enemies, especially those in Toronto. The members of the old "family compact" felt none of the pleasure Mrs. MacDonnell expressed in assuming that Wakefield was the *éminence grise* of the Bagot administration. Since they violently disapproved of Bagot putting power into the hands of the Baldwin-Lafontaine government they viewed with horror the activities in Kingston and Montreal of a man who had been convicted of felony, had spent three years in Newgate, and was, as it seemed to them, the evil genius of a Canadian governor general. No one apparently undertook to refute their version of the relationship between the two men except Bagot himself who in the autumn of 1842 wrote three times to Lord Stanley to say that, in spite of the rumours current that he was being pushed around by Wakefield, he had not seen the gentleman in the last three months and fervently wished that the ministers would find something for him to do in Australia.²

Three years ago Mr. Paul Bloomfield, dazzled by the contradictions in Wakefield's life and by the enormous reputation as an empire builder which he did for a time enjoy in Australia and New Zealand, produced the fourth biography of him to appear since his death in 1856, and ascribed to him, chiefly on the basis of Wakefield's own writings, all the credit for the revival of the British empire in the nineteenth century, for the grant of "responsible government" in the dominions, for the end of transportation to Botany Bay and Van Diemen's Land, for the successful settlement of New Zealand, and for pretty much everything else creditable to the British people overseas which was done in his lifetime.³ Bloomfield is the first of Wakefield's biographers to devote an entire chapter to his hero's return visits to Canada (1841-44) and in it he incorporates Mrs. MacDonnell's findings, although he also quotes Bagot's denials. This is one of Bloom-

¹Ursilla N. MacDonnell, "Gibbon Wakefield and Canada subsequent to the Durham Mission, 1839-1842," *Queen's Quarterly*, XXXII (1924-25), 119-36, 285-304. These quotations are on pp. 302-3. The most recent treatment of the politics of the Bagot administration is in an article by George Metcalf in which Wakefield is scarcely mentioned. (*Canadian Historical Review* (C.H.R.), XVII, (Dec., 1961), "Draper Conservatism and Responsible Government in the Canadas, 1836-1847.") Mr. Metcalf demonstrated very clearly that it was W. H. Draper, the leader of the moderate conservatives in Bagot's Executive Council, who forced Bagot's hand and compelled him to come to terms with Lafontaine and his followers as soon as the Assembly met in September, 1842.

²For Bagot's private letters to Stanley, see Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Bagot Papers, V, letters dated Sept. 26, Oct. 12, Nov. 11.

³Paul Bloomfield, *Edward Gibbon Wakefield* (London, 1961), p. x.

field's most lyrical chapters for his aim is ever to present Wakefield as a Merlin or a Prospero, and he feels that never were his magical arts better displayed than in his dealings with Lord Sydenham, Sir Charles Bagot, and the French-Canadian voters. It is the purpose of this article to present a more prosaic view of this episode in Canadian history, to enquire more closely into Wakefield's motives for conduct which is, to say the least, contradictory to many of the views he expressed earlier and later, and to find out just how the visit was connected with the building of the Beauharnois Canal. No attempt will be made to analyse Wakefield's curious career in Canadian politics, but the story of his first eight months in Canada in 1842 cannot fail to arouse a deeper sympathy for that most unfortunate of all Canadian Governors General, Sir Charles Bagot.

Wakefield went to Canada in 1841, and again in 1842, as the representative of the North American Colonization Association of Ireland (N.A.C.A.I.), a joint stock company incorporated under an act of the British parliament, which had purchased from Edward Ellice the whole seigneurie of Beauharnois along with two adjacent townships of freehold land not yet developed in any systematic manner. Bloomfield, in proof of his hero's wizardry, points not only to the "Letters from Canada" published in the *Colonial Gazette* which gave a preview of Bagot's policy toward the French Canadians but also to his much vaunted success in persuading the Governor General to select Beauharnois as the site of the canal destined to unite those parts of the St. Lawrence waterway between Montreal and Kingston which were still separated by rapids, and to his election to the Canadian assembly by French-Canadian voters in November, 1842. Since Wakefield went back to England in 1844 and from that time until his death turned his full attention to New Zealand, his biographer found it unnecessary to comment on the fact that the Beauharnois Canal when completed never lived up to expectations as a navigable waterway and that the N.A.C.A.I. folded up and went out of business within ten years of his return to England, with great loss to all connected with it except himself.

There are many factual errors in Bloomfield's book but probably the worst in the Canadian chapter are in the pages where he describes the purchase of Beauharnois and other landed property in Canada from Edward Ellice in 1839.⁴ Ellice was in England and did not again cross the Atlantic until 1858; Bloomfield tells us that after he had completed

⁴Bloomfield, *Wakefield*, pp. 242-3. Almost everything Bloomfield says about Ellice and his Canadian interests is wrong. Ellice did not buy Beauharnois from the Lotbinières in 1832 but inherited it from his father who had accepted it in payment of a debt in 1795. The only change in 1832 was that Ellice's efforts to convert his property to freehold were at last successful.

arrangements for the sale, "the affairs of the North American Association of Ireland were of no further importance [to him]." Nothing could be further from the truth for the Association was never able to raise the money to settle their side of the bargain; Ellice had to accept shares in the company in lieu of payments, and being a large stockholder as well as a creditor felt it necessary to interfere constantly in the policy-making of the directors by writing letters to John Dewar, the secretary of the board, and by giving his orders to his brother Russell whom he insisted on having made one of the directors. It is therefore from the Ellice Papers, at present lodged in the National Library of Scotland, that much of the information for this article has been drawn.⁵ They tell a sordid but fascinating story of how the Beauharnois deal was made, of Ellice's protests against the Association's policies, especially in dealing with Wakefield, and of the insistence of the directors that Wakefield and Wakefield alone could handle their affairs in Canada so that the company's investment there should at last begin to pay dividends.

Ellice's difficulties with the company went back to a difference of opinion over the terms of the original agreement. This difference did not turn on the enormous price to be paid (£150,000) but on the timing of the payments and the state of the property which Ellice had agreed to hand over. One of the first points in dispute concerned Ellice's responsibility for clearing large areas of land in the seigneurie of "squatters" who had certainly received no kind of grant from Ellice. The claim of these well-established settlers was that their land was not within the limits of the seigneurie as it had been granted by the French king to the Beauharnois family but were a part of the township of Hinchinbrook which lay to the south of the seigneurie and was not a part of the Ellice land. They did not hold grants from the British Crown, however, and apparently the surveyor general of the province and his staff had refused to interfere in their favour. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the case the settlers, who were all English-speaking, refused to pay rents to Ellice as seigneur or to give up their farms.⁶ The whole controversy would certainly involve the new owners in a lawsuit which they naturally wished to avoid. The directors argued that, as a matter of course, Ellice was responsible for clearing the land of encumbrances before it was turned over. Ellice on the other hand

⁵The Ellice Papers are the property of Mr. Russell Ellice of Invergarry, and with his permission microfilms were made which are now in P.A.C.

⁶See *The History of the County of Huntington and the Seigneuries of Chateauquay and Beauharnois from the Earliest Settlement to the Year 1838*, by Robert Sellers (Huntington, Quebec, 1888). Sellers based his book on local knowledge and record and interviews with older people in the English settlements. He is strongly pro-settler but his statement of their claim is apparently accurate.

insisted that in the first verbal agreement he had made with the company's representative (Wakefield) he had used the phrase that the purchaser would "step into his shoes" and accept "all the faults and advantages." This casual procedure on Ellice's part was well described by the solicitor whom the Association eventually called in: "Mr. Ellice's habitual and well-known confidence in his own judgment leaves him, as he often remarks, no reason to regret the absence of legal advisers."

Since Ellice had made a bargain entirely to his own liking some explanation must be sought for the equally casual proceedings of the purchasers. The directors of the company became so indignant at Ellice's interpretation of the contract they had made with him that in 1840 they had their version of the preliminary negotiations inscribed in full on vellum leaving large margins for Ellice's comments.⁷ From this impressive document it is possible to reconstruct the story of Ellice's dealings with Wakefield although something must still be left to the historian's imagination. According to Ellice he received a letter from Wakefield in January, 1839, when he (Ellice) was visiting the dowager Countess of Leicester, whom he later married, at Holkham in Norfolk. Wakefield had recently returned from Canada, a few weeks ahead of Lord Durham whom he had served as a confidential adviser. In the course of his stay in Canada Wakefield had visited Beauharnois and had learned from Durham that Ellice wished to sell all of his Canadian real estate. In his first letter, according to Ellice, Wakefield represented himself as the agent for parties who wished to purchase.

Ellice never produced any of the letters from Wakefield to which he referred and it seems likely that as soon as he knew that Wakefield was interested in Beauharnois he invited him to Holkham where these two past masters in the art of making profitable deals quickly came to terms. The directors, in stating their side of the case, tried to show that the initiative came entirely from Ellice, but the point is not of much importance. The real puzzle is how Wakefield or anyone else could have accepted Ellice's estimate of £150,000 as a proper evaluation for his real estate in Canada. Edward Ellice, Jr., had lived at the seigneurie for several months in 1838 and gone carefully over all the accounts and the reports of the resident agent. His final word on the subject to his father was that while £150,000 might some day be a fair price to ask if Canada ever regained her prosperity Ellice would be very lucky to get half that amount in view of the disordered state of things at the moment.⁸ Soon after this letter was written the manor

⁷Ellice Papers, I, 54, Item 73. The quotations in the previous paragraph are also a part of this document.

⁸*Ibid.*, 4a, Edward Ellice, Jr., to his father. The first page of this letter is missing but internal evidence shows that it was written in September, 1838.

house was seized by rebels in the rising of 1838, Ellice, Jr., was kidnapped and held in captivity for several weeks, and the rebels no doubt took whatever they could use from the manor and the demesne land. This episode must have decreased the value of the property still more in the eyes of Canadians, and in any case it was generally known that Ellice as an absentee landlord had never been able to make his Canadian property do more than meet expenses.⁹

The terms of the informal agreement between Ellice and Wakefield, as reached in January, 1839, seem to admit of only one explanation and that a very simple one. Ellice promised Wakefield a 5 per cent commission if he could arrange the deal on Ellice's terms and thereafter, as Ellice himself phrased it, Wakefield was "acting for both parties." The deal as arranged was always described in Canada as a "notorious jobb" and since Wakefield did eventually receive his £7,500 as well as a good deal more for services rendered in Canada during the period under consideration it is fair to say that he alone profited from the whole transaction.¹⁰ It was after he had made his first arrangements with Ellice, however, that Wakefield ran into difficulties. The directors of his company refused to pay the amount fixed by Ellice, and Wakefield had to persuade a philanthropic gentleman, Colonel Kingscote, to assume the entire responsibility for the purchase.¹¹ Kingscote did not succeed in raising enough money to meet Ellice's demand for a downpayment and Wakefield went back to the directors who agreed to meet Ellice's terms if Kingscote would provide most of the cash needed immediately. In any case the deal went through in August, 1839, with Ellice receiving £20,000 in cash and turning over £1000 to Wakefield as the first instalment of his commission. It was at this point that the harmonious dealings between Wakefield and Ellice ended abruptly. Wakefield insisted that he should receive his whole commission as soon as the agreement was signed; Ellice countered that he would pay it only when he himself received the money. Ellice refused to see Wakefield thereafter and turned the negotiations over to the attorney Joseph Parkes, a friend of Lord Durham's who might be regarded as a neutral in the dispute. After his fourth interview with

⁹In his testimony before a parliamentary committee in 1828 Ellice said that he received only £500 in rentals and blamed this low return on the system of seigneurial tenure. This figure contrasts with Wakefield's estimate of £4,000 in his pamphlet mentioned below. In the correspondence on the subject Ellice always blamed his manager, Brown, but neither he nor the Company was ever able to find a satisfactory estate agent.

¹⁰Wakefield's motives and profit were accurately estimated by English Canadians. Robert Christie, *A History of the Late Province of Lower Canada* (6 vols., Quebec, 1848-55), II, 351 n.

¹¹These transactions are described in the first paragraph of the Company's exposé mentioned above. Colonel Kingscote was probably the Henry Robert Kingscote, philanthropist, on whom there is an article in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. If so his title came from a commission in the militia and his income chiefly from land.

Wakefield Parkes reported complete failure to reach an agreement. Of Wakefield he wrote "He is greedy, I see, and did not prove himself early in life very nice about getting money."¹²

With the directors at this time Ellice was on good terms. He agreed to accept stock in the company in lieu of larger cash payments but before doing so he insisted on having his brother Russell and several of his friends in the City of London made directors. Earl Fitzwilliam, a peer who had great influence in elections became the governor, and Andrew Colvile, one of the inner ring of merchants controlling the Hudson's Bay Company, the deputy governor. Ellice's greatest coup was to persuade Sir George Simpson, governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, to serve as director. Having thus put himself rather than Wakefield in control of the company as he believed, he wrote to his representative in Canada that "at least I am in honorable hands."¹³

But if Ellice was satisfied the directors, after a few months' experience of launching a Wakefield colonization project, were not. A plan was drawn up and published in London in 1840 which had two beautiful maps, one of the seigneurie and the Ellice townships, the other of a larger area showing both shores of the St. Lawrence River and the orientation on Montreal. It called for the sale of "triple orders" for land, each entitling the purchaser to one hundred acres of farm land, properly surveyed, and two town lots to be located in the village of Beauharnois, at the head of navigation from Montreal, or the new town of Ellice to be located farther west on the St. Lawrence. Each would-be purchaser must deposit £20 before his name could be registered and a total of £200 before being allowed to take part in a lottery on the basis of which the farms and town lots were to be distributed. The lottery was to be held in the presence of the directors in London but the choice of farms and lots was to be made at Beauharnois after the holders of the "triple orders" had had the opportunity of examining the whole property. Would-be purchasers were permitted to appoint proxies both to draw in the lottery and to make the choice at Beauharnois, thus making these privileges equally available to Englishmen who wished to emigrate to Canada and to Canadians already on the spot. Moreover the purchasers were under no obligation to settle on the land; the company would act as agent for those who wished to hold it for later sale at an advanced price or to rent it to *bona fide* farmers. The company was to retain full title to one-tenth of the land but their allotments would also be acquired by participation in the lottery.¹⁴

The plan was as close a replica as circumstances would permit of

¹²Ellice Papers, I, 54, Parkes to Ellice, Aug. 16, 1839.

¹³*Ibid.*, Ellice to S. Gerrard, Aug. 9, 1839.

¹⁴*Colonization of Beauharnois* (London, 1840).

the one which had been successfully pursued in launching the South Australia Company in 1836 and the New Zealand Company in 1838 but the Beauharnois project did not get off to so good a start.¹⁵ The company had not yet found a satisfactory Canadian manager (none ever was found) and would-be colonists in England did not come forward bearing £200 in savings. Nor was the number of those who wished to speculate in Canadian land, at this point in Canadian history, as large as the group who had shown themselves ready to risk their money in New Zealand. Incidentally, had the triple orders all been sold the total realized would have been no more than £200,000, and in view of the promises made in the pamphlet of public improvements in the seigneurie and assistance to be given to emigrants, it is hard to see how the company could ever have expected to pay its debt to Ellice or dividends to the stockholders. The hopes of those who were active in trying to get the whole project into operation rested more and more on the expectation that the Governor General would select Beauharnois as the site for the next vital link in the chain of canals which would make it possible for ships of moderate tonnage to go all the way from Quebec to Lake Erie. The building of a canal across the seigneurie would inevitably increase the traffic between Beauharnois and Montreal, create a market for farm produce, and improve the economy of this part of the countryside south of the St. Lawrence, which had suffered because it did not lie on the route to Upper Canada, nor on the principal road to Lake Champlain and the more travelled parts of the United States.

Opposing the Beauharnois route was an active group, settled on the road to Upper Canada which ran north of the great river, who were agitating for building the canal across the seigneuries of Soulanges and Vaudreuil. The northern route was longer but short canals had already been built near the river in some of the low-lying sections and the residents of the two seigneuries were naturally reluctant to see the trade route moved to a part of the country which many of them had never even visited.

Early in 1841 J. Abel Smith, Wakefield's staunchest supporter on the board of directors, wrote to Russell Ellice that "political management" was needed in Canada; that Wakefield was going out there on his own affairs and would attend to theirs as well provided they made it possible for one of the directors to go with him.¹⁶ In May Wakefield and John Auldjo, another of his supporters on the Board, arrived in

¹⁵The working of the plan in New Zealand is described in Michael Turnbull, *The New Zealand Bubble* (Wellington, 1959). On South Australia see Douglas Pike, *Paradise of Dissent* (Melbourne, 1957).

¹⁶Ellice Papers, II, 6, J. Abel Smith to Russell Ellice (undated).

Canada and in July they had an interview with the Governor General, Lord Sydenham. Sydenham had previously written to Lord John Russell in very unfavourable terms about Wakefield and his company but in the despatch written after this interview he changed his tone completely and recommended that the company be given full support of the government on both sides of the Atlantic. On this despatch, preserved in the Colonial Office, there is a note by Vernon Smith, the undersecretary, "Wakefield has won." In the course of the summer Wakefield returned to England and reported on his mission as a complete success. Mr. Bloomfield chalks this up as the first of Wakefield's triumphs in dealing with the Canadian political situation, an example of his unique ability to present his case in such convincing terms that not even his opponents could resist the logic of his arguments and his personal charm.¹⁷

A different light is thrown on this episode by a letter from Sir George Simpson to Edward Ellice written on May 3, 1841, before Wakefield had arrived in Montreal. Simpson had just been with Lord Sydenham for two long interviews and after they had arrived at an amicable agreement on the affairs of the Hudson's Bay Company the Governor General himself brought up the subject of the new Association, having heard by this time of the reorganization of the board of directors and the acceptance by Simpson of a directorship. He told Simpson that he had written to Lord John Russell in January criticizing the company and its prospectus on the subject of land sales in London to would-be colonists, a plan "which might have done very well for Australia or New Zealand but had been ridiculed by everybody in Canada." Since writing this letter, said Simpson, Sydenham had reconsidered the matter and was inclined to do what he could to "forward the views of the Association by every means in his power." Simpson attributed this change of front to Sydenham's wish to show his regard for Ellice after a period in which there had been an estrangement between them, and also to show favour to any British companies willing to invest their capital in Canada.

The second explanation is more convincing than the first. It was Ellice's reorganization of the company rather than Ellice's personal charms which had carried conviction. "His Lordship has no great opinion of the North American Land Company [chartered in 1834] or of the Canada Land Company [chartered in 1825]; the former he said was in a bankrupt state, the latter had full occupation for their means." On the other hand, the new company "from the parties who

¹⁷Bloomfield, *Wakefield*, pp. 243-8, gives a full account of the reaction in Downing Street to Wakefield's success. Wakefield's memorandum for Sydenham was printed in *C.H.R.*, XIII (1932), 37-44, with an introduction by A. R. M. Lower.

are connected with it could do much in the way of raising loans for public works in this country, which would not only be highly important to the interests of the Province, but to those of the Association." Simpson gathered, after going into matters thoroughly, "that measures will be concerted immediately for carrying either a ship canal or a railroad through Beauharnois, for establishing the company in a land agency business under the sanction and protection of the government, and for the formation of a banking establishment which would likewise have the support of the government."¹⁸

These measures, except for the building of the railroad, represent exactly the support which the Association did receive from Lord Sydenham, and later from Sir Charles Bagot, and in view of the date of Simpson's letter and the very explicit promises he received from the Governor General it is safe to say that Sydenham's support for the Association was due far more to the influence of Simpson and the shrewd reorganization of the board of directors by Ellice than to Wakefield's visit to Canada. Sydenham was by training and tradition a businessman; he liked dealing with men whose reputation in the City of London was above reproach. As to Wakefield, he begged Simpson to keep him out of Canada and suggested that the one of the directors he knew the best, Andrew Colvile, should come to Canada, stay with him for a week, and settle the affairs of the company on a sound basis. When Wakefield and Auldjo did arrive, however, he received them courteously and sent in the favourable report to the Colonial Office already referred to. Sydenham's miscalculation was in supposing that Ellice, Colvile, or anyone else among the directors really wanted to invest funds in Canada. Having raised as much money as they could in London in order to begin their payments to Ellice and make other necessary arrangements in England the directors counted on getting the money needed in Canada for immediate operations from the Montreal banks which were able to put up the cash to permit the province to begin operations at once on public works because provincial credit for that purpose was still supported by the loan of £1,500,000 from the British government.

Sydenham's death and the change of government in England ended this chapter of the story. The route of the canal was still unsettled although Sydenham in his speech to the Assembly had supported the southern route on the ground that the assistance offered by the N.A.C.A.I. would reduce the estimated cost considerably. Strong opposition had nevertheless developed in the Assembly and the directors feared that Bagot might be less inclined to take a strong stand than Sydenham had been. The two leaders of the group which

¹⁸Ellice Papers, II, Simpson to Ellice, May 3, 1841.

backed the northern route were George Moffatt, the head of the British party in Montreal who represented the interests of the seigneur of Vaudreuil, an Englishman named Harwood, and John Simpson, the M.P.P. for Two Mountains County north of the St. Lawrence. Simpson was the central figure of a group of four men all closely connected with each other and all determined at almost any cost to prevent the building of the canal across Beauharnois. The other three were Simpson's son who was customs collector at Coteau du Lac on the frontier of Upper Canada, and the two Roebuck brothers, one of them a river pilot and one an insurance man whose business was connected with the transport of goods through the rapids. The Roebucks' mother had married the elder Simpson, but an even more important connection with Canadian politics was through their brother, J. A. Roebuck, the radical M.P. in London, who had acted as agent for the Lower Canada assembly and had been the close friend and confidant of Papineau.¹⁹ It was the close affiliation of these four men with certain of the French-Canadian leaders that gave them their real importance. In general the French Canadians, all of whom were opposed to the union of the provinces, probably cared little whether the canal was built or not, but they had not actively opposed it in the Assembly. The danger was that the strong and united French bloc might be persuaded to oppose the Beauharnois route and might influence some of their liberal friends among the Upper Canadians. The dislike of French Canadians for all land companies could be taken for granted; to this was added a personal grudge of many of them against Edward Ellice.

It was almost certainly because Wakefield believed that the French-Canadian vote in the Assembly might prove decisive in blocking favourable action by that body that he adopted a new editorial policy in his *Colonial Gazette* in London, a policy which provided one of the main themes for the "Letters from Canada." These letters began in January, 1842, and ended in September as soon as Wakefield had written enough to be able to boast that he had helped to bring about the change of ministry. But even in the long obituary on Sydenham in October, 1841, this future policy was foreshadowed. Sydenham was praised for his constructive policies, with the reservation that he had done nothing to restore the French Canadians to the position in politics which was rightfully theirs by force of numbers. In the "Letters from Canada" Wakefield stressed in particular the fact that French Canadians around Montreal were excluded from even the minor offices and that French-speaking residents of the poorer classes were unable to make themselves understood in government offices. These articles

¹⁹Most of this information about the Roebuck and Simpson families is given in Bagot's private letter to Stanley of July 19. Bagot Papers, VII.

reached their climax in July, 1842, when in Letter VII he announced that the French had been reduced to a state of "Helotage" and implied that they had really been deprived of their rights as British subjects.

It would be very hard to account for Wakefield's complete change on the question of the policy which should be pursued by the British government and the Queen's representative in Canada toward the French Canadians on any other ground than his determination to win over the French members of the Assembly, as well as the *habitant* voters in Beauharnois County, to a more friendly feeling for his company and its policies, and, above all, to the building of the Beauharnois Canal. The letters he had written to Sir William Molesworth in 1838 confirm the rumours current at the time that Wakefield was even more anti-French than Lord Durham himself in contrast to Charles Buller who wanted a policy of clemency and tolerance. From Canada in 1838 he wrote to Molesworth: "Buller has been true to his principles. He has ever been the advocate of mercy and justice and against policy. Not so I; who have had deeply impressed upon me the opinion first suggested by you—that the Canadians are a miserable race and that this country must be made English by one means or another." From Plymouth after his return he wrote again on the subject to express his astonishment that Molesworth had from the beginning "had so true a view of the case." "Thank God [was his conclusion] that you have not gone over into Roebuckism."²⁰

But now Wakefield had out-Roebucked Roebuck and was ready to give the French Canadians everything they wanted—full amnesty for rebel leaders, use of their own language—everything except the end of the Union. On that great principle of Whig policy, founded on the Durham Report, he did stand firm and pointed out with great sagacity and political foresight that if the French-Canadian leaders would anchor their cause to that of the liberal reformers in Upper Canada they would be better off than they had ever been in the past.²¹ These letters, containing also a glowing prophecy of the economic growth of the United Province, and the importance of Montreal as a centre of Canadian and American trade with Europe, are excellent examples of Wakefieldian imperial propaganda but for the most part they are not really consistent with the main premises of the Durham Report. Although they pay lip service to "responsible government" no time is spent in explaining how it could be made to work better; both Buller and Wakefield could write as though the appointment of leaders in the Assembly to office did in itself constitute responsible government

²⁰Millicent Fawcett, *Life of the Right Honorable Sir William Molesworth* (London, 1901), p. 201.

²¹*Colonial Gazette*, No. 175 (March 30, 1842), Letter II, dated Feb. 22.

under Sydenham and Metcalf. The stress in the "Letters from Canada" is entirely on the injustice to the French Canadians as a race which resulted from Sydenham's deliberate policy.

Meantime the directors were concerned with the problem of having a representative in Canada who would be able to put their case to Sir Charles Bagot and put pressure on the executive branches of the government to act quickly. In October, 1841, J. Abel Smith opened a correspondence with the Ellice family which had as its purpose the sending of Wakefield once again to Montreal and Kingston to act as the Association's representative. To Russell Ellice he wrote:

Now touching Canada—we must again make a move. We shall be on good terms with Sir Charles Bagot but more regularity of form will be required in dealing with him than with others. . . . We must put the Management on a different footing. Lyman [the new manager of the Beauharnois property, chosen apparently by Ellice] may be a good banker, but all my accounts concur in representing him to be wholly unfit to manage a delicate and difficult negotiation which ours will and must be in the present state of parties in Canada & quite incompetent generally to superintend our affairs. We must face this at once & I shall be glad to know when you are in town that we may try in earnest to put the thing in train before the meeting of the Provincial Parliament in December when we must fight for the great object of the Canal on the South Bank."²²

Three weeks later Smith wrote directly to Edward Ellice and informed him that it was essential to send Wakefield back to Canada, and that, in order that good relations might be restored between Ellice and Wakefield, the directors were willing to advance the remainder of Wakefield's commission if Ellice would write the amount off the debt which the company still owed him. "The Association is quite ready to do this and Wakefield *will not go* unless something is finally settled on this point."²³ All that was needed was that Ellice should inform the Board how much money had already been paid to Wakefield and give his consent. Ellice was certainly not enthusiastic about the arrangement, as he was later to explain at length, but he did give his consent. He never at any time considered the building of the canal a solution for all the Association's problems; nor had he any faith in Wakefield as an emissary likely to make friends and influence people. Nevertheless Wakefield did receive his £6,500 and departed for Canada arriving in Montreal early in January 1842.

There is more mystery surrounding Wakefield's second visit to Canada on behalf of the N.A.C.A.I. than there is about his first brief visit in the summer of 1841. Bagot arrived in Kingston a few days

²²Ellice Papers, II, 6, J. Abel Smith to Russell Ellice, Oct. 5, 1841. The "regularity of form" referred to difficulties in clearing the title to the lands which had involved delays. The Assembly did not meet until September, 1842, and it is not clear why Smith expected it to meet in December, 1841.

²³*Ibid.*, Smith to Ellice, Oct. 30, 1841. Italics are mine.

after Wakefield reached Beauharnois but in the course of the whole year Wakefield would appear to have seen him only two or three times. On the first occasion he refused an invitation to dine at the Chateau de Ramezay thus missing what was perhaps his only opportunity to carry on a more intimate conversation with the new Governor General.²⁴ There seems to be no evidence at all that he put any direct pressure on Bagot or his more intimate advisers in connection with the choice of the canal site or any of the other business he was transacting for the company. Wakefield's technique in Canada was much the same as his technique in England; he cultivated the company of men who might be expected to have more influence than he himself could hope for in the highest quarters and attempted to conceal some of his ultimate objectives behind other activities the purpose of which was not immediately apparent. Thus he certainly cultivated as much as he dared the company of two men whom he had known well when he was in Canada with Lord Durham: Dominick Daly,²⁵ the Provincial Secretary, an Irishman, educated in Montreal, who did not bear a very high reputation among his British colleagues in the council, but who did know many French Canadians well and had always gotten on with them, and T. W. S. Murdock,²⁶ the Civil Secretary, who had been an intimate adviser of Sydenham and was the man on whom Bagot depended to gather information about his Canadian visitors whether French or English. Murdock became in the course of time quite as much convinced as Bagot that there was no way out of the political impasse in the United Province except to persuade the leading French Canadians to serve in the council, and since his views on this matter must have changed after Sydenham's death it is possible that Wakefield's influence had been at work.

The only written evidence we have, however, of Wakefield's activities at court during his first six months in Canada has nothing at all to do with his converting anyone in the government to his ideas on politics nor yet on the site for the canal. In June, while Bagot was in residence in Montreal, Wakefield called at the Chateau de Ramezay accompanied by J. W. Dunscombe, the member of the Assembly from Beauharnois County, who was Wakefield's alter ego and tool during the whole of his stay in Canada at this time. A long memorandum

²⁴Bagot Papers, IV, Bagot to Stanley, June 12, 1842.

²⁵Daly had received his appointment by a piece of political jobbery in England, not in Canada, and it was violently opposed by the Governor, Lord Dalhousie. (H. T. Manning, *Revolt of French Canada* (Toronto, 1962), p. 267.)

²⁶T. W. S. Murdock was the member of the Colonial Office staff who accompanied Lord Durham to Canada in 1838. When Charles Buller returned to England Murdock succeeded him as civil secretary, the one officer in the province on whom the Governor could rely for complete co-operation and plenty of hard work.

from Murdock to Bagot explains that the purpose of the visit was to see the Governor General in order to persuade him to appoint J. J. Girouard as one of three members of a royal commission who were to consider what changes should be made in the system of tenures in the lower province. Dunscombe was a banker in Montreal and theoretically a member of the English party. He assured Murdock that the businessmen of Montreal, including George Moffatt and Charles Grant, the seigneur of Longueuil, all favoured Girouard.²⁷

Dunscombe's statement that Moffatt and Grant favoured the appointment of Girouard as the French member of the commission is surprising in view of Girouard's close connection with the rebellion of 1837, but it is not necessarily false. J. J. Girouard had been one of Papineau's most faithful lieutenants in the Assembly between 1834 and 1837, and was considered one of the most important leaders of the *patriote* forces in the County of Two Mountains where he lived. The last fighting of the rebellion took place in his own village, St. Benoit, and Girouard had been accused by some Montreal papers of having exhorted the populace to universal slaughter and reckless violence. More sober witnesses, however, named Amury Girod, who had come on horseback from the Richelieu Valley, as the guilty party, and represented Girouard as urging immediate surrender when the defeat of the *patriote* forces in the south became known. Unfortunately for himself, perhaps, Girouard was persuaded to flee to the woods, and was one of a dozen rebels for whose capture a reward of £500 was offered. When he gave himself up he spent six months in gaol in Montreal and was only released after the disallowance of Lord Durham's ordinance dealing with political prisoners. Since that time he had lived in seclusion and shunned politics. The reasons urged for making Girouard a commissioner were that he was not only a leading lawyer but also an expert whose advice was often sought on matters of seigneurial tenure and that before the rebellion he had been universally respected by his English-speaking neighbours. It was probably taken for granted that his legal views, like those of Papineau, favoured the rights of the seigneurs and that he would hold that if seigneurial tenure were abolished the demand of the *habitants* that they be released from their dues without paying compensation should not be allowed to prevail.²⁸

Wakefield's reasons for supporting Girouard for a place on the commission were certainly more complicated than those of Moffatt and

²⁷Bagot Papers, II, 370-3, memo dated June 16.

²⁸The best account of Girouard is in L. O. David, *Les Patriotes de 1837-38* (Montreal, 1888), pp. 79-93, 65-71. See also Christie, *History of Lower Canada*, IV, 491n., and V, 9-10 and note. Christie confirms David's statement that Girouard was greatly respected by the English in the Montreal community.

Grant, if indeed those gentlemen did support him, but he probably shared their fear that the commissioners might lower the rate of compensation which the *habitants* would be required to pay to the seigneurs if the system were abolished. Beauharnois was one of the few seigneuries where the conversion to freehold, as far as the seigneur's relationship to the Crown was concerned, had been completed. When Ellice sold the property he was no longer paying feudal dues to the Receiver General or administering such land as did belong to him in accordance with the edicts of the French kings. On the other hand, the earlier grantees (the *censitaires*) whether French or English had not released themselves from their obligations to the seigneur for the very good reason that it would have cost them twenty shillings an acre to do so. They still paid *cens et rentes* annually and, although those payments were inconsiderable, the *lods et ventes*, paid when the land changed hands, were high. Wakefield in his pamphlet had estimated the income from such payments at £4000 and the total intake of the company if all the tenants decided to release themselves from their semi-feudal obligations at £140,000. Although this estimate, made for the purposes of convincing the world of the value of the company's assets, is probably a gross exaggeration, it was nevertheless true that any action taken by the government in favour of the *habitants*, who during the rebellion had demanded the end of all seigneurial dues, would have been a heavy financial loss to the N.A.C.A.I.²⁹

But if this account of his financial motives for wanting a conservative lawyer like Girouard on the commission is correct, it is also clear that Wakefield had other and perhaps more important reasons for urging the choice of Girouard as commissioner. Girouard was venerated by all *patriotes* as one of the leaders of the rebellion who had not compromised his principles in any way. If Wakefield could win his friendship he would gain admission to French-Canadian circles which would otherwise be closed to him. Wakefield never sought the company of Lafontaine or Morin, as far as is known, and would not have made much headway if he had. Girouard, who was not in politics, was more easily approached and was presumably flattered by Wakefield's attentions. It is significant that it was to Girouard that Wakefield wrote the letter on Canadian affairs which he later published over his own signature, boasting of his own disinterestedness in doing what he had done for Girouard's compatriots. This letter was written in 1842 and

²⁹*Colonization of Beauharnois*, pp. 24-5. Wakefield's own views on the seigneurial system seem to have been as flexible as his views about the French Canadians. He did not appear as a witness before the commissioners (of whom Girouard was *not* one) but he did write a letter praising the seigneurial system as a method of settlement.

was probably circulated during his election campaign in November.³⁰ One other motive suggests itself for making what connections he could with Girouard, who was an important figure in the part of the province where opposition to the southern route for the canal was strongest. It may have been a move to carry the campaign for the Beauharnois route into the enemy country, for Girouard had been a close friend before the rebellion of the elder Simpson and had chosen him as the person to whom he surrendered in 1838. While Wakefield could scarcely have thought it possible to win over the Simpson family to his side he may have hoped to lay the foundation for a reconciliation in the future with important elements in Two Mountains County.

More time has been spent on Wakefield's relationship to Girouard than may seem justified, but it illustrates his oblique approach to the Canadian political situation. This single and very formal call at the Chateau de Ramezay was apparently the only attempt he made to see the Governor General after his attendance at a *levée* in May.³¹ When Bagot returned to Kingston in August Wakefield must have followed within a few weeks but Bagot assured Stanley in his private letter of September 26 that he had not seen him and that the rumours being spread that Wakefield had played any part in his negotiations with the French Canadians were false. Some other explanation must be found for the fact to which Mrs. MacDonnell calls attention that beginning with the "Letter from Canada," dated May 28 (Letter V), Wakefield did have inside information about Bagot's activities, and even his plans, and was able to prophesy what would be his future policy. He foretold the appointment of Hincks as Inspector General, and Sherwood, an extreme conservative from Toronto, as a member of the Executive Council, and deplored the policy of trying to have all parties represented in this central administrative body. It was as if Queen Victoria should summon Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, Charles Buller, and Joseph Hume and tell them to jumble themselves together in the same cabinet. In his next letter, however, he was able to applaud without qualification the appointment of Vallières de St. Réal as Chief Justice of Montreal, which he had prophesied in Letter V, and also Bagot's offer of the solicitor-generalship to C. S. Cherrier,

³⁰The letter formed the appendix to Wakefield's little book published in England in 1844, *View of Sir Charles Metcalf's Government of Canada*. It had almost certainly been printed earlier in Canada in one form or another.

³¹Bagot's biographer knew of the rumours and also of Mrs. MacDonnell's article but could find no evidence of any important link between the two men. (G. P. Glazebrook, *Sir Charles Bagot in Canada* (Oxford, 1929), p. 124n. The Bagot Papers present a very full record of Bagot's activities and the present writer's conclusion would be the same as Glazebrook's. For Wakefield's attendance at *levée* see Bagot Papers, IV, Bagot to Stanley, June 12, 1842.

who had unfortunately refused to serve. In this letter (Letter VI) he ended with a paean of praise for his own gift of prophecy: "Mark my words: have I not almost a right to give myself the airs of a prophet in speaking of Canadian affairs?" At least one editor in Montreal agreed with him and when the letters were published in Canada remarked in an editorial: "Some weeks before such rumours were current this ubiquitous writer was able to prognosticate with all confidence the above-mentioned appointments."³²

In point of fact these early leaks of information very much disturbed Bagot himself even while they were taking place. Although Wakefield saved his most brilliant critique of Bagot's early strategy for his "Letters from Canada" he seems to have supplied briefer items to a few local papers, notably at the time that Bagot was trying unsuccessfully to persuade Cherrier to join his Executive Council. On June 4 Bagot wrote to Dominick Daly to call his attention to paragraphs which had appeared in the *Montreal Times* and the *Montreal Courier*: "There is somewhere or other a faux frere dans le camp of whose indiscretions or treachery I have not now to complain for the first time." Bagot added that it would be impossible to carry on successfully the business of government unless such leaks could be stopped. Daly was asked to conduct an investigation as to how it came about that matters of great delicacy could be "divulged with such remarkable accuracy." At that time Bagot did not see the hand of Wakefield behind this systematic spying, and even later when the two letters about his appointments had appeared in the *Colonial Gazette* he seems scarcely to have taken in what the obvious implication was. After all Wakefield was really the only man in Montreal who had money to spend on hiring agents to do his dirty work.³³

The next very curious episode was in August when Wakefield wrote a letter to Lord Elliot, whom he had known slightly in England, and entrusted it to T. W. S. Murdock who was leaving Canada. Murdock agreed to put it in the post in Liverpool in order, as Wakefield expressed it, that it should escape the eye of "our rascally Post Office."³⁴

³²Quoted by Mrs. MacDonnell, p. 291. Mrs. MacDonnell offers this as proof that Wakefield was in close touch with Bagot in May, but does not explain why Bagot should have been willing to have the information published prematurely. Letters V and VI were printed in *Colonial Gazette*, Nos. 186 and 188, appearing in London June 15 and June 29.

³³Bagot Papers, IV, Bagot to Daly, June 4, 1842.

³⁴For Wakefield's letter to Elliot, see Public Record Office (P.R.O.), C.O. 537/140. This volume contains Bagot's confidential letters to Stanley and the only reason for the inclusion of Wakefield's letter was that Elliot sent it to Stanley who studied it and forwarded it to Bagot, who also studied it and then returned it to Stanley. Whether Wakefield knew that Elliot would turn the letter over to Stanley is not clear but presumably he would not have objected. One odd feature of the whole business is that this cannot have been the original version since a large part of it consists in printed

The purpose of this letter was ostensibly to convey to Elliot some intelligence of Sir Charles Bagot's position in the hope that Elliot would be able to do something to help him at the Colonial Office. Wakefield implied that all Bagot's most serious difficulties were due to interference from England and Stanley's lack of confidence in him. Wakefield's open attack on Stanley had begun in Letter VI when he stated that the Colonial Secretary's "arrogance and self confidence" made him exactly the sort of character upon whom "Mr. Mothercountry would know how to play for the purpose of meddling in everything here." Of Bagot himself Wakefield invariably spoke in terms of highest praise stressing his goodness of heart and absence of guile.

The rest of the letter, except for a final word in praise of Murdock, was a facsimile of Letter VIII, which was to appear in the *Gazette* in London on August 31 and which is quoted extensively in Mrs. MacDonnell's article. It emphasized the key position of the French group and pointed out that their solidarity gave them the bargaining power in dealing with other groups which, if they retained it, would soon restore them to the political influence which was rightly theirs as representing the majority of the population. Wakefield urged the advantages from the point of view of the British government of an alliance between this group and the liberals under Robert Baldwin in Upper Canada and pointed out that if they allied with the conservatives (the old Family Compact) who were also wooing them they would probably succeed in getting a vote in the assembly calling for the repeal of the Union. In one matter Wakefield was always true to the Durham Report. The Union must stand whether the French Canadians liked it or not.

The remarkable feature of the letter is not the accurate description of the state of the Assembly but the implication that Bagot knew how critical the situation was and wished to act quickly in order to win the support of the French as a group, since he had failed in his attempts to win their support as individuals. If he were not permitted to do so he would have to return to the form of government existing before the rebellion when the Governor ruled in defiance of votes of the Assembly. Nothing appearing in the Canadian press at this time had dealt with this approaching crisis, and Bagot's enemies, when the letter was published, were convinced that Wakefield had been consulted by Bagot and was influencing his decisions. What was unknown to them, and later to Mrs. MacDonnell, was that Bagot, on July 28, had sent a most private letter to Stanley from Quebec describing the situation,

columns of the *Colonial Gazette* which did not appear until August 31. Lord Elliot had presided over the Select Committee on New Zealand which reported in 1840 and for whom Wakefield was the star witness.

not as clearly and trenchantly as Wakefield did, but just as definitely, and had asked permission to try to come to terms with Lafontaine before the Assembly met.³⁵ There can be no question that Bagot's letter was inspired by several letters from the leading members of his Executive Council, W. H. Draper, S. B. Harrison, and R. B. Sullivan. The most important of these was one from Draper written on July 16, following a conference between the two men in Quebec. Draper was explicit and emphatic in explaining that unless the ministers could get the support of French votes most of them would resign as soon as they were defeated on an important measure. The Governor General would then be in a much weaker position to negotiate with Lafontaine and his party than if he made them an offer at once which they were willing to accept. He admitted that the French members would certainly think it necessary to consult Robert Baldwin but thought that Baldwin might advise them to take office without him. Draper said he could not remain in the council if Baldwin were appointed to it, but preferred to resign rather than carry on in the teeth of solid French opposition.³⁶ Bagot tried to convey almost in Draper's words how desperate the situation was and explained that Draper and Harrison were both in favour of his taking steps immediately. But he would have done better to send Draper's letter for Stanley to read.

Bagot's July 28 letter created consternation in England. The ministers were all away from London but it was forwarded to Stanley in Cumberland. Stanley felt he could not reply without consulting Sir Robert Peel who was at Drayton, but he returned to London and sent his reply along with Peel's letter on September 4. The gist of their advice was that Bagot should attempt to carry on with the council he then had even though he lost a few measures at first. Stanley made a number of calculations to show that the French party controlled less than a third of the votes and that even if they combined with the radicals they would not have a majority. Peel pointed to the crises in English politics where the government had carried on without a majority in the House of Commons and had in mind, no doubt, his own conduct of affairs in 1835. Both ministers were emphatic that Bagot must not allow appointments to be forced on him by any party and must not dismiss "faithful servants of the Crown" at the behest of Lafontaine and Viger who they assumed had probably been guilty of treason. But they had certainly not taken in that most of the "faithful servants of the Crown" were threatening to resign and that Bagot had no one to turn to who could command more than a handful of votes

³⁵Bagot Papers, V, Bagot to Stanley, July 28.

³⁶For letters of Draper and Harrison see Bagot, II, Draper to Bagot, July 16, and Harrison to Bagot, July 11 (from Kingston). For the whole story of Draper's determined pressure on Bagot see Metcalf, "Draper Conservatism and Responsible Government in the Canadas," pp. 305-7.

except Lafontaine. The only evidence they gave of their recognition of the difficulties of Bagot's position was in the admission that Bagot could not appeal to the country as Pitt had done in 1784. The letters of Stanley and Peel did not arrive in Kingston until after the political crisis was over and the Baldwin-Lafontaine government had been installed. Their only effect was to render Bagot acutely unhappy and to prove that Wakefield was well informed in saying that the Tory ministers would not support Bagot in what he (Wakefield) regarded as the only enlightened policy.³⁷

For the historian the real question is not whether Wakefield influenced Bagot in reaching the decision to come to terms with Lafontaine, for in truth the decision was made not by Bagot but by his ministers. The real question is whether Wakefield's system of espionage was efficient enough to enable him to have knowledge of Bagot's private letter of July 28 and perhaps even to read a copy of it. The dates suggest that such a leak may have occurred. Bagot returned to Montreal very soon after the private letter was despatched, and the "spy," if he were a member of Bagot's clerical staff, might have gotten the word to Wakefield before he wrote his long letter to Lord Elliot on August 6. As to who the spy was there is no evidence at all since for various reasons men like Murdock and Daly may be ruled out.³⁸ The most likely explanation is that a clerk or copyist of inferior rank was definitely and over a considerable period of time in Wakefield's pay. He was probably only one of several tools of that wily gentleman who supplied information on Bagot's visitors and private correspondence.

Wakefield's final display of journalistic pyrotechnics came in the autumn, after the political crisis had ended and the assembly was despatching business with record speed and efficiency. On September 24 the *Kingston Chronicle and Gazette* reprinted on its front page three of the "Letters from Canada" in which Wakefield's gifts as a political expert and prophet had been most conspicuously displayed. On the second page the leading editorial called attention in particular to Letter VIII and inquired rhetorically where one could find a better prophet of things to come than in the writer of that letter. Then, as a fourth exhibit, and in order to bring things up to date, there appeared, also on the front page, a communication from an "English Traveller" under the heading "Crisis in Canadian Affairs."³⁹ It was this last item which Bagot studied most carefully and which, even more than the

³⁷For Stanley's letters to Bagot and Peel, and Peel's reply to Stanley see Bagot, XII.

³⁸Daly was in England when Bagot wrote his letter of July 28; Murdock was in England when the next incident occurred in September. While Daly was indiscreet and may have been venal, Murdock was highly praised for his integrity and loyalty by all the governors he served.

³⁹*Kingston Chronicle and Gazette*, Sept. 24. For Bagot's comments see P.R.O., C.O. 537/140, Bagot to Stanley, Sept. 26, 1842.

accounts of his earlier interviews with the politicians, greatly troubled him. He wrote to Stanley that this exposé of recent events "had a most curiously correct report of the history and course of all my late negotiations, of the state of parties, and questions which led to them." It is indeed a very remarkable letter with a full account of Bagot's offer to Lafontaine made only an hour before the opening of the provincial parliament. Whether or not these details might have been woven together from a close study of the proceedings in the Assembly, a summary of which is also given, no one in Canada but Wakefield could have composed the letter. It seems almost incredible that Bagot should have informed Stanley that "it was by another hand."

In point of fact Bagot's whole reaction to Wakefield's activities is rather surprising. He sent copies of the *Chronicle* to Stanley, calling attention especially to the fourth letter. He bemoaned his fate because he found that his enemies in both provinces were accusing him of using Wakefield in dealing with the French leaders and being guided by his advice in the acts which they most deplored. He refused to see Wakefield or hold any communication with him and begged Stanley to find something for him to do in Australia. Yet the unfortunate Governor General seems never to have taken in how much the unwelcome rumours which were current everywhere emanated from Wakefield himself and never suggested that the publication in the Canadian and English press of matters which were supposedly known only to the principals involved were due to Wakefield and his agents. Apparently Bagot never read the "Letters from Canada" except for Letter VIII which Stanley had sent him and which he described as a very able exposition of the situation in the Assembly, although because of the praise for Baldwin he added that one could see "the radical peeping through." Wakefield was right in his comment that Bagot was "without guile." It should further be remembered that he was already a very sick man suffering not only from disease but from exhaustion and nervous tension as a result of his full knowledge that his conduct was not approved by his superiors in England.

There is in fact only one explanation of Bagot's failure to appreciate the full range of Wakefield's activities which is not a reflection on the Governor's general intelligence and alertness of mind. He could find no motive for Wakefield's efforts to stir up trouble between him and Stanley, nor yet for Wakefield's persistence in publishing inside information which could not benefit either himself or his company. Bagot knew of his activities early in the spring in meeting with the Board of Works and pushing for an immediate decision in favour of the southern route for the canal, but that question had been settled in June and the work had begun in July. There seemed to him no

reason for Wakefield to continue to stir up trouble since he had already profited from the Governor's backing and might need his help again. What he was temperamentally unable to grasp was that E. G. Wakefield was frequently activated by that "motiveless malignity" which a great Shakespearean critic ascribed to Iago. He was always looking for weapons to harass and belabour the Colonial Office and, having relented for the moment in the case of Lord John Russell and Lord Sydenham on whom he had made a vicious attack at the time of his appointment, he was the more ready to stir up trouble between Lord Stanley and his Canadian viceroy. It could certainly do him no harm, since Stanley was known to be against the French Canadians, whose favour Wakefield was still actively seeking, and it served his purpose very well to boast that he had helped to bring in the Lafontaine-Baldwin government. Moreover the "Letters from Canada" must have added considerably to his reputation as a colonial expert in England.

It should be added that the change of government, whether or not he helped to bring it about, was of real service to Wakefield in completing the task for which he had been sent to Canada. The Assembly was too busy getting itself organized and the new ministers were too much beholden to Bagot for giving them everything they had asked for to carry on any searching investigation as to why the Governor General had chosen the southern route and begun work on it on July 19. A special committee was appointed with Moffatt as chairman and some effort was made to show that Wakefield put undue pressure of one kind or another on Kilally, the chairman of the Board of Works, and on J. H. Dunn, the Receiver General of the United Province, who had approved the loan from Dunscombe's bank on the basis of which the work had been begun. It developed that Dominick Daly had strongly advised Bagot to give orders that work begin early in the summer in order to provide employment for the needy emigrants who were already arriving. But the committee's report was completely inconclusive, merely stating that expert opinion as to which was the better route was divided. The assembly voted its approval of the estimates and the loan early in October.⁴⁰

Wakefield's next move was to get himself elected to Dunscombe's seat in the Assembly, having persuaded Dunscombe to resign in his favour.⁴¹ The only reason that suggests itself for this move, as far as the interests of the N.A.C.A.I. were concerned, was that Dunscombe

⁴⁰*Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada*, Vol. II, Appendix Z for the Report. There is a good account of the investigation in Mrs. MacDonnell's article (pp. 286-7). She refers to rumours of bribery and corruption widespread in Montreal.

⁴¹Bagot Papers, V, Bagot to Stanley, Oct. 12, 1842. Bagot wrote that Wakefield had attempted, by various indirect channels, to have Dunscombe made a member of the Legislative Council, but he, Bagot, had refused.

had been under attack for the methods used in getting himself elected for Beauharnois in 1841 and might be unseated on the recommendation of the committee investigating elections under the Sydenham régime. But Wakefield's principal motive may well have been to attract attention to his own talents in parliamentary politics, something he could never hope to do in England. He was triumphantly elected, carrying all the larger French-Canadian parishes and using to the utmost his claim that he had helped to bring in the Lafontaine-Baldwin government. In the Assembly he was to play a conspicuous part in the next political crisis, supporting Metcalf against the ministers and devising some rather curious formulae about responsible government which Lord Durham would scarcely have approved. The story of this part of his Canadian career cannot be told here. He does not seem to have taken an active part in business connected with the building of the canal although there were labour troubles and riots which led to an Assembly investigation. In fact he transacted only one piece of business for the company, the introduction of a bill to give them privileges as a bank which would issue loans based on the security of land. His career in the Assembly, which lasted through two sessions, seems to have had no very vital connection with his earlier activities and in 1844 he left for England never to return.

All that is needed to round out the story of Wakefield's service to the North American Colonization Association of Ireland is to quote once more from the correspondence of Edward Ellice and John Dewar, secretary of the board of directors, in the spring of 1844 when Wakefield had returned to England. Ellice's letter is dated May 24.

Sir, I think it right after having heard the Report at a formal meeting of the Association yesterday, to prevent all misrepresentation on the subject either now, or hereafter, to restate for the information of the Governor and Board of Directors the opinion I have expressed to some of those gentlemen, of the great disproportion between the remuneration as it actually appears given by them to Mr. Wakefield & any results which have yet been realized, or are, as far as my experience enables me to form a judgement, prospectively secured to the shareholders of the association, by his agency in the affairs.

I was not aware of the amount proposed to be paid to him until I heard it stated in the Report. Whatever may be the issue of this speculation . . . it appears that Mr. Wakefield will have received . . . exactly the sum of £ 20,000—within £ 5000 or £ 6000 as much as has been received of principal by me, and two thirds of the whole cash paid up by the proprietors . . . before they have realized *at their Bankers* the least benefit from his agency.

The rest of Ellice's letter, which is long, harks back to the arrangements of 1841 when he had consented with the greatest reluctance to have Wakefield's commission deducted from the total amount of the

debt still owing to him by the company. He stated flatly that he had no such hopes of immediate gains for the Association from the building of the canal as some of the directors had expressed, and that he would not, in any case, admit that the choice of the site was really due to Wakefield's intervention but rather to the obvious natural advantages of Beauharnois over the northern route.⁴²

As will be seen from the passage quoted above Ellice was more deeply impressed by the wrong done to himself as the creditor of the company and also the holder of approximately a fifth of all the shares, than he was in trying to evaluate Wakefield's services over three years in comparison with other salaries or commissions paid to Britons serving the state or the great commercial companies in British North America. It is worth noting, however, that except for the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Governor General of the Province no one in British North America seems to have received as much in hard cash as did Wakefield between 1841 and 1844. £20,000 was only a little less than the salary over three years received by unfortunate Governors General of Canada who worked themselves to death in the service of the empire.

Only one question may be raised in conclusion of this part of a curious and probably unique episode in Canadian history. How much of his enormous salary or commission did Wakefield dispense in the supposed interest of the North American Colonization Association of Ireland and how much stuck to his fingers or helped him to finance his next venture? Bribing members of the Governor General's staff of clerks or members of the Board of Works cannot have been cheap even with salaries as low as they were in government offices. The buying of newspapers or space in newspapers for broadcasting his own prophecies of coming events must have been costly. Election expenses, while certainly not as high as they were in England, may have amounted to a considerable sum.⁴³ The accounts of the N.A.C.A.I. could perhaps be checked by diligent scholars in the future but the personal accounts of Edward Gibbon Wakefield are never likely to see the light of day.

⁴²Ellice Papers, II, 6, Ellice to Dewar, May 24, 1844.

⁴³See *ibid.*, Dewar to Ellice, Nov. 3, 1854, for comment on some of the promises made and deals (chiefly in real estate) used in the election of Wakefield for the county of Beauharnois. The letter was apparently connected with Ellice's regaining ownership of property.

Quebec and the Fenians

HEREWARD SENIOR

EVOLVING OUT OF THE YOUNG IRELAND MOVEMENT which failed so dismally in 1848, Fenianism preserved in Ireland and among the overseas Irish much of the spirit of the romantic republicanism of '48. Although borrowed from continental Europe, this republicanism blended easily with the Irish revolutionary tradition and temperament. Yet as a tendency in Irish politics, the Fenians were far less effective than the earlier followers of O'Connell or the Home Rule party in the days of Parnell. Fenian leaders were too often violent, emotionally unstable, and incompetent conspirators who were careless about financial matters and appeared, at times, to be exploiting nationalist sentiments among poor and excitable Irish immigrants for the sake of ill-defined personal ambitions. Still, Fenianism was more than a movement for Irish independence. It provided for the social needs of the half-assimilated Irish in the new world by maintaining interest in Irish politics and by creating a kind of government-in-exile with a president, congress, and paramilitary organization with an abundance of senior officers. Here the overseas Irish might hope to play a more satisfying rôle than they could in the conventional politics of their new homelands.

Nowhere were conditions more favourable for Fenianism than in the United States where the nativism of the Know Nothing movement presented a barrier to assimilation, and the Anglophobia and republicanism of the Fenians provided both a link with Irish politics and a means of finding common ground with the rising spirit of Americanism. While no responsible American politician was prepared to risk war for Ireland, Fenian agents had been active in recruiting for the northern armies during the civil war, Anglophile sentiments were unpopular with the electorate, and the Irish vote was formidable. A few ambiguous words could usually be exacted by Fenian leaders from Americans prominent

in politics, words which committed them to nothing but could be interpreted and misinterpreted by Fenians as a promise of future support. There were, indeed, a few politicians, such as Congressmen Banks and Butler, who openly encouraged the Fenians to link the cause of Irish republicanism to manifest destiny.

As the end of the civil war brought thousands of Irish veterans and a number of non-Irish adventurers into the Fenian organization, it became imperative to find some means of employing this military talent. Although an attack on Ireland was considered, British North America was the only realistic objective for the kind of military force which the Fenians were capable of creating. By an American-based invasion of British territory, the Fenians hoped either to start a war between Britain and the United States, to acquire a base for further operations against Ireland, or, at the very least, to create difficulties for the British empire.

In appearance, the Fenian military organization was impressive because of its numbers and because it was made up largely of former soldiers.¹ Yet the tens of thousands who turned out for parades, meetings, and picnics in various parts of the United States could not easily be concentrated near the Canadian frontier or kept in the field for any length of time. Moreover, discipline was entirely dependent upon the enthusiasm of the volunteers, and as an invasion of British territory involved the violation of American neutrality, the Fenians had to face the possibility of a clash with American authorities the moment they reached the border area. When the time for action came in 1866, only a token force took the field,² and the substance of the invasion was a fiasco at Campobello on the Maine-New Brunswick frontier,³ while a more successful invasion of 800 Fenians at Fort Erie was forced to retreat across the border⁴ as was the intrusion of Fenian cavalry into Frelighsburg and St. Armand on the Quebec border near St. Alban's, Vermont.⁵ Yet if the Fenians were not formidable as potential conquerors, they were capable of mischief and could not be

¹William D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement in the United States: 1858-86* (Washington, 1947), p. 180; *Montreal Gazette*, 17 Aug. 1867.

²D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*, pp. 138, 141, 163-4; F. W. Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions of Canada of 1866 and 1870 and the Operations of the Montreal Militia Brigade in Connection Therewith* (Montreal, 1904); *Montreal, Le Pays*, 5 juin 1866.

³D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*, pp. 138, 141; *Le Pays*, 12 avril, 26 mai 1866.

⁴For various accounts see, John A. Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada, A History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870* (Toronto, 1910); George T. Denison, *Fenian Raid on Fort Erie with an Account of the Battle of Ridgeway* (Toronto, 1866); *Correspondence Relating to the Fenian Invasion, and the Rebellion of the Southern States* (Ottawa, 1869).

⁵Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions*, p. 24.

ignored. New military forces had to be raised to secure the frontiers,⁶ and detectives were hired to collect Fenian secrets.⁷

Politically, the Fenians' only possibility of success would lie in identifying themselves with some tendency in the Canadas. It was assumed by the Fenians that their invasion would be supported by the Irish Catholic population of the British provinces and perhaps by French Canadians whom the Irish republicans were inclined to count as allies. This mistaken reasoning ignored the contrast between the position of the Irish in Canada and in the United States. Although Irish Canadians tended to favour Irish independence and, like uprooted Irishmen everywhere, were attracted by the romance of an Irish government-in-exile, Fenianism never won more than a few hundred restless and relatively obscure men in the British provinces. The Irish in British America had no quarrel with the established government, and there was no counterpart of the Know Nothing party on British territory. Even the tension between the "Orange" and the "Green" had been softened by their co-operation in support of the Crown in 1837⁸ and by their many mutually advantageous electoral compromises. Moreover, while the Fenians in the United States might expect sympathy from the American authorities, Irish Canadians could not support Fenian activities without becoming involved in conspiracies against their own government. American Fenians had no interest in the British provinces apart from their place in the grand strategy of Irish nationalism; thus they had no programme with which to attract political tendencies within Canada save an appeal to Anglophobia and perhaps support of annexation to the United States.⁹

It is not surprising, then, that the Irish in the Canadas were, for the most part, indifferent to Fenianism, and that the hierarchy of the Catholic church, D'Arcy McGee, and other prominent Irishmen in Canada looked upon Fenianism, not as a serious threat to the British empire, but as a force that might compromise the Irish in the eyes of other Canadians. If Fenianism could not be dealt with as an internal problem of the Irish Canadian, it would become an affair for Orangemen and Grits who were already more than convinced that Roman Catholic Irishmen were politically irresponsible.

While the two main factions of the Fenian movement in the United

⁶Sir John Michel to Cardwell, 10 Nov. 1865 (*Correspondence Relating to the Fenian Invasion*, p. 139); Monck to Cardwell, 9 March 1866 (*ibid.*); same to same, 12 March 1866 (*ibid.*, p. 140). See also *ibid.*, pp. 153-5.

⁷D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*, pp. 90, 94n.

⁸H. Senior, "The Character of Canadian Orangeism," in *Thoughts from the Learned Societies of Canada 1961* (Toronto, 1962), p. 180.

⁹For American Fenianism see, D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*; D. C. Lyne, "The Irish in the Province of Canada in the Decade Leading to Confederation," unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1960.

States were disputing over the desirability of invading British North American territory, their movement acquired a nucleus of Canadians. In Toronto where first-generation Irishmen made up a third of the population, the perennial hostility between the Orange and the Green provided the Fenians with an opportunity to take advantage of the anti-Orange sentiment prevailing among the Roman Catholic Irish. The ground had, in some respects, been prepared for them by the failure of the police to find the slayer of a Catholic killed in the riots of 1858.¹⁰ This led to the founding of the Hibernian Benevolent Society, ostensibly for the purpose of providing defence against the Orangemen,¹¹ and the society was taken over gradually by the Fenians. Although the Hibernian Society was relatively small, it might have secured a powerful hold on the Catholic Irish in Toronto if a donnybrook with the Orangemen could have been provoked. Such a riot, however, required some show of aggressiveness on the part of the Orangemen, but Orange leaders, like Ogle Gowan, were anxious to avoid violence. Moreover, the church hierarchy and most Catholic leaders preferred to oppose Orangeism by denouncing it as a secret society, while stressing their own legality and loyalty. Nothing could be more unfortunate, from their point of view, than violence provoked by the incautious Fenians where the responsibility could easily be assigned to Irish Catholics.

The obvious occasions for such riots were July 12, when the battle of the Boyne was celebrated, November 5, Guy Fawkes day, and St. Patrick's Day on March 17th, and if there were casualties, the spirit of revenge might neutralize the efforts of Orange and Catholic leaders, thus creating an atmosphere in which Fenianism could flourish. Trouble was avoided on Guy Fawkes Day in 1865 when the Orangemen were induced to hold their celebrations indoors,¹² but on St. Patrick's Day, 1866, the Fenian-controlled Hibernian Society insisted upon holding a parade which was clearly intended as a show of force. Much of its effect was lost when other Irish societies refused to participate, and the government kept the Orangemen away from the demonstration by calling out the Volunteers, which included most Orangemen, and keeping them in the armouries throughout the day. The Fenians, less than 600 in all, did nothing more than march about the city in a threatening manner and then disperse.¹³ Although this parade, which

¹⁰Lyne, "The Irish in Canada," p. 227.

¹¹*Gazette*, 17 Aug. 1867; D'Arcy McGee, *The Irish Position in British and in Republican North America—a Letter to the Irish Press Irrespective of Party* (Montreal, 1866), p. 13.

¹²Lyne, "The Irish in Canada," p. 235.

¹³C. P. Stacey, "A Fenian Interlude: The Story of Michael Murphy," *Canadian Historical Review*, XV (1934), 142–5.

marked the climax of Fenianism in Toronto, was a demonstration of weakness rather than of strength, the organization in the United States optimistically purchased uniforms for prospective Upper Canadian supporters. It is not surprising that there were far fewer Canadian Fenians prepared to claim these uniforms when the invasion was attempted a few months later than had marched in the Toronto demonstration.

After this ineffectual parade and the arrest of the Hibernian Society president, Michael Murphy, as he tried to join the invaders at Campobello in April, the centre of the Fenian movement shifted from Toronto to Montreal. There Fenian influence had been noticed by D'Arcy McGee as early as 1861. At that time, a meeting called to raise Irish volunteers for the Canadian militia was repeatedly disrupted by hecklers who were identified as O. J. Devlin, a brother of the well-known Montreal lawyer and city councillor, Bernard Devlin, and several men of the Prince of Wales's Regiment.¹⁴ McGee claimed the affair had its origin among the Fenian Brotherhood in Rutland, Vermont, and that a Fenian named Keogh along with twelve or thirteen others had been sent to Montreal to "break up the meeting" as indeed Keogh boasted of having done in a letter to the *Irish American* in New York.¹⁵

In a letter which he had published anonymously in the *Montreal Herald*, McGee warned his countrymen against Fenianism, and later he wrote a similar warning under his own name in the *Gazette*. Yet it was not until 1863 that Fenian sympathizers took the rather obvious step of organizing a branch of the Hibernian Society in Montreal.¹⁶ If this society was not simply a Fenian front, its existence is difficult to explain. The St. Patrick's Society made another Irish social club redundant, and protection was hardly required against the few Orangemen in Montreal. It does not appear that the Hibernian Society attracted more than seventeen members to its meetings, but attending its St. Patrick's Day dinners in 1863, 1864, and 1865, when Fenian heroes were toasted, were several fairly prominent Irish Montrealers, among whom were O. J. Devlin and J. Walsh, a brother of D'Arcy McGee's former law partner, T. J. Walsh.¹⁷ More significant, however, was the experience of another Montreal lawyer, Henry J. Clarke, who, on being invited to become president of the Hibernian Society, insisted upon inserting a clause in its constitution which would have banned members of secret

¹⁴The First (or Prince of Wales's) Regiment of Volunteer Rifles was the oldest unit of volunteer infantry in Montreal, having been organized in 1859. It is now the Canadian Grenadier Guards.

¹⁵*Gazette*, 17 Aug. 1867.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 20 Aug. 1867.

societies.¹⁸ The Hibernians immediately rejected Clarke and his constitution, and the presidency was offered to J. Walsh, who apparently accepted without conditions. Clarke was henceforth marked out for reprisal and some years later was attacked by Fenians while visiting Chicago.¹⁹ The Hibernian Society was recognized as a Fenian agency by the church and provoked a pastoral letter from Bishop Bourget, warning against secret societies, which was read with considerable force by Father Patrick Dowd.²⁰ Such measures might have been enough to make the majority of Irish Catholics wary of Fenianism, but McGee reported that many left the church saying that Father Dowd had to denounce Fenianism as a matter of policy but did not mean it.²¹ Such statements could easily be circulated by Fenian sympathizers and would eventually reach such eager listeners as the Orangemen and the Grits. Secret societies had become so much a part of Irish tradition that the habit was not easily lost. Yet Fenianism, in its thin Hibernian disguise, had so little attraction to Irish Montrealers that the Fenians undertook the more profitable business of infiltrating the very loyal and respectable St. Patrick's Society.

However, if Fenianism was to become a powerful force in Lower Canada, it would have to gain some influence among the French-Canadian majority of the province. Undoubtedly, the French Canadians and the Irish had much in common. There was a large French-Canadian population in the United States with problems similar to those of the Irish Americans. French Canadians from both sides of the border had served in the Union army and were facing postwar readjustment. Like the Irish Americans, they were a people in a protestant Anglo-Saxon melting pot, with grievances against Great Britain and having among them a body of nationalist intellectuals under the influence of secular republicanism. Yet the parallel cannot be pressed too far. Resentment against the British was not felt with the same intensity by French Canadians, and among them there was no tradition of secret society violence, or of a class of military adventurers who had, for centuries, served in the armies of the world.

Although French-Canadian radicalism was of a different quality than Fenianism, a French-Canadian movement in the United States emerged in the fall of 1865²² which maintained fraternal relations with the Irish²³ and was encouraged by Congressmen Banks and Butler upon whom the Fenians rested their hopes for American support.²⁴ Among the leaders of this Franco-American movement was Doctor

¹⁸*Ibid.*

²⁰*Gazette*, 17 Aug. 1867.

²²Montreal, *La Minerve*, 26 juil. 1867.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 18 déc. 1866; *La Minerve*, 9, 19 jan., 21 août 1867.

¹⁹Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions*, p. 21.

²¹*Ibid.*

²³*Le Pays*, 3 avril 1866.

J. N. Cadieux of Elmira, New York, a former surgeon in the Union army. In the autumn of 1865 he organized a preliminary convention of French Canadians in New York City²⁵ and in the spring of 1866 several public meetings were held in Elmira, followed by a second convention in New York City which maintained correspondence with Franco-Americans as far away as California.²⁶

At these meetings, confederation was denounced as a conspiracy of reactionaries, and resolutions were passed favouring annexation of Canada to the United States. Annexationism could serve French Canadians resident in the United States in much the same way as Fenianism served the Irish. It provided a means of keeping in touch with old country politics which was, at the same time, a vigorous assertion of American ideals. Yet these French-Canadian annexationists, who appeared to have so much in common with Irish Americans, were appalled at the thought of a Fenian invasion of Canada. The Franco-Americans held a conference on the independence of Ireland on March 22, 1866, at Corning, New York, which was attended by Fenian representatives.²⁷ Here Cadieux declared himself against the invasion of Canada as "de faire la guerre à deux millions de Canadiens français, qui sympathisent fortement avec toutes les nations opprimées, qui seraient heureux de voir d'Irlande libre, mais qui seraient contraints de prendre les armes contre les envahisseurs."²⁸

At the New York convention on April 10, 1866, a delegate, who asserted that he had been "obligé de venir chercher aux Etats-Unis une nationalité qui je ne pouvais jamais accepter du Canada," declared to the conference:

Car, messieurs, vous tous, comme tous amis des libertés humains, avez accordé une large part de vos sympathies au mouvement fénian. . . n'avez vous pas haussé les épaules quand l'on vous a parlé de cette invasion du Canada par les fénians? N'est-ce pas tout simplement ridicule? . . . Si les fénians commettraient cette grande faute, ils donneraient raison à ceux qui les accusent d'avoir pour unique but le pillage. . . Cette agression mènerait le Canada, qui contient une majorité des amis de l'Irlande, au suicide politique préparé par ses gouvernants sous forme de confédération."²⁹

Although the *rouge* journalists in Canada, who reported these conventions, were less outspoken than the Franco-Americans on the subject of annexation, they, too, were dismayed by the Fenians.³⁰ So convinced were they that Fenianism was helping confederation that when the

²⁵*Le Pays*, 20 jan., 17 avril 1866.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 5 avril 1866.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 3 avril 1866.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, 21 avril 1866.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 5, 22 mai 1866.

Fenian leader, Killian, announced in New Brunswick in April, 1866, that "it was the evident duty of the Fenians to wreck Confederation," the *rouge Pays* commented: "Sans l'aide des fénians, les ennemis du gouvernement responsable savent qu'ils ne peuvent rien. Nous avons déjà appelé l'attention sur cette remarquable coïncidence: la déclaration de Killian qu'il savait parfaitement calculée pour aider les unionistes, déclaration pour laquelle, nous n'en doutons pas, il était payé par le parti canadien."³¹ However, the *rouge* press was reluctant to join the rising denunciations of Fenianism. *Le Canadien* opposed the calling out of 10,000 men against the expected attack,³² and at the time of the Fenian raids which began June 1, *Le Pays* printed the facts without making editorial comment until June 9 when it stated: "Si nous avons gardé le silence, c'est qu'il ne nous serait jamais venu à l'esprit que des hommes sérieux pussent nous soupçonner un seul instant de favoriser la déloyale attaque des fénians. . . . Les fénians se cachent du soleil pour exécuter leurs projets; ils violent la neutralité. . . . Ils attaquent le Canada que ne leur a rien fait . . . et vous voulez que nous ne nous révoltions pas contre cette tactique de guérilleros, de filibustiers, de brigands!" While the absence of comment understandably provided grounds for suspicion, it is most easily explained by simple bewilderment at the conduct of the Fenians and the inability to formulate policy.

The clerical and conservative press, which reflected the opinions of the majority of French Canadians at this time, suspected the *rouge* supporters of secret Fenian sympathies. The *bleu Minerve* attacked *Le Pays* for its reporting of the Franco-American conventions in the United States and its silence on the June invasions. *La Minerve* was also outspoken on the question of American intercession on behalf of Fenian prisoners taken in June.³³ It stated, "Le fénianisme est un crime. . . . S'ils [les Etats-Unis] persistent, par une coupable négligence, à laisser nos frontières à la merci de la première troupe de brigands qui voudra s'organiser à l'ombre du drapeau américain, ils peuvent être assurés, que leur protégés d'aujourd'hui expieront leur faute."³⁴

Moreover, there is evidence of growing exasperation with the Irish, which underlines the apprehensions of D'Arcy McGee. Early in 1867, *La Minerve* commented:

Le Canada avait des sympathies naturelles pour l'Irlande. Tous les deux pays catholiques unis par les mêmes liens à une domination protestante. . . . Les Irlandais ont été reçus ici comme des frères. . . . Nous aussi, nous avons été des

³¹*Ibid.*, 22 mai 1866.

³²C. P. Stacey, "Fenianism and National Feeling in Canada," *Canadian Historical Review*, XII (1931), 246.

³³*La Minerve*, 9 jan. 1867.

³⁴*Ibid.*

vaincus, mais du moins nous avons accepté les conséquences de notre défaite. . . . Les Irlandais ont donc montré une conduite insensée en se séparant des alliés que la nature et la religion leur assignaient. . . . Ils ont tourné leurs armes meurtrières contre ceux qui les ont reçus nus, misérables et affamés. C'est au moment où des milliers d'Irlandais jouissaient d'un sort prospère en Canada, que cette race ingrate voulait assouvir sa rage dans notre sang. . . . Il n'y a pas un peuple qui ait plus de patriotisme en parole, et qui ait autant d'orgueil déplacé.³⁵

The only possible way the Fenians could have exerted influence in Canadian politics was by attaching themselves to anti-confederation tendencies and seeking to control them by secret society methods. Yet no serious gesture in this direction was made. General Sweeny's proclamation at the time of the June invasions was a curious literary exercise. He protested his want of animosity towards the peoples of the provinces, but felt it necessary to state explicitly that "we are here neither as murderers, nor robbers for plunder and spoliation." Irishmen were appealed to in the name of "seven centuries of British iniquity and Irish misery" while "to the friends of Ireland, of Freedom, of humanity, of the people, we offer the olive branch of peace and the honest grasp of friendship. Take it, Irishman, Frenchman, American. Take it and trust it."³⁶

Although the Fenians might have argued that the word "American" covered all inhabitants of the continent, the failure to include English, Scots, and Welsh in this offer was probably intentional. Fenians could hardly have expected sympathy from English Canadians who welcomed the invasion in holiday spirit as indicated by the following passage in the very Protestant *Montreal Witness*: "All classes seem to entertain a kind of grim joy at the opportunity apparently about to be afforded of repulsing and punishing the men who for so long and so unjustly have annoyed Canadians with threats which are now being carried into cruel and lawless execution."³⁷ And in a lighter vein, there was the improvised marching song which ran: "Cheer up, let the Fenians come, for beneath the Union Jack, we'll drive the rabble back."³⁸ Quotas for Volunteers were oversubscribed. Montreal, a city of 70,000, provided 2,000 for active service,³⁹ and among those who answered the call were forty-seven Canadian residents of Chicago who joined the Toronto militia.

D'Arcy McGee feared that the spirit which the invasions had aroused could easily be turned against any section of the population which appeared to be tinged with Fenianism. Yet there were only isolated signs of Fenian sympathies: a few policemen and civil servants refused

³⁵*Ibid.*, 17 jan. 1867.

³⁶Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada*, p. 30.

³⁷Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions*, p. 15.

³⁸Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada*, p. 41.

³⁹Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions*, p. 8; D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*, p. 173.

to take a special loyalty oath;⁴⁰ a sergeant-major in the Prince of Wales's Rifles deserted at Lachine station as the regiment was about to embark for the frontier;⁴¹ and some railwaymen refused to join a special volunteer company.⁴² Certainly, there was no evidence of the working of an effective Fenian organization.

A Fenian minority could do nothing in the wartime atmosphere created by the raids, but this was temporary, and the normal attitude towards Fenianism among the Montreal Irish was one of indifference and tolerance. Most leaders of the Irish community were anti-Fenian, but, except at the time of the invasions, there was no popular anti-Fenianism. In the absence of an overt threat, opportunist politicians found association with Fenian sympathizers quite safe and even profitable. It was difficult to avoid Fenian entanglements without offending friendly people or appearing cool to Ireland's wrongs. Moreover, secret combinations, however small, could give useful support to friends and victimize those they regarded as enemies.

The defeat of the Fenian invasions and the subsequent triumph of confederation made open Fenianism impossible, but did not exclude the influence of the Fenian minority in Montreal. It was associated with a powerful Irish American organization which could be useful and dangerous to those with business connections in the United States, while the American Fenians, who were preparing to try again, needed agents in Canada. Indeed, in early 1867, a report to Roberts, the leader of the Fenian faction most active in preparing the invasions, stated that "the agents sent, with your approbation, exhibit a good state of feeling among the French of the Eastern Provinces, who will, doubtless afford us much assistance, when once we are in the country."⁴³ There were, then, still opportunities for mischievous, if futile, activity, but such activity had to be secret, and secrecy was difficult under the watchful eyes of D'Arcy McGee. Although Irish Canadian indifference was the most formidable enemy of Fenianism, Fenians might prefer to regard McGee as the author of their defeats and seek to destroy him for the sake of revenge, as insurance against future exposure, and from the need to come to grips with a visible enemy. As McGee had personal and political enemies, Fenians at last could find a tendency in Canadian politics to which they could attach themselves—the enemies of D'Arcy McGee. These were, of course, varied and it was only within a section of his Montreal enemies that Fenianism found allies.

Like the Fenian leaders, D'Arcy McGee had been active in the

⁴⁰*Le Pays*, 12 juin 1866; *Gazette*, 20 Aug. 1867.

⁴¹Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions*, p. 17.

⁴²*Gazette*, 20 Aug. 1867.

⁴³Spear to Roberts, 1 Jan. 1867, cited in Lyne, "The Irish in Canada," p. 243.

Young Ireland movement of the late 'forties and subsequently an exile in the United States. Of this period in his life, McGee said: "Politically, we were a pack of fools, but we were honest in our folly, and no man need blush at forty for the follies of one-and-twenty. Unless, indeed, he still perseveres in them."⁴⁴ His experience as a reporter in the British House of Commons had converted him to British institutions and his observations of life in America had convinced him of the demoralizing effect of republican institutions on society.⁴⁵ Monarchical Canada and particularly, catholic Quebec, he considered to be more in harmony with the real Irish traditions as upheld by the mediaeval saints, the Irish Jacobite exiles, and, more recently, by Daniel O'Connell. Yet McGee was hardly a reactionary and still less an opportunist since he had upheld the cause of the American Union against the slave states and jeopardized his position with the clericals by supporting George Brown's "Rep. by Pop."⁴⁶ There was about him a largeness of mind and sympathies which gave him an independence of party interest and popular prejudices rare in any age. He opposed Fenianism, not merely because it was secular and republican, but because it confirmed in the minds of many the popular image of the Irish as an immature and undignified people, possessed of a romantic love of conspiracy and violence. Fenianism lowered the tone of politics, as secret societies normally do, and McGee had acquired an intense dislike of secret societies as a result of his contact with the Know Nothing party in the United States.⁴⁷ This made him a vigorous enemy of Canadian Orangeism, which he did not fully understand. If he had denounced "Know Nothings" and "Orangemen" because of their secret character, he felt a strong obligation to oppose Fenianism on the same grounds. In his anxiety to keep entirely clear of Fenian association, McGee even refused to intercede on behalf of Fenian prisoners. To Father Hendricken, who on grounds of old acquaintance, asked help for a Fenian prisoner, McGee wrote with more wit than charity: "Terence McDonald, like the rest of his comrades, left his home (if he had any) and his honest employment (if he followed one) to come several hundred miles to murder our border people, for this filibustering is murder, not war."⁴⁸

The Fenians, for all their follies, were part of a formal military organization, inspired by a political idea; thus they could not be, and, in fact, were not treated as mere bandits. While it is possible that McGee expressed his real feeling about the Fenian prisoners, he could

⁴⁴*Dublin Evening Mail*, 16 May 1865, photostat copy in *ibid.*, app., p. 381.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*; see also McGee, *The Irish Position in British and in Republican North America*.

⁴⁶Lyne, "The Irish in Canada," p. 203.

⁴⁷Josephine Phelan, *The Ardent Exile* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 113, 136-7.

⁴⁸McGee to Hendricken, 14 June 1866 (Campbell, *The Fenian Invasions*, p. 30).

not, without jeopardizing his position among non-Irish Canadians, take any other stand so soon after the raids. However, Irish sympathies are inclined towards the prisoner in the dock, particularly if he is an Irish political prisoner. McGee weakened his position in the Irish community of Montreal by his attitude, thus providing the Fenians with a convenient vantage point from which he could be attacked. McGee estimated that there were perhaps 355 Fenians in Montreal.⁴⁹ A dozen of these could create a disturbance and fifty could break up a meeting. In November, 1866, McGee was abused at a concert when he insisted that Fenian prisoners deserved the death penalty.⁵⁰ However, serious violence during his public appearances in Montreal did not erupt until the election campaign in the summer of 1867 when the Fenians allied themselves to the supporters of his rival, Bernard Devlin.

Devlin, a successful lawyer, had represented the American government in the case against the Confederates who had raided St. Alban's, Vermont, in 1865. In his prosecution against the Confederate raiders, Devlin used arguments⁵¹ similar to those employed a year later against the Fenian prisoners whom he defended.⁵² Devlin was lieutenant-colonel of the Prince of Wales's Regiment, had served at the frontier against the Fenians in June, and was president of the St. Patrick's Society. His position in society was thus sufficiently secure to allow him to associate with the Fenians with some degree of impunity, although it is not clear whether he did so from sympathy or opportunism. Though evidently not a Fenian himself, he was on good terms with the American Fenian leader, Roberts,⁵³ and his brother, O. J. Devlin, had been active in the Fenian-inspired Hibernian Society. Moreover, Bernard Devlin offered to serve as intermediary between the Canadian government and the Fenians just prior to the invasions.⁵⁴ So carefully did he avoid any denunciation of the Fenians that, in addressing the St. Patrick's Society along with McGee and others on March 17, 1866, when the theme was loyalty, Devlin spoke only of a new hall the society was planning to build.⁵⁵

Serious attacks upon McGee began in August when he was pelted with stones on the streets⁵⁶ and was unable to make himself heard at a meeting at Point St. Charles.⁵⁷ McGee named the Fenians as the source of the attacks, threatened exposure of their organization in Montreal,

⁴⁹*Gazette*, 20 Aug. 1867.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 30 Nov. 1866.

⁵¹*Montreal Herald*, 22 March 1865.

⁵²*Le Pays*, 15 déc. 1866.

⁵³*Gazette*, 22 Aug. 1867; D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*, p. 209.

⁵⁴*Gazette*, 22 Aug. 1867; Phelan, *The Ardent Exile*, p. 263.

⁵⁵Lyne, "The Irish in Canada," p. 252.

⁵⁶*Gazette*, 3 Aug. 1867; *La Minerve*, 19 août 1867.

⁵⁷*Gazette*, 5 Aug. 1867.

and accused his opponent, Devlin, of being a patron of the Fenians.⁵⁸ As a result, McGee was himself soon accused of exploiting the Fenian menace for electoral purposes.⁵⁹ Previous interruptions of McGee in public had been in response to his condemnation of Fenianism, and it is difficult to conceive of the attacks coming from other than a Fenian source. Devlin publicly deplored the attacks on McGee,⁶⁰ but failed to mention the Fenians. He insisted that Fenianism was irrelevant to the election although the Toronto Fenian newspaper, the *Irish Canadian*,⁶¹ and the Montreal *bleu Minerve*⁶² stated it to be the real issue. Indeed, Devlin's French counterpart, Médéric Lanctôt, who was the *Rouge* candidate for Montreal East against Cartier, was accused of having formed a secret society called Le Club St. Jean Baptiste which *La Minerve* claimed was affiliated with Fenianism,⁶³ and of having gone to New York early in August, supposedly to recruit funds from the Fenian treasury for his contest against Cartier.⁶⁴

Late in August, McGee attacked Fenianism in the *Gazette*⁶⁵ declaring that a packed meeting of the St. Patrick's Society had invited O'Mahoney, then the leader of American Fenianism, to lecture in Montreal in 1863, and that the books containing the correspondence in connection with the invitation had been destroyed. Devlin, during an election speech in Victoria Square, answered the charges, accusing McGee of slandering Irishmen "as disaffected and disloyal to our Gracious Sovereign," and declaring the books of the society to be intact and uninjured.⁶⁶ McGee, he stated, was an approver, an informer, a Canadian Titus Oates. Why, he asked, had McGee waited until the election to reveal this information if it was not a political trick? He claimed, irrelevantly, that McGee had once received a public horse-whipping on the streets of New York at the hands of two American Fenian leaders, Colonel Doheny and Devin Reilly. The meeting ended with three cheers for the Queen.

McGee had denounced Fenianism as an evil, without emphasizing its strength in Canada lest he give the impression that Irish Canadians were disloyal, but the assaults on his election meetings in 1867 made him reverse his policy. He had received a number of threatening letters from the Fenians⁶⁷ and declared that Devlin himself had told him that the attacks would cease if there was no further mention of Fenianism. Devlin's use of the word "informer" was particularly irresponsible as the fate of informers was normally death. It was not until August 28 that Devlin denied he was a Fenian and referred to the Fenians as "those

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 9 Aug. 1867.

⁶²*La Minerve*, 19 août 1867.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 19 août 1867.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 22 Aug. 1867.

⁵⁹*Herald*, 7 Aug. 1867.

⁶¹*Gazette*, 31 July 1867.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 21 août 1867.

⁶⁵*Gazette*, 17, 20, 22 Aug. 1867.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 20 Aug. 1867.

misguided unhappy men." At the close of the election, McGee's headquarters were attacked by a mob which might well have killed him had he been there.⁶⁸ Though McGee won the election, Devlin led McGee by a slight majority in the Irish ward of the city.⁶⁹ The controversy continued after the election when, on one occasion, Devlin spat in McGee's face, and the St. Patrick's Society formally thanked T. W. Anglin of New Brunswick when he accused McGee of damaging the name of the Montreal Irish.

It is difficult to believe that McGee was exploiting the Fenian menace for electoral purposes. He must have realized that attacks on Fenianism were losing Irish votes while adding little to his strength among non-Irish conservatives. Fenianism threatened what was, in a sense, his life work—the integration of the Irish community into Canadian society. Realizing that his attacks on Fenianism might cost him his life, he sought safety by exposing the extent and nature of Fenian influence. Whether Devlin sympathized with the Fenians, merely found them useful, or even feared them, he was protecting their interests by acting as though they did not exist.

With the end of the election campaign, it seems probable that some of the more active Fenians undertook to avenge their defeat by assassinating McGee. There is no evidence that anyone in the factions which made up the Fenian high command was connected with the killing,⁷⁰ although some of those arrested immediately after the assassination were known to have recently visited the United States.⁷¹ The most intense bitterness against McGee was felt in the Montreal area, and the somewhat inconclusive evidence presented during the seven-day trial suggests that the assassination was the work of an informal self-appointed group of Fenians whose most active members had been resident in Montreal during the election.⁷² Patrick James Whelan, who was executed for the killing, was almost certainly a Fenian, but he died protesting his innocence, declaring at the close of his trial that he would give the "last drop of his blood for the noble lady whose portrait hangs above my head."⁷³ Whelan was convicted on circumstantial evidence and testimony gathered by dubious methods.⁷⁴ In calmer times, he might well have been acquitted. Yet members of Irish secret societies, both Orange and Green, like those of the Ku Klux Klan in the

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 7 Sept. 1867; *La Minerve*, 7 sept. 1867.

⁶⁹*La Minerve*, 7 sept. 1867.

⁷⁰*Le Pays*, 18 avril 1868; D'Arcy, *The Fenian Movement*, pp. 293–4.

⁷¹*Herald*, 9 April, 9 Sept. 1868; *La Minerve*, 14 sept. 1868, see testimony of William Mitchell.

⁷²*La Minerve*, 17 avril 1868, see testimony given at preliminary enquiry; see also *La Minerve*, 9–12 sept. 1868.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 16 sept. 1868.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 9 sept. 1868.

American south, made a standard practice of denying their guilt and counting on the influence of their organization to gain acquittal. While this technique often failed in cases where public opinion was aroused, it nevertheless placed obstacles in the way of the prosecution and drove it to methods which, if not illegal, were at least unethical. Although the Crown's version of the assassination rested on controversial evidence, it contained a high degree of probability and the facts it offered threw further light on Fenian activity.

Whelan, an ex-soldier who had served nine years, four of them in India, came to Canada from the United States some four or five years prior to McGee's assassination.⁷⁵ He was first noticed in Toronto early in 1865 some time before the St. Patrick's Day demonstration of that year. Employed there as a regimental tailor, he apparently left after ten days for Kingston where he worked in the same capacity for a few days, and was next identified in Quebec City where he used the name of Sullivan⁷⁶ and was again employed as a military tailor. There he joined a volunteer cavalry unit in which he gained the rank of sergeant.⁷⁷ While in Quebec City, where he remained three months, he was arrested for attempting to recruit Fenians, but the charge was dropped.⁷⁸ As Whelan was reported to be a good tailor and in other respects satisfactory to his employers,⁷⁹ he evidently changed jobs by choice. It was a common practice of the Fenians to recruit Irish regulars into their organization, sometimes by offers of money and of rank in the revolutionary army, and it seems likely that Whelan was employed in this type of work. Whelan claimed that he went directly to Montreal after leaving Quebec,⁸⁰ but other reports suggest a brief return to the United States and thence to Ontario before coming to Montreal where he was again employed as a tailor.⁸¹ In Montreal, he married Bridget Boyle, a boarding-house keeper much older than himself who enjoyed a modest prosperity.⁸²

Whelan began to take an active interest in D'Arcy McGee, following him to Prescott where McGee stood for election in 1867, and he was particularly noticed at L'Orignal and other places when McGee was present.⁸³ During the Montreal election, Whelan worked as a scrutineer on behalf of Devlin⁸⁴ and was reported to have been involved in elec-

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 16 sept. 1868, see Whelan's statement; *Herald*, 9 Sept. 1868.

⁷⁶*La Minerve*, 10, 16 sept. 1868.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 16 sept. 1868, see Whelan's statement.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, see also *Herald*, 9 Sept. 1868.

⁷⁹*La Minerve*, 8 sept. 1868.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 16 sept. 1868.

⁸¹*Herald*, 9 April, 9 Sept. 1868.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴*La Minerve*, 16 sept. 1868, see Whelan's statement.

tion violence.⁸⁵ When McGee went to Ottawa in November, 1867, to take up his parliamentary duties, Whelan quit his Montreal job to go to Ottawa, too, leaving his wife in Montreal.⁸⁶ In Ottawa, he frequently attended the sessions of the House when McGee was present, and in spite of a residence of only a few months, Whelan was made marshal of the Ottawa St. Patrick's Day parade⁸⁷ which was managed by the Fenian-infiltrated St. Patrick's Society.⁸⁸ Whelan had been in and out of the House during the night of McGee's assassination,⁸⁹ and had, for several nights prior to the shooting, been drinking in the tavern opposite the boarding house where McGee resided.⁹⁰ When arrested, he was in possession of a recently fired revolver of the same calibre that had killed McGee.⁹¹ In Whelan's trunk were found photographs of Fenian head centres, a ribbon of the Toronto Hibernian Society, and a copy of the pro-Fenian *Irish Canadian* whose editor, Patrick Boyle, was among those arrested after the assassination.⁹² Yet even if Whelan was not the assassin, the shooting had a professional touch. It was done on an evening when the moonlight was so bright the streets were almost as light as day,⁹³ and as assassination was, for the Fenians, an accepted mode of struggle, it seems unlikely that the killing was the work of a non-Fenian agency. For all the incompetence of their strategy and propaganda, long experience had given the Fenians and, indeed, most Irish secret societies, an almost professional grasp of such acts as assassination, ambush, gaol delivery, and, above all, obstructing trial by jury.

Whelan's trial, like any other trial in which their organization was involved, provided the Fenians with an opportunity to bring their influence to bear, but their usual devices had no chance of success in the face of a hostile public opinion. While the latent hostility of the tory and *bleu* press understandably rose to the surface, even the *rouge Pays* and the anti-McGee Montreal *Herald* assigned responsibility to the Fenians. The *Herald* outspokenly declared: "We believe that very few men anywhere entertain any moral doubt that Whelan was the real culprit";⁹⁴ while *Le Pays* wrote: "Il n'y a qu'une voix dans le Domaine et aux Etats-Unis pour maudire le Misérable qui a tranché les jours d'un homme réellement éminent. . . . Tout porte à croire que M. McGee est

⁸⁵Montreal *True Witness*, 10 Sept. 1868, see testimony of J. Faulkner and A. Turner.

⁸⁶*La Minerve*, 8 sept. 1868.

⁸⁷*Herald*, 9 Sept. 1868.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*; see also *La Minerve*, 8, 18 avril 1868.

⁸⁹*La Minerve*, 16 sept. 1868, see Whelan's statement.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹*True Witness*, 17 April 1868, see preliminary enquiry report.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 15 May 1868; *Herald*, 9 April 1868; *La Minerve*, 10 sept. 1868.

⁹³*La Minerve*, 8 avril 1868.

⁹⁴*Herald*, 16 Sept. 1868.

tombé victime de ses dénonciations du fénianisme.”⁹⁵ Yet *Le Pays* printed without comment an official denial of responsibility by the Fenian *Irish People* of New York which said:

The authorities of the Fenian organization hold in detestation the murderer and his crime. Neither the leadership nor the members have any sympathy for those who have employed violence against Mr. McGee who, although he has used all his efforts to destroy Fenianism, has always had the courage to declare himself openly. We will make those enemies swallow their lies who wish to make the blood of McGee fall on the heads of each member of the Fraternity.⁹⁶

The Catholic *True Witness* would not comment on the responsibility for the assassination,⁹⁷ and Bernard Devlin was equally non-committal.⁹⁸ Yet when a picnic was organized by anonymous parties to raise funds for the defence of Whelan and the other Fenian prisoners, Devlin thought it necessary to denounce it. Addressing himself to the Irishmen of Montreal, Devlin wrote: “It was only when I saw that the disavowal of the St. Patrick’s Society, of Father Dowd, and every priest connected with St. Patrick’s Church had passed unheeded, that I ventured to point out the folly of the unknown parties who persist in asking you to be disobedient.” Devlin declared that funds for the defence could be raised by private subscription and that “when a public subscription is got up, it is not too much to ask for the name of the treasurer and some guarantee that the funds would be applied to a legitimate object.”⁹⁹ Devlin may have suffered somewhat from being tainted with Fenianism as he was no longer an officer in the St. Patrick’s Society,¹⁰⁰ and the Society’s disavowal of the picnic suggests a reaction against Fenianism on the part of the membership. On this occasion, the traditional Irish sympathy with the prisoner in the dock was overshadowed by the impressiveness of McGee’s funeral.¹⁰¹

Although the assassination of McGee would hardly have alienated the sympathies of the few hundred Fenians in Quebec, it left their movement a spent force. The funeral of McGee was a demonstration of anti-Fenian sentiment, led by the Irish community. Moreover, Fenians had no tangible foe to conspire against and had to content themselves with keeping contact with one another and with the American organization.

While most American Fenian leaders probably assumed that their sympathizers in Canada would play a part in the preparation of further

⁹⁵*Le Pays*, 11 avril 1868.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 18 avril 1868.

⁹⁷*True Witness*, 10, 17 April 1868.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 17 April 1868.

⁹⁹*Herald*, 5 Sept. 1868.

¹⁰⁰*True Witness*, 1 May 1868.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 17, 24 April 1868; *La Minerve*, 14 avril 1868.

invasions, Quebec Fenians were given no opportunity to do so in 1870 because the Fenian general, O'Neill, planned a surprise attack. Even though it meant concealing his plans from many of his colleagues and depriving himself of the full support of his own organization, O'Neill perhaps adopted the wiser course. It was difficult to get the divided Fenian leadership to agree to any concrete plan, and the Grant administration was not inclined to tolerate open preparations for an invasion of Canada. Although it could hardly have entered into O'Neill's calculations, any sign of Fenian activity within Canada would have aroused the hostility of all parties, while the absence of such activity made government measures against the coming invasion suspect. On April 12, 1870, *Le Pays* commented, "Le Fénianisme, au Canada, joue le rôle du spectre rouge en France. Cela sert dans les discours, mais nul homme sensé ne le prendra au sérieux. On a vu ce que le prétendu complot contre l'Hon. M. McGee a révélé de complices! Une attaque de Fénians contre le Canada n'a pas l'ombre du sens commun."

O'Neill's project had an appearance of improbability which could easily have given him an initial success had it not been for the presence of the British agent, Le Caron, at his headquarters. Le Caron's prompt action in alerting the Canadian government¹⁰² ensured that the second Fenian invasion would be halted with comparatively little bloodshed.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, when news of the invasion reached Montreal, Fenian sympathizers seem to have reacted spontaneously. The *Evening Star* reported "indications of a movement . . . among the Fenian circles. Workmen in various parts of the city quietly threw down their implements and as reticently walked off to some unknown rendezvous. Shovellers at the elevators left in squads of a dozen at a time: large numbers of employees at the blast furnace also quit work, and several workmen on the Lake Shore Railroad refused to remain at work during the day. Other Hibernian labourers are known to have given up their legitimate work."¹⁰⁴

It would be hazardous to say how long Fenianism survived in Quebec, but some contact was probably maintained with the American organization well into the 'eighties. By that time, the Irish were belatedly abandoning the romantic republicanism of '48 which continental nationalists had given up in the age of Bismarck and Cavour, and it was not to be a major force in Irish or European politics again until World War I. The special circumstances which gave Fenianism its

¹⁰²H. Le Caron, *Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service* (London, 1893), pp. 81-96.

¹⁰³Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada*, pp. 156-161; *Le Pays*, 27 mai 1870; *Montreal Evening Star*, 28 May 1870.

¹⁰⁴*Evening Star*, 27 May 1870.

relevance in North America was the civil war, for if Irish republicanism was a useful means of giving old world connections an American appearance, it was the aftermath of the civil war which turned Fenianism towards futile and dangerous military adventures. While few of the conditions which made Fenianism attractive to Irish Americans were present in British North America, and less so in Quebec than elsewhere because of the secure position of the church, it was not easy to clear the Irish community of the Fenian taint. This was achieved through the uncompromising hostility of D'Arcy McGee to the Fenians and to his death at their hands. Cartier, whose relations with McGee had not always been cordial, said of him:

Il était du nombre de ceux qu'il plaît quelques fois à la providence de donner au monde... qu'il n'y a pas de doute qu'en empêchant les Irlandais Canadiens de se joindre à [cette organisation étrangère sur le sol voisin] il a rendu le plus grand service qu'un Irlandais puisse rendre à son pays. Il a acquis aux habitants Irlandais du Canada cette inestimable réputation de loyauté, qui repousse tous les sentiments détestables de haine qui animent cette abominable organisation du fénianisme.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵*La Minerve*, 8 avril 1868.

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Anti-Catholic Nativism in Canada: The Protestant Protective Association

JAMES T. WATT

IN THE EARLY 1890's a secret, oath-bound, anti-Catholic society called the Protestant Protective Association made its way into Canada from the United States. For six years the P.P.A. worked secretly to protect the institutions of Canada against what it alleged to be a Roman Catholic conspiracy to take control of the state. Its battle against this menace consisted of a bitter campaign on both social and political levels; the P.P.A. discriminated against Catholics personally by boycotting their businesses, and also attempted to drive Catholics out of political life. During its meteoric rise the P.P.A. ran candidates in municipal and provincial elections in Ontario and in the federal election of 1896 with such success that Wilfrid Laurier, Oliver Mowat, and Lord Aberdeen, the Governor General of Canada, all denounced its activities in public speeches. The P.P.A. seemed so powerful at first that one Ontario journal predicted that further growth "would mean either civil war or the breakup of Confederation."¹ The importance of this anti-Catholic organization, however, stems not so much from its political impact as from the insight it provides into the spirit of the 1890's.

The P.P.A. was more than just a secret, anti-Catholic society; for the first three years of its existence in Canada it was a movement which rather than creating anti-Catholicism was a product of it and only reflected, and in some ways intensified, the dominant social and psychological spirit of the time. In the 1890's a strident anti-Catholic nativism blossomed in Canadian life and the ideals of Confederation became obliterated in an orgy of warped and misguided patriotism. Basically, nativism is an antipathy toward a minority group which, because of its

¹The *Week*, May 26, 1893.

connection with a foreign influence, appears to threaten the life of the nation from within.² Anti-Catholic nativism in Canada expressed itself in a defensive type of nationalism, reacting against Catholic allegiance to the Pope as head of the church, and condemning the Catholic's alleged failure to assimilate with the majority. Roman Catholics who clung tenaciously to their separate schools and charities and whose religious leaders spoke out vigorously during elections for the preservation and strengthening of these institutions easily differentiated themselves from the rest of the community and aroused suspicions that Catholics were refusing to join in the creation of a broad Canadian nationality. Embittered further by the economic depression of the 1880's and early 1890's, many Canadians took out their hostility on "foreign elements," of which Roman Catholics and French Canadians were the most prominent because they seemed to be frustrating the ideal of a homogeneous nation based on a common language and cultural background and a general pride in the so-called Anglo-Saxon race. With the bonds of unity severely strained, the P.P.A. offered a way of championing national homogeneity because it pleaded for a re-awakened patriotism. By joining the P.P.A. those embittered by all the resentments of preceding years would have their wrath and irrationalism socially sanctioned.³

By 1891 the centre of power of the American Protective Association, the progenitor of the P.P.A., was located in the American midwest, and particularly in the city of Detroit where W. J. Traynor, the first president of the Michigan State Council, had built a strong organization. Traynor's background explains the circumstances behind the entry of the anti-Catholic society into Canada. A Canadian who had been born at Brantford in 1845, Traynor moved to Detroit where he became the publisher of the *Patriotic American*, a mouthpiece for anti-Catholicism which supported any organization which seemed to offer a hope of defeating "Romanism."⁴ Traynor's familiarity with the Canadian scene provided him with a special interest in promoting the P.P.A. in Windsor, while his paper, published just across the river, could prepare the already fertile ground. Since he was also a high-ranking Orangeman,⁵ the Detroit editor would be acquainted with prominent Orange brethren in Windsor.

Under these circumstances a branch of the American organization

²J. Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (Brunswick, N.J., 1955), p. 30.

³G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 58.

⁴D. L. Kinzer, "The American Protective Association: A Study of Anti-Catholicism," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1954, pp. 198-9.

⁵Traynor had been Deputy Grand Master of the Orange Lodge of the United States in 1891-92, Grand Master of the Michigan Orange Lodge, Vice-President of the Triennial Council of the World for the Loyal Orange Order. *Ibid.*

was formed in Windsor sometime late in 1891 as Council No. 1 of the Protestant Protective Association.⁶ Of the men who organized this first council, the chief promoter, and its first Grand President, was John H. McConnell, a Windsor Orangeman.⁷ The organization's best-known member was Oscar E. Fleming, a distinguished Windsor lawyer and the son of a prominent Essex County family. The P.P.A. became generally known in Essex County after Fleming, partly on the strength of P.P.A. support, was elected mayor of Windsor in 1892.⁸

At first the P.P.A. was a branch of the A.P.A., the chain of authority coming from the supreme headquarters in the United States.⁹ Thus, the ritual and general principles of the society were taken almost unaltered from the American association.¹⁰ In essence the P.P.A. operated as a secret, ultra-patriotic non-partisan organization committed to political action against any political party which made it part of its policy to win office through the medium of ecclesiastical influence. The policy of the P.P.A. was not to interfere in any election where the supposed concessions to Roman Catholicism were not an issue; where the alleged "solid Catholic vote" was not a factor, members were free to vote as ordinary citizens. But in every Dominion, provincial, school board, or municipal election contested between a candidate deemed friendly to the Catholic Church and a Protestant candidate, the P.P.A. was to support the Protestant and form a solid vote to offset the Catholic influence.¹¹

In the government of the society, the membership was theoretically supreme, but the real authority resided with the Grand Executive, consisting of the Grand President, Grand Vice-President, Grand Treasurer, Grand Secretary, and Grand Chaplain. Authority descended from this main body to the divisional council, which represented individual lodges, to the local lodge itself.¹² To become a member of the

⁶The exact date of the organization of the first P.P.A. council in Windsor is not known. In an interview with the Grand President, the Rev. J. C. Madill, the *Globe* of Jan. 31, 1894, quoted him as saying it had been in existence at that time for more than two years. The *Sarnia Observer* asserted on Jan. 4, 1894, that the P.P.A. had been in existence in Windsor for three years. Its introduction thus would have occurred some time late in 1891.

⁷In a speech given on July 12, 1894, at a joint meeting of Orange, A.P.A., and P.P.A. orders, McConnell boasted publicly that he had "started" the P.P.A. With other members of the P.P.A. present, it is likely that he would have been repudiated if his statement had not been true. This speech was reported in the *Sarnia Observer*, July 20, 1894, and the *Globe*, July 13, 1894.

⁸*Globe*, Dec. 12, 1893.

⁹"The P.P.A. Suit," *Toronto Mail and Empire*, April 7, 1897. In March, 1897, William Harding entered a suit against Grand Secretary Jackson Little to receive payment for lodge paraphernalia supplied to the society. The information given in a court of law under oath can be accepted as fact.

¹⁰Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), *The P.P.A. in Ontario, History and Principles of the Organization* (n.p., n.d.).

¹¹Interview with Grand President J. C. Madill, *Globe*, Jan. 31, 1894.

¹²"A Powerful Order," the P.P.A. Convention, Hamilton, 1894, *Mail*, Jan. 25, 1894.

P.P.A., a candidate came before the chaplain of the council and, with his hand on his heart, swore not to permit a Roman Catholic to become a member of the society or to aid the Catholic Church or any of its institutions in any way; not to employ a Catholic when a Protestant was available; to shun controversy with a Catholic on the subject of the order; and, more significantly, to refuse to vote for, or countenance the nomination of, a Catholic for public office.¹³ The P.P.A. believed that Roman Catholics were unfit to hold military or political office, considering them a "subversive" element which owed its first allegiance not to the government of Canada but to a foreign ecclesiastical potentate. In owing allegiance to the head of the church, who was in effect a foreign ruler, the P.P.A. held that a Roman Catholic became in every sense of the term an alien. According to the citizenship laws of the time, however, the organization would allow him the right to hold property and therefore be liable to taxation.¹⁴

The oath completed, the blindfold was removed, symbolically returning the initiate from "mental darkness" so that he made the final declaration in full possession of his faculties. With his right hand on the presumed emblem of the Catholic Church, a cross, and his left hand on the "Book of Faith," the Bible, he repeated:

I hereby denounce Roman Catholicism. I hereby denounce the Pope sitting at Rome or elsewhere; I denounce his priests and emissaries and the diabolical work of the Roman Catholic Church, and hereby pledge myself to the cause of Protestantism to the end that there be no interference with the discharge of the duties of citizenship and I solemnly bind myself to protect with all the means in my power, the good name of the order and its members, so help me God, Amen.¹⁵

Very little is known about the P.P.A. during the first years of its existence; obscurity rather than secrecy seemed to hide it from the public view. However, the society grew steadily, albeit unspectacularly, taking root in most of the larger towns in southwestern Ontario. Branches of the dying Equal Rights Association provided a ready made organization; its members, still excited by the alleged menace of Roman Catholicism, were a major source of P.P.A. membership in the early years. After the third council was established in Sandwich near Windsor, the P.P.A. spread its tentacles to Sarnia in Lambton County, where Council No. 4 was organized,¹⁶ and then to Parkhill in Middlesex, an area which, along with Lambton, became the western stronghold of the organization under the leadership of Dr. Thomas M.

¹³"P.P.A. Principles, Proceedings of the Grand Board, Change of Oaths," *Globe*, Feb. 23, 1894.

¹⁴*The P.P.A. in Ontario, History and Principles*.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives (P.A.O.), Wallace Papers, newspaper clipping sent by Robert Birmingham to Wallace, April 16, 1895.

Ovens.¹⁷ In the London area, Henry Macklin, one of that city's most respected and active citizens, helped to organize councils. From its western stronghold the P.P.A. jumped in February, 1892, to Toronto where Jackson Little, a druggist who served three terms as Grand Secretary, was one of its instigators.¹⁸ During this early period, two men who later became the society's best known members were elected to public office—E. T. Essery, the P.P.A.'s most effective platform speaker, was elected mayor of London in December, 1892,¹⁹ and George Sterling Ryerson, the ablest member of the P.P.A., won the provincial by-election in East Toronto on February 28, 1892.²⁰

Despite the growth of the organization and the election of Ryerson and Essery, the P.P.A. was not generally known in 1892. The *Mail*, a newspaper in sympathy with ultra-Protestantism, does not mention it until as late as December 19, 1892, when it reported an interview with a P.P.A. member.²¹ About nine days earlier A. H. U. Colquhoun, an editor of the Toronto *Empire* and a confidant of James Pliny Whitney, a prominent Conservative M.P.P. who later became Premier of Ontario, wrote to Whitney asking him "if you have heard anything down your way of the P.P.A. . . . in my view of profound political import."²² Although there is no record of a reply, the sensational growth of the P.P.A. during December makes it highly likely that Whitney had heard of the new secret society.

The P.P.A. skyrocketed into national prominence when Sir John Thompson, a Roman Catholic, became Prime Minister after Sir John Abbott's retirement on November 25, 1892. The very fact that a Roman Catholic convert from Methodism should have the highest office in the land aroused the bitter wrath and fears of narrowminded Protestants. The conviction that Thompson, when Minister of Justice, was part of a Roman Catholic conspiracy and an agent of the Jesuits gained wide currency because of his advice to the cabinet on the decision not to disallow the Jesuits Estates Act.²³ In view of the alleged danger to Canadian institutions by a man believed to be in league with the Jesuits, many ultra-Protestants sought refuge in the Protestant Protective Association as the most effective means of fighting the supposed menace.

The major reason for the spread of the P.P.A. during 1893, however,

¹⁷Hamilton *Spectator*, Jan. 5, 1894.

¹⁸London *Free Press*, March 7, 1893.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1894.

²⁰The *Ryerson Family Scrapbook*, comp. George Sterling Ryerson (privately held), p. 35.

²¹*Mail*, Dec. 19, 1892.

²²P.A.O., Whitney Papers, A.H.U. Colquhoun to Whitney, Dec. 10, 1892.

²³*Globe*, Jan. 21, 1893.

was that many Orangemen became disenchanted with their organization and flocked to the P.P.A. when Grand Master Clarke Wallace and past Grand Master Mackenzie Bowell accepted cabinet posts under Thompson, seemingly sacrificing the principles of the Orange Order for political expediency. This dissatisfaction intensified when the ultra-Protestant members of the Order were effectively muzzled by the approval of a resolution prepared by Wallace and other members of the pro-Conservative Orange executive that prohibited the publication of resolutions passed by subordinate lodges criticizing the conduct of Grand Officers.²⁴ According to one disgruntled member, the Order had become "nothing more than a Tammany Society for the Conservative party" and for this reason "thousands of Orangemen are joining the Protestant Protective Association."²⁵

In fact the P.P.A. did grow rapidly during 1893, tightening its grip on southwestern Ontario where it received the bulk of its support. Its influence was greatest in the larger towns, although it spread into the rural areas as well. Sometime during this year, the P.P.A. severed its official ties with the American Protective Association, partly because of the growth of the P.P.A. but also because of the strong imperialist bias of the Canadian society, an attitude the American parent body apparently could not appreciate.²⁶ As early as March, 1893, the *London Free Press* remarked on "the phenomenal growth of the P.P.A.," estimating its membership at 1500 to 2000 in that city.²⁷ The society had also put down strong roots in Toronto, where the *Mail* reported a membership of 3000 enrolled in twenty lodges.²⁸ Yet these figures cannot be taken at face value, since membership statistics were always inexact. Exaggerated figures were given as representing not only membership but "influence," or votes controlled, and were as high as would be accepted.

There were several methods by which P.P.A. councils were established. In some cases members of the Grand Executive acted as organizers, setting up lodges where and when they could; paid organizers also travelled throughout the province lecturing and assigning charters. Probably the most successful agents were the self-styled "ex-nuns" and "ex-priests" who travelled from town to town dispensing anti-Catholic propaganda with a personal touch. Without a doubt the work of Mrs. Margaret Lisle Shepherd, described by the *Catholic*

²⁴"The Meeting of the Orange Grand Lodge at Sault Ste. Marie," *London Free Press*, Aug. 4, 1893.

²⁵Letter to the editor, *Mail*, Oct. 16, 1893.

²⁶University of Toronto Archives, *The P.P.A. in Ontario, Being Extracts from the Letters and Speeches of J. D. Edgar, M.P.* (n.p., n.d.).

²⁷*London Free Press*, March 11, 1893.

²⁸*Mail*, Jan. 27, 1893.

Register as "the foundress of the P.P.A. in Canada,"²⁹ was by far the most successful. An immigrant from Britain, she had arrived in the United States in 1887 and become associated with the A.P.A. In 1892 she travelled to Canada where she began her infamous series of lectures which helped to inspire the formation of numerous P.P.A. lodges.³⁰ C. W. Sawers of Peterborough described Mrs. Shepherd as "an exceedingly crafty woman," who, during a meeting in that town, had packed the Opera House and "stirred up the people almost to a fighting state." According to Sawers, Mrs. Shepherd had succeeded in her objective and "that association [the P.P.A.] had already a very large membership not only here but in other parts of the country."³¹

Evidence of an increase in the number of P.P.A. councils throughout Ontario appeared in the contemporary press. Beginning in the spring of 1893, editorials and articles appeared in Liberal newspapers such as the *Globe*, the *Sarnia Observer*, and the *Hamilton Evening Times*, as well as in Catholic weeklies, attacking the principles and membership of the P.P.A. In many cases a bitter exchange took place between these newspapers and ultra-Protestant journals such as the *Mail*, the *Hamilton Spectator*, the *Forest Standard*, and the *London Free Press*, all of which took up the P.P.A. cause. The opposing newspapers, the *Globe* and the *Mail*, were probably the most active in disputing the worth of the P.P.A.

The *Globe*, a Liberal journal under the editorship of John Willison, had a special interest in exposing the P.P.A. because Sir Oliver Mowat's Liberal government was the butt of much of the P.P.A.'s venom. The ostracism of Catholics from public office, the *Globe* argued in one of its first attacks, "would only serve to intensify the evil against which the association is striving to contend."³² As the Mowat government approached the end of its term of office, the attacks of the *Globe* grew more shrill. Although the movement had probably obtained "the support of well-meaning people," nevertheless, the *Globe* stated, after "very little reflection" no man who supported Confederation could "conscientiously give his adhesion to a set of principles" which aimed at excluding Catholics from office.³³ The *Globe's* attacks on the P.P.A. were answered through the editorial columns of the *Mail*, where many letters from P.P.A. members were published attacking the *Globe* as the organ of Mowat's Liberal administration, a government

²⁹*Catholic Register* (Toronto), April 27, 1893.

³⁰This information is based on an exposé published in 1893: M. J. Brady, *A Fraud Unmasked: The Career of Mrs. Margaret L. Shepherd* (Woodstock, Ontario, 1893).

³¹Wallace Papers, C. W. Sawers to Wallace, Nov. 21, 1893.

³²*Globe*, March 27, 1893.

³³*Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1893.

which the ultra-Protestants accused of being in league with the "Romish hierarchy." One letter printed in November condemned the Liberal party in Ontario as "the tool of the priests," declaring that the P.P.A. was founded "to stop this political dealing with the Catholic vote."³⁴ Another described how the Catholic Church supposedly was able to control the government through the Catholic vote, which could turn a "minority into a majority purely for its own aggrandizement."³⁵

The announcement that the P.P.A. had nominated a candidate for the provincial by-election in East Lambton invited a declaration of war from the Liberal party, which placed its campaign under the control of J. D. Edgar, a prominent federal Liberal and close associate of Laurier. At the annual meeting of the Toronto Reform Association held in Toronto on November 21, 1893, Edgar condemned the existence of "a new weapon" being used "to stab Sir Oliver Mowat" and referred to the P.P.A. members as "emissaries of bigotry and hate."³⁶ As part of his campaign against the P.P.A., Edgar wrote several letters to the newspapers attempting to allay fears of an alleged Catholic influence on the Ontario government and pointing out as well the dangers of a militant Protestantism sweeping the nation. Edgar's letters to the press involved him in a debate through the *Mail* with Colonel William O'Brien, M.P. from Muskoka and a loyal follower of D'Alton McCarthy. O'Brien maintained that Edgar's attacks on the P.P.A. were not motivated by principles of tolerance but by political expediency. If the Roman Catholic Church were to confine itself to its spiritual functions, and not trade for votes, O'Brien concluded, there would be no need for the P.P.A.³⁷

Despite press hostility, by the autumn of 1893 the Protestant Protective Association had attained a place of influence. With an organization that had lodged itself firmly in most of the counties of southern Ontario and overflowed into some parts of Manitoba and Quebec, it was prepared to test its political strength. The P.P.A.'s unexpected victory in the Ontario by-election of East Lambton and its outstanding success in municipal elections rocked the country and disturbed the national conscience. The *Globe* saw the election of P.P.A. candidate P. D. McCallum in East Lambton as not only a setback for Mowat's government but a rejection of liberalism in its historic sense.³⁸ The French-language press was also quick to denounce the anti-Catholic society, *Le Monde* partly attributing its formation to a reaction against

³⁴Letter to the editor, *Mail*, Nov. 24, 1893.

³⁵*Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1893.

³⁶*The P.P.A. in Ontario, Extracts from Edgar's Letters.*

³⁷Letter of O'Brien to Edgar, printed in the *Mail*, Dec. 13, 1893.

³⁸Editorial on the East Lambton by-election, *Globe*, Dec. 4, 1893.

the fanatical ultramontane party.³⁹ By January 3, 1894, members of the P.P.A. had also been elected to the office of mayor in Brantford, London, Hamilton, Chatham, Kincardine, and Petrolia.⁴⁰ The *Montreal Witness* probably summed up best the feelings of many Canadians when it declared:

Wherever they [the P.P.A.] have run candidates of their own or wherever they have taken a special interest, they have carried the day by large majorities. Indeed it is the strength of the majorities which is most significant. . . . the general strength of the Association in Ontario is a thing which must be taken into serious account.⁴¹

As events were to prove, the P.P.A. had reached its peak. Its notoriety, at first restricted to Ontario, had spread throughout the Dominion, earning it the denunciation of two of the most prominent Canadians of the day, Lord Aberdeen and Wilfrid Laurier. Ever fearful of racial and religious strife in Canada, Laurier had approved of Edgar's speeches and public letters criticizing the P.P.A.,⁴² and in a speech delivered in Quebec City on January 4, 1894, the Liberal leader made a plea for civil and religious freedom. According to Laurier, the theory advanced by the P.P.A. that Catholics could not be good citizens because they owed their first allegiance to the Pope was "positively false." He quoted a letter of Cardinal Newman to the Duke of Norfolk which pointed out that while the Pope possessed supreme jurisdiction in spiritual matters, he claimed none in temporal affairs.⁴³ Speaking at the Toronto Board of Trade, Lord Aberdeen did not mention the P.P.A. by name, but spoke on a loftier plane, hoping that Ontario would take the lead in "promoting the broad, tolerant and sympathetic spirit" which he termed "the true and necessary result . . . of civilization . . . and especially of true Christianity."⁴⁴

These authoritative words did not fall entirely on deaf ears. The movement within the P.P.A. to bring about a moderation of oaths, which revealed itself at the Grand Convention of late January, 1894, showed that the more moderate members had been influenced by the flood of criticism. The P.P.A.'s third annual convention was held in

³⁹*Le Monde*, quoted in the *Globe*, Dec. 5, 1893.

⁴⁰*Globe*, Jan. 2, 1894. *London Free Press*, Jan. 2, 1894. *Hamilton Spectator*, Jan. 2, 1894. P.A.C., McCarthy Papers, W. G. Fee to McCarthy, Feb. 5, 1894. N. Robertson, *History of the County of Bruce* (Toronto, 1906), p. 459. *Sarnia Observer*, Jan. 12, 1894.

⁴¹*Montreal Witness*, quoted in the *Mail*, Jan. 4, 1894.

⁴²P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Edgar to Laurier, Dec. 25, 1893. In this letter, Edgar acknowledged Laurier's approval.

⁴³Speech of Laurier at Quebec City, Jan. 4, 1894, quoted in J. S. Willison, *Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party* (2 vols., London, 1903), II, 368-9.

⁴⁴Speech of Lord Aberdeen delivered at the banquet of the Toronto Board of Trade, quoted in the *Catholic Register*, Jan. 11, 1894.

the week of January 23 at the Y.M.C.A. Hall in Hamilton in order to celebrate its victories and to prepare for the expansion in the coming year. The onus was on the delegates to formulate policies which would make the P.P.A. an even stronger power in national politics. Grand Secretary Jackson Little declared that the society now had 49,799 members belonging to 439 councils throughout Canada.⁴⁵ Beneath such surface optimism, however, lurked differences of opinion which could not be suppressed. Moderate members, disturbed by the torrent of press criticism concerning the intolerance of the culmination oath whereby a member swore not to employ a Roman Catholic, voted to delete it. On the urging of newly elected Grand President J. C. Madill, the ritual was changed so that an initiate swore that he would not keep company with Roman Catholics, a revision which, of course, did not satisfy the moderates. Another revision of the ritual pledged members to "stand by the principles of this association and . . . loyally support the legal nominee of the order if such there be." In opposition it was argued that under this oath members would be compelled to vote for the nominee of the divisional council, and thus the action of ten or twelve men would control the votes of three or four thousand. Both these changes sowed seeds of dissension within the ranks of the P.P.A., creating divisions which eventually helped to destroy the society.⁴⁶

That Grand President Madill's leadership caused dissension became evident soon after the convention. One observer in Orangeville had predicted correctly that a victory for the Mowat government in the Ontario election would destroy the P.P.A.'s influence and added: "Ever since the Mayoralty contest here they are on the decline in this locality and also generally since they could get no better leader than Rev. Mr. Madill."⁴⁷ This dissatisfaction with the leadership of the P.P.A. was heightened by the results of the provincial election in June. The P.P.A. had concentrated all its energies for two years on an attempt to put Mowat's government out of office and their lack of success, despite the election of fourteen P.P.A. members to the legislature, was bound to have an adverse reaction on the rank and file, particularly since the society had carried the day in its first political ventures. Hence, members complained of "the bungling and mismanagement at headquarters" and singled out Madill as "not a large enough calibre to preside over an association of such large proportions as the P.P.A."⁴⁸

⁴⁵"The P.P.A. Convention," *Globe*, Jan. 25, 1894.

⁴⁶"The Complete Ritual, Initiation Service and Oaths of the P.P.A. as Amended by the Convention of 1894," *Globe*, Nov. 27, 1895. Cf. "Proceedings of the Grand Council, Change of Oaths," *Globe*, Feb. 23, 1894.

⁴⁷Wallace Papers, J. S. Leighton to R. S. White, M.P., Feb. 13, 1894.

⁴⁸Letter to the editor, *Mail*, July 17, 1894.

The lack of confidence in Madill and the resentment of the dictatorial control held by his clique over the affairs of the P.P.A. came into the open in November after the publication of an interview with Grand Treasurer E. J. McRoberts, chairman of the London Board of Education, in which he announced his resignation.⁴⁹ Like many other disenchanted members, McRoberts had been alienated at the January convention. He blamed Madill and his group for introducing "doctrines" which were designed to ostracize individual Roman Catholics; moreover, McRoberts specifically disagreed with the amendment requiring P.P.A. members to vote for the candidate in an election chosen by the divisional council. "There is a tendency towards disruption," he declared, "unless a big change is made in the administration."⁵⁰ The results of the municipal elections of late 1894 seemed to prove the validity of McRoberts' prediction. In an editorial the *Sarnia Observer*, a Liberal journal, commented, perhaps too enthusiastically, on the falling P.P.A. star:

Taken generally throughout the Province the P.P.A. experienced a set-back in the municipal elections. In Brantford, a city that was controlled by the members of that order last year, not one has been left to tell the tale. London wiped out the last trace of it when it left ex-Alderman Coe [prominent P.P.A. member W. C. Coe] at the foot of the polls, and elected a Liberal Mayor, and even Toronto came within a few votes of electing a Liberal Mayor.⁵¹

The rifts within the P.P.A. were carefully camouflaged during its 1895 convention, held in Toronto in late January. Trusting in the gullibility of the public, the Grand Executive endeavoured, through their carefully edited press release, to give the impression of a harmonious and expanding society. According to this release, the P.P.A. showed a total membership of 100,000 in 908 councils located in every province in the Dominion with the exception of Prince Edward Island. The wholesale turnover of officers, however, revealed that all was not well within the shrouded ranks of the society. Of the previous members of the Grand Executive only Grand Secretary Jackson Little was re-elected. The Grand Presidency went to Edward S. Busby of Southampton, a former Conservative.⁵² Busby's affiliation with the redoubtable D'Alton McCarthy, the powerful leader of the ultra-Protestant wing of the Conservative party who was attempting to organize an independent political organization called the McCarthyite League, made the new Grand President an important asset to the

⁴⁹"A P.P.A. Bombshell," *Mail*, Nov. 21, 1894, Cf. *Globe*, Nov. 22, 1894, London *Free Press*, Nov. 22, 1894.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹"The P.P.A. in the Municipal Elections of 1894," *Sarnia Observer*, Jan. 11, 1895.

⁵²"The P.P.A. Convention, 1895," *Mail and Empire*, Jan. 26, 1895, Cf. *Globe*, Jan. 23, 1895.

P.P.A. and was probably a strong factor in his election: if McCarthy could be brought into the P.P.A. fold the problem of leadership and respectability would be solved and the retreating tide of P.P.A. influence might be stemmed.

During the federal campaign of 1896, a rapprochement was indeed made between the P.P.A. and D'Alton McCarthy; however, this arrangement was on terms which benefited the McCarthyite League more than the P.P.A. Circular 226, which laid down the general strategy for the P.P.A. in the election, related that McCarthy had met with the Grand Executive and had guaranteed to support the P.P.A. platform. Hence, the Committee on Elections urged the nomination of P.P.A. candidates as McCarthy men "wherever practicable."⁵³ McCarthy had no intention, however, of obligating himself or his movement to the P.P.A. An official alliance could only alienate support for his League by tarring it with the brush of bigotry which many associated with the P.P.A.⁵⁴ As a result, he repudiated the idea that his organization and the P.P.A. had officially merged by stating in a letter to the *Globe* that he had "nothing whatever to do with" the Circular,⁵⁵ although he made it clear that he would welcome the voting support of the secret society providing no strings were attached,⁵⁶ support which his candidates duly received.⁵⁷

Despite the P.P.A.'s endorsement of McCarthy candidates, the results of the election proved that the vaunted power of the society was almost non-existent. Only two McCarthyites and one member of the P.P.A. were elected and the latter's victory could not really be

⁵³P.P.A. Circular 226, *Globe*, May 3, 1895.

⁵⁴A letter from the organizer of the McCarthyite League, W. G. Fee, to McCarthy reveals the policy of the League in regard to the P.P.A. Fee wrote that it "will never do to allow the association [i.e. the P.P.A.] to control our work. . . . There is no reason why, by judicious management, that they should do so. We must not play second fiddle to [any] society or organization. With the close of the Local Election in June [the Ontario provincial election of 1894] they will cease to be an officious factor and will fall into line and support us from principles." McCarthy Papers, W. G. Fee to McCarthy, Feb. 17, 1894.

⁵⁵McCarthy letter to the *Globe*, May 4, 1895.

⁵⁶Fee recommended to McCarthy that copies of McCarthy's dual language speech be sent to every P.P.A. lodge. McCarthy Papers, W. G. Fee to McCarthy, Aug. 1, 1894.

⁵⁷While McCarthy received P.P.A. support, he also made an arrangement with the Patrons of Industry and the Liberals whereby a number of constituencies in southern Ontario were divided up to avoid splitting the anti-Conservative vote. The revelation of this agreement was made by the disgruntled Patron Grand Secretary, L. A. Welch, who protested against the supposed non-partisan farmers' organization entering into such an alliance. Welch sent several letters between himself and Grand President C. A. Mallory, which traced the history of the negotiations, to the press. The *Mail and Empire*, June 6, 1896. For other details of the arrangement, see McCarthy Papers, W. G. Fee to McCarthy, July 4, 1896, and Laurier Papers, R. Cartwright to Laurier, Oct. 22, 1894.

attributed to the strength of the organization.⁵⁸ The complete bankruptcy of the P.P.A. was graphically revealed in a letter from Grand Treasurer T. M. Ovens to Clarke Wallace, suggesting the formation of a new secret, ritualistic, anti-Catholic association. This new society, according to Ovens, would have none of the weaknesses of the P.P.A. He hoped that its finances would allow the proposed society to maintain a permanent organization, and by gaining control of the Conservative organization, the problem of hostile treatment at the hands of the press would be overcome. The other major problem, the lack of a nationally prominent and able leader, would be solved for the new society by Clarke Wallace, "the Hero of the hour," whom the organization would make "Premier of Canada."⁵⁹ Ovens's appeal to Wallace went unheeded. Now reduced to the core of what had once been a well-supported movement, the P.P.A. survived for two more years in relative obscurity.

The political atmosphere in Canada changed in the period following 1896 as a result of the relative absence of divisive religious controversies and the consequent dwindling of the harsh strains of anti-Catholic nativism. The most decisive factor in dissolving the irrational ideas of a Catholic conspiracy probably was the resignation of Mowat, who accepted the Ministry of Justice in Laurier's government. His record of fair consideration of Catholic interests had won for the Liberal party the support of Ontario Catholics, as well as the condemnation of many Protestants who interpreted his friendliness as the sign of an unholy alliance with the Catholic hierarchy. No such tie of personal loyalty bound Catholics to Mowat's successor, A. S. Hardy. Hence, Protestant fears of a "solid Catholic" vote abated. Another factor was the burgeoning prosperity in the country.

The existing remnants of the P.P.A. did not find the new tolerant climate congenial to their survival. In the spring of 1897, the society received its last publicity when certain of its members became involved in a lawsuit centring on the responsibility for debts incurred by the organization. This action grew out of an agreement made by John McConnell and J. C. Madill, and Grand Secretary Jackson Little, whereby William Harding, a member of P.P.A. Council No. 2 in Sandwich, agreed to supply sets of lodge paraphernalia—a pair of scales, flags, two gavels, and a crucifix—to the P.P.A.; apparently two hundred sets were purchased for a total cost of \$1,500. Because Harding had

⁵⁸Laurier Papers, P. H. McKenzie to Laurier, July 10, 1896. In this letter, McKenzie, the defeated Liberal candidate, suggested that John Tolmie, the P.P.A. nominee, also had an endorsement from the Patrons of Industry as well as some support from the Liberal and Conservative organizations.

⁵⁹Wallace Papers, Ovens to Wallace, July 15, 1896.

received only \$900, he entered a suit against Little for the amount outstanding. Little's counsel, former P.P.A. stalwart O. E. Fleming, claimed that the former Grand Secretary was not personally responsible because he was merely carrying out the orders of the Grand Executive. The judge, however, ruled in favour of Harding who was awarded a judgment of \$400.⁶⁰ Little lost his subsequent appeal, and the action was dismissed without costs.⁶¹ This event revealed the P.P.A.'s almost moribund state and ended all hopes of survival. The small amount of press coverage accorded the P.P.A. during the trial shows that it no longer caught the interest of the public. The *Catholic Register*, the only journal to comment editorially on the trial, reflected public reaction to the exposure of the P.P.A.: "The P.P.A. dragon is burned But the post-mortem explanation that took place in the law courts over the cost of regalia showed that the dragon was stuffed almost from the beginning. . . ."⁶²

Despite occasional references in the press to the demise of the P.P.A. there is evidence that the Grand Executive, led by Grand President Busby, continued to exist at least until the court case in 1897.⁶³ After that time, however, the society dropped from view and very few references were made to it in the press. The indirect cause for the dissolution of the Grand Executive was probably the revealing evidence of the court case; the direct cause was the appointment of its leader, E. S. Busby, to the Canada Customs Service, an appointment which took him out of the country to Boston, and later to the Yukon.⁶⁴

After the defeat in the 1897 provincial election of A. F. Gurd and P. D. McCallum, members of the P.P.A. who had held both the Lambton seats for the society in the Ontario legislature, the *Sarnia Observer* declared that Lambton County had "dealt a death blow to the P.P.A. . . . the disgrace of the surrender of the Lambtons to the fanaticism of that unrespectable [organization] has been wiped out and Lambton can once again raise its head in pride."⁶⁵ It was a fitting obituary for the P.P.A., which had been catapulted into national prominence after its first major political victory in that same Lambton County.

⁶⁰For the P.P.A. trial, see the *Sarnia Observer*, March 26, April 9, 1897; *Hamilton Spectator*, April 10; *Mail and Empire*, April 7, 1897.

⁶¹*Globe*, Nov. 6, 1897; *Sarnia Observer*, Nov. 2, 1897.

⁶²*Catholic Register*, May 6, 1898.

⁶³Whitney Papers, A. E. Belcher to Whitney, April 3, 1897.

⁶⁴H. W. Morgan, ed., *The Canadian Men and Women of the Time* (Toronto, 1912), p. 180.

⁶⁵*Sarnia Observer*, March 4, 1898.

Reviews

Canadian

Dictionary of Canadian Biography. I. 1000 to 1700. Edited by GEORGE W. BROWN, MARCEL TRUDEL, and ANDRÉ VACHON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. xxiv, 755. \$15.00.

THIS IS THE FIRST VOLUME of a projected massive dictionary of Canadian biography, in parallel English and French editions, to be published in the tradition of the *Dictionary of National Biography* and the *Dictionary of American Biography*. Made financially possible by a bequest of the late James Nicholson, a Toronto businessman, for the English edition, and by the assumption by Laval University of responsibility for the publication of the French edition, the preparation of both has involved a vast amount of translation from each language into the other. Thus, all the biographies in this volume are in English, although many were originally written in French; the articles in the French edition are all in French, although many of them were originally written in English. But the problem of translation was only one of many: as explained in the "Editorial Notes" (pp. 2-4) there was a constant editorial problem, after the actual selection of the biographees, of the spelling and the rendering of proper names, especially those of Indians; there was the problem of cross-referencing which was admirably resolved; and the editorial usage in, and the translation of, quotations, the inconsistencies of the "old style" and "new style" calendars, and the untranslatability of certain French words and phrases all presented editorial problems of great difficulty. All these were excellently resolved, except that of dates: it surely would have been simpler, and much less difficult for the lay reader, to have translated all old style dates into new style, instead of leaving him to figure out the actual date of an event upon the basis of the practice in which "dates in those [biographies] based entirely on English documents can be assumed to be Old Style; and in those based exclusively on French, Portuguese, etc. sources will surely be New Style"—a practice at once both too pedantic and too vague to be practicable for the poor reader.

Apart from the General Introduction, the volume is prefaced by four brief introductory essays on "The Indians of North America" (with a "Glossary of Indian Tribal Names"), "The Northern Approaches to Canada," "The Atlantic Region," and "New France, 1524-1713." The inclusion of these essays is explained on the ground that they are intended "to provide for the biographies a framework of events and significant developments which will make many of them more understandable and meaningful," and the quasi-Turnerian principle that "all the societies and countries of the American hemisphere were created by influences and patterns of thought and action brought from Europe and remoulded under the relentless pressures of geography and circumstance in the New World; and it was

the people who, as individuals, families and groups, brought these influences and patterns . . . and reacted to the challenge of the new environment" (p. xix). These essays though brief, are, indeed, valuable. Chiefly historical in nature, they do provide a general setting for the biographies of the individual men and women who walked upon that stage. Inevitably, of course, many of the events and conditions described in the essays are of necessity repeated, often in more detail, in the individual biographies.

In contrast with the *Dictionary of National Biography* and the *Dictionary of American Biography*, in which the biographies appear in strictly alphabetical order throughout, which necessitates the preparation of supplementary volumes for the accommodation of the continuing flow of new names, the editors of this work wisely devised a plan according to which the *Dictionary* will be divided into volumes arranged chronologically, within each of which the biographies will be arranged alphabetically. The result of this plan is that the present volume, which covers the centuries from 1000 A.D. to 1700 A.D., is complete and, barring the discovery of omissions of people who should be in it, will never have to be rearranged to accommodate people of later periods who would have to be included in their alphabetical order. The addition of new volumes covering new chronological periods can go on forever, without any necessity for disturbing this one, or its successors. It is a very ingenious, convenient, and successful arrangement.

As for the biographies themselves, which are, of course, the real meat of the book, the ideal set before the biographers has been in each case "to provide not merely the essential factual material, but also an indication of the personality of the subject and the significance of the career" (p. xvii). The biographies were to be based upon source materials and were to be "interpretative in the best sense." They were expected to be "readable, objective, and fair," and they were to indicate the successes and the failures of the subject. Within the limitations imposed by space and available materials, the biographies were expected to be "independent and original treatments and not mere compilations of preceding accounts." Each biography was to include its own bibliography (these vary surprisingly in length).

It is to be noted that, for the total of 594 biographies in the volume, there were some 117 contributors—an average of about five articles for each contributor. In the main, the contributors have succeeded in achieving the standards set before them. One might cite as examples the biographies of Leifr heppni Eiriksson (Leif Ericson), of Louis de Baude de Frontenac et de Palluau (Frontenac), or of the Indian Otreojit ("Big Mouth"). The articles are well and interestingly written, and each one has its own bibliography, in addition to which the reader may refer to the very extensive General Bibliography at the end of the volume.

This volume of the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* is a resounding success; it is an invaluable contribution to the history and the biographical record of Canada in the years between 1000 A.D. and 1700 A.D. The editors are to be congratulated.

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Dictionnaire biographique du Canada. I. De l'an 1000 à 1700. Edité par GEORGE W. BROWN, MARCEL TRUDEL et ANDRÉ VACHON. Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1966. Pp. xxvi, 774. \$15.00.

LA RECENSION D'UN DICTIONNAIRE DE BIOGRAPHIE n'est pas chose aisée, surtout

lorsque le volume en question couvre une période qui nous est moins connue. Après plusieurs autres, nous rendons hommage à la générosité de M. James Nicholson, dont le legs financier est à l'origine de cette entreprise, et à l'activité de ceux qui ont été chargés de mettre en marche un projet d'une telle envergure. Signalons aussi que l'aide accordée par le Conseil des Arts du Canada a permis des éditions dans les deux langues en impliquant la collaboration de deux maisons d'édition universitaires: Toronto et Laval.

La tenue du premier volume annonce bien pour l'ensemble de la collection. Point n'est besoin d'insister longuement sur l'intérêt des articles introductifs qui encadrent une matière inégalement répartie sur sept siècles d'histoire mais particulièrement dense en ce qui concerne le XVII^e siècle. L'objectif d'un dictionnaire n'est pas de produire de nouvelles interprétations mais d'insister sur l'aspect hautement informatif des articles. La précision fondée sur l'utilisation des sources de première main en est le trait principal. En somme il s'agit d'une œuvre d'érudition. Sans avoir lu attentivement tous les articles, il nous a paru que leur qualité répondait en général à des normes assez élevées. Ceci prouve non seulement que les collaborateurs ont été choisis avec soin mais que les responsables du dictionnaire ont fait montre d'un effort critique considérable. Car les personnages du XVII^e siècle ont exalté les imaginations et déclenché parmi les historiens bien des embardées apologétiques. C'est un siècle autour duquel se sont développés tellement de mythes. A cet égard, l'article sur Marie de l'Incarnation a certainement occasionné des maux de tête aux éditeurs. Un effort supplémentaire était nécessaire pour en ajuster le ton à celui de la majorité des autres textes. La vénération que porte Marie-Emmanuel Chabot à son personnage l'a empêchée de se plier aux intentions de la collection. Mais tout cela est exceptionnel dans le dictionnaire. Même les textes sur les grands jésuites ont évité ces travers. En somme, en autant que son but premier est concerné: la qualité de l'information, le dictionnaire de biographie est un instrument de travail de première classe.

Il est un autre aspect éminemment positif qui apparaît à la lecture de ce premier ouvrage. Les renseignements qu'il fournit sur les individus et la qualité même des individus retenus dans le dictionnaire suggèrent des indications nombreuses sur la nature des élites et sur la structure sociale. L'emprise des valeurs nobiliaires y apparaît de multiples façons: l'origine noble de plusieurs immigrants, les efforts de plusieurs pour obtenir des lettres de noblesse, les usurpations de titre, les additions de *de*, les mariages, l'accès à la propriété seigneuriale, la participation au pouvoir, les différents mimétismes sociaux. Tout cela indique que l'équation: marchand égale bourgeois, n'est pas valable.

Source intéressante pour prendre contact avec les catégories professionnelles et indirectement avec les réseaux de valeurs, le dictionnaire n'a, il faut le dire, qu'une valeur partielle. D'autres sources restent plus fondamentales parce qu'elles renseignent sur les mêmes points et sur les structures des revenus. Mais tel quel, le dictionnaire offre une prise de vue significative. Les biographies des clercs fourmillent de faits qui révèlent la statut de l'Eglise dans la société et le rôle global du clergé dans la structure sociale. Nous n'en finissons pas de relever tout ce que ce premier livre contient et promet pour l'*histoire sociale*. Historiens et sociologues en feront certainement leur profit.

FERNAND OUELLET

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The Seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study. By RICHARD COLEBROOK HARRIS. Madison, Milwaukee, and London: University of Wisconsin Press; Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1966. Pp. xvi, 247, illus. \$10.00.

PROFESSOR HARRIS' WORK is a long-awaited one. For years now, rumours of a new, revisionist, and radical study of the seigneurial system have been bruited about the historical profession. This study fulfils some of the great expectations, although not all that were hoped for. The strength of the work lies in the author's not accomplishing the purpose set out in the title, that is, restricting the study to a geographic one. In fact, the great value of the work lies in its approach. This is the first serious and valid study of the early seigneurial system since the days of Munro. (This is written in the full knowledge of the works of Heneker, Frégault, Vanasse, and Trudel.) Harris defines his terms in the preface and sets out the purposes of his studies. He insists on the geographic element, but divides his materials so that economic-historical topics dominate. The meaning of the words *seigneur*, *censitaire*, *roture*, domain(e), and so forth are explained. Moreover, Harris correctly notes the futility of attempting to convert the monetary terms and values of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into current values. He insists on internal rather than modern criteria.

In the first chapter, "The Problem of the System," Harris sets out his revisionism. He is critical of the "ligne de force" interpretation of the seigneurial system. This *core* interpretation, he writes, has limited past studies. What he proposes is a geographic approach, by which he understands size, shape, and distribution of land holdings; the influence of inheritance; the amount of land controlled by individual seigneurs; and the spatial distribution of lands, and their owners and tenants. The chapter concludes on a rather strong note: "The seigneurial system was itself largely irrelevant to the geography of early Canada, and it is reasonable to conclude that it was equally irrelevant to the way of life which emerged there." (p. 8). The assertion is made, but from a geographic base never proven. If Harris means that the lay of the land and the flora and fauna had no effects on the agriculture and economic activities, then his maps and charts contradict him. If, however, he means that the patterns of land ownership and land production were influenced by more than mere geography, then one can agree with him.

In his section on "Land Division among the Seigneurs" Harris traces the patterns of grants from the earliest days of the colony to the end of the French régime. (The meaning of early Canada is never fully elucidated.) The grants, at first large, were later restricted in size and then after 1730 enlarged. This section on land grants is complemented by the next chapter, "Seigneurs' Control of Land," and the fifth chapter on seigneurial revenues. The author brings out a too often neglected aspect of the system—the subdivision of lands on the death of an owner with many heirs. This point, while valid, should also take into consideration multiple ownership of lands. Harris neglects to do justice to this aspect of the question. Another very valid point is made (p. 45) when he writes that it is difficult to class the owners of seigneuries as a distinct group. On the contrary, the seigneur was involved in a variety of agricultural and commercial activities. He errs, however, when he claims that empirical data for the social classification of the seigneurs do not exist. What is lacking is not data, but research. Harris tends to perpetuate the myth of the poverty of the seigneurs (p. 44). He cites a letter of the intendant and governor supporting the demand of Madame La Gardeur to a seigneurie. The lady in question, a resident of

Montréal, already owned a seigneurie. She was, as well, engaged in the manufacturing of blankets for the hinterland trade. For this endeavour she received a yearly subsidy from the state (*une gratification*). In a section on land speculation, Harris categorically states that "apparently none of the seigneurs who acquired several seigneuries was speculating in land" (p. 62). This *apparent* view is illustrated graphically in Figures 4-4 and 4-5. The evidence for this view is less than complete. For one thing, not all the documentary evidence on this point was consulted, in particular the records of the Domaine d'Occident. Some speculation, and very overt speculation, did take place. Moreover, speculation can take other forms than sales of seigneuries. From 1711 to 1731 the lands of 400 *censitaires* were reunited to seigneurial domains. These lands were cleared lands. They were reunited because the tenant could not produce a clear title. This is speculation at best, and exploitation at worst.

The chapter on seigneurial revenues is one of the most interesting, and at the same time one of the most disappointing. Finally an attempt has been made to give a concrete statement on land revenues. Each of the rights of the landowner is detailed. The shortcomings of the section are, again, the lack of evidence. Rather than present a detailed, seigneurie by seigneurie analysis, Harris has chosen to use quantitative analysis in aggregate rather than in particular. Table 5-1 uses a micromodel for *possible* revenues. This general model is then used to conclude that, on a whole, seigneurial revenues were low. The only use of macroanalysis is found in Tables 5-2 and 5-3, which concern church lands. Unfortunately, land owned by the church is a poor example.

The relative indifference of many seigneurs to their lands is brought out in chapter 6. Harris is here most critical of the old myths of the land dwelling resident owner. At this point, a table of absentee landowners would have been appreciated. The author then turns to an analysis of the *rotures*, their size, shape, value, distribution, and in the following chapter, to the uses of the land by the tenant farmers. His evidence is interesting, but too eclectic. The generalizations which follow, are for this reason, less than valid. It is unfortunate that most of the analysis is concerned with the period up to 1725, for it is in the Beauharnois-Hocquart régime, 1726-48, that the pattern of the seigneurial régime proves to be most destructive of old myths and interpretations.

What should have proven to be the most interesting chapter, "The Seigneurie as an Economic and Social Unit," is the least informative. Again the uncritical use of micromodels; "Fig. 9-1—Settlement pattern in a *hypothetical* seigneurie" (*italic added*) weakens the argument of the chapter. This section emphasizes geography and not economic and social units. The author's conclusion that the seigneurie was not a significant social unit is valid; all that is lacking to sustain the conclusion is proof.

The conclusion is followed by an appendix listing the seigneuries by governments, the footnotes, a glossary, and a bibliographical essay. Harris' critical bibliography is informative and to the point. Some of his statements are misleading, however. It is highly doubtful that "only the first volumes" of the B series are "indispensable readings" on the seigneurial system (p. 236)). On the contrary, all the volumes are. It is also doubtful that the index of the C^{11A} (Canada, Correspondance générale) is a sufficient guide to that collection. For one thing, the transcripts upon which the index was built are incomplete. The omission of the C^{11A} volumes on the Domaine d'Occident is unfortunate, as is the failure to mention (and consult?) the Collection de pièces judiciaires et notariales in the Archives de Québec.

One further comment: the now prevalent tendency of academic presses to put their footnotes at the end of a work is to be deplored. The economic rationalization of this pernicious habit has reduced the scholarly need of footnotes at the bottom of the page to a secondary and even a tertiary factor.

In spite of the reservations expressed, this is a valuable book: valuable because it is a modern pioneering effort. The work wedges open the door; further analysis firmly anchored in the particular and the concrete will push open the portal of that murky closet which is the seigneurial régime in New France.

CAMERON NISH

Sir George Williams University

Histoire de la pêche française de la morue dans l'Amérique septentrionale (des origines à 1789). By CHARLES DE LA MORANDIÈRE. Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose. 2 vols. 1962. Pp. 1022, illus.

CHARLES DE LA MORANDIÈRE's study is a valuable complement to our knowledge of the Atlantic fishery, since it differs from Innis' standard *Cod Fisheries* in scope, structure, and point of view. Innis attempted to view the fisheries in the context of the vast economic networks of the North Atlantic, the struggle for monopoly, and the clash of empires. M. de La Morandière's ambition has been more modest. As his title frankly indicates, he is concerned solely with French fishing activity in North America prior to 1789. The first section of this work is a systematic description of cod fishing methods. Detailed information is given on the construction and manning of vessels, and the techniques of catching, curing, and marketing the cod. In the second section the author recounts the evolution of the fishing industry from the time of the first discoveries. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are treated in particular detail. A survey of French coastal towns sending vessels to North America is followed by an account of their activities in various sectors of the New World: before 1713 in Acadia, Gaspé, Petit Nord, and Placentia; from 1713 to 1763 at Ile Royale and Ile St-Jean; and from 1763 to 1793 at St-Pierre and on the French Shore.

Although one cannot condemn an author for strictly defining his topic, one can perhaps regret that M. de La Morandière has been so unusually rigid in doing so. He seems to have consulted a bare handful of English documents, and even fewer English secondary sources. For example, Innis does not appear in his bibliography. By viewing his story almost totally through the eyes of French participants, he has distorted the crucial theme of international competition in the fisheries, which is seen only when English fishermen emerge from the distant mists to engage in "déprédations anglaises" and "violences anglaises."

The work is encyclopaedic and exhaustive, rather than discursive and controversial. The vast material has been masterfully organized, but synthesized to an inadequate degree. The author quotes documents at surprising length and blinds his readers with a duststorm of individual statistics, which they, lacking guidance, are at a loss to make meaningful. Thus while a reader with only a passing interest in the fisheries may well tire of these volumes, the specialist will find in them a valuable source of selected facts, figures, and quotations. Unfortunately the reference value of the work is marred by the omission of an index.

Within its own terms of reference, this study is an achievement of the most precise and rigorous scholarship. In the areas where I have worked extensively with the author's sources, I can attest to his thoroughness and accuracy in the

smallest detail. Hopefully this work will be valued highly among those contributions of foreign scholarship which have helped Canadians to understand their past.

University of California
Los Angeles

RICHARD ELPHICK

Letters from Hudson Bay, 1703–40. Edited by K. G. DAVIES, assisted by A. M. JOHNSON, with an introduction by RICHARD GLOVER. London: Hudson's Bay Record Society. 1965. Pp. lxviii, 455. Available to members only.

ANY LINGERING NOTION that the Hudson's Bay Company "slept at the edge of a frozen sea" during the first half of the eighteenth century should be dispelled by a reading of this volume. Although, as Professor Davies observes in his preface, the Company adopted "no purposeful policy of exploration and discovery" the life of the Company men on the Bay was exceedingly active. Their daily round is vividly depicted in Richard Glover's admirable introduction and emerges in detail from the documents. These were remarkable men, surviving from day to day on a routine in the strongest possible contrast with the mystery that lay beyond, in an environment of which they had very little certain knowledge.

The letters printed here are those surviving in the Company's archives that were written from the Bay in the years indicated. There are understandably some gaps; only four of the letters bear a date before 1714 and there is none for 1718, 1720, or 1721. The posts represented are Albany, York, Churchill, and Moose; obviously the series makes an important addition to what is available in print for the study of this period in the history of the fur trade. Such a volume would have been a delight to Arthur S. Morton, in whose classic *History of the Canadian West to 1870–71* much of this material was first used and to whose scholarly insight Glover's introduction pays generous tribute.

The seventy-nine letters and their generous annotation take up the greater part of the volume. The Hudson's Bay Record Society follows the civilized practice of placing footnotes where they ought to be. This is well for the reader, for it is hard to imagine more compelling notes than those that appear here, unless it be those in the introduction. Appendices provide lists of the governors and chiefs of Bay posts between 1697 and 1740, of ships sailing between England and Hudson Bay in the same period, of the cargoes sent to the Bay, 1713–28, and of the furs taken and goods loaded at the Bay posts. Still another appendix provides biographies of Henry Bayley, Anthony Beale, John Fullartine, Michael Grimington, Henry Kelsey, "The Slave Woman," and William Stewart. Like the index these are of the superlative quality that can be taken for granted in the work of Miss A. M. Johnson and the staff of the Company's archives.

L. G. THOMAS

University of Alberta

The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712–1857. By W. S. MACNUTT. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1965. Pp. xii, 305, illus. \$8.50.

The Atlantic Provinces is the first scholarly treatment of the history of the Atlantic region in the pre-Confederation era. Apart from the author's own history of New Brunswick, these provinces have been badly served by twentieth-century historians.

The impenetrable thickets of Beamish Murdoch, the antique prejudice of Judge Prowse, and the erratic meanderings of A. B. Warburton have had to serve as entrances into the histories of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island for the interested student. In this book (Volume IX in the publisher's Canadian Centenary Series and the fifth to appear), we are at last given a connected history of each of the Atlantic provinces that will be the indispensable introduction to the subject for some years to come.

The enormous volume of unexploited Maritime primary material is beyond the capacity of any one scholar to master, as Professor MacNutt observes, and he has therefore relied largely upon previously published work although original sources have plainly been drawn upon not only for New Brunswick but for other provinces as well. There are ten chapters, divided chronologically, the nineteenth-century chapters dealing with shorter time spans than those of the eighteenth century; within chapters, each province, in the main, is treated separately. The use of this form, rather than a thematic one, has led to a fourfold discontinuity without much compensating advantage, since rates of provincial development were uneven, and the historical experience of each society very different despite a generally similar geographic environment. "Perhaps dissimilarity recedes as the tale unfolds": perhaps, but this reader was not convinced, in the absence of direct argument in support of this tentative conclusion.

Professor MacNutt is interested chiefly in political and economic life, and their place in an imperial setting, although in the earlier chapters there is much on settlement, religion, diplomacy, and war. New Brunswick, naturally enough, is handled with greatest ease and conviction, but the narrative is clear and notably free of dogmatism throughout. What bias exists is on the conservative side, as in a defence of Wentworth against Cottnam Tonge, or in the warts-and-all picture of Joseph Howe. Newfoundland historians are gently chided for their sentimentality in relating the early tribulations of the island's people, and a mild claim is entered for the West Country point of view. Self-government was conceded prematurely to Newfoundland by a Whig administration beguiled "by the distant echoes of their own trumpets." Colonial reformers are taken down from their pedestals and assigned the normal motives of politicians. It is persuasively held that the shift to responsible government in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was "technical rather than fundamental" and brought no marked changes. A previous contention of the author's that New Brunswick attained the essence of responsible government fully eleven years before Nova Scotia, is here more firmly established. Jungles of interpretive confusion stemming from parochial enthusiasms and misconceptions have been cleared away, and in areas where past scholarship has been in conflict, as with Nova Scotia during the Revolution or the Maritime-West Indies-United States trading pattern from 1783 to 1820, there is illuminating summation and judicious re-evaluation. Dispassion and balance are not enough, however, to cope with still reverberating events like the Acadian expulsion. (Indeed, the Acadian community nowhere receives more than perfunctory attention.) Nor can it be said that the author rises to the imaginative challenge offered by great human movements like the New England, Loyalist, or Irish migrations, or gets much beyond old-fashioned church history in assessing the role of religion in community building, modes of behaviour, or dominant mental climate.

Although on the whole an authoritative guide to the literature on early Maritime history, *The Atlantic Provinces* does not draw upon some sources as fully as might have been expected and omits some important secondary sources altogether. Lunenburg, despite Winthrop Bell's remarkable study, gets only a few sentences. John Reeves (*History of the Government of Newfoundland, 1793*: still the basic

account) is cited only at one remove. Henry Alline's printed sermons show that it is scarcely precise to say that the political beliefs "if any" of the New Lights were "remote from the realities of the great revolutionary conflict." Levy's dehydrated history of the Baptists is a pale substitute for the earlier works of Saunders and Bill and for the spiritual biographies of primitive preachers like Harris Harding. The brilliant articles by Margaret Ells on political conflict between pre-Loyalist and Loyalist and on the strategy of patronage during the Wentworth régime have been overlooked entirely, as, apparently, have the subsequent contributions of J. M. Beck and S. D. Clark in the same field: instead, Murdoch and Sabine are cited. The Arms Fund and the connection D. C. Harvey revealed between it and Prevost's strengthening of the Church of England have not been mentioned. The numerous articles by Harvey and J. S. Martell on educational and quasi-intellectual history, many of them in Maritime journals difficult to come by, do not appear in the bibliography, nor do they appear to have been used. Andrew Clark's *Three Centuries and the Island*, a ground-breaking book, has been drawn on, but still awaits imaginative exploitation. The bibliography itself is quite inadequate, a particularly unfortunate failing in a field of history so little known to most Canadian scholars. It is regrettable that the series editors have not adhered to the standard initially set in this regard by G. M. Craig's volume on Upper Canada.

Many of the above deficiencies, and others not mentioned, arise from the attempt to squeeze a century and a half's history of five societies and four colonies into 270 pages of text. The imperatives of the series publisher apart, there can be no scholarly justification for this miserly allocation to Maritime history (nor for the terminal date of this volume, meaningless in a Maritime context). In terms of the relative importance of Maritime history in the period, and the complexity and relative unfamiliarity of much of that history; in terms of the radical disproportion between the meagre allotment to each Maritime province and the substantial share given to a single colony, Upper Canada, for a fifty-year period; and in terms of the current directions of pre-Confederation scholarship, including Professor MacNutt's own work in the history of New Brunswick, the decision of the editors of this series is indefensible. The present volume must stand as an unfortunate monument to their centralist outlook and assumptions. Nova Scotia alone, for much of the period, was in many respects a more important colony than Upper Canada; the condensation of its history into a fraction of this book is inexplicable. A richer, more complex, and more human history of early Canada can only come from an acceptance of the intrinsic importance of the histories of each of its colonial societies, no matter what their later fortunes, and from a willingness to concede that our divergences are as significant as our similarities.

S. F. WISE

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Thrust and Counterthrust: The Genesis of the Canada-United States Boundary.
By H. GEORGE CLASSEN. Toronto: Longmans Canada. 1965. Pp. xiv, 386, maps.
\$7.50.

THIS BOOK is a popular account in six long chapters of the genesis, settlement, and surveys of the boundaries between British North America and the United States. In addition there is an account of the maintenance of boundaries today. As an editor in the federal Department of Mines and Technical Surveys Mr. Classen possesses a surveying expertise that makes this a useful work for historians.

This book is also the product of wide research, much wider than the list of recommended readings would imply. Indeed on the Alaska boundary dispute the author has used manuscript sources apparently not previously used and evidently found in the Department of Mines and in the offices of the International Joint Commission. Because this book is avowed as "not a history for historians," sources are not cited, though references at the back of the book would have obviated a "veritable forest of bothersome numbers." In so far as a sampling of the large number of quotations could be checked they are accurately transcribed and accurately interpreted. The book is well indexed, but the five good maps are unindexed. Sentences and paragraphs are clear and vivid though marred by too many colloquialisms and slang expressions. The reader should also note that the preliminary conference setting up the Joint High Commission of 1898-9 is confused with the conference itself (pp. 325-6).

Mr. Classen emphasizes the descriptive and the dramatic; he is good on events and individuals in the field. He is less successful in relating them to an over-all meaning. His aim of "entertainment" has contradicted that of "enlightenment of our contemporaries." Thus the importance of the rather ludicrous Donald R. Cameron, son-in-law of Sir Charles Tupper, is magnified out of proportion. He is held responsible for what Classen calls the coastal doctrine—the doctrine that the word "coast" in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 means a line drawn along the edge of the islands bordering the continent and not the one joining the headwaters of the inlets on the continent itself. Was the theory in fact far-fetched? Lord Herschell at the Joint High Commission argued that the word "océan" had replaced the word "mer" in the Treaty of 1825, a substitution that distinguished the ocean proper from the salt-water inlets. The real problem in the coastal doctrine, however, is why the Canadian government adopted it in late February, 1898, when it had approved the opposite earlier in the month? It was yielding to public pressure because of the Yukon gold rush. In such circumstances the only diplomatically possible way of defending Canada's claim against the virtually unchallenged American occupation of the panhandle and American power was a juridical interpretation of the treaty.

Classen has not much to say about the exercise of American power and its ability to take advantage of Britain's pre-occupation elsewhere. Indeed a continuing analysis of long-term factors such as this would have given the book an over-all unity that is generally lacking. His use of predominantly American monographs also explains the frequent American bias of this book and the lack of analysis of Canadian suspicions against the United States and Britain.

Nevertheless I hope that the Russian-born Mr. Classen, fluent in Russian, German, and Spanish, having arrived in Canada from the Argentine only in 1959, will write another book. He will find that closer attention to the canons and form of historical scholarship will often give a book more than a temporary reputation.

NORMAN PENLINGTON

Michigan State University

The Icelandic People in Manitoba: A Manitoba Saga. By W. KRISTJANSON. Winnipeg: Wallingford Press. 1965. Pp. xx, 558. \$9.00.

MOST OF CANADA'S ICELANDIC IMMIGRANTS arrived between 1873 and 1914. In the beginning the Icelanders concentrated in the Manitoba interlake area, having been granted land for a colony, with the right to exclude non-Icelandic settlers, and

promised by Canadian immigration officials ". . . their language and their nationality, for themselves and their descendants, for all time" (p. 18). Even during their brief stay in Ontario they were permitted to organize Icelandic language schools. Very quickly, however, they gave up the concept of a colony and became instead an immigrant group successful by Canadian standards: extensively urban, reasonably well educated, usually prosperous or prospering, and assimilated to Canadian institutions and ways. John Porter, in *The Vertical Mosaic*, includes two Icelanders (Byron Johnson and Joseph Thorson) in his political élite of 157 members—a small number, but not small in relation to a total representation of five "ethnics." Although not one of the "founding races" or "charter groups," the Icelanders seem to have become one of the "managing races," albeit so junior in the partnership as to be insignificant. Still, an explanation of this relative success would be of great interest. It cannot be explained by numbers. The 1961 census lists only 30,623 Icelandic Canadians, concentrated in Manitoba but in part dispersed throughout the dominion. The upward mobility factor of the group rests on other considerations. Unfortunately this type of question receives very little attention in *The Icelandic People In Manitoba: A Manitoba Saga*.

The subtitle of the volume reveals much about its nature for Mr. Kristjanson has written a saga, "a story of heroic achievement." The book is about the success of the Icelanders. Success is described but not analysed. We learn that the early Icelanders possessed the usual pioneer virtues of honesty, perseverance, thrift, and the ability to work hard, but we learn little of the process whereby men prospered and rose to positions of eminence first within the Icelandic community and then in the larger Canadian one. We learn little about the structure of the Icelandic community either in the beginning or now. For example, while we are told about the success of G. F. Jonasson and the Keystone Fisheries, we are not told about the grimness of the interlake fishing towns. It is not possible to understand the interlake area without knowing more about its poverty and the depressed nature of its fishing industry than we are told.

None the less Mr. Kristjanson has written a useful work. He has collected and preserved a mass of invaluable material about one of our oldest ethnic communities and its various settlements. Much of the book is concerned with the pre-1914 period. This material will be useful to any student of Canadian immigrant groups or Canadian immigration policy. Some Icelandic Canadian institutions, especially churches, newspapers, and clubs, receive a fair amount of attention. This material too will be of lasting importance. Other studies have illuminated the history of Manitoba's Mennonites, Hutterians, Ukrainians, and Jews. Without such studies the very complex story of the Manitoba mosaic is incomprehensible.

DONALD SWAINSON

Queen's University

Sinews of Steel: The History of the British Columbia Dragoons. By R. H. Roy. Brampton: Charters Publishing for the Whizzbang Association. 1965. Pp. xiv, 468, maps, illus. Available from British Columbia Dragoons, Kelowna, B.C.

IT IS A PITY that there is a strong tendency to regard regimental histories as examples of special pleading, rationalizing mistakes and presenting information more in the form of a memorial than a critical analysis. That these strictures do apply to a considerable number of regimental histories is undoubtedly true. But occasionally a work appears in this field that combines scholarship with shrewd

insight into the practical aspects of soldiering, failures as well as successes, and Professor Roy achieves this distinction with his fine account of the British Columbia Dragoons.

There is much in this book of interest to others than those directly concerned with the regimental record. The social historian will find suggestive comments on the relationship of a militia unit to its community, the social strata from which it draws its officers and recruits, and its contact with overseas populations. The economic historian will find detailed confirmation, at the fighting level, of the high cost of military machines and the consequences of curtailed expenditures in periods of economic depression. The politically minded historian will find interesting evidence of the activities of Sir Sam Hughes, vacillations in governmental policy, and the clash of personalities.

Roy has traced the varied roles of the Dragoons: originally raised as cavalry in the Okanagan, committed to battle as infantry in the First World War, reorganized as cavalry, converted to motorcycles, and finally mounted in tanks during the Second World War. The descriptions of the Dragoons' training in the United Kingdom and their subsequent battles in Italy and northwest Europe are clear and convincing. One interesting point emerges—the relatively detailed descriptions of training exercises in England contained in the commanding officer's letters to his wife in Canada and written at a time when all ranks were being exhorted to observe the tightest security!

Some minor errors mar the history: for some reason the name of Mackenzie King is frequently hyphenated; in one reference the name of the historian of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in the First World War is mis-spelt; Nijmegen is on the Waal, not the Rhine, and the Neder Rijn does not really provide a "moat" for Arnhem. It is also strange to read that Montgomery "advised" the Canadian army commander of future operational commitments—Monty's directives were always given in the form of crystal clear, unequivocal instructions.

These are small matters in a regimental history of such high quality. Roy has made another notable contribution to the growing library of Canadian military records. (He had previously written the history of the Canadian Scottish in the Second World War.) In particular, he has avoided the normal tendency to gloss over episodes in which the regiment, or its commanders, were not at their best.

The excellent maps were prepared by Major C. C. J. Bond and S/Sgt. E. H. Ellwand, who have few equals in the field of military cartography.

T. MURRAY HUNTER

Carleton University

Great Britain and the Commonwealth

The Habit of Authority: Paternalism in British History. By A. P. THORNTON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: George Allen & Unwin. 1966. Pp. 402. \$7.50.

PROFESSOR THORNTON begins his book with a characteristic epigram that "most history is the history of what the thinker thinks important" (p. 16). In his case, being a student of the history of the British empire, he believes that certain traits of English character—the habit of authority and its complement, the habit of deference—have much to do with its history. Having studied the ways in which Englishmen imposed their authority overseas, Professor Thornton decided to study

how they did it at home, from William the Conqueror to Mr. Harold Wilson. His book is neither a monograph nor a textbook—being too thin on footnotes and archival research for the one, and too sprightly and urbane for the other. Rather it is a collection of thoughtful and attractively written essays, arranged in more or less chronological sequence and based on a wide if not quite up-to-date reading of the chief works in British political history.

His theme “is the continuity of paternalism and its attitudes in the face of the rising principle of democracy” (p. 17). It was not until the eighteenth century—apart from that unnatural occurrence, the Puritan Revolution—that the voice of democracy (in an American accent) “arrested the attention of the ruling classes of England” (p. 99). They learned little from this experience, however, and not much more from the French and Industrial Revolutions. If I understand Professor Thornton correctly, they hardened their hearts and grew a bit cynical—thus weakening the “old solidarity that had based itself on the loyalty owed to a genuinely paternalist authority” (p. 173). To meet this state of affairs the Victorian governing classes became what Professor Thornton calls an “Ascendancy”—a caste which sought “to harden rather than weaken aristocratic codes of behaviour” (p. 227) by inculcating these in middle-class parvenus by means of the public schools. No longer exclusively landed in its composition, the Ascendancy survived into the twentieth century, becoming an “unprincipled system” (p. 294), trampling on the “fractured hopes” of Joseph Chamberlain and “the lost ideals of Lloyd George” (p. 310), and producing no man of the people like William Jennings Bryan or “progressive figures” (p. 310) like Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, indeed producing little in the way of genuine leadership down to 1939. In the 1950’s, the Ascendancy, which had been identified with the Conservative party ever since Bonar Law’s day, “petrified into an Establishment” (p. 367), the latter being less independent of the people who had won the right “to license a political party to administer a paternalist state on their behalf” (pp. 364–5). As Professor Thornton sees it, although the Labour party under Mr. Wilson is not part of the Establishment, it scarcely differs from the Tories in its paternalist outlook.

This bald summary does less than justice to two aspects of Professor Thornton’s book. First, his frequent and spirited excursions for comparative purposes into American, Canadian, and Scottish history. The ease with which he moves in these several realms is impressive, and the comparisons drawn—especially with Scottish society—are illuminating. The second is Professor Thornton’s point of view. That he prefers Coleridge to Bentham becomes clear in an interesting discussion of nineteenth-century thinkers. He faults the Benthamites and the Fabians for ignoring the deficiencies of rationalism; and he deplores the materialism and “the mass readership for mass-produced rubbish” (p. 369) of the welfare state. But he is not enough the Coleridgean to contemplate happily the reluctance of the mass of men to become political activists.

It is a matter for gratitude that Professor Thornton has a point of view. But it would have suited some tastes better to have had something less of evaluation and something more of analysis—something more of the problems of how it all worked. Although the English landed aristocracy was not alone among aristocracies in ruling authoritatively over a deferential people, its success has been remarkable. What conditions favoured this success? If it was not overthrown by popular forces—as Professor Thornton implies it was not—precisely what happened to it and when and why? In particular, what became of its habit of authority? And conversely, what happened to the habit of deference? Professor Thornton seems rather incurious about the vast stretches of English society outside the upper classes. He writes his history—so far as England is concerned—much as conventional

historians have done, from the vantage point of London intellectuals and parliamentary politics. He therefore leaves the unfortunate impression that popular transformations were of small consequence to the affairs of the great. Yet they left their mark on them as two recent studies make clear—Dr. Vincent's on the formation of the Gladstonian Liberal party and Professor Beer's on the differences between the modern Conservative and Labour parties. Some notice of these matters might have made a useful addition to Professor Thornton's book.

DAVID SPRING

Johns Hopkins University

British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole. By DANIEL A. BAUGH. Princeton University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1965. Pp. xiv, 557. \$12.50.

SIR CHARLES WAGER, the old jack tar First Lord of the Admiralty, set the tone for Britain's naval war with Spain in 1739—"A man who would not fight for a galleon would fight for nothing"; and, indeed, the war lives on in tradition as a triumph of private interest over the public good—a badly planned grabbing after loot, of which Anson's misconceived and (privately) fantastically profitable buccaneering expedition around the world is the epitome.

None the less, as Dr. Baugh demonstrates in great detail in this excellent book, the war of 1739–48 was a turning point in the struggle to establish the public interest as the primary focus of naval administration. Already, in the long peace of 1713–39, the essential sinew of war—a sound financial system—had been built up, and the means of channelling it effectively to the service of the navy was developed with remarkable speed in the early years of the struggle, to the degree that fleets of unprecedented size could be maintained in foreign waters with hardly an interruption in any of their vital supplies (save that of seamen), and the enormous predominance of British naval might in home waters secured even before the decisive battles off Finisterre in 1747. Once the money was assured, the other supplies were forthcoming. No longer were there awkward shortages leading to administrative and strategic failures. Instead, the shortcomings in the navy and subordinate boards, in the dockyards, overseas bases, victualling service, and naval finance, were those of the generous waste and corruption of a successful administration which used money and waste to buy the essential efficiency of the fleet at sea. Parliamentary critics at the time, and administrative historians since, persisted in mistaking purity for efficiency. Dr. Baugh, however, rightly pays tribute to those far-seeing administrators (of whom Anson was the most important) who emphasized that the essence of good administration lay not so much in reforming the offices of administration (which reform would have run counter to the institutionalized prejudices of the ruling classes in any case) as in breathing a spirit of enterprise and accomplishment into those offices.

The one paradoxical failure was in the recruiting of seamen, a failure that, as Dr. Baugh points out, badly warped naval administration. British commerce, that excessively protected "nursery of seamen," failed to produce the men, and Parliament failed to provide the incentives to raise a trained reserve. It was not a lack of money, but a refusal to acknowledge that the nursery of seamen had failed, that stood in the way. Hence the navy had to fall back on coercion, and the liberties of Englishmen were protected from foreign attack by fleets of floating prisons.

Dr. Baugh's management of his subject is masterly—whether he is discussing the complex manning problem, the technicalities of naval finance, the irregularities in the dockyards, or the minutiae of the victualling service. His account is enlight-

ened by a clear style and a sure instinct for the underlying administrative significance of the details. The work will certainly become a classic for all students of naval administration.

JOHN NORRIS

University of British Columbia

Government and the Railways in Nineteenth Century Britain. By HENRY PARRIS. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1965. Pp. xii, 244. \$5.75.

HENRY PARRIS HAS PUBLISHED WORK on the railway policy of the Peel administration and selections from the diaries of General Sir Charles Pasley, one of the first of the railway inspectors. He has also contributed to the scholarly debate on the nineteenth-century revolution in government with criticism of the views of A. V. Dicey and Oliver MacDonagh. The book at hand is based directly on his 1959 doctoral thesis for the University of Leicester. Its theme is the regulation of railways by British government and it focuses on the establishment and development of the railway sections of the Board of Trade in the 1840's and 1850's and on their operation. Despite its title, the book has little to say of other decades. In effect it is a case study of the early development of modern administrative practice and of the regulatory function of the modern state. What other historians have undertaken to demonstrate with respect to the growth of state action in the fields of factory reform, popular education, poor relief, prison organization, coal mines, and public health, Dr. Parris reviews with reference to railways. His general conclusions confirm what has been found in these other areas. Government intervention and control together with the vital role played by administrators in these important areas make it evident that exceptions to *laissez-faire* were after all not so exceptional. By 1854 the railway department was one of sixteen departments, all of them equipped with powers of inspection and regulation, employing delegated legislative powers and quasi-judicial authority, and exercising a powerful influence on the legislative process in parliament. Indeed, it all sounds very modern.

The pioneers of the modern bureaucratic state, such as Sir Charles Pasley, seem scarcely to have been conscious of any novelty in their endeavours. As Parris shows, railway regulation was an exception well within the early nineteenth century's understanding of classical economics and utilitarianism. Railways, it quickly became evident in the 1830's and 1840's, had a strong, inherent tendency toward monopoly; and monopoly was one of the things the age agreed needed control. Then too the pioneers were largely unaware of breaking new ground since the whole development of railway regulation was a practical, common-sense response to immediate and pressing problems—particularly problems of public safety which were dramatically highlighted in a series of appalling railway accidents. Intervention on behalf of the railway-using public beginning with the establishment of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade in 1840 was therefore no surprising phenomenon; its appearance and growth illustrate the pragmatic and undogmatic flexibility of British government and administration in the middle decades of the century and its capacity for improvising significant new devices to meet new situations. On the whole Dr. Parris finds that the railway bureaucrats did very well. The railway companies too secure high marks. In general the growth of government control was accompanied by a remarkable degree of co-operation on the part of the entrepreneurs. Hostility was not unknown but "the more fundamental pattern was one of emerging partnership" in the

interest of the public weal. Parris' book is solidly based on extensive research in the records of the railway department and the Board of Trade, the private papers of all the major political figures involved, and the records of the railway companies of the period. The work illuminates many aspects of the history of public administration and makes a sound contribution to an important area of nineteenth-century British studies.

H. W. McCREADY

McMaster University

Balfour's Burden: Arthur Balfour and Imperial Preference. By ALFRED GOLLIN. London: Anthony Blond [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1965. Pp. x, 293. \$9.90.

ALL THAT IS NEW AND USEFUL to the professional specialist in this book could have been said in an article; but students of English politics will find it a fascinating tale of feuds and intrigues in the "corridors of power." Its centre-piece is a new and convincing explanation, derived from the private papers of most of the key men concerned, of how and why Arthur Balfour ditched or lost five ministers in September, 1903. This analysis is set between superficial accounts of domestic and imperial problems before the cabinet crisis occurred and a brief examination of what followed: the tariff reform campaign, and the Unionist coalition's decline and electoral defeat in 1906.

Dr. Gollin once and for all debunks the once widely held myth that Balfour was intellectually aloof and a dilettante in politics. He was both ruthless and able in his pursuit of what he saw to be in the national interest. In ditching both preference men and free traders he made the most of an unenviable burden handed to him by Joseph Chamberlain. He managed to keep his party in office until he had succeeded in clinching an alliance with Japan and made important contributions to imperial defence. Dr. Gollin assumes unconvincingly that the press influences significantly the public at large as well as politicians. However, he exposes thoroughly the machinations of politicians and publicists to influence public opinion on the question of imperial preference. His account of Lord Northcliffe is particularly revealing. So too is his examination of the Treasury's role in the 1903 crisis. He argues that the free-trade chancellor, Charles Ritchie, did much not only to thwart Chamberlain but also to embarrass Balfour who after all was prepared to see an advantage in adopting retaliatory tariffs if not outright preference. But had Dr. Gollin examined the papers of Sir Edward Hamilton, the Treasury's secretary in charge of finance, he might have discovered that Ritchie was but a creature of the permanent officials.

Although the portrait of Balfour is convincing that of Chamberlain is not. Dr. Gollin is inclined to accept the assessment of Chamberlain and his motives handed down to us by members of the young group of imperial idealists such as J. L. Garvin and L. S. Amery who so much admired the colonial secretary. Chamberlain was not essentially a visionary prepared to gamble all to achieve imperial preference as a first step toward imperial unity. He was a man disillusioned with office, made tired by its demands, annoyed with his conservative colleagues, and embarrassed politically by the Education Act of 1902 passed while he was recovering from a serious accident. (Dr. Gollin ignores the adverse effect that act, through which Balfour provided aid to church schools, had on one of Chamberlain's main sources of political support—the nonconformists). These pressures and Chamberlain's impulsive nature led him to act impetuously, to attempt to recoup his political fortunes and escape the rigours of office by foisting upon the Unionist

coalition a controversial policy without first obtaining prior tangible commitments (as the records of the 1902 Colonial Conference reveal) from the self-governing colonies.

Dr. Gollin makes some shrewd remarks about cabinet government, but it is the personalities who use its institutions that draw his attention. He is, for example, more concerned to show how politicians will exploit trade statistics to prove preconceived notions than to examine why a data-gathering system cannot provide a definitive assessment of the merits of free trade or imperial preference. His proven ability to examine the sources and uses of power among Britain's ruling élite has established him as a foremost authority on twentieth-century British political history. However, this book does not quite reveal the sureness of touch demonstrated in Dr. Gollin's works on Garvin and Alfred Lord Milner.

ROBERT KUBICEK

University of British Columbia

John Buchan: A Biography. By JANET ADAM SMITH. London: Rupert Hart-Davis [Toronto: Ambassador Books]. 1965. Pp. 524, illus. \$12.75.

JOHN BUCHAN died in 1940, and his world—the world of Lord Milner and T. E. Lawrence, the world too of Richard Hannay and Edward Leithen—now seems far away. Janet Adam Smith has taken a long time to write her official biography, and it is the better for it; but it has a nostalgic quality which it would not have had if it had been published even a decade ago.

Buchan visited the University of Toronto in (I learn from the book) 1924; and I recall the boy I have left behind me pointing out to him that a quotation on the university war memorial derived not from *Pilgrim's Progress* but from *Mr. Standfast*, and being properly shaken when the visitor was heard to say, "As a man of letters I'm a farce." Buchan came back to Canada as Lord Tweedsmuir in 1935, and the manner of his coming was the measure of his success and his failure. His ambitions had clearly been primarily political. He would doubtless have liked to be prime minister. He attained the Commons, but never the cabinet; and he died the highly successful constitutional governor of the senior dominion. In his career, with all its distinctions, there was a good deal of failure to achieve the very first rank. In 1899 he failed of election to a fellowship at All Souls. Disappointed and angry, he said he would never try again; yet he did try again next year, and again he failed. He would have appreciated formal recognition of the important work he did in the First World War; but they would not give him a K.C.M.G., and he seems to have felt himself too good to be a mere knight bachelor. These things are symbolic.

His story is a tale of two cities: Glasgow and London. He was a child of the manse and, actually, of the Gorbals; but he went to Oxford and got involved with the best people—or almost the best. He married a Grosvenor—not one very close to the family dukedom, but close enough for the Duke to lend his coach for the wedding. He became too anglicized for the taste of some of his Scottish countrymen. But his Scots nature appeared in his vast industry; at the age of 17 he had produced an edition of Bacon's *Essays* for a London publisher, the first of the 68 books he wrote as mere incidentals to an active career in business and politics. No Englishman ever worked as hard as that.

If Tweedsmuir's Canadian career was a second-best for him, nevertheless he worked as hard at it as he did at everything else and made it a very good best. Clearly the heaviest cross he had to bear was his prime minister. In his dealings

with Tweedsmuir, Mackenzie King appears at his pettiest, and that was very petty indeed. Miss Adam Smith does not quote much of their correspondence, but to anyone who knows something about King her account of the relationship rings painfully true. Perhaps Tweedsmuir's Scots heredity really did help him in Canada. He seems to have liked and understood the country. What may be called his final word about it (addressed to the King in 1939) was: "The crying need for Canada is for some national leader who would really guide the thought and touch the imagination of the whole country." That may seem a rather ordinary observation, but how many native sons today would deny that His Excellency had a point?

He was a teller of tales in the tradition of the great Scots romancers; he wrote two really excellent historical novels—*Witch Wood* and *The Blanket of the Dark*—and some good biographies; and he refused to take his writing seriously, though perhaps it was really for this that destiny had marked him. He deserved a good biography of his own, and Miss Adam Smith has produced it: thorough, honest, and beautifully written. Buchan, an essentially honest man himself, would probably have winced here and there, but would nevertheless have approved of it.

C. P. STACEY

University of Toronto

The Transfer of Institutions. Edited by WILLIAM B. HAMILTON. Durham, N.C.: For Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center by Duke University Press. 1964. Pp. xii, 312. \$8.00.

WITH THE EMERGENCE OF COLONIAL AREAS into self-governing nations and the development of new institutions of society to accord with the new status, the need has arisen for a closer look at the ways established systems have adjusted to their new environment. Nowhere has this development been clearer than in Commonwealth areas where well-established structures and patterns of colonial life based upon British models made for easier adaptation since the theory, if not the practice, had been to anticipate maturation into autonomous life and direction.

While familiar forms are to be found in reproduction, experience has shown that there are increasing variations in institutions so that it is not so much a matter of transplantation as transformation as Daniel Lerner points out in his opening chapter of the study under review here. It is in this opening chapter that the theoretical foundations of this compilation are laid. Succeeding chapters elaborate upon the theme with illustrations from government, economics, agriculture, education, law, trade unionism, and military history. As is usually the case in compilations the approaches of the individual authors vary widely and except for the general theme there is little integration. Geographically the spread deals with Canada (two chapters), India (five chapters), and Africa (two chapters). Some chapters are specialized and detailed in approach such as Robert Crane's study of Indian education, Professor Elder's case study of the Brahmins, and the study of trade unionism in British Africa by Professor de Vyver. Professor Brady on the other hand writes in broad terms on the transfer of parliamentary polity from Britain to Canada in which he reviews much political history which is second nature to Canadian readers. Professor Preston's essay on "The Transfer of British Military Institutions to Canada in the Nineteenth Century," while not as familiar as that of Professor Brady, likewise does not traverse new material. One of the longest and in some respects the most thoughtful of the contributions is that of M. Yudelman on the "Problems of Raising African Agricultural Productivity."

With so wide a compass and such varying subject matters it is hard to make a meaningful review except to express the hope that readers seeking some insights

on these themes may be led to further speculation. Unfortunately in some of the cases bibliographical leads to other materials on the topics have not been suggested but in some the footnotes should prove most helpful.

LIONEL H. LAING

University of Michigan

Economic Enquiry in Australia. By CRAUFURD D. W. GOODWIN. Durham, N.C.: For Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center by Duke University. 1966. Pp. xviii, 659. \$12.50.

THIS BOOK IS AS IMPRESSIVE AS IT IS MASSIVE. Professor Goodwin sets out to study the evolution of economic thought in Australia up to about 1929 and he emphasizes the adaptations, modifications, and developments which major European and American theories underwent at the hands of Australian politicians, publicists, popularizers, and professors. It is astonishing, to this reviewer at least, that anyone could have found out so much about Australian economic history after only six months' residence in the country. He is one onlooker who has seen, and shown to those who care to read, most of the game. Resident experts in the field will learn much from him.

Some idea of the scope of the enquiry is suggested by the major chapter headings: "International Commerce" (Protection and Free Trade theories), "Land Disposal and Taxation," "Banking and Currency," "Economic Fluctuations," "Transport Development," "The State and Economic Growth," "Evolution Theory and Social Thought," "Labor and the Economy," "Population Studies," "Economic Statistics," "Two Pioneers of Macro-Economics" (Alfred de Lissa and Sir Anthony Musgrave), "Economics in the Universities," and "Growth of a Discipline."

In such a vast area of enquiry it is perhaps nearly inevitable that the writer should see more of the innumerable individual trees than of the shape of the forest as a whole. One feels that hardly a single comment made in the Australian continent on economic ideas has gone unchronicled, but the over-all pattern of development in economic thought comes out slightly less clearly. It is to be hoped that this relative absence of a unifying coherent theme or "argument" will not lead economic historians to undervalue the book. Those interested in Australian history will do so at their peril.

It is extremely interesting to learn that Australian economic thinkers in the last century were not always mere borrowers or adapters of ideas worked out by influential theorists in Britain or elsewhere. Goodwin demonstrates, for example, that Alfred De Lissa, a tolerably obscure Sydney lawyer, worked out most of the basic features of the multiplier theory a full seventy years before J. M. Keynes and others did so in the 1930's. Sadly but realistically he notes too that the absence of a sufficiently informed and interested audience in the provincial antipodean environment condemned De Lissa's work to virtual oblivion. Yet the same, relatively simple environment itself constituted an important stimulus to his thought.

Despite its bulk, the book is so clearly and attractively produced that it is a pleasure to read. It is thoroughly documented and indexed and the footnotes appear where they should—at the bottom of each page. Australian readers will wish that local publishers would follow at least this admirable American example.

RUSSEL WARD

University of New England
Armidale, New South Wales

The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of British Colonial Policy between the Wars. By KENNETH ROBINSON. London: Oxford University Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1965. Pp. viii, 95. \$3.50.

DR. KENNETH ROBINSON'S REID LECTURES OF 1963 provide a model of what such lectures should be and say more about their subject than does many a big book. In fact there is no big book on the subject he has chosen, British colonial policy between the wars, and it is to be hoped that the author of this brilliant *aperçu* will make it his future business to produce one, regardless of the customary cry that no definitive work can be brought out until the Colonial Office documents, at present available to 1921 only, are opened. If these archives do not confirm the judgments that Dr. Robinson here presents, everyone, not excluding the guardians of these files, will be very much surprised. As it is, the material provided in the notes to the three chapters of this book is enough to start off a host of research students along avenues of reward.

In examining the doctrine of trusteeship Dr. Robinson looks first at its imperial context, then at the administrative institutions that were designed to express it, and lastly at the dilemmas which the very nature of a paternalist responsibility imposes on those who have (or at least who considered that they had) to carry it. He makes a close examination of the economic structure of the British colonial system: this has been done before, but has never been so expertly related to both policy and to social development in the colonies themselves. He draws on his knowledge of the administrators, using to great effect the material set forth so engagingly in Sir Ralph Furse's study of a civil service under another sun, *Aucuparius* [a layer of nets]. Dr. Robinson has an ironic style and a sharp eye for the anomalies that dogged both the policy and the various attempts to execute it, and does not forget to relate these to the background of democratic apathy against which any idea of colonial service had to work in the interwar years. But in sum it is a warm-hearted, humane account of something that itself was, in essence, also humane and warm-hearted. Dr. Robinson's conclusion will be unpopular in a number of places, since it shows his conviction that the world is rather worse than better for the loss of the very idea of service: "The dilemmas of trusteeship remain, as the young Churchill wrote of East Africa more than half a century ago, 'the problem of the world.'"

A. P. THORNTON

University of Toronto

Europe

The Cambridge Medieval History. IV. The Byzantine Empire. Part I, Byzantium and Its Neighbours. Edited by J. HUSSEY. Second edition. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1966. Pp. xl, 1168. \$28.00.

GIBBON WROTE OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE as a disgraceful postlude to the fall of Rome. Since his day, a devoted and growing fraternity of Byzantinists has applied its talents to prove him wrong and to rescue for us this neglected and undervalued chapter of human experience. It is typical of the zeal of Byzantinists that, thirty-odd years after the original volume IV of the *Cambridge Medieval History* was published, they should supply a wholly rewritten and greatly expanded replacement—certainly the only volume of the series likely to be replaced

for a long time to come. Still to appear is the second instalment, devoted to Byzantine government, church, and civilization, areas of intensive work in the interval since the first edition, which dealt with them in only three chapters.

As one realizes in looking at the number of *emeriti* on the roster of contributors, this volume is a monument to an already past generation of Byzantinists. Far from being a final statement, it is an extensive progress report, embodying the many revisions which that generation contributed to this rapidly developing field and, by its shortcomings, suggesting to the Byzantinists of today many problems that deserve further consideration. Besides, its meticulous index and two hundred pages of bibliography (up to date to 1963) make it an indispensable reference work.

Much space would be consumed simply by listing the contents of this volume, whose design is to supplement chapters on Byzantium itself from 717 to 1453 with extended examinations of the neighbours of Byzantium on all points of the compass: the Balkans, Hungary, Russia, Georgia and Armenia, the Muslim caliphates, the Turks, the Papacy, Venice, and the Latin foundations on Byzantine soil. The approach is chiefly political and diplomatic, and several contributors have not avoided the pitfall of this genre, the unintelligible catalogue of names, places, and dates. One cannot help regretting that a better balance was not struck between politics and social and economic developments. This is unlikely to happen, however, until Byzantinists acquire some new interpretative ideas and, for example, abandon their simplistic identification of great landed proprietors with enemies of the state.

Detailed review of the individual contributions must be left to the specialized journals. The interested general reader will decide for himself which chapters to prize and which to avoid. The worst, in my view, is that on "Venice to the Eve of the Fourth Crusade." Among the better ones are those of Nicol on "The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires," of Lewis and von Grunebaum on Muslim government, society, and civilization, and of Obolensky on "The Empire and Its Northern Neighbours," an outstanding presentation of the relations between Byzantium and the world that remained "barbarian." Special mention must be made of "The Amorians and Macedonians, 842-1025," by the late Henri Grégoire. The personality of a giant of Byzantine studies is writ large in this chapter, which is also the only occasion when Grégoire, the author of hundreds of articles, settled down to write a narrative of the period that was specially his own.

Knowing the middle ages without knowing about Byzantium is comparable to knowing modern America without knowing about Europe. Every mediaevalist owes it to himself to discover what happened in that part of the world where Romanity blithely prolonged its way of life, unaware of the fact, so emphatically proclaimed by western historians, that Rome had fallen. This new volume, despite its forbidding bulk and the inevitable unevenness of a co-operative venture, is a good place to start.

WALTER GOFFART

University of Toronto

The Government of Florence under the Medici, 1434 to 1494. By NICOLAI RUBINSTEIN. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1966. Pp. xiv, 336. \$13.50.

RENAISSANCE FLORENCE has always attracted the attention of historians—and with

good reason. Throughout the most flourishing period of Italian culture it produced or fostered almost as many men of genius as all the rest of Italy. It also produced what is possibly the most complicated system of republican government ever devised by man, and it is perhaps a tribute to the genius of the Florentine people that they made an unworkable constitution work, in one way or another, for more than two centuries. Despite the immense mass of records available in the Florentine archives, however, the constitutional history of Florence has never been adequately studied. The work at present under consideration is an attempt to remedy this lack for one important period in Florentine history.

Professor Rubinstein is one of a group of recent scholars, many of them English or American, who have been making good use of the Florentine archives, which for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are unequalled by those of any other European state. Here he presents for the first time an accurate and detailed account of the gradual evolution of that incredibly complex electoral machinery by means of which the Medicean régime maintained its control of the republican government. A large part of his study is devoted to the personnel and operation of the *balie*, the extraordinary councils to which were entrusted the periodic scrutinies that determined the eligibility of candidates to the highest offices in the state. It was through the extraordinary legislative powers granted to these more or less hand-picked *balie*, too, that the authority of the old constitutional councils of the people and of the commune, which the régime found it more difficult to control, were gradually whittled down, until in 1458 the powers of the *balie* were largely taken over by the smaller Council of 100, which in turn was superseded by the still more select Council of 70. A second theme is the rôle played by the committees of *accoppiatori*, who were empowered to distribute the names of candidates among the purses from which the names of incumbents of a number of offices were still drawn by lot. What made the function of the *accoppiatori* of such crucial importance to the Medicean régime, however, was that through them the bi-monthly elections of the Signoria, the highest executive power in the state, could be closely controlled. Except for very brief periods, the *accoppiatori* were empowered to select "by hand" from among the numerous qualified candidates a small number (a minimum of five for each priorate and three for the *gonfaloniere*) from whom the offices were then filled by lot.

No brief summary could do justice to the complexity of the constantly changing process by which the members of the *balie* and the *accoppiatori* were themselves elected or the way in which they functioned. Professor Rubinstein can scarcely be blamed if his story is a confusing one, which demands much use of cross-references and careful attention to the fine print in the footnotes, but a less dense style might have made it easier to follow. Nor is it his fault that he tells relatively little about the way in which Cosimo or even his more clearly dictatorial grandson exercised their personal authority. Being unconstitutional, it does not appear in the constitution. One suspects that it was exercised most directly in small gatherings of the inner circle of the régime in the equivalent of a smoke-filled room in the Via Larga, and for these meetings no records would be kept. What does emerge clearly is that "the Medici 'party' was, like the Albizzi faction before 1434, a loosely knit group, by no means always completely united . . . and not necessarily committed to following consistently the leadership of Cosimo" (p. 133). That the revolution of 1434 did not mark the end of republican liberty and the beginning of a Medicean despotism has long been recognized, as has the fact that both Cosimo and Lorenzo were determined to work within the framework of the constitution, however much they might have to manhandle it to do so. It is Professor Rubinstein's invaluable contribution that he spells out the elements

of both continuity and innovation in fully documented detail. A lengthy appendix (pp. 236–316), listing the names of all *accoppiatori* from 1434 to 1494 and all the members of the eight *balie* summoned during that period, furnishes unprecedented information about the composition of the Medicean party. This is a book that no serious student of the period can afford to ignore.

WALLACE K. FERGUSON

University of Western Ontario

The New Cambridge Modern History. VIII. The American and French Revolutions, 1763–93. Edited by A. GOODWIN. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1965. Pp. xxiv, 748. \$10.00.

THIS LATEST VOLUME OF THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY puts us in touch with much of the recent scholarship dealing with a period which has never lacked for brilliant analysts or controversial interpretations. There are, perhaps inevitably, a few lacunae (sociological studies by Elinor Barber and others of class relationships in eighteenth-century France are ignored, for instance); but the editorial supervision of Professor Goodwin of Manchester is generally balanced and lively.

Professor Goodwin's excellent introduction establishes the case for beginning with 1763. The major European states, faced by the financial problems left over from the Seven Years' War, were attempting to rationalize their administration and were thereby establishing the foundation of modern government operation. The conflict between the rival forces of bourgeois ambition and "aristocratic resurgence" was clearly heading towards a crisis by the 1760's, especially in the "Atlantic" world west of the Elbe. And east and west Europe were diplomatically out of touch with each other between 1763 and the late 1780's, thus reinforcing a divergence in their development at a most critical moment in their political and economic evolution.

Most of the contributors consent to cope with the concept of enlightened despotism, despite its ambiguity. Should it be taken to mean a conscious effort by which reform-minded monarchs would attempt the transformation of society? Or was it something quite different, fundamentally an effort to promote what Pirenne called "la rationalisation de l'Etat?" However interpreted, enlightened despotism is the concept in terms of which Europe's princes are judged here. Frederick the Great is dismissed as an "unenlightened petty despot" with a "medieval" social policy; Pombal is, somewhat surprisingly, given even shorter shrift; while Catherine II gets unwonted sympathy as a liberal whose sincere reforming zeal was replaced after 1767 not by reaction but by resignation to a process of emancipating her subjects through a slow process of education.

Professor Stark, in a survey of intellectual trends, assigns to Rousseau a kind of "intellectual hegemony" over this generation, no doubt quite reasonably. Yet some of Rousseau's contemporaries, more venturesome explorers into the darker regions of *sensibilité* (Choderlos de Laclos and de Sade, to name two) surely reveal aspects of the romantic temper which help us to understand the age and deserve some mention. And what are we to make of the remark that Rousseau was "the protagonist of the petite bourgeoisie, eager for a total revolution, and even announcing . . . the proletarian movement of the future!"

There are rewarding essays in æsthetics, including a fascinating examination of the rôle played by Piranesi's etchings of ancient Rome in the history of taste and an analysis of Haydn as the quintessential composer of the Enlightenment.

We are constantly reminded of this age's sense of obligation to classical antiquity. We *need* to be reminded that Rousseau owed as much to Cato's Rome as he did to Geneva!

Some rather bold challenges are hurled at conventional interpretations of revolutionary France. We are informed that it is quite inaccurate to think of the ideological conflict of the 1790's in France as a conflict of generations: the champions of counter-revolution were as youthful as their revolutionary adversaries. Danton's advocacy of "natural frontiers" is seen as a design to restrain, not encourage, expansionist tendencies. And the decentralization of France after 1789 is analysed as facilitating the growth of a new consciousness of French national unity because it helped to extinguish provincial separatism. The Rev. J. McManners urges us to abandon the conventional division of historians into "Plot" and "Circumstances" schools and to consider evaluating them rather according to their difference of view on the use of violence and its legitimacy.

Geoffrey Adams

Loyola College
Montreal

The New Cambridge Modern History. IX. War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval, 1793-1830. Edited by C. W. CRAWLEY. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1965. Pp. xiv, 748. \$10.00.

TWO GENERATIONS HAVE NOW PASSED since the Cambridge historians first condensed the historical experience of modern Europe into the deservedly famous volumes of the *Cambridge Modern History*. The lapse of time has shifted the focus of the series, and this volume of the *New Cambridge Modern History* gives the most striking evidence of these changed perspectives. Sixty years ago historians could still regard the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars as the ultimate upheavals of European society and its state system. Ours is a more chastened generation. Compressed in this one volume is material which in the original series occupied about three times the space. At the same time the addition of more general chapters and essays on the non-European world has further restricted the detailed exploration of the familiar and traditional themes. Condensation is the key to which all has been tuned.

All of these modifications are to be welcomed, and certainly this book is a more accurate indication of our historical predilections. In spite of this, it appears now that we will never regard the *New Cambridge Modern History* with quite the same reverence we had for the old. For the large majority of chapters in this volume there are easily available better alternative sources of information and interpretation. The editors' long-established practice of seeking contributions from many sources leads inevitably to considerable unevenness in the execution, while the practice of giving each section roughly the same space (about thirty pages) gives rise to a number of curious imbalances in the volume. Thus, while E. V. Gulick's vividly written chapter on the Congress of Vienna is both ample and detailed, Geoffrey Bruun's chapter on the "Balance of Power, 1793-1814," though equally well presented, is perforce limited to a superficial survey of international relations which seems oddly out of scale with the importance of the subject. With over half the volume devoted to chapters oriented around national or regional history, and the remaining portion to chapters on such general themes as education, science, and religion, some repetition is unavoidable. A system of cross-references from chapter to chapter helps sort out the confusion which often

results, but this is no real solution to the need for a balanced and coherent interpretation. The total effect of this volume is of a *Festschrift*, with all the variations in technique and competence that this sort of publication suggests.

In order to avoid approaching each of the twenty-five chapters as a teacher would approach papers to be graded, I wish here to point out only a few chapters which seem to me to be worth seeking out to read. C. C. Gillispie's chapter, "Science and Technology," stands out in a class by itself, a brilliant analysis of the institutions and accomplishments of the age as well as of its intellectual and technical limitations. C. V. Sternfeld's brief chapter on music offers a satisfying, comprehensive, and informative picture of changing tastes and a changing audience. The chapters on literature and painting, by contrast, are pedestrian catalogues. Jacques Godechot in the chapter on French internal developments from 1793 to about 1800 wisely curtailed his discussion of the Jacobin republic and concentrated on giving an excellent picture of the much neglected period of the Directory. Of the other chapters concerned with the individual European states, Raymond Carr's on Spain and Portugal, C. A. Macartney's on Austria-Hungary, and J. M. K. Vyvyan's on Russia are the most satisfactory. J. D. Fage's chapter on Europe and Africa carries the story on to the 1870's and achieves stature as a historical essay because it can ignore the chronological and subject restrictions which compel mediocrity in so many of the others.

As a work of reference, the *New Cambridge Modern History* has its great value, though I join heartily with those other reviewers who have deplored the editorial decision to eliminate bibliographical material entirely, except for infrequent footnotes. The old series of volumes is not adequately replaced by the new, but perhaps we expect too much. The original *Cambridge Modern History* was unique; the new series has competition, and the competitors seem to have discovered that a volume composed by a single historian often offers more than a *pot-pourri* of essays. I must agree with the competition.

JOHN P. SPIELMAN, JR.

Haverford College

A History of Modern Germany, 1648-1840. By HAJO HOLBORN. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1964. Pp. xiv, 532, xxvi, maps. \$7.50 text; \$10.75 trade.

THE PERIOD OF GERMAN HISTORY discussed by Professor Holborn in this second volume of his projected trilogy poses many fundamental problems. Readers should expect to find, among other thing, a clear and intelligent description of the breakdown of the Holy Roman Empire, the consequent development of Prussia and of the Austrian monarchy, the impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon on Germany, and the pervasive sociopolitical changes that occurred after 1815. Professor Holborn does, indeed, consider such matters, but does not offer many new insights; nor does he often rise above the level of the textbook writer. His style is plodding and on occasion does not provide a useful vehicle for the conveyance of his ideas.

In evaluating such a work the reader must consider the question of balance. Does the author attempt to write a comprehensive account? Holborn, for example, does not, except for a few pages in chapter II, really pay attention to economic history. He dismisses the Zollverein in several vague paragraphs, although he will presumably return to this subject in volume III. The portion of the book that ends in 1790 includes a considerable amount of detail concerning political history, but the author's interest in politics seems to decline appreciably when he reaches the

revolutionary era, and to disappear in the account of the post-1815 period. If one compares the relatively clear and stimulating work of Erdmannsdörffer with Holborn's account of the pre-1740 period the contrast between good and only competent historical writing becomes apparent. Although Holborn discusses such important problems as the Baltic and eastern European power struggles he does not often clearly develop such topics into concrete themes. As a consequence, his work lacks emphasis and does not stimulate the reader. The author often says very sensible things, but his dispassionate style and unambitious approach cause the whole of the narrative to sink to a uniformly dry level.

The great personalities of the era, particularly Frederick the Great, Stein, and Metternich, are conventionally portrayed. Holborn rejects the authoritarianism of the older German institutional historians but does not replace it with a clear-cut general focus of his own. The clarity and imagination that have impressed us in the *Political Collapse of Europe* are not to be found here.

In matters of religious, and, to some extent, philosophical, educational, and musical, history, Holborn's touch is often deft. Pietism receives excellent attention; the author is clearly at home in religious history. Recent work on the social impact of Pietism in Germany is either not stressed, or overlooked. Although the last portion of the book, that concerning the post-1815 period, includes some excellent comments on cultural topics, particularly religion and education, the discussion is so condensed that it resembles a typical series of articles in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Professor Holborn has, unfortunately, written a book which on the one hand is too narrow to be used as text and on the other too cursory to be considered a fundamental and original historical account. Quite possibly the author, after he finishes the third volume, should condense the whole into a large one-volume text. This surgery might well result in a valuable manual for undergraduates. Despite many weaknesses the general level of volume II is vastly superior to other surveys of German history in English for the pre-1789 period.

HUBERT C. JOHNSON

University of Saskatchewan

France. By JOHN CAIRNS. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1966. Pp. xii, 178. \$4.95 cloth; \$1.95 paper.

JOHN CAIRNS must have enjoyed writing his *France*. He wrote it as an historian on holiday from history; the past interests him less than the present; he relies on intuition more than on documents, on the reading of newspapers and periodicals more than on the interviewing or close observation of politicians; he does not approach French society with the tool kit of a sociologist, simply with intelligence and sympathy.

Notwithstanding its title, the work is not, whatever may have been the intention of author and publishers, a book primarily intended for the student who seeks an introduction to modern France; nor is it a guide to the tourist who wants advice on how to channel his observations. John Cairns offers his data as one would present to friends very well acquainted with a country a series of travel slides; one can almost hear him say "you know all that," "there is nothing particularly interesting here," as he compresses into thirteen dry pages the history of France from the origins to 1814. When he comes closer to the Second World War, he slows the

pace, becomes more analytical; but it is to the Fifth Republic, to the last seven years of French history, that he reserves his brilliance and his wit.

The author's constant and, on the whole, happy search for aphorisms, his concise and literate descriptions which unfold like a brilliant conversation, sometimes result in imprecision or oversimplification. To say that 10 per cent of the French population is "old" (p. 4) without saying how old are the old makes nonsense of precise statistical data; to say that France never gave the League of Nations her trust (p. 47) should have been qualified—Briand did and the parliament followed his leadership; to include in the *petite bourgeoisie* the street sweeper and the secondary school teacher who is often an *agrégé* (a degree more prestigious in France than the Ph.D. in North America) is really sweeping; to say that General Jouhaud was condemned to death (p. 102) without mentioning that he was pardoned is unnecessarily dramatic.

In the very tight packing of his data the author left out much which should have been there; some has remained however which could well have been omitted. How many readers, unless they be political scientists, will know what an "organic law" is (p. 103)? The technical accuracy is here unnecessary. To qualify or explain, the author might have made greater use of footnotes; I found only one. This absence of notes may also, possibly, lead the uninitiated reader to misallocate quotations; how many will know (p. 46) that the saying that the French carry their heart on the left and their wallet on the right is André Siegfried's?

My criticisms amount to a disagreement with the attempt made by the book to give something to the uninformed while talking to the specialist as well, to present a rapid cultural travelogue (from Brigitte Bardot and Johnny Holiday to foreign affairs) and yet to remain analytical. Within these contradictions, Professor Cairns does very well; but how much better he could have done if he had simply written a series of essays on what interests him most in modern France without making any attempt at being comprehensive.

J. A. LAPONCE

University of British Columbia

United States

Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. By JAMES MADISON. With an introduction by ADRIENNE KOCH. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1966. Pp. xxiv, 659. \$10.00.

1787, The Grand Convention. By CLINTON ROSSITER. New York: The Macmillan Company [Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada]. 1966. Pp. 443, illus. \$9.50.

CONTRARY TO THE CLAIMS of some modern ideologies, revolutions depend less on the workings of irresistible, impersonal forces than on the heroic muster of human energies. As a result, in revolutionary times there always arise crises in which the achievements already won are to some extent reversible. Few students of the American Revolution would deny that 1787 was such a crisis. But for many years an argument has raged over whether or not the revolutionary process was reversed with the framing of the constitution. Professors Rossiter and Koch agree in seeing the constitution as the fulfilment of revolutionary ideals rather than as their repudiation.

Only one of the fifty-five delegates at the constitutional convention both continuously attended and bothered to keep a comprehensive record of the proceedings, so that we are largely dependent on Madison's *Notes on the Debates* for our knowledge of how the constitution was framed. Professor Koch has done a valuable service for scholars by publishing a new authoritative edition of a work that has long been out of print, although one could wish that as Madison has the monopoly of this field, his editor might have devoted a little of her introduction to cautioning the reader about his limitations as a framer and reporter. An index would also have been useful.

Professor Rossiter's book goes well beyond the convention, and even beyond 1787, which he believes is the most important date in American history. His is a comprehensive narrative examining events from the conclusion of the revolutionary war to the election of 1800; but anyone familiar with the period will find few surprises in it, despite a wealth of information, mostly biographical, which is for the first time conveniently assembled in one place. Indeed, Rossiter himself argues more for the relevance of his book than for its originality. He has written it "because men of the 1960's are bound to think about the convention in ways that might have seemed irrelevant or even frivolous as recently as 1940 or even 1950."

What makes this a book that speaks to the 1960's, I suspect, is its preoccupation with personalities and their ability to bargain and negotiate, and its neglect of political theory. This charge may surprise those familiar with Professor Rossiter's earlier work, particularly *The Seedtime of the Republic*, and will surely be denied by the author himself, who states flatly that "no explanation [of the constitution] can have validity that does not also acknowledge the framers as men of ideas, and give to ideas a leading place among the influences that shaped their behavior and decisions." But this is followed by only a short chapter, "Materials and Choices," which contains a wooden survey of the intellectual consensus in which the framers took part. The bulk of the book deals with the rôle of individual members in the drafting of the document, with conflict and accommodation between contending interests, and with political manipulation, particularly in the ratifying conventions. Rossiter justifies his neglect of theory by asserting a continuity between the ideas of 1776 and 1787, but in doing so he reduces the framing of the constitution from an act of intellectual creation to one of political engineering.

Apart from its historical distortion, Rossiter's approach is symptomatic of an alarming tendency among American intellectuals. While he seeks to present the framing of the constitution as a great achievement of the liberal west, he is well on the way to depriving himself of any criteria for measuring it which do not contain serious difficulties. Certainly his judgment cannot rest on the convention as illustrative of democratic procedures, for the only way we can distinguish it from the most sordid political horsetrading is by the principles under debate and the excellence of the finished product, neither of which can be assessed without more reference to political theory than is offered. Perhaps to evade this dilemma, Rossiter suggests that the constitution be judged by its consequences, namely that it gave birth to a nation which subsequently has risen "from impotence and obscurity to power and glory." Apart from the dubious logic of implying a relationship between the constitution and the present status of the United States as a great world power, is there not a danger that those we teach to reverence the founding fathers on such grounds will be the first to repudiate the achievements of the grand convention in the hour of national distress?

RICHARD BUEL, JR.

Wesleyan University

The Rise of the West, 1754-1830. By FRANCIS S. PHILBRICK. New York: Harper & Row [Toronto: Longmans Canada]. 1965. Pp. xviii, 398, illus. \$7.50 cloth; \$2.45 paper.

THE AUTHOR OF THIS BOOK on the old American West, between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, states in his preface that "he has long been interested in the subject—in fact, ever since he was allowed in 1899 to teach a college course on the territorial expansion of the United States." But more than three score years of personal and scholarly involvement with "The West" have not led him to become sentimental about it. His main object is to sweep away romantic myths and legends, and to get at the plain and prosaic truth about the rôle of the West in early American development. He has been remarkably successful. His style is certainly prosaic, even arid, but his judgments are incisive and iconoclastic.

The major portion of the book deals with the West as an area to be fought over, to be acquired, and to be organized. That is, we see it as a factor, on the whole, a passive factor, in the events leading up to and during the Revolution, in the relations between the United States on the one hand and Great Britain, France, and Spain on the other, and finally, as a region to be prepared for development and to be integrated into the American union. In analysing these complex questions, Mr. Philbrick is often sharply critical of previous writers such as C. W. Alvord, F. J. Turner, A. L. Burt, C. A. Beard, and T. P. Abernethy. In particular, he denies that there was ever any real danger that the West might separate from the rest of the country, and he believes that most accounts of "conspiracies," especially those connected with the names of Wilkinson and Burr, have been wildly exaggerated. His discussion of Canadian-American relations is occasionally a trifle shaky in detail but in its larger outlines it is sound and penetrating. Some readers will feel that he relies excessively on references that are forty or more years old, yet he is also aware of more recent work.

As for Turner's famous frontier thesis, Mr. Philbrick states that it has long since been buried; but he devotes several pages to throwing more earth on the grave. The picture that Turner had in his mind of the frontier was "totally unreal"; it was based on "faith, not evidence," and it arose out of an uncritical acceptance of environmental theories that have long since been exploded. Because of his yearning for the society which he remembered as a boy in Wisconsin, Turner wanted to believe that the frontier had had a constantly regenerating and ennobling influence on American life and ideals, and so for forty years he went on repeating his vague doctrine of "environmental magic" without ever attempting to test or to document his so-called thesis. Mr. Philbrick believes that Turner, in his articles on the late colonial and revolutionary era and in his collecting and editing of documents, "rendered great services to American historiography," but not in his attempts to explain American history.

Where Turner went wrong, Mr. Philbrick believes, was in his failure, or refusal, to see the importance of the first frontier, east of the Alleghenies, the most enduring, in point of time, of all the frontiers, and the most influential. There, "long before 1776 . . . Americans had become different from Englishmen not merely in individual personality but in social organization." In the century and a half after 1607, "the visible characteristics of Americans were erected," and they did not change much thereafter. Americans then went out to conquer the continent, not to be conquered (or regenerated or ennobled) by it. It seems safe to say that Mr. Philbrick has contributed significantly to the permanent interment of the frontier hypothesis.

University of Toronto

G. M. CRAIG

Age of Industrial Violence, 1910-1915: The Activities and Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations. By GRAHAM ADAMS, JR. New York and London: Columbia University Press [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1966. Pp. xiv, 316. \$8.50.

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS received congressional approval in August, 1912, and, after some changes in membership brought about by the new administration, met for the first time in the fall of 1913. Its representatives from labour, employers, and the general public included two prominent members of the A.F.L., the historian John R. Commons, and millionairess Mrs. J. Borden Harriman. Frank Walsh, a zealously pro-labour attorney from Missouri, was chairman. The commission conducted hearings all over the United States, visiting the scenes of the most violent labour disputes in American, not to mention world, history. One division under Commons was devoted to general research. The *Final Report*, issued in 1915 after acrimonious disputes among members about the nature of their findings, constitutes a *comédie humaine* of the period.

In summarizing the activity and findings of the commission Mr. Adams does a very adequate job. He also combs contemporary literature to discover the public's response to each stage of the commission's history. As far as possible his judgments are fair to all sides.

As a work of interpretation, however, the book is dissatisfying. Under a title like *Age of Industrial Violence*, for instance, one might expect some mention of the extent of violence throughout the whole of the industrialized world during these years. This is not an irrelevant criticism. Progressivism, as a uniquely American movement, acknowledged that something had gone wrong with America, but assumed that the traditional system could be made to work. America had no need of "foreign ideologies." Were these assumptions valid? Mr. Adams tells us that the testimony before the commission "lent little comfort to those who envisioned their nation as a community of harmonious classes." The book ends with a quotation from Matthew Arnold's *Dover Beach* about ignorant armies clashing by night—hardly the usual American image. But further than this the author does not venture to go. He admits that "a common unifying theme emerged from the inquiries," namely that "almost every strike, irrespective of origins, appeared to have erupted into violence which threatened the structure of society." A rather devastating view perhaps, but a footnote warns us that the author uses the term "social conflict" in this broad sense "rather than in reference to a study of the origins of some specific social movement (e.g., socialism, progressivism)." Socialists of the day would have been a little bewildered.

WILLIAM MILNER DICK

University of Toronto

The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence. By E. W. HAWLEY. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1966. Pp. xvi, 525. \$10.00.

THE SCOPE OF THIS BOOK is broader than the title suggests. It is in fact a painstaking examination of practically every twist and turn of economic policy under the New Deal. Each of Roosevelt's major campaigns to redeem the American economy—the adventure in national planning (NRA); the several experiments in selective planning designed to stabilize especially fragile industries (agriculture, coal, crude oil, cotton textiles, railroads, and others) after the collapse of NRA; and the trust-busting phase—is retold in detail.

Professor Hawley is one of those economists who feel obliged to redeem the reputation for opaqueness that clings to the craft as a whole by a deliberateness of procedure and an exhaustive explanation of everything. Every phase of the story is introduced by a long essay on the history of the problem, and a patient enumeration of all the schools of thought since Adam; the New Deal chapter in the story is then worked over sonata fashion: exposition, development, and recapitulation. The author's cautious nature extends to scholarly things as well as to his didactic method. He is lavish in reference to an incredibly broad range of documents, published and archival. However, his publisher (or somebody) has talked him into the use of the Schlesinger cumulative footnote. This is an invention alleged to facilitate the reading of academic work, but which is in fact a trap for a scholar of Hawley's integrity, for it obliges him to pour all his painfully garnered references into a plastic bag for shipment, knowing full well that no one will ever get down on hands and knees to assemble the apparatus.

I have implied a certain impatience with Hawley's slowness of procedure. Even readers as uneasy with economic concepts as myself must surely get the point a good deal sooner than Professor Hawley supposes. That is a small matter, however; and in any case we all know what to do about it. This is an exceedingly valuable book. I know of no other book that pulls together so many of the odd-shaped pieces that make up the New Deal on its policy-making (as distinct from its political) side. Its thesis is standard, mainstream liberal. The healthy-minded experimentalists of the New Deal provided (largely inadvertently) opportunities for all system-builders to discredit themselves, thus clearing the air for a slow re-structuring of the economy not according to idealized models but along the lines dictated by practical politics. The result is the present economy, "characterized by private controls, partial planning, compensatory governmental spending, and occasional gestures toward the competitive model." Unlike the historians of the Schlesinger school, however, he does not find the New Deal to have been impelled by anything as positive as a "pragmatic spirit." Roosevelt's real contribution was in marking time until a more propitious climate (the war) made uncontroversial and non-partisan the "spending solution" to the depression. The problems of reconstruction were practically all deferred to the postwar years. At best, Hawley concludes, the trial-and-error inventions of the New Deal did the system no permanent harm.

PAUL MERKLEY

Fresno State College
Fresno, California

Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917. By JOHN A. S. GRENVILLE and GEORGE BERKELEY YOUNG. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [Montreal: McGill University Press]. 1966. Pp. xviii, 352. \$7.50.

PROFESSOR SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS has publicly praised this work of his former students, which is a collection of eleven essays dealing with American foreign policy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They have explored a heretofore unused collection of the papers of William L. Scruggs (held by Walter M. Robinson of Nashville), but the bulk of their citations are to the standard manuscript collections and to a selected group of secondary studies. They occasionally refer to the proceedings of the Congress, but they tell their story in terms of a handful of men at the top. It is history in terms of some members of the

political élite without any significant references to economic leaders or to the majority of the population.

At its best, episodic history offers the valuable insights and intellectual excitement of the half-truth. The chapter on Admiral Stephen B. Luce has this quality and does point the way toward a better understanding of the 1870's and early 1880's. It is unfortunate, however, that they ignore Robert W. Shufeldt and discount the degree to which the navy itself thought in terms of building gradually to a battleship fleet, a consideration which casts a quite different light on the men who are usually dismissed as isolationist opponents of the navy.

Other chapters are less satisfactory. The treatment of Harrison and Blaine is very weak. Their discussion of Cleveland is not as new as they seem to believe (the recent revisionist works cited actually add very little to what Professor Barnes said 30 years ago in his biography of John G. Carlisle), and they give no evidence of understanding the expansionist nature of the silver movement. They add details about Scruggs, but they offer nothing fundamentally new except an exaggerated estimate of his importance. The treatment of Lodge ignores Brooks Adams, whose influence was far greater than that of his brother Henry, attributes far too much to Scruggs, and dramatizes a misplaced confidence in manuscript evidence that characterizes the entire work. They miss a great deal about Lodge, and the other men they consider, that is to be found in other collections, in the *Congressional Record*, and in the newspapers.

Their handling of the navy's 1896 plan for war against Spain, which included an attack on Manila, is confused and wholly unconvincing. It is simply mistaken to assert that there was no high-level discussion of keeping the Philippines prior to the attack on Manila. McKinley and others were probing that question at least as early as September, 1897 (and probably in June or July). The war plan was not responsible for the taking of the Philippines. It had to be acted upon, to mention but one consideration, and it was acted upon—and extended—by men who clearly wanted a base for American expansion in Asia.

The major weakness of the study, however, is one that it shares with all other book-length accounts of American foreign policy from 1865 to 1901. Other than offering a few clichés about the isolationism or indifference of the people, it ignores the majority of the population. In truth, however, it was the militant and expansionist economic nationalism of the agricultural majority that powered the politics of the era and that generated the energy for America's outward thrust into imperialism. And there can be no accurate assessment of the élite save in that context.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

University of Wisconsin

Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE AND ANN LIDDELL

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; T.B.R. following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

I. CANADA'S COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Charles Tupper's Minutes of the Charlottetown Conference

RECENTLY A DESCENDANT OF SIR CHARLES TUPPER kindly presented to the Public Archives of Canada a considerable quantity of additional Tupper papers. Among these papers are several pages and loose notes in Tupper's handwriting which are entitled "Minutes of Conference at P.E. Island, 1864." It is clear that they are a draft of the official minutes of the Charlottetown Conference. At the opening session Charles Tupper and Leonard Tilley were elected joint secretaries but Tupper apparently undertook the task of keeping a record of the proceedings of the conference. The entries are brief and are confined to the official business of a conference whose object was to consider a legislative union of the three Maritime Provinces. There is only a brief indication of the sessions to which the members of the Canadian cabinet were admitted in order to explain their views on a federal union of all the British North American colonies. As official minutes, however, they include copies of motions and resolutions and are a brief record of the ten sessions of the conference, of which six were at Charlottetown (September 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7), two at Halifax (September 10, 12), one at Saint John (September 16), and one at Toronto (November 3).

The discovery of the minutes at this particular time posed a problem for the Public Archives as they would obviously be of great and immediate interest to many scholars. It seemed fairest to all concerned to release the text in the pages of the *Review*, and this the Editor has very kindly enabled us to do. In addition, he has made it possible for us to present the text of the other two documents upon which historians have depended hitherto for much of their knowledge of what happened at Charlottetown. This will be a convenience to those who wish to compare and analyse the three accounts, which inevitably are in some respects conflicting.

Obviously the chief value of the Tupper minutes is as an official record which was made on the spot. Gordon's letter to Cardwell was written after the delegates had left Charlottetown and his account was

based on conversations with the delegates and the unofficial representatives from Canada. Brown's letter to his wife was written after the conference had moved to Halifax and his account is confined to the sessions which were attended by the members of the Canadian cabinet.

There are a few discrepancies in the accounts in regard to time and dates. For example, Brown reports that the Canadians were presented to the Maritime delegates on Thursday, September 1, the first day of the conference and that the entire session on Friday, September 2, was devoted to the "general arguments" of Macdonald and Cartier. Tupper's minutes show that the conference was organized at 3 P.M. on September 1, that resolutions were read and discussed on the morning of September 2, that the Canadians were not introduced until the third session at 3 P.M. on September 2, and that it was Saturday, September 3, when Macdonald spoke "at length" on federation after a brief closed session of the conference.

The chief discrepancies in these three accounts, however, are in regard to the time and attention devoted to the consideration of a legislative union of the Maritime Provinces. Gordon reported that after he left Charlottetown Maritime union had "gradually drifted out of sight." Brown was more explicit. He said that on Wednesday morning, September 7, "the Conference gave the Canadian Delegates their answer—that they were unanimous in regarding Federation of all the Provinces to be highly desirable *if the terms of union could be made satisfactory*—and that they were prepared to waive their own more limited question until the details of our scheme could be more fully considered & matured." Tupper's minutes record that on Wednesday morning, September 7, a resolution in favour of a legislative union of the Maritime Provinces was moved by Tupper, seconded by Dickey, and discussed before the conference adjourned to meet in Halifax on September 10. The minutes also show that debate on Tupper's resolution continued at the sessions in Halifax and Saint John.

The text of the resolutions that were submitted to the conference has been incorporated into the minutes in the appropriate places. Actually they are on separate scraps of paper and one of them has several words crossed out. As originally written it is, "Tilley, Palmer. Resolved that with a view to acting more effectively upon the public opinion in the different Provinces." This portion is crossed out, except for the names of Tilley and Palmer, and the text continues "Resolved that the invitation of the delegates from Nova Scotia to adjourn this Meeting of the Conference to Halifax to meet on Saturday next at XI o'clock be accepted."

Finally, a word of explanation may be useful concerning the brief

report of the debate on Tupper's resolution in favour of Maritime union. The report is written on both sides of three loose sheets of paper and there is no indication of the order in which these speeches were given or of the date or dates. The resolution was debated, apparently, at Charlottetown on the morning of September 7, at Halifax on the afternoon of September 10 and the morning of September 12, and in Saint John on the evening of September 16. Perhaps there is internal evidence but there is no notation to indicate how much of the debate was recorded. It seems unlikely, however, that it is a complete record because, although the views of all the delegates from New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island are summarized, there is no reference to the views of the Nova Scotian delegates. However, there are some rough notes which appear to relate to two additional speeches.

Public Archives of Canada

WILFRED I. SMITH

| | |
|--|------------------|
| Present | |
| Hon. C. Tupper | } Nova Scotia |
| " W. A. Henry | |
| " Jonathan McCully | |
| " R. B. Dicky | |
| " A. G. Archibald, Esq., M.P.P. | |
| Hon. S. L. Tilley Provincial Secretary | } New Brunswick. |
| " W. H. Steeves M.L.C. & M.E.C. | |
| " J. M. Johnson Atty Gen | |
| " E. B. Chandler M.L.C. | |
| " J. H. Gray M.P.P. | |
| Hon. Col. J. H. Gray | } P. E. Island |
| " W. H. Pope Col. Secty | |
| " Edward Palmer Atty Gen | |
| " Geo. Coles M.P.P. | |
| " Andrew A. McDonald M.L.C. | |

Minutes of proceedings of Conference on Union of Maritime Provinces held at Charlottetown on Thursday Sept 1st 1864.

Delegates assembled at the Colonial building at 3 o'clock P.M. Present all except the Hon. A. A. McDonald.

The Hon. C. Tupper moved that the Hon. Colonel Gray be the President of this conference which was seconded by the Hon. S. L. Tilley & passed unanimously. The Hon. J. H. Gray moved that the Hon. C. Tupper and the Hon. S. L. Tilley be requested to act as the joint Secretaries of this Convention which was seconded by A. G. Archibald Esq M.P.P. & passed unanimously—

After some time spent in discussion the conference was on motion adjourned to meet at 10 o'clock A.M. to morrow.

Friday Sept 2nd—Met at 10 o'clock A.M. Present—Resolutions passed by the Legislatures of N.S. N.B. & P.E. Island were read—and after some time spent in discussion adjourned until 3 o'clock P.M.

Met at 3 o'clock and received the members of the Canadian Government who explained their views upon the question of Colonial Union. After some time spent in general discussion the conference adjourned to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow—

Saturday Sept. 3rd Conference met at 10 o'clock A.M. Present all the Delegates.

Minutes of yesterday having been read correspondence between the Governor General & the Lieut Governor of P.E. Island on the proposed attendance of Delegates from the Government of Canada at the Conference of the Delegates of the Maritime Provinces was laid before the Conference At XI o'clock the Conference received the members of the Canadian Cabinet on behalf of whom Hon. J. A. McDonald explained at length the views of the Canadian Government in favor of a confederation of all the B.N.A. colonies and the means by which they proposed to obviate the difficulties which would attend such Union. After further discussion the Conference adjourned to meet at 10 o'clock on Monday next with the understanding that they would in future meet at 10 every day and adjourn at 3 p.m.

Monday 5th Sept.

Conference met at 10 o'clock A.M. All the Delegates Present. Members of Canadian Government also present Discussion on Confederation of Provinces continued by Canadian deputation until 3 o'clock P.M. when conference adjourned until XI o'clock A.M. Tuesday.

Tuesday 6th Sept.

Conference met at XI A.M. Delegates all present Members of Canadian deputation also present. Discussion on Federation resumed by them & continued until 3 p.m. when conference adjourned until 10 o'clock A.M. Wednesday.

Wednesday 7th Sept.

Conference assembled at 10 o'clock. Delegates all present & Resolution moved by Dr. Tupper & Seconded by Mr. Dickey:

[Whereas in the opinion of this Conference a Union of Nova Scotia New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island under one Government and Legislature would elevate the status—enhance the credit—enlarge the influence—improve the social commercial and political condition—increase the development and promote the interests generally of all these Provinces. Resolved that the time has arrived when such Union should be effected.]

Debate adjourned.

Resolution moved accepting invitation of N.S. Delegates to Halifax & meeting adjourned to meet there at 3 p.m. on Saturday next.

[Tilley Palmer Resolved that the invitation of the delegates from Nova Scotia to adjourn the Meeting of the Conference to Halifax to meet on Saturday next at XI o'clock be accepted.]

Conference met pursuant to adjournment at the Legislative Council Chamber at Halifax N.S. at 3 p.m. on Saturday the 10th Sept. Delegates all present except Mr. Johnson Atty Gen. N.B. after some time spent in discussion on Dr. Tupper's resolution debate adjourned until Monday 10 A.M.

Monday 10 A.M.

Conference met delegates all present except Mr. Johnson—Members of Canadian Government rec'd at XI Hon. Mr. Cartier moved vote of thanks to Hon. Col. Gray President of the Conference which was seconded by Hon. Dr. Tupper and

passed unanimously Hon. W. A. Henry moved vote of thanks to the members of the Canadian deputation which was seconded by the Hon. E. B. Chandler and passed unanimously. It was announced by the Hon. J. A. McDonald that the Canadian Government would advise His Excellency the Governor General to invite a delegation from the Provinces of N.S. & N.B. & P.E.I. & N. Foundland to meet at Quebec on Monday the 10th of Sept. [*sic*] to consider officially a proposal to unite the British N. American Provinces in one Confederation.

Members of Canadian deputation withdrew and the debate on Dr. Tupper's resolution having been adjourned the conference adjourned to meet at Stubb's Hotel St. John N.B. on Friday the 16th Sept. at seven o'clock.

Friday Sept. 16th 1864

Conference met pursuant to adjournment at Stubbs Hotel. Delegates all present except Messrs Johnson and Henry. After some discussion the following resolution was passed—

Resolved that the debate on Dr. Tupper's resolution be adjourned until after the contemplated meeting of Colonial delegates which is proposed to be held at Quebec on Monday the 10th October next.

Resolved that this conference be adjourned to meet at such time and place as may be subsequently decided by the Hon. Col. Grey and notified by the joint secretaries to the members.

[Whereas we have reason to believe that the question of a Confederation of the British N.A. Provinces is shortly to be formally submitted for the Consideration of the Maratime Provinces Resolved that the decision of this conference be postponed until after an opportunity shall have been given to consider fully how far such deliberations may affect the question of a Legislative Union of the Maratime Provinces.]

A meeting of the Delegates from the Maratime Provinces to the Conference at Charlottetown was called & held pursuant to adjournment at the Queen's Hotel Toronto on the third of November 1864 Present all the Delegates except Hon. E. B. Chandler Hon. Col. Gray in the chair. It was resolved

That in view of the resolutions passed at the Quebec Conference in favor of a Confederation of the British North American Provinces this conference decide to postpone the consideration of a Legislative Union of the Maratime Provinces.

It was also

Resolved that the joint Secretaries be instructed to draw up a report embracing the facts connected with the proceedings of the Conference of the Maratime Provinces to be signed in triplicate by the Chairman and Secretaries to be submitted to the Lieut. Governors of the three Provinces for the information of their Legislatures.

A vote of thanks was then on motion passed unanimously to the Hon. Col. Gray for the able manner in which he had discharged the duties of Chairman and the conference adjourned sine die.

Johnson: I am in favor of a Leg. Union of all the Provinces That is impracticable—If the vote must be taken will vote for Dr. Tupper's resolution but think it better to defer P.E.I. would derive great advantage from becoming a partner in the land of N.B. and the—

Pope: Think the advantages of a Leg. Union greater for P.E. Island than a Federal Union—but could not be carried in our Legislature—If we cannot carry a Leg. Union the sooner we turn our attention to a Federal Union the better.

If the members around this Board can agree the arrangements will I think be carried out I think the Union of P.E.I. absolutely necessary—Prospect of deadlock in P.E.I.—The Maritime Provinces would probably be able to make better terms separate than united—While I approve of the resolution of Dr. Tupper and am prepared to vote for it I think it better to allow it to lie on the table.

Gray: Think the only business like course has been taken by Dr. Tupper in proposing this resolution—but that it will be better to forego the discussion on this question until we find a solution for the larger question, when if we fail in accomplishing the Confederation I am prepared heartily to support it.

Tilley: Why do Canadians feel so anxious to have us to unite in a Legislative Union—Because they would have to give us better terms if we went in separately. Better for N.B. not to unite because the lands would have to be divided with N.S. & P.E.I. \$90,000—

Dickey: But small progress has been made by Mr. Tilley in discovering the views of the Canadians. *Entrapped.*

Steeves: In favor of Federal Union when I came here. We have often begun conventions to deal with this question Leg. Union not so essential.

Col. Gray: Must speak the sentiments of others—N.S. & N.B. are united in any respect. We are isolated—Can see the advantage of N.S. & N.B. being united previous to the Confederation—but the disadvantages to P.E.I. would be equally great—Could not get the consideration then we now might expect. If we were united first P.E. Island could not avoid going into a Confederation.

Coles: Dr. T. has brought Canada to our doors. We shall get our land question settled on better terms. The federal Govt. would buy the lands with Federal money & give them to the local Govt. to disburse.

Chandler: N.B. is quite as strongly in favor of Leg. Union as N.S. It could probably be carried in N.S. easier but would have done our best in N.B. Seat of Govt very difficult question in N.B. If we were to agree to the resolution it would do harm instead of good. A Leg. Union would enable us to enter the Confederacy on better terms, but that would not help us to carry it.

Palmer: We are precluded from expressing any opinion by the terms of the resolution passed by the P.E. Island Legislature 9/10 against any Union Federal or Legislative—Rep by Pop would be a farce Four or five colonies separate would be overwhelmed—Suppose the resolution were to pass what then? The question must then be gone into.

McDonald: It is necessary to know more of details. The Island hostile to Legislative Union in any shape. Not expected to give any decided expression of opinion Great advantages might induce us [?] to agree to Federal Union.

Tilley: Would support the resolution heartily if matters remained now as they were when that resolution was passed. believe a satisfactory arrangement may be made for the Confederation doubt whether we can advance that union by a Legislative Union—would be more difficult to carry the Legislative Union than the Confederation—Seat of Government. Could not agree. Would have three parties—To agitate the Leg. Union would delay the Confederation. If we get the Confederation now we could easily unite the Maritime Provinces in a Leg. Union afterwards. Will be in a better position to deal with the question of Leg. Union after the Meeting is held with Canada & the other provinces. If the Confederation cannot be obtained

will support strenuously the Leg. Union.—If we were one Province the public men of each would each contend for local interests.

Mem[o]

Common interest—Law Education—Franchise—Municipal Institutions. Seat of Government. Could we get better terms separate? Not as partners but as man & wife. Relation to Parent state Character of Legislative Union Prospect of deadlock in P.E.I.

1771–93 1784–80

2 No antagonistic interests

1 Homogeneous people

3 Diverse productions Similar institutions Legislation—Franchise Laws Judiciary. Education Currency. Tariff Postal arrangements Free trade. Equally prosperous Debt? Influence—members—

THE HON. ARTHUR H. GORDON TO THE RT. HON. EDWARD CARDWELL,
FREDERICTON, SEPTEMBER 12, 1864 (C.O. 188, pp. 229–35)

You are already aware that during the spring addresses were presented to me and to the Lieut. Governors of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island by the Legislative Bodies of the three Provinces requesting the appointment of delegates who might confer together upon the expediency of effecting an immediate Legislative and administrative union of the maritime Provinces of British North America. It was subsequently settled that the Delegates consequently appointed should meet at Charlotte Town in Prince Edward Island on the 1st instant.

2. According to this arrangement the Delegates of the three Provinces met at Charlottetown on the day appointed. Their meeting however took place under circumstances which had been by no means foreseen at the time when the Conference had been first resolved on.

3. You are aware that in the month of June a ministerial crisis took place in Canada which led to the formation of a Cabinet, the members of which, among other things, pledged themselves to propose a plan for the Federal Union of the whole of the British North American Provinces. The Canadian Government accordingly suggested that an opportunity should be afforded them during the meeting at Charlottetown of stating the nature of the plans to the Delegates there assembled. The Government of Canada were informed that no objection could be entertained to an unofficial communication of their views, but that as the Delegates were appointed solely for the purpose of considering the proposed Legislative Union of the Lower Provinces, it would not be competent for them officially to discuss the larger, and more novel, proposal now made by Canada.

4. Availing themselves of the opening thus afforded for unofficially discussing the merits of the scheme which they had prepared, nearly all the members of the Canadian Cabinet appeared at Charlottetown on the morning of the 1st September. The avowed and formal object of the Conference thus became in fact subsidiary to one of wider scope and greater importance.

5. I had been requested to visit Charlottetown at this time, and as I have long taken a warm interest in the Legislative and Administrative Union of the Lower

Provinces, I willingly repaired there, and have now the honour to report to you the views entertained on this subject, and on that of a Federal Union, by Members of the Conference who as you are aware, comprise the leading men of the existing Governments and also of the opposition in each of the three Provinces.

6. The Delegates from Nova Scotia were unanimous in favour of the immediate legislative and administrative union of the Lower Provinces, but were divided in opinion as to the advantages to be derived from the adoption of any wider scheme. Those from this Province were not all quite so warm in their advocacy of the Legislative Union as those from Nova Scotia, but though some doubt and hesitation might exist on the part of individuals there was no dissent expressed by them from the opinion in its favour which was strongly maintained by Mr. Tilley, Mr. Chandler, and the majority of their Colleagues. Those from Prince Edward Island were almost without exception hostile to the original proposal of Legislative Union which the Conference was assembled to consider, but appeared not disinclined to the adoption of a Federal Union with Canada provided their separate Legislature was maintained as now existing, and pledges were given that the whole revenue derived from the Island should be expended within its limits!

7. I had also a good deal of conversation with the Canadian Ministers especially with Mr. Galt who appears to me by far the ablest of their number. He developed to me at considerable length the details of the scheme of federation which had been agreed upon by the Canadian Cabinet. This scheme involved as an essential preliminary the entire union of the three Maritime Provinces. It was proposed on this being effected that Upper Canada, Lower Canada and the three Maritime Province [*sic*] should each possess a local Legislature, the powers of which should be carefully restricted to certain local matters to be specified and defined by the act establishing the Confederation, whilst all general Legislation should be dealt with by, and all undefined powers of legislation reside in, a central Legislature which should in fact be not only a federal assembly charged with the consideration of a few topics specially committed to its care, but the real Legislature of the country, whilst the local assemblies were to be allowed to sink to the position of mere municipalities. I need hardly remark on the importance of the distinction between a federative system in which all powers except those specially conceded are retained by the Local Legislatures, and one where all powers are vested in the central body except such as are explicitly conferred upon the municipal assemblies.

7. [*sic*] I asked Mr. Galt whether the local Legislatures according to his plan were to be, not only inferior to, but, under the control of, the Central one, and liable to have their attributes and constitution altered and modified by it from time to time, or whether within their own limits they were to be entirely independent and unsusceptible of further changes except through the agency of an Act of the Imperial Parliament. On this point he was not very clear. His wishes pointed in the direction of making Central authority supreme, but he thought it would be impossible to bring it about at present.

8. Whilst however these very rational views are held by Mr. Galt and other members of the Canadian Government, I am bound to state that they are not those generally entertained, nor do they harmonize with the interpretation usually affixed to the word "Federation" in these Provinces.

9. "A federal union" in the mouth of a lower Canadian means the independence of his Province from all English or Protestant influences — in the mouth of an inhabitant of the Maritime Provinces it means the retention of the machinery of

the existing local executive government; the expenditure within each Province of the revenue raised from it, except a small quota to be paid towards federal expenses; and the preservation of the existing Legislatures[;] a central Parliament to which the consideration of some few topics of general interest are to be confided under vigorous restraints, prompted by a jealous care for the maintenance of Provincial independence; that is to say facilities for local jobbing.

10. In my conversations with Mr. Galt I was desirous rather to ascertain his opinion than to state my own, but to you, Sir, it is perhaps right that I should express the view I take of this comparatively popular scheme. Such a Central Body feeble and inefficient but costly (for its members like those of all other deliberative bodies in British North America would have to be highly paid) appears to me not only wholly useless but probably mischievous. No federal union which does not comprise a complete subordination of the local assemblies to the Provincial Parliament can in my mind ever be of the smallest utility; and it was therefore with great pleasure that I heard the views enunciated by Mr. Galt and his Colleagues.

11. It is my duty however to inform you, Sir, that I am perfectly convinced from my knowledge of the public men of British North America, of their character and their mode of transacting public business, that, whatever their present views may be, every point in the proposed scheme which distinguishes it from the more popular idea which I have just now sketched will be gradually abandoned, partly from the fear which possesses almost every public man in this country of making any proposal in the slightest degree unpopular, partly in order to render the adoption of some scheme of federation more feasible by rendering it more palatable to the newspaper Editors and the democratic mass of the community.

12. This has indeed already as I am informed, been to some extent the case. I thought it better not to remain long at Charlottetown and accordingly left it after two days stay during which I had the opportunity of making myself thoroughly acquainted with the views of the Members of the Conference and other influential persons. Since my departure I understand the project for the immediate union of the Lower Provinces, which alone the Delegates were empowered to discuss, and which then appeared certain of adoption, has gradually drifted out of sight, and that they have since been occupied in the discussion of the details of a federal union of the illusory nature referred to in the preceding paragraph, by which each Province as now existing would retain its virtual independence. But on this point you will doubtless receive fuller information from Sir R. Macdonnell as the Conference has adjourned from Prince Edward Island to Halifax.

13. But for the proposals from Canada I have no hesitation in saying that the Union of the Maritime Provinces would have been effected for the Delegates both of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were fully agreed in the determination not to permit the reluctance of Prince Edward Island to affect their determination. The ultimate concurrence of that Island was a matter of certainty and in the meanwhile a temporary delay on its part would have inflicted no real inconvenience on the two chief Maritime Provinces in the event of their Union.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant

Arthur H. Gordon.

GEORGE BROWN TO HIS WIFE, HALIFAX, 13 SEPTEMBER, 1864
(George Brown Papers, pp. 1029-36)

My Dearest Anne

I wrote you a hurried note last evening just before dressing for a public dinner given to the Delegates by the Government of Nova Scotia, & fully expected to have been by this time well on in our voyage to Shediac. But we were not able to leave as we expected. A storm came on about the time I closed my letter, & it gradually increased until the hour our party broke up when it blew a regular gale. The steamer was in consequence storm-staid & is so still, & our route will now be changed. We remain here today & start by land tomorrow morning for Windsor, where we take the steamer for St. John's New Brunswick. From St. John's we will either take the steamer to Portland & return to Quebec by the Grand Trunk R.R., or take rail from St. John's to Shediac & go thence by our own steamer up the St. Lawrence. If you look at one of "Nelson's maps" you will see exactly where we are & where we are going. But whichever route we take, it is greatly to be feared that our arrival at Quebec will be delayed until the 19: or 20; & as I have much public & private business to transact before sailing for England, it is too evident, I am very sorry to say, that our meeting at Abden House will have to be postponed a week or two later than we calculated upon. It is very provoking, my own dear Anne, that we should be so long separated—but there is no help for it under the circumstances of the case.

Our party from Quebec consisted of Cartier, John A. Galt, McDougall, Campbell, Langevin, McGee & myself—besides the Clerk of the Ex. Council, Mr Lee, the Clerk of the Atty Genl Mr. Bernard, & a shorthand writer. We had great fun coming down the St. Lawrence—having fine weather, a broad awning to recline under, excellent stores of all kinds, an unexceptionable cook, lots of books, chess-boards, backgammon & so forth. Our first stopping place was at Gaspé, a pretty [?] little fishing town in Canada, where the population turned out *en masse* to receive us, amid firing of guns & other rejoicings. Mr. LeBoutillier, M.P.P. gave us a most hospitable reception at his mansion & conducted us over the great fishing establishments of the place. In the afternoon we sailed out of the beautiful little harbour in the same distinguished manner of our entry! From Gaspé our course was direct to Charlottetown, the little capital of little Prince Edward Island. I was up at four in the morning!—Thursday morning—to see the sun rise & have a salt water bath. We had just reached the Westerly point of Prince Edward & were running along the coast of as pretty a country as you ever put your eye upon. The land all along the shore rises gradually up from the sea for a space of two or three miles, & this slope all round the island is well cultivated & when we passed was clothed in bright green verdure. About noon we came to an inlet which we entered, & running up for some miles what appeared to be a river but was in fact but an inlet of the sea, amid most beautiful scenery, we came suddenly on the capitol city of the Island. Our steamer dropped anchor magnificently in the stream & its man-of-war cut evidently inspired the natives with huge respect for their big brothers from Canada. I flatter myself we did that well. Having dressed ourselves in correct style, our two boats were lowered man-of-war fashion —& being each duly manned with four oarsmen & a boatswain, dressed in blue uniform, hats, belts & [?] in regular style, we pulled away for shore & landed like Mr. Cristopher Columbus who had the precedence of us in taking possession of portions of the American continent. Our brother delegates were there before us. Five from Nova Scotia, five from New Brunswick & five from Prince Edward. Newfoundland goes heartily with the movement, but was not notified in time to

take part in the proceedings. At two o'clock the Conference was organized by the appointment of Col. Gray, Prime Minister of Prince Edward as President of the Convention. You are aware that the Conference was originally summoned merely to consider the question of a union of the Maritime Provinces & that Canada was no party to the arrangement & had no interest in it. We came then, not as recognized members of the Conference, but unofficially to discuss with them the propriety of extending their scheme & seeing whether the whole of British America could not be included in one Government. The Conference was accordingly organized without us, but that being done we were formally invited to be present & were presented in great style to the Conference. Having gone through the shake elbow & the how d'ye do & the fine weather—the Conference adjourned to the next morning at 10 then to meet for the serious despatch of business. In the evening the Governor, Mr. Dundas, gave a large Dinner party to as many of the party as he could conveniently receive—I being one. He is a very nice fellow, son of Dundas of Dundas in the neighbourhood of Edinburgh. His wife is English, of the name of Atkinson—a very agreeable person. During our stay they were very kind to us. The Government House is very pretty—handsome grounds around it & the sea washing up gently to the very door. After all, Anne, there is something in the sea. I was the guest of Mr. Pope, the Prov'l Secretary, during my stay on the island & was very glad to get to bed the first night. On Friday, we met in Conference & Canada opened her batteries—John A. & Cartier exposing the general arguments in favour of Confederation—& this occupied the time until the hour of adjournment at three. At four o'clock, Mr. Pope gave us a grand *Dejeuner a la fourchette*—oysters, lobsters & champagne & other island luxuries. This killed the day & we spent the beautiful moonlight evening in walking, driving or boating as the mood was on us. I sat on Mr. Pope's balcony looking out on the sea in all its glory. On Saturday the conference resumed its deliberations & Mr. Galt occupied the sitting in opening up the financial aspects of the Federation & the manner in which the financial disparities & requirements of the several Provinces might be arranged. When the Conference adjourned, we all proceeded on board our steamer & the members were entertained at luncheon in princely style. Cartier & I made eloquent speeches—of course,—& whether as the result of our eloquence or of the goodness of our champagne, the ice became completely broken, the tongues of the delegates wagged merrily, and the banns of matrimony between all the Provinces of BNA having been formally proclaimed & all manner of persons duly warned then & there to speak or forever after to hold their tongues—no man appeared to forbid the banns & the union was thereupon formally completed & proclaimed! In the evening Col. Gray gave a grand dinner party at his beautiful mansion. His wife is daughter of Sir John Pennefather, Commander of the Forces at Aldershott. She seems a most excellent person. She has three daughters—one here & two at Aldershott on a visit to their grandmamma. You will like her very much when you see her. I half promised to make a run down to Aldershott & see her daughters, while in London. On Sunday I attended the Free Church & heard a very good discourse from a licentiate whose face was familiar to me but whose name I did not learn. The afternoon & evening we spent quietly at home. Mrs. Pope is a very plain person with a large family of strong vigorous, intelligent & good-looking children—eight of them all steps and stairs kicking up a precious row occasionally. Her grandfather was governor of the Island & she is related to all the old families upon it. She was born in the island & was never out of it in her life! Many of the people here are in the same position—and are notwithstanding amazingly civilized. Mrs. Pope has a governess for her children—beautiful grounds for their recreation—& a capital library. On

Monday the Conference resumed its sittings, when I addressed the members on the Constitutional aspects of the question—the manner in which the several governments general & local should be constructed—and the Judiciary should be constituted,—what duties should be ascribed to the General & local legislatures respectively—& so forth. My speech occupied the whole sitting. At four, we lunched at the residence of Mr. Coles, leader of the Parliamentary opposition. He is a brewer, farmer & distiller—& gave us a handsome set out. He has a number of handsome daughters, well educated, well informed & as sharp as needles. The evening I passed on board the steamer, playing chess & catching lobsters over the side of the steamer. On Tuesday the Conference resumed its deliberations—earnestly discussing the several details of the scheme. The Canadians this day closed their case, left the conference to decide what course it would take on their proposition. At four o'clock Mr. Palmer, Atty General gave the delegates a grand luncheon at his residence. He is a very agreeable amiable man—a person of good sense & ability who has seen much of the world. His family are in mourning, so that we did not see the ladies. In the evening Mrs. Dundas gave us a grand Ball at Government House—a very nice affair, but a great bore for old fellows like me. I stayed half an hour or an hour & then bolted off quietly. On Wednesday, the Conference gave the Canadian Delegates their answer—that they were unanimous in regarding Federation of all the Provinces to be highly desirable, *if the terms of union could be made satisfactory*—and that they were prepared to waive their own more limited question until the details of our scheme could be more fully considered & matured. It was agreed that the Conference should stand adjourned until Monday the 12th Sept. then to meet at Halifax. That afternoon, the Canadian delegates received on board our steamer the Governor & Mrs. Dundas & a number of ladies—& entertained them in grand style. I was not present, having been laid up with a bilious attack, the natural result of such a round of dissipation. On Thursday, we made our parting visits, rode into the country & amused ourselves generally. In the evening we were entertained at a grand Ball by the inhabitants of the island in the Parliament Buildings. It was a very grand affair—two bands of music—fine supper—& so forth. I went for an hour, but escaped about 12 as the supper was approaching. After the supper, the Goths commenced speech-making & actually kept at [it] for 2 hours & three-quarters, the poor girls being condemned to listen to it all! From the Ball, all came on board the steamer & we fired up steam & sailed for Pictou.

Midnight—This is all I can get through—have been kept up to the ears all day. We start at 6 in the morning & I have yet to correct the reporters' notes of my speech. So goodbye my own Anne. Love to Little Darling.

Your own loving

George

Hepburn, King, and the Rowell-Sirois Commission

RICHARD M. H. ALWAY

FEW POLITICAL CAREERS IN CANADIAN HISTORY have equalled in drama, turbulence, and general interest that of Mitchell Frederick Hepburn sometime Premier of Ontario, gentleman farmer, Liberal orator, and politician extraordinaire. No Ontario premier since Confederation has cut as vigorous, flamboyant or, indeed, enigmatic a figure as Elgin County's most famous and most controversial native son. It might truthfully be said that a knowledge of the record of Hepburn's tenure as premier of the nation's most populous province is indispensable to an understanding of the course of Canadian politics in the 1930's. Bearing directly on this point is the fact that after 1935 perhaps the most consistently important aspect of Hepburn's career was the growing split, both personal and political, between himself and Mackenzie King.

In the federal election campaign of 1935, Mitchell Hepburn, as premier of Ontario, had put his political reputation and drawing power squarely on the line and stumped the breadth of Canada for Mackenzie King and the federal Liberals, travelling over ten thousand miles and making sixty-five speeches in six weeks.¹ Yet King in 1940, on hearing that Hepburn had contracted yet another attack of bronchial pneumonia, was prompted to write in his diary, "I don't often wish that a man should pass away but I believe it would be the most fortunate thing that could happen at this time."² The complete split between Hepburn and King, both of whom were in power at the time, both of whom were Liberals, presents a situation unique in Canadian political history. Each came to despise the other with a fierce intensity.

¹J. Castell Hopkins, ed., *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, Vol. 34, 1935 and 1936 (Toronto, 1939), p. 63).

²Quoted in J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record. I. 1939-1944* (Toronto, 1960), p. 93.

Each did his best to rid the Canadian political scene of the presence of the other. What must happen to the political party of which both were members was obvious. The split between the leaders was the primary reason for the provincial Liberal disaster of 1943. Hepburn, of course, was not in office in 1943, but the damage had already been done. The publicity given the King-Hepburn feud and the cabinet resignations it had provoked at various intervals would have to affect the voter. Also, the public was, from 1939 on, primarily, indeed almost exclusively, concerned with the war in Europe and resented the continuous political sniping between Toronto and Ottawa.

Although Mackenzie King had not been happy with the choice of Hepburn as Ontario Liberal leader in 1930, the effective genesis of the Hepburn-King vendetta may be seen in the federal election campaign of 1935 and its aftermath. When the Liberals under King were returned, Hepburn, having played an active role in the campaign, expected to be given some say in the apportioning of Ontario's cabinet seats. One recommendation he definitely made concerned his personal friend, Arthur Slaught, the former Ontario Liberal Association vice-president.³ When the appointments were made, however, Slaught was left out of King's cabinet and the Ontario seat that might have gone to him was given instead to C. D. Howe, a newcomer to politics, who had no connection with Hepburn. Hepburn was annoyed. He had worked hard in the campaign and felt he had delivered Ontario's votes. The same finance committee which had supported Hepburn in 1934 had supported the federal Liberals in 1935.⁴ Yet King had offered Hepburn no practical thanks and not only had formed his cabinet without consulting Hepburn, but had deliberately ignored the recommendation Hepburn had made on his own initiative. Other differences between the two men followed in rapid succession. King's silent but unmistakable opposition to Hepburn's anti-C.I.O. policy during the Oshawa strike of April 1937 was answered in October of the same year by Hepburn's flat refusal of the Prime Minister's twin requests to approve the reappointment of the Ontario Lieutenant Governor, Herbert A. Bruce, and to reconsider the decision to close Chorley Park, the vice-regal residence in Toronto.⁵ Hepburn's vehement opposition to a proposed joint Canadian-American development of the St. Lawrence waterway throughout 1937 and 1938 certainly postponed any chance of a definite understanding between Canada and the United States on the matter. But taken in an exclusively Canadian context it also provided a

³Interviews with Norman A. Lambert, David Croll, and Colin A. Campbell.

⁴Senator Lambert to author, Aug. 13, 1963. Senator Lambert was in charge of most of the details of the 1935 federal Liberal campaign.

⁵Hepburn to King, Oct. 12, 1937, in Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1937.

clear warning that future agreements between the Dominion government and the province of Ontario on matters of mutual concern would be impeded, if not altogether precluded, by Hepburn's profound suspicion of Mackenzie King's motives and designs in the whole area of Dominion-provincial relations. Translated into political terms, the dispute between the two leaders of the Liberal party was becoming a cause for increased anxiety on the part of Ontario Liberals. It not only strained communication between Toronto and Ottawa, it threatened to disrupt party machinery in the province and to destroy the morale of the rank and file members.

Up to this point personal and political in their inspiration and application, the differences between Hepburn and King were now being transferred to the larger and more basic debate about the nature of Canadian federalism. On August 14, 1937, an Order-in-Council had been passed by the federal government which set up a Royal Commission "to investigate the economic and financial basis of Confederation and of the distribution of legislative powers in the light of the economic and social developments of the last seventy years."⁶ The plight of the federal treasury, constantly faced with *ad hoc* demands from the provinces, was one obvious reason for the Commission's appointment. Coupled with this was the realization, in Ottawa, that the revenue sources available to the provincial governments were not, in general, adequate to enable them to discharge responsibilities which now included the cost of unemployment relief and other social services.

Therefore it was proposed that "either new revenue sources must be allotted to them [the provinces] or their constitutional responsibilities and governmental burdens must be replaced or adjustment must be made by both methods."⁷ In order to facilitate this kind of adjustment the Commission was instructed to investigate the allocation of revenue sources and the character and amount of taxes collected from Canadians. Whether the money presently available to be spent reflected a truly equitable distribution of the burden of government was to be another matter for the attention of the Commissioners. As the terms of reference went on to state, the Commissioners must be prepared to express

what in their opinion, subject to the retention of the distribution of legislative power essential to a proper carrying out of the federal system in harmony with national needs and the promotion of national unity, will best effect a balanced relationship between the financial powers and the obligations and functions of each governing body, and conduce to a more efficient, independent, and economical discharge of governmental responsibilities in Canada.⁸

⁶Order-in-Council P.C. 1908. A copy enclosed in E. H. Coleman to Lt.-Gov. Herbert A. Bruce, Aug. 24, 1937, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1937.

⁷Order-in-Council P.C. 1908.

⁸*Ibid.*

In short the Commission was instructed to confine its recommendations to Dominion-provincial relations and, by its terms of reference, it had to determine a coherent plan of collecting and distributing the nation's tax resources which would be fair to the taxpayers of all provinces.

Although it is true that constitutional history, even when related to the living issues and political conditions of the day, tends by its nature to the impersonal, in this case the issues of Dominion-provincial relations were significantly influenced by the personal animosity that existed between Hepburn and Mackenzie King. Hepburn's reaction to the concept of trying to reach a widely based accommodation between the federal and provincial levels of government was not, however, immediate. Occupied first by the 1937 provincial election campaign and cabinet reorganization, and then by the negotiations with the Federal government over the appointment of a new lieutenant governor for Ontario, he was not able to devote much of his attention to the functioning of the new Royal Commission until the end of 1937. Even then there were some signs that Hepburn might lend his support to the achievement of the Commission's objectives. The previous January the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had given a negative opinion as to whether the Canadian parliament had had jurisdiction to enact the Unemployment and Social Insurance Act of 1935. In answer to an inquiry from Mackenzie King, Hepburn, writing on November 25, 1937, showed a complete willingness to co-operate with the Dominion government in order to make unemployment insurance available to Canadians. Referring to the Privy Council decision he stated that "the Province of Ontario is prepared to waive any constitutional objections and to give the fullest measure of co-operation and support to the proposed amendments to the British North America Act, empowering the Federal Government to enact unemployment insurance legislation."⁹

This new spirit of accord was short-lived, however, and soon gave way to Hepburn's basic mistrust of Mackenzie King. Although prepared to support a federal scheme of unemployment insurance as part of government's general response to the economic breakdown, Hepburn began to suspect that there might be hidden motives behind King's proposals for provincial co-operation in connection with such a measure. Referring to King's proposals in a letter to Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec on January 24, 1938, Hepburn stated that it appeared "that he [King] is simply asking for a blank cheque insofar as amending the British North America Act is concerned and is using unemployment insurance as the thin edge of the wedge." Hepburn was still willing to commit Ontario to the principle of a national

⁹Hepburn to King, Nov. 25, 1937, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1937.

unemployment plan, "but, not at the expense of confederation."¹⁰ By the middle of February 1938 Mitchell Hepburn's thinking had jelled even further. He was now willing to admit that he rather regretted having endorsed King's proposed scheme of national unemployment insurance in the first place. It was probably too late to be having second thoughts on the matter and he was willing to see the plan instituted but, as he wrote Duplessis, "if this means that we have to sacrifice Confederation I am quite prepared to withdraw any support whatsoever."¹¹ The reasons for Hepburn's attitude were quite clear and they were intimately bound up with his primary concern of promoting the interests and protecting the rights of the province of Ontario. Under Mackenzie King's plan, as Duplessis had pointed out, the provinces would be deprived of all provincial rights in the sphere of unemployment insurance.¹² Under the new national scheme all benefits would be on a par and therefore could not be increased by a single province unless increases in the benefits paid in the other eight provinces kept pace.

As Hepburn explained his position, it seemed to be based on a fundamental reluctance to agree to the principle of provincial equalization involved in a national plan of this kind. Ontario should not be forced to subsidize the rest of Canada. If the federal structure of Canadian government was a compromise measure reached because people were prepared to agree to union for certain purposes, it did not mean that they were willing to agree to unity for all purposes and for all measures. Mitchell Hepburn chose to place a strong emphasis on the territorial dispersal of power under the federal system. It was also beginning to appear to Hepburn that this interpretation of the ideal constitutional division of powers was not the current vogue at Ottawa. Nevertheless he stood ready to defend his ground especially as it appeared that the principle of equalization really meant continual payments by Ontario and Quebec to the other seven provinces. "It is clear to me," he complained to Duplessis, "that with the western provinces hopelessly bankrupt, any national scheme of unemployment insurance will have to be borne by the two central provinces, and if unemployment insurance is necessary it probably will be better to run our own show."¹³ As for the Rowell-Sirois Commission, Hepburn now did not hold out much hope that he would be able to support whatever recommendations it finally made. These recommendations would, in all likelihood, follow the same line put forward in the national unemployment

¹⁰Hepburn to Duplessis, Jan. 24, 1938, *ibid.*, 1938.

¹¹Hepburn to Duplessis, Feb. 14, 1938, *ibid.*

¹²Duplessis to Hepburn, Jan. 31, 1938, *ibid.*

¹³Hepburn to Duplessis, Feb. 14, 1938, *ibid.*

insurance plan. The kind of thinking behind this type of proposal seemed obvious. In the end it always advocated some kind of equalization which, in effect, meant that Ontario and Quebec would be expected to subsidize the other provinces. Hepburn's patience with this type of arrangement had worn thin. "The more I read of the representations made by the other provinces," he explained, "the more convinced I am of the necessity of Ontario and Quebec resisting together, and in no uncertain way, the ever increasing, unreasonable and impossible demand. . . . I can readily understand the advantage it would be to the other provinces for them to raid the Federal Treasury, particularly when Ontario and Quebec contribute eighty per cent of the revenue."¹⁴

Therefore when the Rowell-Sirois Commission came to Toronto in early May to receive the submission of the province of Ontario, Hepburn left no doubt that he was not ready to be pushed into any new scheme of government financing that would work to the detriment of Ontario. From the outset, the tone of his remarks reflected the intractability of one who had been permanently alienated from the work of the Commission. After a short speech of welcome Hepburn expressed what even he was forced to admit was one "long, deep note of discontent."¹⁵

In the first place, the first notice he had received "that a Commission had been appointed to investigate the relations of the provinces with the central government came at the breakfast table, with the morning newspaper."¹⁶ His words dripping with scorn, he wondered why the provinces had not been consulted or at least given prior notice of a matter which touched on their interests in the most direct and vital manner. Perhaps, as some people suspected, this merely meant that Ontario had been bypassed by the Dominion government with regard to the establishment of the Commission. But whatever the real reason for Ottawa's offhand way of treating Canada's premier province in the matter, Hepburn charged that the whole matter had "several folds of significance. For one thing it illustrates the manner in which political business is conducted (and perhaps throws a side light on the decline of democracy)." This was not all. As Hepburn warmed to his topic, he gave expression to an understanding of Canadian federalism that all but dealt the death blow to any hopes that the Commission might be able to achieve real progress under its terms of reference:

May I with all respect . . . say that matters concerning the structure of Confederation should not have been assigned to a commission (no matter the distinction of

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Statement by the Government of Ontario to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, The Prime Minister's Statement* (undated), p. 1.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

its membership). There may be different views as to the approach to Confederation; personally, I have always regarded Confederation as the outcome of a conference. Holding that opinion I hold that even the senior partner should not have empowered a commission to proceed as your reference runs, "with re-examination of the economic and financial basis of Confederation." If there is to be a change in Confederation (in my opinion) it can be brought about only by renewed conferences of representatives of the people and with unanimity of approval. It follows that the Province of Ontario is not before this Commission either as an applicant or as a defendant.¹⁷

Allowing his cynicism to run rampant Hepburn not only doubted the real validity of the Commission's existence, he wondered if its appointment did not, in fact, manifest the depth of the quandary facing Canada as she attempted to balance her democratic tradition with the need to adjust to the economic and social demands of a new age. Canada, he allowed,

was not alone in falling on new times. How people may adapt themselves and their political institutions to the social and economic pressures of to-day is quite the most important thing on earth. Are modern demands upon governments such that people may no longer govern themselves? European nations seem to have generally answered in the affirmative. Looking across the Atlantic we can observe social orders crumbling, like chalk under the iron-hand of concentrated power. Only people deeply grounded in individualism have been able to hold on to freedom.

Is our vision blurred at home? I do not, for a moment suggest there is a formidably deliberate plan to destroy our parliamentary institutions; I do say: were the men of 1867 to take stock of our politics, in 1938, they would find little left of the political ideals on which they placed such store.¹⁸

Hepburn was willing to grant that there was waste in public administration in Canada but he claimed that economy was still possible under the existing political framework. The overlapping of functions between the central and provincial bodies could surely be corrected without destroying the balance which had originally been set up for the insurance of self-government. In other words, a satisfactory solution was quite possible without changing the constitution. For example, the uniformity of social services had been set up as a desirable goal in Canada. The operative question then became how was this condition to be achieved. The federal government had recently committed itself to a policy of unemployment insurance. The issue was really whether this area might not have been better left with the provinces, "for no sooner had the matter been talked about than the capitalized wheat growing interests of the West began a drive for crop insurance." Yet the basic fact surely remained that the principle of insurance depended directly upon the feasibility of predicting, with reasonable assurance,

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

what was likely to happen in the future. Obviously the injection of the prospects of wheat crops into such a scheme altered the picture radically. It could even be, Hepburn felt, that "in a country with Canada's economic diversities, 'federal codes' are impossible." Perhaps when codes were required they could be better arranged by a compact between the provinces rather than by federal legislation: "If it is proposed that re-adjustment be in the form of assigning more duties to an already over-burdened central government, more power to a government that has already departed from the well-thumbed practices of parliamentary institutions, then . . . we have but to look across the Atlantic to read the destiny of the Canadian people."¹⁹

Therefore, in Hepburn's view, the provinces should be authorized to take over additional functions which could be financed by a new assignment of all tax sources between the federal and provincial levels of government. The issue before the Rowell-Sirois Commission was where to place the new services incumbent upon governments in the twentieth century, services that could not have been foreseen in 1867. Hepburn's answer was simple and straightforward: give the provinces the responsibility of administering the services and give them the fiscal means to make this possible. Such a solution would provide for admittedly desirable social welfare services while preserving the delicate balance of Canada's federal system and preventing a potentially dangerous overcentralization of government functions and power at the national level. For, in the end, Hepburn warned,

the answer does not depend wholly upon what we want governments to do for us; it depends upon what governments may do to us, once they get seized with power. For we are a stupid people if we imagine ourselves immune from the consequences of concentrating power in few hands. We may not disagree over the lessons of the times and all time. The accumulation of all power leads to autocracy; its distribution is the safety-zone of democracy.²⁰

The presentation of the remainder of the Ontario submission to the Commission was left to the Attorney General, G. D. Conant. Much less bellicose in tone, his statement was nevertheless an elaboration of the basic provincial rights position put forward by Hepburn. While claiming that Ontario was not the "Midas in the picture or the villain at the feast, sitting back without obligations," Conant made it quite clear that Ontario's position with regard to government financing was that of wanting more and not less in the way of provincial taxing authority. How this might affect the other provinces or whether in the words of the terms of reference of the Commission it would be "in harmony with national needs and the promotion of national unity" was not the

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 7.

primary concern of the government of Ontario, "This province," Conant told the Commissioners

has built up, rightly or wrongly, a large structure of hospitalization, social services, and so on, until it has reached very large proportions. And we must say to this Commission that, if the field of taxation which for lack of a better name is now called direct taxation is invaded by the Federal Government, our financial structure, our whole fabric of Government is and must be, very seriously jeopardized.²¹

Hepburn had now run up the colours of provincial rights and was prepared to do battle under this standard. He and Duplessis were already in basic agreement in their opposition to further centralization of power in Ottawa's hands. It did not take long for Premier William "Bible Bill" Aberhart of Alberta to rally to their side. "It has been the unwavering opinion of this government that the personnel and terms of reference of the Commission rendered it useless for the great and responsible task with which it was entrusted," Aberhart told Hepburn in September of 1938. Far from achieving the degree of national unity essential to the future of the federal union, Aberhart considered the Commission's proceedings were fully justifying his original misgivings and were serving to aggravate further the already acute situation between the two levels of government. Already embroiled in the controversy over federal disallowance of certain Alberta legislation regarding fiscal and banking matters, Aberhart considered the difference between the outlooks of the federal and provincial governments in Canada was more basic and significant than the specific differences of situation and policy-making of the individual provinces. The real obstacle to the cordial and smooth functioning of the governmental apparatus in Canada was not the constitution so much as the federal government's desire for over-all domination of the provinces. Therefore, Aberhart added that it seemed

evident to us that so long as the Provinces attempt to negotiate as separate entities for an adjustment of their constitutional and economic difficulties, the Central Government is able to maintain a dominating position and united action by the Provincial Governments is rendered impossible. For this reason we urge in brief that as a preliminary to any further steps being taken to secure an adjustment of Dominion-provincial relations, the provinces should come together in conference without the intervention of the central government.²²

Certainly Hepburn could understand and sympathize with Aberhart's general opposition to increasing federal centralization. This did not, however, mean that he shared the Alberta premier's rather naïve optimism that all interprovincial problems could be worked out if

²¹Statement of the Hon. G. D. Conant to the Rowell Commission, May 6, 1938, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1938.

²²Aberhart to Hepburn, Sept. 9, 1938, *ibid.*

only the federal government could be prevented from intervening. Aberhart seemed to see the controversy on an abstract level as one between the basic and conflicting self-interests of the two wings of government. Hepburn's concern, on the other hand, was caused by the belief that the federal government was acting as an agent of equalization between the various provinces. Thus Ottawa was always likely to take the side of the Maritimes and the West against Ontario and Quebec, the two wealthier, more industrialized provinces.

This was the rock upon which Hepburn's opposition to Ottawa and Mackenzie King was built. By December of 1938, after the federal government had appropriated for its own use a portion of the succession duty taxation field, Hepburn's attitude toward the Rowell-Sirois Commission as the creature of the central government was completely negative. As far as further involvement in the proceedings of the Commission was concerned, Hepburn informed Mackenzie King, Ontario was opting out.²³ Speaking before the Empire Club of Toronto on December 15 Hepburn preached a very fundamentalist version of the doctrine of provincial rights. As he spoke he wondered aloud if his audience, made up of men who were leaders of thought in the community, realized

the inroads which are being made today upon the resources of this, the central Province, and the richest Province? I wonder if you realize that at this moment you are paying subventions for coal in Alberta, approximately one-half the freight rates on feeder cattle coming from the West to Ontario, and you are paying subventions for wheat going to both seaboards? With respect to the Maritimes you are paying subsidies to the extent of \$2.00 per ton on Maritime coal coming to Ontario, you are paying subsidies on fish, you are paying subsidies on potatoes.²⁴

Even though Ontario was continually subsidizing the rest of the country it appeared that the Rowell-Sirois Commission would try to take even more from Ontario for the other provinces. Hepburn as well as being premier was Ontario's provincial treasurer and he did not intend to surrender any more of the provincial taxing power to Ottawa. Going even further in discussing the Commission, Hepburn stated that

as far as I am concerned, I have washed my hands of the whole business, because the Dominion Government did something which I cannot forgive it for. There are many things it hasn't done, more than it has done, as a matter of fact. This Commission was set up for the purpose of studying facts and problems as between the Dominion and the Provinces, and before the Commission had a chance to report to the Federal Government, new taxation was levied by the Dominion which invaded a field of provincial taxation. Now remember, my friends, Confederation was brought about as a result of an agreement between the Provinces. We created the central government, the central government did not create us. But before this Commission had a chance to report the Federal Government, in the last session,

²³*Toronto Daily Star*, Dec. 13, 1938.

²⁴*Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1938.

invoked new taxation which invaded present provincial fields of taxation, and I refer particularly to the gift tax, which is a direct invasion of the field of succession duties.²⁵

Hepburn's strongly negative reaction to the Rowell-Sirois Commission clearly presaged a gloomy future for any recommendations the Commissioners might make. The tenor of his statements had been noted with some dismay in Ottawa. Mackenzie King, in appointing the Commission, had no idea what form its final recommendations might take. On the other hand it seems clear that he had hoped that its deliberations and report would set guide lines for a new pattern in Dominion-provincial relations which would increase over-all national cohesion and promote the execution of common policies especially in the social and economic fields. This, however, had not proven to be the case. Some of the provinces, especially Ontario, had seen the Commission's role as one of choosing between conflicting interests—federal and provincial. Under these circumstances it had not taken long for partisanship to flare and for agreement to give way to struggle.

Thus with Hepburn's continued opposition to the St. Lawrence Seaway and his repudiation of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, there were new and serious reasons other than those of practical politics for Mackenzie King to desire to be rid of Hepburn. Toward the end of 1938, the possibilities of accomplishing this looked increasingly bright to some members of the federal party. In the late autumn David Croll, Hepburn's former Minister of Labour who had been dismissed at the time of the Oshawa strike, had been elected Mayor of Windsor with a large majority despite a vigorous personal intervention against him by Hepburn.²⁶ A new provincial Conservative leader, George Drew, was selected to oppose Hepburn and had already pronounced in favour of the surrender to federal authority of some of the provincial powers most obstructive to the effective functioning of national economic policy, a stance which had been heartily endorsed by the usually pro-Hepburn *Globe and Mail*.²⁷ Perhaps for the first time Mitchell Hepburn would now be faced with a really aggressive and apparently united enemy in his own province and, as B. K. Sandwell commented in *Saturday Night*, it was "no secret that a considerable number of Liberals in the Ontario Legislature, and a few even in the Cabinet do not look with enthusiasm on the anti-Mackenzie King policy of their leader."²⁸

On the other hand, the federal party was, during this period, waxing

²⁵Copy of the speech delivered to the Empire Club of Toronto on Dec. 15, 1938, by the Hon. M. F. Hepburn, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1939.

²⁶*Saturday Night*, Dec. 17, 1938.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Ibid.*

fairly confident and with good reason. The Tories were showing few signs of staging a comeback under Robert Manion who was following an extremely cautious policy as Conservative leader. It was not surprising that Ottawa Liberals considered Hepburn their most serious problem. He had already declared his uncompromising enmity toward Mackenzie King and had asserted that he would refuse to support a Liberal party led by King in the next federal election. It was evident that the federal party would have to prepare to fight a campaign in which the Liberal premier of Ontario would be on the other side. In the normal course of events this campaign would be no more than one year away. It was time for the national Liberal party to take a stand with regard to Hepburn if only to protect the integrity of its election organization in Ontario.

The lid was initially lifted from the long-simmering party feud by the Hon. Norman Rogers, the federal Minister of Labour, at a Liberal constituency meeting in Port Arthur in November when the Hon. C. D. Howe was nominated for re-election. In speaking of the rift between the federal government and Hepburn, Rogers established the interpretation of the split which would in the future be used by all federal Liberals. The differences between Ottawa and Toronto, he admitted, were party differences but, more importantly, Hepburn's intransigent attitude toward the federal government also constituted a grave threat to national unity. Rogers claimed an alliance existed between Hepburn and Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec which represented more than just "an understanding between the Premiers of two neighbouring provinces to consult and co-operate in matters of policy lying properly within provincial jurisdiction." In fact their real community of interest was based on "studied obstruction and hostility" toward the national government. Referring to Hepburn's attitude toward the Rowell-Sirois Commission, Rogers and Howe joined in charging Hepburn with trying to bring about Mackenzie King's retirement "with the evident purpose of setting up a government at Ottawa which would be largely dependent on and largely controlled by the provincial governments at Toronto and Quebec."²⁹

In retrospect it seems inconceivable that Rogers and Howe, both of whom were important members of King's cabinet and both of whom represented Ontario ridings, had brought the issue of the relations between Ottawa and Toronto into the public spotlight without advance clearance from Mackenzie King. The manoeuvre gave every sign of being part of an over-all plan formulated to deal with the party split. King's quick agreement with the substance of the speeches of Rogers

²⁹"Mackenzie King Will Ask Liberal Caucus Action on Hepburn Attitude," *Canadian Liberal Monthly*, Dec. 1938.

and Howe gives added weight to this conclusion. King publicly admitted that he thought Hepburn would be satisfied with nothing less than King's own retirement from Canadian public life and explained his earlier reticence to acknowledge the split with Queen's Park. "For a year and a half," King told the press, "I have refrained from saying a word or taking any step which might serve to widen the breach created by Mr. Hepburn's attitude toward myself and the Dominion Government. I have done this in the hope that legitimate differences, whatever they might be, would disappear or be removed."³⁰ Mackenzie King also followed Rogers' lead in picturing the rupture in relations between the East Block and Queen's Park as a threat to national unity. "The issue as it has developed," King warned, "transcends the narrower considerations of personalities and parties. It has become one involving the standards which are to prevail in the public life of Canada, in the relations between the Provinces and the Dominion, and the whole question of national unity."³¹ Now that it had been raised, the issue would have to be dealt with and King was even willing to announce what his policy would be in dealing with the situation. "This issue," King commented, "must be and will be squarely faced. To that end, as a first step, I intend as soon as Parliament reassembles to discuss the situation in all its implications with members of the party in the House of Commons and the Senate."³²

Very soon after King's statement had been made public, a meeting was called in Ottawa of all Liberal members of parliament and unsuccessful federal candidates from Ontario to discuss the state of the party in that province.³³ Whether all the Liberals who trooped to Ottawa on December 19, 1938, did so to swear undying fealty to their federal leader and war to the death against Hepburn deviationism was, however, extremely doubtful. Many probably felt squeamish about a meeting that would obviously put them very much on the spot. They would have liked to have been rid of Hepburn but they were not too sure as to how, or even if, this could be done. The results of the Waterloo South federal by-election had proved instructive. Neither the Hon. N. O. Hipel, who represented the riding provincially, nor Hepburn had given any assistance to the Liberal candidate and the seat was won by Karl Homuth, the Conservative candidate.³⁴ The axiom of party warfare was that provincial members should help federal candidates and many Ontario M.P.'s knew that in 1935 Hepburn's support had been an important factor in their personal victories.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid.*

³²*Ibid.*

³³Toronto *Globe and Mail*, Dec. 19, 1938.

³⁴*Canadian Annual Review*, Vol. 35, 1937-38, p. 58.

Thus feeling among informed Liberals was that the Hepburn-King rift was "tragic since it will cut straight down through the party to its very roots in ward and township."³⁵ Most federal Liberals were also of the opinion that the national Liberal party forces should begin organizing "for the election which at most is only eighteen months away. It will mean rival organizations in almost every riding but that cannot be helped."³⁶ The federal party in Ontario was also comforted by the conviction that Mackenzie King still had the loyalty and support of a great majority of the party rank and file. This it was felt was due partially to the English-Canadian tradition of placing a more important emphasis on federal politics and partially to the fact that many Liberals seemed content to support both King and Hepburn, despite the great personal animus between the two men. One report estimated that if a caucus of the fifty-six Ontario Liberal M.P.'s were held "no more than four" might swing away from King.³⁷

The validity of this last judgment was upheld at the Ottawa meeting of December 19. The general tenor of the "informal" caucus was one of caution and concern but there was no evidence of any substantial swing of opinion away from Mackenzie King among the seventy-two M.P.'s, senators, and defeated candidates from Ontario. The absence from the meeting of two members of parliament, W. H. Moore of Oshawa and A. G. Slaughter of Parry Sound, had been expected.³⁸ Both were closely identified personally with Hepburn. When the caucus was adjourned for lunch it was evident from opinions expressed during the morning session that while there was a strong anti-Hepburn feeling among those in attendance, a large number of persons still felt that some kind of co-existence with Hepburn was possible and that no steps should be taken to read him out of the party in any formal way.³⁹ It would appear that various steps were taken at the afternoon session to give an adequate expression to both these opinions. To show continued and unwavering support for Mackenzie King a resolution drafted by J. C. McRuer which pledged "loyalty, devotion and support for the future" to the Prime Minister was signed by all those present.⁴⁰ Also a committee of seventeen was appointed, under the chairmanship of the Hon. W. D. Euler, "to consider matters of interest to the Liberal Party in the province of Ontario, the said committee to report back to caucus (of Ontario members) during the approaching

³⁵An unidentified Liberal M.P. quoted in the *Toronto Daily Star*, Dec. 13, 1938.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸*Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1938.

³⁹*Ibid.* This report was confirmed in the interview the author had with the Hon. Norman Lambert who, as national Liberal organizer, attended the meeting.

⁴⁰*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Dec. 20, 1938.

session of the House.”⁴¹ Furthermore, to this same end, a subcommittee under Ross Gray, the chief Liberal whip, was given the immediate and important task of getting in touch with Hepburn.⁴² Its job was to convince him that co-operation or at least co-existence was possible between the two wings of the Ontario party and that a continuation of unrestrained warfare between Queen’s Park and Ottawa would be tantamount to political suicide for the party both in Ontario and in Canada.

The Ottawa members for all their loyalty to King were obviously not ready to expel Hepburn from the party fold. Any glimmer of hope for a declaration of peace must be actively pursued. This point had been expressed by several M.P.’s. Nevertheless it was recognized that with a federal election no more than eighteen months away and with Hepburn’s open declaration of opposition to a government led by King, some immediate preparations for the campaign in Ontario were imperative. Therefore the larger committee under Euler was asked to consider in detail the requirements of organization should Hepburn determine to continue his attack. A letter from Mackenzie King to the chairman of the Ottawa caucus appeared to show that King was willing to leave the door open for further negotiations with Hepburn. “The only solution to the problems of our day,” King wrote, “will be found in co-operation based upon good will. If I might be permitted to say a further word concerning my feelings at this time, it would be to express the hope that today’s meeting may serve to mark a place of new beginning in friendly and hopeful co-operation, on the part of all members of the party, in all parts of Canada.”⁴³ At a dinner of the Ontario Liberals that same evening, King further stated that although he could not and would not submit to the conditions Hepburn seemed intent on imposing, he personally would be glad to shake hands with Hepburn and forget what had been said about him as leader of the Liberal party.⁴⁴

King was evidently trying to appear as open as possible on the general subject of negotiations with Hepburn. If there were still an opportunity for a genuine reconciliation, well and good; if there were not, King could claim to have done his best, to have gone as far as was compatible with the integrity of his own position as federal leader. At the same time he was avoiding a complete break with the Ontario government while preparing for just such an eventuality if it arose. To the public he appeared to have been extremely reasonable with the Ontario premier. It was once more the patient headmaster dealing with an unruly student whose self-conscious precocity now presented

⁴¹*Toronto Daily Star*, Dec. 20, 1938.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

a problem of discipline. King's conciliatory stance at once won him the editorial support of the *Toronto Daily Star*, *Ottawa Journal*, *Hamilton Spectator*, *Windsor Star*, *Brockville Recorder and Times*, and the *London Free Press*.⁴⁵ As usual Mackenzie King had completely outmanœuvred his opposition.

Hepburn, for his part, had seemed unperturbed at the prospect of being read out of the federal party. Even on the day of the Ottawa conference the *Globe and Mail* was reporting his latest attack on Mackenzie King. "I repeat that Mr. King is living in a past age and generation without any hope of betterment so far as he is concerned," commented Hepburn. "To anticipate any more would be comparable to the hope of getting results from putting a mustard plaster on a wooden leg." He also refused to have any affiliation or contact with the newly formed Gray Committee and stated that so far as he was concerned there could be "no compromise whatsoever," with the federal party.⁴⁶ Mackenzie King's tactics were wearing Hepburn's nerves thin. He simply could not understand them. In an open fight Hepburn felt that he could handle King but King refused to be provoked. It was very much a case of the reckless swashbuckler pitted against a wily and experienced fencing master. Hepburn in one characteristic outburst revealed that he had little desire to engage in King's kind of fight. "I wish," he said, "that some of the Ontario federal members had backbone enough to make an attack on me in the open and then face it before their own constituents."⁴⁷ It was one wish that Mackenzie King would never grant.

At the end of 1938 Hepburn's war of attrition with Ottawa entered a new phase. Up to this time the Ontario premier had contented himself with issuing occasional jeremiads against federal politics and authority. Now for the first time, Hepburn seemed prepared to offer alternative proposals to existing federal policy in at least one area of governmental concern—public finance. It was in this context that a sudden trip to Australia at the beginning of 1939, ostensibly to study at first hand the administration and operations of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, gave rise to intense speculation in the press of the province. The apparent reasons for choosing Australia as a model of fiscal stability were quite evident. As early as November of 1938, the *Ottawa Journal* quoted Hepburn as admitting he was "most pessimistic over the condition in which we find the affairs of the Dominion."⁴⁸ The reasons for such a pessimism were, he claimed, quite clear to the

⁴⁵Many of these papers had supported King's policy of conciliation even before the Ottawa caucus. See the *Toronto Daily Star*, Dec. 16, 1938.

⁴⁶*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Dec. 19, 1938.

⁴⁷*Toronto Telegram*, Dec. 20, 1938.

⁴⁸*Ottawa Journal*, Nov. 7, 1938.

observer of current public affairs. The municipalities of the nation as well as the Federal government were saddled with financial burdens which under normal conditions they would never be able to wipe out. The public debt of Canada, including all municipal, provincial, and federal debt, totalled over eight billion dollars by the end of 1938 and in all three sectors total indebtedness was still increasing with great rapidity.⁴⁹ Only in Ontario was it possible to show a corresponding asset for any increase in debt. Yet should this not be the case everywhere? If individuals increased their financial obligations without a corresponding asset then it was inevitable that bankruptcy would follow "and that is the way this nation is headed at the present time."⁵⁰

It is easy to see that Hepburn's views in this area were intimately connected with his opposition to the Rowell-Sirois Commission. Ontario by careful budgeting and by cutting government expenditure to the bone had maintained a healthy and much envied financial position throughout the depression years. Now the principle of equalization threatened to penalize her for having achieved such a status. Hepburn pointed out that in contrast to Ontario, the federal government in paying subsidies had been forced to borrow money

to take care of fifty million dollars deficit on railways each year, losing sixty millions on wheat alone in this one calendar year, paying in some instances one hundred percent of the relief cost of the West, and according to the Premier of Saskatchewan who appeared before the Rowell Commission, three-quarters of the people of Saskatchewan were last year on relief. . . . We loaned 140 million dollars to the West, not a dollar of which is recoverable.⁵¹

Debt charges in some of the western provinces constituted almost one-half their revenue. Municipalities were paying a 6 per cent interest rate on loans and going into bankruptcy. "The thing seems impossible to me," Hepburn complained.

I have never felt more discouraged about the situation than at the present time. Within the sphere of our own jurisdiction we are trying, as best we can, to meet our obligations and to assist the overburdened taxpayers. It is like putting an ice pack on Mount Vesuvius. While here in Ontario we are trying to do those things, trying to economize, doing things in the interests of the people, look at Ottawa and see the debt mounting day by day, millions by millions, half of which is borne by Ontario, because we constitute one-half of all the Federal taxation.⁵²

However, Hepburn claimed not merely the insight to diagnose the malady; he also believed he could prescribe the cure. He continued:

⁴⁹Speech to the Empire Club by Hepburn, Dec. 15, 1938, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1939.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²*Ibid.*

"Australia had the same condition that we have. But they had a government with courage with the result that today Australia has no unemployment and the country is enjoying the full measure of prosperity."⁵³ Once again, it was the glib Mitch, equally ready to take a fast swipe at the federal government and to present an easy solution for problems of which that government had failed to take proper heed.

In his Empire Club speech in 1938 Hepburn had further expanded on this view that the structure of public finance in Canada needed a complete overhaul. He warned not just as premier but also in his capacity as provincial treasurer that unless stock and inventory were taken at once of the serious situation obtaining in national finances, and measures instituted through some national refunding scheme in order "to save our principal," bankruptcy for Canada would be inevitable within three years. It seemed evident that what Hepburn had in mind was Australia's programme of compulsory conversion of interest rates. The fact that Canada's federal interest rate was lower through voluntary conversion measures than was Australia's through compulsion⁵⁴ was apparently ignored. To his attentive but not overly enthusiastic audience at the Empire Club luncheon Hepburn preached on economic reform taking, it seemed, his inspiration if not his text from the theories of the western Social Credit movement. "We've got to have some national refunding scheme," Hepburn told his listeners,

that will take into consideration the present position of the Dominion and the provinces. We've got to cut down our interest charges whether we like it or not. It has been done in England, and it has been done in Australia and it has got to be done here. Our position today is so critical that we must give serious consideration to the study of monetary reform.⁵⁵

Existing excessive interest charges, Hepburn claimed, simply had to be reduced. Regulated sacrifice was necessary "all along the line." The principal at least must be saved in order to pay back for value received but if a policy of drift were allowed to continue much longer even this would not be possible. "Never mind the interest," Hepburn challenged his conservative, pin-striped audience, "let's save our principal . . . let us have enough courage and backbone to do now the things that are very obvious—to straighten out our financial difficulties."⁵⁶

There can be no question that at this time Hepburn favoured certain radical fiscal changes which ran against both the orthodox financial

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴*Financial Post*, Dec. 24, 1938.

⁵⁵Speech to the Empire Club by Hepburn, Dec. 15, 1938, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1939.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

opinion of the Canadian business community and the views of the professional academics in the universities. In effect these theories were Hepburn's answer to the Rowell-Sirois Commission. What the Commission might propose to do for the nation by a system of equalization grants which would take from Ontario more than would be returned, Hepburn promised to do by reorganizing the fiscal structure of the Canadian economy. The question arises as to whether it is too much to ask that a political leader know economic and fiscal theory and be able to apply this knowledge to a given situation. Certainly Hepburn's thought in this area was moving along new lines but it is difficult to see that his proposals were part of any overall economic theory or philosophy of government other than the rather vague one of provincial rights.

But before Hepburn even left Queen's Park on his much publicized fact-finding jaunt to the dominion "down under," certain practical brakes were applied to his fiscal free thinking. Just after Hepburn's speech to the Empire Club on the iniquities of high interest rates on government borrowing, trading in high-yield province of Ontario bonds came to a virtual standstill in Toronto. No real bids appeared for issues paying 5 and 6 per cent.⁵⁷ It was distressingly evident that prospective buyers were taking Hepburn's Empire Club speech to heart and feared that his general proposals regarding interest rates included reduction of the rates on these bonds, thus leaving their market value open to question. Also, Hepburn's conversion views were seen by leading London bankers and investment brokers as a real menace to Canadian business "just at a time when owing to widespread insecurity in Europe, funds are flowing to Canada for refuge as never before and on excellent terms."⁵⁸ "One can explain a McGeer or an Aberhart," one prominent financier was quoted as saying, "but how can one explain Ontario's premier bursting out like this. Probably never before has a government leader suggested a refunding scheme and then said the country is going bankrupt. It's as if a man went to a banker and said he would go bankrupt if he didn't get a loan."⁵⁹

Thus it was perhaps quite natural that when the Hepburn party left for Australia on New Year's Day 1939, press conjecture had it that the real significance of the trip would be shown in Hepburn's proposals for financial reform upon his return. In fact, it would appear that the press exaggerated both the importance and the seriousness of the trip. Hepburn, stung by the cool public reaction to the provincial bond issue and the evident horror manifested by professional economists

⁵⁷*Toronto Daily Star*, Dec. 16, 1938.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1938.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

and bankers at his recommendations for fiscal reform, had already begun to "soft-pedal" the issue of public finance.

Considering the timing of his trip to Australia it is perhaps not surprising that Hepburn came back from the Pacific with a new concern uppermost in his mind—national defence. With the outbreak of the war at the beginning of September, speculation regarding domestic politics seemed, for the moment, quite out of place and in Ontario Hepburn immediately moved the resources and power of his government behind Ottawa's war effort.⁶⁰ He visited the capital personally to offer his full co-operation in prosecuting the war.⁶¹ When attempts at enlisting in the army met with failure,⁶² Hepburn obviously saw his role at home as one of prodding others into actions that would increase the efficiency of the nation's defences. Although he had quickly rallied to the support of the federal government after the declaration of war it did not take long for Hepburn's basic hostility toward Ottawa to reassert itself. It took Hepburn almost no time at all to conclude that conversion of the nation's productivity to a war footing was proceeding at much too slow a pace.⁶³ In a matter of months his attitude of seeming co-operation with the federal government was replaced by one of outright condemnation. In the Ontario legislature he moved a resolution on the war which expressed the regret of that body "that the Federal Government at Ottawa has made so little effort to prosecute Canada's duty in war in the vigorous manner the people of Canada desire to see."⁶⁴ By staking the life of his government on the resolution Hepburn was able to secure its passage but, in doing so, he further split his party in Ontario and contributed in no small measure to King's record victory in the national election of 1940.

But if the twin questions of fiscal "reform" and Hepburn's attitude toward the Rowell-Sirois Commission seemed to have been made largely irrelevant by the outbreak of war in Europe, they were not completely dead. While Hepburn had publicly damned the Dominion government for what he considered a half-hearted war effort and privately deplored the federal Liberal landslide of 1940, his most publicized split with Ottawa, and by far the most serious during the war years, occurred at the Dominion-Provincial Conference which began in Ottawa on January 14, 1941. Mackenzie King had called the conference to discuss recommendations contained in the Rowell-Sirois *Report*. The *Report* had been presented to the Federal government on May 10, 1940, but it had not been until the adjournment of Parliament

⁶⁰Hepburn to King, Sept. 5, 1939, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1939.

⁶¹Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 36.

⁶²Hepburn to H. Miles Cox, Oct. 12, 1939, Hepburn Papers, Supplementary, 1939.

⁶³See, for example, Hepburn to Thomas Wayling, Sept. 15, 1939, *ibid.*

⁶⁴*Saturday Night*, Jan. 27, 1940.

on August 7 that the government had been able to give it careful and systematic study.⁶⁵ The essential and by far the most significant recommendations of the commissioners were contained in what the *Report* termed Plan Number One, which advocated the assumption of all provincial debts by the federal government which in turn would acquire the sole taxing authority in the personal income, corporation, and inheritance fields. The principle of provincial equalization was to be given new and stronger recognition by the replacement of fixed provincial subsidies with a system of National Adjustment Grants payable annually according to provincial need. The federal government was also to assume the entire responsibility of unemployment relief.⁶⁶

Under strong pressure from some provinces and with the hope of achieving some measure of agreement on new tax arrangements,⁶⁷ Ottawa had decided to call a Dominion-provincial conference to discuss the Commission's recommendations. King held out little hope that any significant accord could be reached on the main points of the *Report* "at this time of war." On the other hand he felt that a conference was necessary if only for the record for "were the Government not to make the attempt, it would be blamed for whatever financial disaster will follow, as it certainly will, in the course of the next year or two."⁶⁸ However, what the government felt it might get and what it really wanted were two different things. King wrote to the premiers of the nine provinces on November 2, 1940, proposing that action be taken to meet together to discuss the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission. He left no doubt as to what the Dominion government hoped would be the outcome of such a meeting. "The Report," he wrote, "commends itself strongly to our judgement. We believe that no time should be lost in arranging for a conference with the Provinces, in order to secure, if possible, the adoption of the Commission's recommendations."⁶⁹ Anticipating some criticism for calling such a conference in wartime, King stated that it was the war itself that made the early convening of such a conference imperative:

The war has cast additional burdens on governments and taxpayers alike. It has inevitably increased the competition between governments to secure revenues,

⁶⁵Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 145.

⁶⁶Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report* (1940). Also see the "Confidential Preliminary Memorandum on the Main Findings of the Sirois Commission," prepared for the Ontario government, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1940.

⁶⁷Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 146.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, I, 159.

⁶⁹King to all provincial premiers, Nov. 2, 1940, in *Report of the Proceedings of the Dominion-Provincial Conference, Tuesday January 14, 1941 and Wednesday, January 15, 1941* (Ottawa, 1941), p. v.

and has aggravated the overlapping, cumbersome and discriminatory character of much of our tax structure. Sometimes the competitive effort to secure revenues has resulted in struggles between the Dominion and the Provinces; sometimes in conflicts between the provinces themselves. If this situation continues, the war effort itself will inevitably be hampered. . . . It is the view of the government that adoption of the Commission's recommendations is necessary to put our country in a position to pursue a policy which will achieve the maximum war effort and, at the same time to lay a sound foundation for postwar reconstruction.⁷⁰

Hepburn's strongly negative attitude toward the Rowell-Sirois Commission, well known since 1938, had, if anything, hardened even further by now. An additional warning of the stand he was likely to take was contained in his answer to King's letter of November 2. "I was hopeful," Hepburn wrote, "that a discussion of this problem could be delayed until after the war so that there could be no possibility of any controversial issue arising which might impair national unity and effective prosecution of the war." Nevertheless he agreed to attend the conference whenever King chose to call it.⁷¹

While Hepburn agreed with King that it was necessary to achieve and maintain a maximum war effort, he evidently did not agree that one way of doing this would be to support the Rowell-Sirois *Report*. Hepburn viewed provincial co-operation with the federal authority in quite a different way. His 1941 New Year's message to the people of Ontario contained the assurance that for the fourth successive year the province would show a modest surplus of ordinary revenue over ordinary expenditure. Because of careful and frugal administration Hepburn could promise that there would be no increase in provincial taxation and no lowering of existing tax exemptions. This, claimed Hepburn, was one way of aiding the nation's war effort: "Undoubtedly one of the most useful contributions any Province can make in time of war is to maintain its credit and thereby help to sustain the credit of the Dominion which is necessarily straining its resources to finance the struggle against the totalitarian powers."⁷² He pointed out that before the war the Dominion had taken eleven dollars out of every one hundred dollars of the national income and was surely taking at least twice that sum now. "Considering the human services maintained at a maximum to increase and improve the comfort and well-being of the people," Hepburn stated, the Ontario government "has done well to live within its income while at the same time making a valuable contribution to the nation's war effort."⁷³

The basic policy positions of both the Dominion and Ontario governments with regard to the Rowell-Sirois Commission had thus been

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹Hepburn to King, Nov. 8, 1940, in *ibid.*, p. ix.

⁷²*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Jan. 3, 1941.

⁷³*Ibid.*

outlined in advance of the Conference. A stand by Ontario against the *Report* was almost a certainty. In his diary Mackenzie King expressed his concern lest Hepburn should use the Conference as an excuse for yet another attack on the federal government.⁷⁴ The federal cabinet itself had been somewhat reluctant to call the Conference and had finally approved only because the ministers hoped it might pave the way for new wartime tax arrangements.⁷⁵

If any further notice of Hepburn's position was needed it was given just a week before the Conference was due to open. In a semi-facetious note to the Hon. C. G. Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air and an old friend, Hepburn wrote that he was "looking forward to meeting you in Ottawa next week. I am going down with blood in my eye and dandruff in my mustache—but of course that's the way you expect me."⁷⁶ It therefore came as no real shock when Hepburn, aided by Premiers Aberhart of Alberta and Pattullo of British Columbia, precipitated the quick adjournment of the Conference on January 15, the day after it opened. Dismissing the *Report* as "the product of the minds of three professors and a Winnipeg newspaperman,"⁷⁷ Hepburn charged that under its provisions, "Quebec and the rest of us will have to agree to a surrender to a central authority of rights and privileges granted by the British North America Act. I say that so long as my colleagues and I have any say in directing public policy for Ontario. . . we shall, as a sister province, stand solidly beside Quebec if at any time her minority rights are threatened."⁷⁸ It is interesting to note that Hepburn saw in the *Report's* recommendations such far-reaching consequences to the constitutional guarantees of the French-Canadian minority. Whether this was the result of a genuine insight on Hepburn's part or of his absolute rejection of the *Report* and his overriding desire to beat it with any and every weapon that came to hand is open to debate.

Hepburn concluded his speech with a peroration that for pure emotion has seldom been equalled in twentieth-century Canada and which seems far more typical of the brand of speechmaking popular in the 1840's and 1850's. Having made his appeal for the support of Quebec, Hepburn now sought English-Canadian support for his stand by ridiculing the importance of the *Report* when viewed beside Great Britain's heroic struggle for national survival. "Is this the time," Hepburn asked the Conference,

to send a courier to bomb-torn London with a document in his hand and have him step into the Hall of Westminster and ask the British Parliament to pause

⁷⁴Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 159.

⁷⁶Hepburn to Power, Jan. 7, 1941, Hepburn Papers, Private, 1941.

⁷⁷*Report of Dominion-Provincial Conference, January, 1941*, p. 11.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 15.

in its consideration of questions determining the very life of the British Empire in order to debate the question of a new constitution for Canada? To me it is unthinkable that we should be fiddling while London is burning. . . . Today while these brave people of London are shielding their houses with their bodies and braving the bursting bombs and hail of machine gun bullets, do we read that the Lord Mayor of London has paused in his efforts to save the nation and has called a meeting of the aldermen to consider a readjustment or a revision of the borough system of the great metropolis which is now a beleaguered fortress?⁷⁹

The stand taken by Aberhart and Pattullo at the Conference was less colourfully stated but just as firm in its rejection of the Commission's recommendations. Their position was simply that they refused to use the *Report* as a basis for a general discussion of federal-provincial problems. They were willing to discuss Dominion-provincial affairs but they were not willing to be tied to an agenda based on the Rowell-Sirois *Report*.⁸⁰ Hepburn agreed with this stand. He was, he claimed, not opposed to discussing anything having to do with improving Canada's prosecution of the war, although, as he took care to point out, "by so doing we are taking up the time of the Government which should concentrate all its energies into pursuit of the war."⁸¹

Unable to obtain the adherence of Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia to the principles of the *Report*, and reluctant to discuss on any other basis the common problems of the provinces and the Dominion, the Federal government had no alternative but to adjourn the Conference even though a majority of the provinces had declared themselves in favour of a discussion of the *Report*. For his part, Mackenzie King was not disturbed by the break-up of the Conference before a permanent settlement had been reached. There were no concrete achievements to point to, but he now had the acknowledgment from all the provincial leaders that federal war needs had an absolute priority and he felt that Hepburn had definitely put himself in a bad light by his attitude and actions at the Conference.⁸²

To what extent King's appraisal of the situation was accurate, time had yet to show. Newspaper opinion varied considerably. The *Globe and Mail*, abandoning its usual posture as a pro-Hepburn paper, ripped into the Ontario premier with a scathing editorial barrage. Commenting on Hepburn's performance in Ottawa the *Globe* charged that he had done

a very excellent job of raising sectional prejudice, and has no doubt ensured for himself another term of office as Prime Minister of Ontario. His portrait will not, however, be included in that group of patriots whom later generations will revere

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁸⁰See speeches of Aberhart and Pattullo in *ibid.*

⁸¹*Le Droit* (Ottawa), Jan. 21, 1941. A translated copy of the story appears in the Hepburn Papers, Private, 1941.

⁸²Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 161.

as the founders of a rejuvenated Canada. He has chosen to sacrifice an opportunity for national service in order to ensure his continuance in office.⁸³

The opposite opinion was expressed by the *Toronto Daily Star*. Ordinarily a staunch supporter of the federal government, the *Star* felt that as it stood the *Report* "contemplates so radical a readjustment of the Dominion-Provincial financial fabric that it provokes discord rather than unity." Nevertheless the *Star*, with obvious reference to Hepburn's outburst at Ottawa, was forced to admit that it should have been possible to discuss the various aspects of the *Report* "without rancour and name-calling."⁸⁴ The *Toronto Telegram* did not hesitate to chastise other Canadian newspapers for not recognizing the Ottawa Conference for the waste of time and energy it surely had been and complained that national attention would have been diverted indefinitely but for "the courageous refusal of three provincial prime ministers, Messrs. Hepburn, Aberhart and Pattullo."⁸⁵ On the other hand, Hepburn's home-town paper, the *St. Thomas Times-Journal*, regretted "the strong terms which Premier Hepburn habitually applies to those who disagree with him. He invariably makes it difficult to meet on open and friendly ground in the future. . . . His remarks at Ottawa will only add fuel to the fires of disunity, which is more unfortunate at this time than any other."⁸⁶

If Hepburn's conduct at the Ottawa Conference had precipitated a divided reaction on the part of the press, individual public leaders also split along other than strict party lines in their attitudes to the Ontario rejection of the *Report*. Earl Rowe, the man Hepburn had defeated so soundly in the Ontario election of 1937, read the text of Hepburn's statement to the Conference and then immediately sat down in his room at the Royal York Hotel to write his congratulations: "Tonight I must say you have expressed my sentiments. Your whole statement is excellent indeed. . . . You have stolen the show this time by a soundness that isn't always so obvious in such a picture."⁸⁷ On the other side of the political fence Premier MacMillan of Nova Scotia returned to Halifax blaming Hepburn for the failure of the Ottawa Conference. He termed Hepburn's discourtesy toward the federal government "without parallel in the history of Canada," and claimed that "personal animosities and political ambitions were quite evidently the dominating factor" in Hepburn's mind when he sabotaged the Rowell-Sirois recommendations.⁸⁸

⁸³*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Jan. 15, 1941.

⁸⁴*Toronto Daily Star*, Jan. 15, 1941.

⁸⁵*Toronto Telegram*, Jan. 18, 1941.

⁸⁶*St. Thomas Times-Journal*, Jan. 17, 1941.

⁸⁷Rowe to Hepburn, Jan. 14, 1941, Hepburn's Papers, Supplementary, 1941.

⁸⁸*Hamilton Spectator*, Jan. 22, 1941.

Calling the *Report* "the product of the minds of three professors and a Winnipeg newspaperman" could hardly be considered a sufficiently explicit reason for torpedoing a Dominion-provincial conference and in reply to a press query Hepburn amplified his views. To meet the increasing demands of Canada's war effort, Hepburn proposed an immediate issuance of \$480,000,000 in new currency.⁸⁹ To those who would criticize this as a step leading to inflation he pointed out that currency in Canada, as issued, was then at \$30 per capita while England's currency was at \$65 per capita and that of the United States at \$70. Such rates had not ruined those countries nor would they ruin Canada. Instead they would serve as a spur to increased production and would put men to work. "There is no doubt that we are only on the fringe of the problem of financing the war," Hepburn commented. "We have to get away from the orthodox system of money and we might as well come to it now. Let us tackle this thing in a big way as suggested by my honourable friend from Alberta."⁹⁰ Here he stopped. Beyond a position of advocating a vague form of monetary reform and currency expansion, Hepburn refused to go.

Premier Aberhart, obviously excited at the prospect of gaining so important a convert was, however, quite prepared to woo Hepburn. In a letter written on February 14, 1941, he adopted the role of an ardent suitor intent on obtaining Hepburn's support for a general monetary reform along Social Credit lines. The evident purpose behind this action was to try to swing Hepburn around to a more explicit Social Credit position so that a definite counterproposal could be put forward by Ontario and Alberta.⁹¹ Such a plan of operation had obvious attractions for Aberhart and Hepburn's reply to Aberhart's call for support gave some indication that this plea had not fallen on totally deaf ears. Reflecting a latent fiscal radicalism that few of his supporters in the legislature would have either recognized or understood, Hepburn told Aberhart that he was

thoroughly convinced that only by the recasting of our monetary system can this democracy survive. The alternative will mean an upheaval the like of which this nation had [*sic*] never witnessed. We cannot continue forever increasing debts and taxation without a financial crisis being created. My one regret is that I did not have an opportunity of discussing this problem with you at Ottawa.⁹²

Furthermore, Hepburn informed Aberhart, his letter had served

as a source of encouragement and, after the smoke of battle in the Legislature clears away, I shall communicate with you with a view to arriving at some

⁸⁹Toronto *Telegram*, Jan. 22, 1941.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹Aberhart to Hepburn, Feb. 14, 1941, Hepburn Papers, Supplementary, 1941.

⁹²Hepburn to Aberhart, Feb. 18, 1941, *ibid.*

common ground on which to present some definite proposals to the people of Ontario. My position here is more difficult in view of the fact that Toronto is the centre for entrenched finance for the Dominion, and the Press, generally speaking, are very hostile.⁹³

Hepburn here recognized an obvious fact. His public utterances on the desirability of expanding the amount of currency in general circulation had already aroused a storm of adverse criticism reminiscent of the reaction to his comments on government borrowing of December 1938. On January 21, 1941, the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix* charged that Hepburn's ideas, however ill defined, amounted in the end to a programme of bald inflation and on January 28 the *Moose Jaw Herald*, in support of its own criticism of Hepburn's plan quoted F. Cyril James, the principal of McGill University and a noted economist, to the effect that there was absolutely "no economic sanction for the contention that Canada's war effort is being impeded by lack of currency or bank deposits." The *Ottawa Journal* merely noted sarcastically that Hepburn's thinking was so woolly, his talk so confused and remote from reality that it was "difficult to reply to him intelligently."⁹⁴ Ottawa, claimed *Maclean's Magazine*, was itself rather puzzled by Hepburn's currency talk. The federal government was not too sure what Hepburn meant by his advocacy of monetary reform and did not think he was either. Finance Minister Ilsley and the Bank of Canada claimed there was, in fact, no currency shortage⁹⁵ and they had the opinion of the nation's press behind them. All were unanimous that any plan such as Hepburn's, which put additional large sums of money into circulation, would mark the beginning of an inflationary spiral making all goods and services dearer in terms of money and leading to all the other consequent woes of financial inflation.

Despite Hepburn's promise it does not appear that he ever pursued the topic of fiscal reform in further correspondence with Aberhart. The Alberta premier pressed the issue in two letters to Hepburn on February 25 and March 12,⁹⁶ but there is no evidence that Hepburn replied. Any plan of mobilizing the public opinion of Alberta and Ontario behind concrete proposals for currency expansion and fiscal reform was fated to die aborning. Trying to devise a pattern from the confused minuet danced by Mitchell Hepburn during this time presents a strong challenge. Hepburn probably realized that it would be impossible to carry the Liberal party of Ontario with him on the issue of fiscal "reform." Ontario, the national stronghold of conservative and

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴*Ottawa Journal*, Jan. 21, 1941.

⁹⁵*Maclean's Magazine*, March 1, 1941.

⁹⁶See Aberhart to Hepburn, Feb. 25, March 12, 1941, Hepburn Papers, Supplementary, 1941.

orthodox financial interests would, at best, be difficult fighting ground for proposals regarding the national currency, proposals which to many ears sounded like a strange mixture of Social Credit theory and straight inflation. Despite his personal views in the matter Hepburn may well have realized the practical impossibility of forging a new political grouping during wartime.⁹⁷

However, probably the strongest reason for ignoring Aberhart's later communications on the subject was Hepburn's hope that he might soon be able to lay down the leadership of the Ontario government in favour of what he considered a more active and useful role in the over-all allied war effort. In early 1941 the allied powers were entering a period of extreme crisis in the conduct of the war. Leading a provin-

⁹⁷However, Hepburn's interest in joining with Aberhart to offer Canadians definite alternatives to federal policies in certain areas was revived just before his resignation as premier in the autumn of 1942. On September 28 Aberhart wrote Hepburn that he proposed to hold a "Provincial Conference of the people of Alberta early in December for the purpose of formulating a definite post-war policy which will reflect the will of the people all across Canada." The only way to mobilize the morale and fighting spirit of the Canadian people during wartime was to point out well-defined postwar aims and to formulate, in detail, ultimate social and economic goals capable of achievement by a united and dynamic society. Aberhart believed that a conference of the people such as the one he was proposing to hold in Edmonton would rally the nation behind such a movement. "I am satisfied," he confided to Hepburn, "that the people will respond enthusiastically to a definite policy of post-war reconstruction and a courageous lead on the war effort ('No party politics in war and a Canada worthy of maximum sacrifices')." Aberhart suggested that Hepburn come west to speak at the conference and that he persuade George Drew, leader of the Conservative opposition in the Ontario legislature, to accompany him in order to demonstrate the non-partisan nature of the new movement. Aberhart could promise the Ontario leaders a "tumultuous welcome" and did not hesitate to point out the political opportunities of such an event to Hepburn: "If you both put over the right stuff as I am sure you will, you could electrify the whole country. I think you will readily appreciate the potentialities of such a move." In Aberhart's opinion the way was open and Canada was ready for "non-party action by men who place their country's welfare above all else."

In replying to Aberhart's dramatic proposal on October 6, Hepburn seemed much more willing to agree with the Alberta premier's assessment of the general political situation than he had ever been in the past. Hepburn had just returned from a speaking tour which had carried him across most of Ontario and he reported that "everywhere . . . I found that which you described as an utter sense of frustration among the people and wholehearted condemnation of the vacillating record of the Ottawa Administration.

"I do believe we are arriving near the point where the resentment of the people will crystallize in some form or other and seek expression.

"I am interested in your suggestion that I attend a Provincial Conference in Alberta. Please let me have another week to take stock and inventory of my own problems here before making a definite reply. Needless to say, I am wholeheartedly in support of the general idea."

Hepburn resigned on October 21, 1942, for reasons which, although still somewhat obscure, had nothing to do with Aberhart's proposal of a new united political front. On November 5 Hepburn wired Aberhart that "because of disturbed political situation" resulting from the change of leadership of the Ontario government he would be unable to attend the proposed conference.

cial government in Canada seemed to Hepburn too remote from the main theatres of active war effort where the destinies of Europe and Great Britain were being decided. A man of action who wanted desperately to be more closely involved in the real fighting, Hepburn renewed his efforts to get overseas. In February of 1941 he probably did not expect to be premier of Ontario for much longer. On the seventeenth of that month he sent a wire to his old friend, J. P. Bickell, in England who was supervising the British end of the overseas bomber ferrying service: "As crisis approaches can you persuade our great Canadian Lord Beaverbrook to arrange for me to assist you in your work. Will resign and leave as soon as advised."⁹⁸

No arrangement was made, however, and Hepburn continued to act as premier of Ontario and leader of the province's Liberal party until his resignation in the fall of 1942. It seemed, nevertheless, that his attention along with that of his countrymen was primarily centred on events in Europe. For Ontarians the real significance of the Ottawa Conference on the Rowell-Sirois *Report* was that it showed that Hepburn and King still had the hatchets unburied. Contrary to his comments about a united national effort during the war, Hepburn had revealed himself as quite willing and prepared to continue his feud with King on any and all available fronts—war co-operation between Toronto and Ottawa notwithstanding. Nor did there seem to be much that Mackenzie King could do to alleviate the situation. The party split in Ontario still posed a serious threat to the effectiveness of the King government and yet there was no real prospect of a settlement in the foreseeable future. The War Resolution of 1940 and the federal election campaign that followed had shown only too well that there was no provincial cabinet minister strong enough to challenge Hepburn in Ontario, nor were the federal members from the province too willing to risk a further widening of the gap between Toronto and Ottawa. Hepburn had too much patronage at his disposal and King, for the time being, was forced to continue playing a waiting game.

⁹⁸Hepburn to Bickell, Feb. 17, 1941, Hepburn Papers, Supplementary, 1941.

The York South By-Election of February 9, 1942: A Turning Point in Canadian Politics*

J. L. GRANATSTEIN

SENATOR ARTHUR MEIGHEN was selected as leader of the Conservative party in November 1941 by a party conference that originally had been called only to fix the date and site of a leadership convention. Meighen had been drafted for the leadership for a number of reasons: to industrialists he was the man alleged to be opposed to the increasing demands of organized labour; to businessmen and merchants he was the foremost critic of the Liberal government's price-freezing policy; and to members of parliament he was the strong, vigorous leader who would revive the faltering opposition in the House of Commons. But above all, to these groups in the Conservative party, Meighen was the leader of the forces in wartime Canada pressing for conscription of manpower for overseas service. If the new leader could direct an attack on the government, using the emotionally charged issue of conscription as his weapon, perhaps Mackenzie King's huge Liberal majority could be turned to the support of a national government, a national government that Meighen through the force of his still powerful personality might be expected to dominate.

The formation of a conscriptionist national government could only be disastrous for King and the Liberal party. Not only would King's personal power be destroyed, but the effects on Canadian unity would be shattering. In 1917 French Canada had reacted to conscription for a "British," "imperialist" war with riots and mass evasion. Knowing this, King had brought Quebec into the Second World War—equally a British war to many in the province—only by pledging himself, his

*This article is drawn from the author's forthcoming book, *The Politics of Party Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945*.

government, and his party to a policy of no conscription for overseas service. For more than two years King had been able to honour his pledges, although conscription for home defence had been deemed necessary after the fall of France. Now with Meighen's return, the question of military service was to become the dominant issue once more.

Meighen needed a seat in the House of Commons in order to press effectively his case for conscription. This necessitated resignation from the Senate, finding a vacancy, and winning the subsequent by-election. But when Meighen finally secured a nomination for a "safe" seat, he found he was opposed by a candidate representing the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. In the normal course of events the election of the leader of the Conservative party in a by-election would have been a mere formality. Complex forces were to meet head on in the York South campaign, however, and a war-weary electorate was to be offered social welfare as a cure for its ills. The decisive and unexpected result of the by-election was a watershed in Canadian politics.

Barring the possibility of a member's death or an unexpected general election, Meighen could only secure a seat in the House of Commons if one of the sitting Conservatives resigned, forcing a by-election. The problem, of course, was to pick a safe seat certain to return the leader. At the same time, with the party holding only thirty-nine seats in Parliament and being as well desperately short of legislative talent, no one wanted to deprive one of the more capable members of his place. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it proved rather difficult to induce a suitable M.P. to offer his seat.¹ Immediately Meighen had been selected as leader, two members had offered to resign in his favour. They were the Hon. Earl Rowe, member for the rural Ontario constituency of Dufferin-Simcoe, and Major Alan Cockeram from the Toronto riding of York South.² Apparently Meighen did not want either of these seats: rural ridings might not be safe ground for a conscriptionist; and Cockeram was on active service with his regiment, a valuable asset to a party claiming to represent the serviceman's interest. The most obvious choice after these two was the Toronto constituency of High Park, held since 1925 by the lacklustre A. J. Anderson, a 78-year-old lawyer. In precarious health, Anderson at one point agreed to give up his seat for his leader, but he soon reneged.³ The sticking point

¹Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Arthur Meighen Papers, Meighen to M. A. MacPherson, Nov. 27, 1941.

²The Hon. W. Earl Rowe Interview, Sept. 9, 1964; House of Commons, *Debates*, Jan. 30, 1942, p. 177 (J. F. Pouliot, M.P., citing Judith Robinson, "Tory Patriot Offers Costly Seat," [Toronto] *News*, date unknown).

³Meighen Papers, J. R. MacNicol, M.P., to Meighen, Dec. 5, 1941.

apparently was the compensation required by Anderson for his sacrifice. Estimates of the amount demanded ranged from twelve to twenty thousand dollars, a sum that Meighen and his party presumably were not prepared to pay.⁴ Finally, on November 26, Major Cockeram was allowed to resign, thus opening the way for Meighen's entry into the House of Commons.

York South seemed to be a safe seat for the Conservative leader. Since its formation in 1904, the constituency had never failed to vote Conservative, often with large majorities. In recent elections, however, the Conservative plurality had been decreasing, and the victory of 1940 was probably attributable to the popularity of Cockeram, a decorated veteran of the Great War, a militia officer, and an outgoing individual. The electorate of approximately 33,500 had given Cockeram a comfortable 2,500-vote plurality over his Liberal opponent, and a 10,000-vote lead over the C.C.F. candidate, Joseph W. Noseworthy. Within the boundaries of York South lay the wealthy and exclusive suburb of Forest Hill Village, the middle class area of Weston, and the heavily populated working-class districts of York Township. The population was largely of British stock, although there were substantial numbers of Jews in the Village.⁵ Some in the party would have preferred Meighen to choose another constituency, but it is hard to see how he could have done better at that time than to contest York South.⁶

With a seat now opened for him, the next problem for Meighen was whether or not he would face opposition. This question did not remain unanswered for long: on December 1 the C.C.F. again nominated Noseworthy to contest the vacancy. The nomination of a candidate was

⁴A. Rodney Adamson Papers (Port Credit, Ontario), Diary, entry for Dec. 4, 1941: ". . . Anderson asked \$12,000 for his seat. Shocking this just the curse of the Tory party again [*sic*]"; House of Commons, *Debates*, Jan. 30, 1942, p. 177.

⁵The population of the constituency of York South, as reported by the 1941 census, was 78,167. Of this number 5,740 lived in Weston, 11,757 in Forest Hill Village, and 60,670 in York Township. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Eighth Census of Canada, 1941* (Ottawa, 1944), II, 35. Well over three-quarters of the population was of British stock (*ibid.*, II, 442-3). Income distribution was sharply varied in the three districts forming the riding. The head of a household in Forest Hill earned an average of \$3,504 yearly and lived in a house valued at \$12,611. In Weston the salary was \$1,715 and the house value \$4,583, and in York Township the figures were \$1,622 and \$3,783 respectively (*ibid.*, IX, 162-7). The York Township averages above are boosted by the "better" districts bordering on Forest Hill Village. Without these areas, the figures would doubtless have been lower.

⁶The Hon. R. A. Bell Interview, July 15, 1964. Bell stated that he had tried to stop Meighen from running in York South, feeling that he could not win there, but that he could win High Park. On the other hand, J. R. MacNicol, M.P. for Toronto Davenport, wrote Meighen that he was relieved he was not to run in High Park because "there are many foreigners and railroad men [in High Park]" (Meighen Papers, MacNicol to Meighen, Dec. 5, 1941). Election results in High Park show a progressive decline in Conservative strength. In 1925, the plurality was 10,344; in 1930, 6,042; in 1935, 2,592; and in 1940, only 205 votes.

no mere whim of the local party organization but the result of a deliberate policy decision taken by the C.C.F. National Executive on November 15–16, shortly after Meighen's designation as Conservative leader.⁷ As the archetypal representative of the "Old Gang" and of the "profit-seeking wolves of Big Business,"⁸ Meighen was to be opposed by the C.C.F. wherever he chose to run.

With the exception of one Cape Breton seat won in the 1940 election, the C.C.F. had never returned a member of parliament east of the prairie provinces. On the outbreak of war in 1939 the movement, internally divided, had taken a somewhat equivocal stand on the question of Canadian participation, and this had seemingly destroyed it. The party's war policy, however, had undergone a slow metamorphosis from pacifism to conscription of wealth rather than men, to no conscription of men without conscription of wealth, and finally, by late 1941, to conscription of both men and wealth.⁹ Coincident with this shift in policy, the C.C.F. found its programme of social welfare becoming more attractive to the public. The gloom of the war years seemed to be encouraging people to look ahead to a brighter postwar prospect, to a world free of depression and strife. When this feeling was coupled with full employment, stronger trade unions, and an admiration for the effective resistance of the "socialist" Soviet Union, the C.C.F. was the beneficiary. The party was ready to move into Ontario.¹⁰ Joseph Noseworthy, the nominee in York South, was a good choice to lead the C.C.F. attack. He was the head of the English department at Vaughan Road Collegiate, the neighbourhood high school, and as such he had a ready-made group of youthful supporters, a large number of former students, and many parents ready to work for him. Despite his crushing defeat at the hands of Major Cockeram in 1940, Noseworthy had a bare chance to win in the changed circumstances of 1942, but only if the vote was not split by the entry of a Liberal candidate.

What would the Liberals do? Meighen would be very dangerous to the government in the House of Commons, and his slashing attacks might destroy Mackenzie King's control of his increasingly restive English-speaking supporters. The York South Liberal Association (or

⁷P.A.C., C.C.F. Records, National Executive Minutes, Nov. 15–16, 1941; Toronto *Globe and Mail*, Dec. 2, 1941, p. 2.

⁸Phrases from a York South campaign pamphlet in author's possession.

⁹Leo Zakuta, *A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF* (Toronto, 1964), p. 60.

¹⁰G. L. Caplan, "The Failure of Canadian Socialism: The Ontario Experience, 1932–1945," *Canadian Historical Review*, XLIV (June, 1963), 99; David Lewis and Frank Scott, *Make This Your Canada* (Toronto, 1943), pp. 3, 14, 25; M. J. Coldwell, *Left Turn, Canada* (New York, 1945), pp. 26–30.

rather one of the two feuding groups in the riding claiming that title) provided the answer on December 5 when it declined to contest the seat, declaring that as Cockeram had resigned only to facilitate Meighen's entry into the House, his wishes should be respected.¹¹ These were praiseworthy sentiments, but they concealed definite attempts to stop any Liberal from running against Meighen.¹² The Conservative leader, certainly, had no doubts as to the reason for this courtesy. Mackenzie King, he wrote long after the event, "would not put a candidate in the field knowing if he did so the vote opposing me would be divided, and he wanted it entirely concentrated, and did not care much under what auspices it was concentrated."¹³

Meighen's jaundiced view of Liberal motives was probably correct, although there were some extenuating factors. A "tradition" that the leader of a party seeking to enter the House in a by-election should not be opposed did exist, and the Liberals could claim that they were honouring this custom.¹⁴ Furthermore it has been alleged that there was an agreement between the Liberals and the Conservatives that Meighen would be unopposed in York South if the Conservatives did not oppose Humphrey Mitchell, the newly appointed Minister of Labour, who was seeking election to the House in a by-election in Welland, Ontario, also scheduled for February 9, 1942. There is no doubt that Meighen made at least one attempt to get a candidate to run in Welland, but there is also no doubt that after his first choice refused to consider seeking the nomination, he dissuaded the Welland Conservatives from entering the contest.¹⁵ Although Meighen later denied that there was any pact with the Liberals, many contemporary politicians believed that some agreement had been reached.¹⁶

¹¹Toronto *Globe and Mail*, Dec. 6, 1941, p. 4. Details on the split between the two riding associations may be found in *Toronto Daily Star*, Dec. 3, 1941, p. 8, and Dec. 5, 1941, p. 8.

¹²F. J. MacRae, the Liberal candidate in 1940, was visited by the Postmaster General, the Hon. W. P. Mulock, and was politely advised not to seek the nomination (MacRae Interview, June 2, 1965).

¹³Meighen Papers, Meighen to Theodore Ropp, July 9, 1957; *ibid.*, Meighen to H. E. Wilmot, Jan. 17, 1942.

¹⁴For example, when Dr. R. J. Manion entered the House in a by-election in November 1938 the *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1937 and 1938*, p. 58, noted that "the Liberal Party extend[ed] the usual courtesy to a newly-elected Party Leader" by not opposing him.

¹⁵Meighen tried to persuade M. A. MacPherson to run (Meighen Papers, Meighen to MacPherson, Dec. 13, and reply, Dec. 16, 1941). For Meighen's efforts at dissuading the Welland Conservatives, see *ibid.*, Meighen to T. F. Forestell, Dec. 16, 1941.

¹⁶P.A.C., John W. Dafoe Papers, Microfilm roll M-80, the Hon. T. A. Crerar to Dafoe, Jan. 31, 1942: "We did not nominate a Liberal against Meighen and there was some understanding—how complete it was I do not know—that the Conservatives would not nominate against Mitchell." Meighen's denial of an arrangement is in Meighen Papers, Meighen to John Bird, Feb. 17, 1942.

In the weeks after his selection as leader, Meighen was busy with the difficult tasks of arranging his personal affairs and with party organization. He was painfully aware of the inadequacy of the party's representation in the House of Commons, but he was unable to induce the men he wanted to stand for election when vacancies could be found for them.¹⁷ There was more success with finances. A new organization under Senator A. D. McRae, the architect of the Conservative victory of 1930, was formed.¹⁸ "The arrangement with Meighen," R. B. Hanson, the Conservative leader in parliament since the resignation of Dr. R. J. Manion in May 1940, wrote some months later, "was that an entirely new financial set-up was made and he was guaranteed relief from any worry over finance."¹⁹ Professor Graham has indicated obliquely that some \$200,000 was to be provided for the party's needs,²⁰ and that this money was intended to finance a national movement for conscription. "We all realize that organization in the old Party line is not either wise or in our minds at all," Meighen wrote to one of his friends. "It is a national new movement we want to generate to get national results."²¹

Without its leader in the House of Commons, the national movement for a total war effort would be stillborn, and the first task was to get Meighen elected. The job of running the by-election campaign was turned over to J. Earl Lawson, a former M.P. for York South and Minister of National Revenue in the last days of the Bennett government. Lawson's chief aide was Leopold Macaulay, York South's Conservative representative in the Ontario legislature since 1926. Under the direction of these two experienced local politicians, a full campaign organization detailing responsibility for everything from publicity to "citizens' committees" was created and functioning before Christmas 1941.²² Ample funds were available for the campaign, although all but a small portion of the \$7,500 expended apparently came from Meighen's own pocket.²³

While the campaign organization was wisely left in the hands of

¹⁷Meighen tried to persuade MacPherson and George Drew to enter the Commons (Meighen Papers, Meighen to H. R. Milner, Nov. 28, 1941, and Meighen to MacPherson, Nov. 27, 1941). Apparently, he also attempted to persuade W. D. Herridge to follow a similar course (W. D. Herridge Papers (Toronto), Herridge to A. P. Waldron, Nov. 24, 1941).

¹⁸R. B. Hanson Papers (Fredericton), File 0-160-F, Hanson to Meighen, March 23, 1942. (The Hanson Papers have since been deposited in the P.A.C.)

¹⁹*Ibid.*, File 0-167, Hanson to D. C. Coleman, May 30, 1942.

²⁰Roger Graham, *Arthur Meighen*. III. *No Surrender* (Toronto, 1965), 162-3.

²¹Meighen Papers, Meighen to Milner, Nov. 28, 1941.

²²*Ibid.*, J. Earl Lawson to Meighen, Dec. 22, 1941.

²³Meighen put up \$7,300 himself, while \$159.85 was received in contributions (*ibid.*, C. F. Moore to Meighen, March 10, 1942). Cf., Graham, *Meighen*, III, 161.

local politicians, Meighen himself determined the issue upon which he would base his fight for election. This issue—the only issue as far as Meighen was concerned—was the winning of the war, and this meant conscription and National Government. His decision to stand on this platform was probably intuitive and was grounded upon his belief that conscription was the foundation without which an effective war effort was an impossibility. It was obvious to Meighen that “no nation has any right to go into a war on any other basis than a compulsory selective service system.”²⁴ None the less, to get the statistics necessary to bolster his beliefs, Meighen commissioned research into the war efforts of the other British dominions (none of which had imposed conscription for overseas service), into the war policy of the C.C.F., and into Canada’s military condition. To get this information, Meighen corresponded with his friends across the country, asking for reports on the situation in their areas.²⁵

Meighen’s campaign advisers were not entirely pleased with the choice of campaign issues. As early as December 9, before Meighen’s first meeting with the executive of the York South Conservative Association, Earl Lawson urged his leader not to oppose an excess profits tax and to support the conscription of wealth and industry as well as the conscription of manpower.²⁶ Remembering the unemployment and distress of the 1930’s when parts of the constituency had been among the hardest hit in the nation, Lawson based his advice on a realistic assessment of political conditions in the riding. His warnings, and those of other Toronto Conservatives, fell on deaf ears, however, for Meighen was concerned solely with the war.²⁷

Meighen’s obsession was readily apparent in his first major address of the campaign, a local radio speech on January 9. After a brief attack on the C.C.F. for blocking his election by acclamation, the candidate turned directly to his joint themes of National Government and con-

²⁴Toronto *Globe and Mail*, Jan. 30, 1942, p. 1.

²⁵Bell Interview, Aug. 24, 1964. Bell prepared an elaborate memorandum on recruiting in the dominions which proved inconclusive, but upon which Meighen proceeded to base his attacks. Meighen’s researchers also looked into the C.C.F. press, but found nothing useful (Meighen Papers, Milner to Meighen, Jan. 12, 1942, and “CCF Attitudes Toward War,” n.d.). Meighen’s principal correspondents on the military situation were Senator McRae and MacPherson (e.g., Meighen Papers, MacPherson to Meighen, Dec. 31, 1941, containing a report prepared by A. H. Bence, Saskatoon Conservative M.P., which is revealing as to the tenor of the reports: “I am afraid that there is nothing that I can point out of a critical nature as far as the local situation is concerned”).

²⁶Meighen Papers, Lawson to Meighen, Dec. 9, 1941.

²⁷F. G. Gardiner, Esq., Interview, Sept. 8, 1964. Gardiner was Reeve of Forest Hill at this time and a key figure on the campaign staff. He recalled that his urging of social welfare on Meighen became so tiresome to the Conservative chief that he took to calling him “Social Security” Gardiner each time they met. Leopold Macaulay confirmed this interpretation (interview, Sept. 17, 1965).

scription. His thesis was simply put: "we are not organized politically as we should be . . ." and "as a consequence of an unsuitable political set-up we are not organized militarily as we should be." In proof of this contention the Conservative leader cited the example of New Zealand, claiming that the small Pacific dominion had contributed a proportionately greater share to the empire's war effort than had Canada.²⁸ How could this alleged disparity be made up? "We need more men for overseas service," Meighen claimed. "We cannot organize this nation without ample power to direct the energies of every man and woman to the place where those energies are needed. That power this government refuses to exercise. The cold hand of political expediency has held it in its grip. A trembling servitude to a sinister tradition has gone far to benumb the striking power of Canada." In Meighen's opinion there could be no excuse for refusing to conscript men in any war. Certainly Mackenzie King's reason—"that if we compel Canadians to serve where Canadians have to fight to save Canada, we will destroy the unity of the Nation," as Meighen put it—was foolish. "Can any normal mind accept such a preposterous contention?" he asked. Despite his belief that the government's course thus far had been a cowardly one, the Conservative leader offered to share the burdens with the Liberals: "If wanted, we of the Conservative party will . . . help within [the government]; if not wanted, we will help from without; but we insist on action. We shall not be satisfied with substitutes or subterfuge. To the utmost of our strength we shall urge abandonment of things secondary and things that make for division and delay. . . ."²⁹

Arthur Meighen's speech was forcefully, even brilliantly, delivered, but in the context of wartime Canada its content left much to be desired. The Hon. T. A. Crerar, King's Minister of Mines and Resources and a colleague of Meighen in the Union government of the Great War, wrote to a friend about the opening salvo of the Conservative Leader's campaign: "Meighen's speech the other night was a characteristic one. He offers to place himself on the altar of his country in a National Government—and then proceeds to make it impossible. I doubt if I have known anyone during my political life with less political instinct or sense than Meighen has. In this he is the victim of his limitations."³⁰ Who could doubt Crerar's judgment? Meighen showed no glimmer of

²⁸The example of New Zealand was not entirely suitable. Not only did that country lack the manufacturing and mineral resources that absorbed much of Canada's manpower, but its government was formed by Labour.

²⁹Meighen's speech is printed in full in *Toronto Daily Star*, Jan. 10, 1942, p. 31. This theme was repeated again and again (*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Jan. 17, 1942, p. 1; Jan. 21, 1942, p. 4; Jan. 30, 1942, p. 1).

³⁰Dafoe Papers, Microfilm roll M-80, Crerar to Dafoe, Jan. 13, 1942.

understanding for the objections of French Canada to overseas conscription. For attempting to abide by his pledge to Quebec, Mackenzie King was guilty of "trembling servitude to a sinister tradition." Anyone who agreed with King and his manpower policy lacked a "normal mind." Meighen's views with their emphasis on victory and sacrifice were truly patriotic, but they were hardly open to compromise. In Canada as elsewhere, compromise was the stuff of politics—even in wartime—and without it eventual defeat was inescapable. Meighen, however, had made one further error of more immediate import.

The opening speech of the campaign was notable for Meighen's almost total neglect of his actual opponent. Other than to level a perfunctory blast at the C.C.F. for daring to force a test at the polls, Meighen had scarcely glanced in Noseworthy's direction. All his heavy fire was directed at the King government. There was no appeal to the voters of York South, no recognition of the C.C.F. campaign for social welfare measures, and no sign of an understanding of local issues. Meighen's faith in the broad interests of his electorate was evidently real—but was it realistic? Might not the electors feel that Meighen was using them only as a springboard to a better platform? Might not the Liberals of the constituency resent Meighen's attacks on their party's policy and translate this resentment into votes—if not for Noseworthy, then against Meighen? More directly, might not Meighen's total reliance on war issues alienate an electorate that was being promised social reform by his opponent?

A new factor was interjected into the campaign on the day after Meighen's opening address. By a "spontaneous and enthusiastic expression of the people's will,"³¹ a Committee for Total War was organized at a meeting held in Toronto's Royal York Hotel. The Committee's avowed purpose was to mobilize public opinion behind a policy of conscription and to exert pressure on Ontario's members of parliament, in the hope of forcing this predominantly Liberal group to desert Mackenzie King and demand conscription.³² The Committee for Total War, more popularly known as the "Toronto 200," had met at the call of three prominent businessmen, J. Y. Murdoch of Noranda Mines, C. L. Burton of the Robert Simpson Co., and F. K. Morrow, a Toronto financier and corporation director. In the background was C. George McCullagh, publisher of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Toronto's zealously conscriptionist morning newspaper. McCullagh had been one of the organizers of the scheme to bring Meighen back from retirement in November 1941. Now he was hoping to organize all

³¹*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Jan. 12, 1942, p. 1.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 8, address by the Committee chairman, J. Y. Murdoch.

Ontario into a grass roots movement that could propel Meighen into power.³³

The formation of the Toronto 200 marked the shift of the conscription campaign into high gear. Meighen's election campaign was merged into a province-wide effort, featuring a lavish use of the mass media, all paid for "by a small group of patriotic citizens."³⁴ In Toronto, of course, the *Globe and Mail* spearheaded the campaign, turning over its news columns to the Committee's activities.³⁵ In other communities, similar drives were under way. As the *Globe and Mail* put it on January 13, "The heather is on fire in Ontario."³⁶ Indeed it was, and if the fire was not as spontaneous as the Toronto newspaper claimed, it was none the less dangerous. The threat of a revolt of Ontario back-benchers, coupled with the imminent return of Meighen to the opposition ranks, posed one of the gravest threats of the war years for the Liberal government.

The demand for conscription in January 1942 was entirely "political and psychological," Mackenzie King believed, for no practical difficulty had yet been experienced in finding volunteers for Canada's overseas armies. The government's opponents were trying to make conscription for overseas service "the symbol, in English-speaking Canada, of a total war effort,"³⁷ and although he believed this view to be wrong, King could see that his pledge not to conscript men for overseas service would be a potentially embarrassing commitment when casualties began to mount. As early as mid-December 1941, therefore, he had begun to feel that the government would have to be released from its pledges by a plebiscite.³⁸ "We might get into Parliament," King told

³³Adamson Papers, Diary, entry for Jan. 10, 1942: "Today is the day of the 'All Out War' meeting at the Royal York. Murdoch and Burton and George McCullagh. Will it prove another Globe stunt [*sic*]"; Dafoe Papers, Microfilm roll M-80, Crerar to Dafoe, Jan. 13, 1942; Meighen Papers, C. O. Knowles to Meighen, Feb. 18, 1942. Meighen denied knowledge of the Toronto 200 "until the call for the meeting was being complied with" (Hanson Papers, File S-175-M, Meighen to Hanson, Feb. 13, 1942).

³⁴Toronto *Globe and Mail*, Jan. 12, 1942, p. 8. Full-page advertisements were placed in every daily and weekly newspaper in Ontario. The *Toronto Daily Star* printed a memorandum distributed at the meeting detailing the plans for publicity (Jan. 12, 1942, p. 10).

³⁵On one typical day (Jan. 13, 1942) at the beginning of the drive, the *Globe and Mail* had five stories about conscription on page 1, two on page 2, one on page 6, two on page 8, all of page 9, and one on page 10.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1. The fire spread to the prairies, and a Total War advertisement was placed in a Regina newspaper (Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, J. G. Gardiner Papers, T. H. Wood to Gardiner, Jan. 20, 23, 1942).

³⁷J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*. I. 1939-1944 (Toronto, 1960), 333.

³⁸*Ibid.*, I, 314; Dafoe Papers, Microfilm roll M-79, Grant Dexter to Dafoe, Nov. 18 and Dec. 22, 1941.

his cabinet, itself restive on the issue of conscription, "and find the party divided; already, there were some for and some against. . . . The situation might become such that to settle the matter there might have to be a change of Government. One thing I did not want was to see any Government managing Canada's affairs of which Arthur Meighen would be the head, or a member. . . ." ³⁹ Characteristically, King saw that the idea of a plebiscite would also serve to cut the ground out from under the Conservatives. ⁴⁰ With Meighen, McCullagh, and the Toronto 200 all demanding conscription, the plebiscite concept offered a way around the Conservative leader's attempt to win his by-election simply on a show of hands between those for and against conscription. With the prospect of a plebiscite before them, only those who wanted conscription immediately, regardless of the situation in the country, would be compelled to vote for Meighen. ⁴¹ Accordingly, the Speech from the Throne that opened the 1942 session of parliament on January 22 included the following statement of policy: "My ministers . . . will seek, from the people, by means of a plebiscite, release from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service." ⁴²

The announcement of the plebiscite produced the predictable charges of political cowardice from the opposition. Meighen was "shamed and humiliated by our Government's despicable evasion. . . . It is a base and cowardly insult." ⁴³ Major Cockeram, on leave from his regiment to participate in Meighen's attempt to win his old constituency, called the plebiscite the "rankest insult to men on active service." ⁴⁴ Mitchell Hepburn, the Liberal premier of Ontario, announced that because of the plebiscite he would support Meighen's bid for election. As George Drew, the Ontario Conservative leader, was already in the fight, Hepburn's entry seemingly united all right-of-centre shades of the Ontario political spectrum behind the Conservative chieftain. ⁴⁵

Mesmerized by the conscription issue, Meighen believed that the announcement of the plebiscite would increase his chances for success in his attempts to destroy the King government. Who would not be outraged by this shameful attempt to evade the responsibility for settling the conscription question? "A fair, decent breakaway from

³⁹Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 314.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, I, 313.

⁴¹Ralph Allen, *Ordeal by Fire* (New York, 1961), p. 416; Graham, *Meighen*, III, 108.

⁴²House of Commons, *Debates*, Jan. 22, 1942, p. 2.

⁴³Meighen Papers, tel., Meighen to John Bracken, Jan. 23, 1942.

⁴⁴*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Jan. 30, 1942, p. 1.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1942, p. 1. Hepburn's letter and Meighen's reply to this offer of support are printed here.

King in the House on this plebiscite would be a magnificent achievement," he wrote. "It would probably lead to the only move that would save the situation. . . ." This move, he continued, "is for the Government members assisted by us if they want us, to unitedly tell the country what has to be done. . . ." What had to be done, it was evident, was the inauguration of total war—conscription and National Government.⁴⁶

Other observers were not misled by the effect of King's call for the plebiscite, for the new dilemma facing the Conservatives was becoming clear. The announcement of the forthcoming vote on conscription seemingly had solidified the Liberal party behind the Prime Minister,⁴⁷ and the chances for the breakaway foreseen by the Conservatives were now decreasing despite the best efforts of Meighen and the Toronto 200. In the light of this changed situation, attacks on the plebiscite inevitably became attacks on the question posed by King—conscription or not? Whatever their contempt for King's political expediency, the Conservatives could hardly afford to see the idea of conscription defeated. As Senator McRae wrote to Meighen, "like it or not," the party had to work to bring out the largest possible affirmative vote in the plebiscite. The Prime Minister, he added, "has once more proven himself the most astute politician Canada has ever had."⁴⁸ So he had. King's plebiscite had destroyed Meighen's main issue; more important yet was the Conservative leader's failure to realize this. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation organization in York South, however, was not about to make this same mistake.

The strategy and organization of the C.C.F. in the Toronto constituency were superb. By deliberate plan the policy of Noseworthy's headquarters was to stir up interest in the campaign and to force Meighen to defend his past record. This strategy was working better than expected. E. B. Jolliffe, a vice-president of the Ontario C.C.F., wrote to national party headquarters on January 18. The *Globe and Mail*, he reported, was beginning to attack the C.C.F. each day, and Meighen was being forced to devote more and more of his time to defending himself and to setting out his "real" views on social security.⁴⁹ At the same time the C.C.F. message of social reform and total war was being delivered to every home in the riding by an army of dedicated volunteers, gathered together from the entire metropolitan

⁴⁶Meighen Papers, Meighen to A. B. Watt, Feb. 2, 1942.

⁴⁷Houghton Library, Harvard University, J. Pierrepont Moffat Papers, memorandum of conversation with Mr. J. W. McConnell, Jan. 24, 1942, and "Notes on Political Situation," Feb. 7, 1942.

⁴⁸Meighen Papers, McRae to Meighen, n.d. Cf. *Winnipeg Free Press*, Feb. 3, 1942, p. 1.

⁴⁹C.C.F. Records, E. Jolliffe to David Lewis, Jan. 18, 1942. For examples of Meighen's defence: *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Jan. 17, 1942, p. 1; Jan. 21, p. 4; Feb. 4, p. 4.

area.⁵⁰ In sharp contrast to the usual C.C.F. penury, money was available for the by-election fight. A national appeal for funds and extensive canvassing in Toronto produced more than \$5,000,⁵¹ and as the party relied on volunteer workers, this money could be used for radio and press publicity.

The plebiscite, which had effectively forced Meighen into an untenable position, hardly bothered Noseworthy's campaign. The C.C.F. candidate readily fell back on his already well-worn themes of social security and "conscription of wealth" and redoubled his attacks on Meighen's record. "Tories of his type," Noseworthy said of his opponent's attempts to defend himself, "always become interested in the poor at election time." "The Tory clique who drafted Mr. Meighen," he charged on another occasion, "want to give us the old 1914-18 leadership for the war, and they want the same type of leadership for the reconstruction period that follows the war." This clique, Noseworthy claimed, was using conscription to divert attention from other phases of the war effort, "such as the mobilization of all our material resources. They hope, moreover, to give to the Conservative party . . . a momentary flicker of life. They hope to get through the election of my opponent some control of our war policy."⁵²

Faced with this barrage of C.C.F. charges, Meighen began to water down his stand on social welfare as the campaign drew to its close. First, however, he found himself embroiled in a dispute with the *Toronto Daily Star*, the one local newspaper unfriendly to him. The *Star* had reported Meighen as saying in a speech on January 29 that "if we have to conscript wealth to win the war, we will, but people of common sense don't advocate that until the last gasp." Six days later, Meighen belatedly claimed that he had been misquoted and announced that he now favoured the conscription of wealth.⁵³ This last-minute conversion was scarcely believable.

After the entry of Mitchell Hepburn into the campaign at Meighen's side, Noseworthy's efforts received an evidently unsolicited boost when

⁵⁰Noseworthy reported that "several hundred" canvassers were organized (C.C.F. Records, Noseworthy to Lewis, Jan. 9, 1942). For the reactions of a typical canvasser, see Hester James, "I Canvassed for Noseworthy," *Canadian Forum*, XXII (April, 1942), 16-18.

⁵¹The budget was expected to range between \$3,600 and \$5,000 (C.C.F. Records, F. A. Brewin to Lewis, Jan. 9, 1942). E. B. Jolliffe states that the maximum figure was exceeded (Interview, June 2, 1965).

⁵²*Toronto Daily Star*, Jan. 22, 1942, p. 9; Feb. 3, p. 5; Feb. 4, p. 8. Meighen's biographer devotes fifteen pages to the C.C.F. campaign (Graham, *Meighen*, III, 109-24).

⁵³In an extraordinary front-page statement on Feb. 5, 1942, the *Star* denied having misquoted Meighen. The reporter who had covered the meeting in question, the *Star* stated flatly, had specifically asked Meighen if his words were intended and had been informed that they were. Meighen's charges against the *Star* are in the issue of Feb. 4, 1942, p. 9.

Arthur Roebuck, the Liberal member for Toronto Trinity and Hepburn's Attorney General from 1934 to 1937, attacked both his old leader and Arthur Meighen in two hard-hitting radio speeches. Roebuck claimed that he was acting on his own responsibility, but it would appear that he asked for and received Mackenzie King's permission to join in the fray.⁵⁴ His entry roused other Liberals. Brooke Claxton, the M.P. for Montreal St. Lawrence-St. George, approached Senator Norman Lambert, former President of the National Liberal Federation and the controller of party finances, for \$1,000 for the C.C.F. in York South. Apparently acting on his own responsibility, Lambert made arrangements with David Lewis, national secretary of the C.C.F., for the transfer of the money.⁵⁵ It would seem that this \$1,000 was the extent of direct financial assistance.⁵⁶ In Toronto, the C.C.F. received other forms of assistance. T. Wilbur Best, a prominent businessman in York South who had earlier supported Meighen's campaign, withdrew his endorsement of the Conservative leader. Because Meighen was unfairly attacking the government, he wrote in an open letter to the *Toronto Daily Star*, "I am . . . withdrawing my support from Mr. Meighen like most other Liberals in the riding."⁵⁷

Whether "most other Liberals" shared Best's opinion was questionable, but the election results of February 9 were not. Noseworthy, who had won exactly one poll in his first try for office in 1940, carried 159

⁵⁴At a party caucus on Jan. 29, King asked his M.P.'s to support government candidates in the by-elections set for Feb. 9 (Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 343-44; Roebuck interview, July 15, 1964). After this caucus Roebuck apparently persuaded the dubious King that there was a chance to beat Meighen and convinced him that he should be allowed to enter the campaign on his own responsibility. Roebuck was likely motivated by his extreme dislike for both Hepburn and Meighen; his feeling was strong enough that he was willing to pay for his own radio time—or so it appears (Roebuck Interview; Jolliffe Interview). Roebuck's speeches are in the *Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 2, 1942, p. 3, and Feb. 4, p. 9.

⁵⁵Douglas Library, Queen's University, Norman Lambert Diaries, Jan. 29, 30, 1942. According to the diary, the money was picked up in Toronto by Andrew Brewin of Noseworthy's campaign staff. In a letter to the author, dated Nov. 23, 1966, Mr. Brewin stated that his recollection was that there was no direct contribution from the Liberals. (I am indebted to the Rev. Neil McKenty, author of a forthcoming profile of Mitchell Hepburn, for drawing the Lambert Diaries to my attention.)

⁵⁶The possibility exists, however, that additional funds could have been transferred by the Liberal "bag man" in Toronto. See *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1942.

⁵⁷*Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 7, 1942, p. 21. Meighen alleged that the King government had forced those Liberals who had endorsed him to withdraw their support on pain of losing their war contracts (Meighen Papers, Meighen to Bird, Feb. 17, 1942, and Meighen to T. Ropp, July 9, 1957). Best, the only Liberal to publicly withdraw his support, vigorously denies that any pressure was put upon him (letter to author, Oct. 19, 1964).

No evidence at all has been discovered, other than Meighen's letters, that Liberal "wardheelers" campaigned for Noseworthy (Graham, *Meighen*, III, 126-7). Jolliffe stated that some Liberals appeared with cars on election day to drive voters to the polls, but he emphatically denied that there was additional assistance (Jolliffe Interview).

of 212 in the by-election and won easily with a 4,456-vote majority. What had happened? Meighen had run well in Forest Hill Village, winning 23 of 30 polls and a majority of 1,537 votes. In middle-class Weston, the Conservative leader held his own, even picking up the only three polls that had voted Liberal in the general election two years earlier. Only in York Township had he done poorly, so poorly in fact that it was there that the election was lost. The working-class districts of York South had cast 11,720 votes for the Conservative candidate in 1940, but only 7,683 for Meighen, a loss of 4,037 votes. In the 1940 election, Noseworthy had won only one poll in the township; two years later he captured 141, most of which had been Conservative in 1940. Only in the areas of the township bordering on Forest Hill Village and in the "better" districts had the electorate chosen Meighen. What had happened, it is clear, is that Meighen had done well in the wealthier sections of the constituency but had lost in the working-class districts.⁵⁸

Other factors than the defection of the working-class vote had undoubtedly contributed to the C.C.F. victory. The weather, first, had been uncommonly bad, Toronto having been struck by "the worst blizzard . . . in recent years" barely 48 hours before the polls opened,⁵⁹ and this may have been responsible for keeping the turnout of voters below that in the 1940 election. If the C.C.F. organization was as efficient in getting out the vote as in canvassing, this could have been an important factor in determining the outcome. And what of conscription? In the plebiscite held ten weeks after the by-election, York South voted 93.7 per cent in favour of releasing the government from its pledges.⁶⁰ Presumably, then, the announcement of the plebiscite

⁵⁸The following table, derived from Chief Electoral Officer, *Report on the General Election of 1940* (Ottawa, 1941) and *Report on By-Elections Held in 1942* (Ottawa, 1943), shows the distribution of the vote in 1940 and 1942:

| | | Forest Hill | York Twp. | Weston | Total |
|------|--------|-------------|-----------|--------|--------|
| 1940 | Lib. | 2,138 | 9,586 | 1,140 | 12,864 |
| | Con. | 2,454 | 11,720 | 1,172 | 15,346 |
| | C.C.F. | 350 | 4,742 | 280 | 5,372 |
| 1942 | Lib. | — | — | — | — |
| | Con. | 3,218 | 7,683 | 1,051 | 11,952 |
| | C.C.F. | 1,681 | 13,565 | 1,162 | 16,408 |

Details of polls won and lost are derived from the *Reports* and from the *Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 10, 1942, p. 8.

Professor Graham's assessment—"the bulk of the normally Liberal vote had gone to Noseworthy"—seems questionable in the light of the above examination (*Meighen*, III, 130).

⁵⁹*Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 9, 1942, p. 10.

⁶⁰*Canada Gazette*, LXXV (June 23, 1942), "Statement of the Result of the Plebiscite. . . ." The results in York South were 29,860 in favour of releasing the government from its pledges and 1,178 against.

had some effect in destroying part of the Conservative leader's support. The one certainty in all this, however, is that almost 4,100 Conservative voters in York Township had either stayed home on election day or else had switched their allegiance to the C.C.F. candidate. As a result, Meighen was defeated decisively "and defeated in the strongest riding in Toronto, which means the strongest Tory riding in all of Canada." "Defeated," exulted the jubilant Mackenzie King, "while supported by financial interests and the press—everything in the way of organization and campaign power that could be assembled for any man. . . ."⁶¹

The loss was a bitter blow to Meighen. "While I was the most doubtful of any of our organization as to the outcome in South York," he wrote indignantly, "the result, I must admit, was much worse than I thought possible. Truly it is discouraging that the foul and despicable methods which were initiated right at the beginning there and carried on without the slightest regard for truth, and on a wholesale scale, could be successful in a constituency almost wholly of Anglo-Saxons. Undoubtedly the average level is not what it was, and just as undoubtedly we are in for real trouble as a result." Politics in Canada, the defeated Meighen concluded bitterly, were even more rotten than in the France of 1940.⁶² Later, Meighen would attribute his defeat to the "common resolve of not one, not two, but three party leaders—the Liberal, the CCF, and the Communist. . . ." and to the absence from the riding of 4,000 men on active service.⁶³

Meighen's reaction to his defeat was understandable, but his analysis of the causes of the *débâcle* was as wrong as his choice of issues. Certainly the C.C.F. campaign with its focus on Meighen's personality and past was not a gentle one, and it seems likely that some Liberal aid was given directly to the C.C.F. But it is none the less difficult to escape the conclusion that the cause of the defeat was Meighen's inept campaign. His political myopia, aggravated by unreasoning patriotism, had led Meighen to fight his battle solely on the issues of the war and to neglect all positive mention of social welfare until the closing days of the campaign. This obsession with conscription and National Government had left him in an exceedingly vulnerable position when

⁶¹Pickersgill, *Mackenzie King Record*, I, 348. King was so pleased by the defeat of his hated antagonist that he told C.C.F. leader M. J. Coldwell that "if titles were in order, I'd make you a K.C.B." (The Hon. M. J. Coldwell Interview, July 6, 1963).

⁶²Meighen Papers, Meighen to M. G. O'Leary, Feb. 12, 1942. This paragraph is repeated in at least two other letters by Meighen (Hanson Papers, File P-450-M, Meighen to Hanson, Feb. 11, 1942; Bonar Law-Bennett Library, University of New Brunswick, R. B. Bennett Papers, Meighen to Bennett, Feb. 12, 1942). Cf. Adamson Papers, Diary, entries for Feb. 6, 7, 9, 1942.

⁶³Arthur Meighen, *Unrevised and Unrepented: Debating Speeches and Others* (Toronto, 1949), p. 420 (speech of Dec. 9, 1942); *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Feb. 10, 1942, p. 1. No voting arrangements were made then (or now) for military voters outside their home constituencies in by-elections. Chief Electoral Officer, *The Canadian Forces Voting Rules* (Ottawa, 1960), p. 7.

the government announced the plebiscite. By his attacks on the King government and by his reliance on the support of the Toronto 200 and of renegade Liberals, Meighen undoubtedly weakened his position with the Liberals of York South. At the same time, and most decisively, the Conservative leader had alienated the working-class voters of the constituency by his attitude to social reform. The C.C.F. strategy of painting Meighen as a profiteer, a strike-breaker, and a tool of the "interests" undoubtedly assisted in this process. As one of Meighen's key lieutenants noted mournfully, "I think the CCF are starting to make inroads in the working vote of both parties."⁶⁴ With its well-organized, well-run campaign, the C.C.F. had capitalized on Meighen's errors and scored a stunning upset. In the process, the attractiveness of social welfare as an election issue had been effectively demonstrated.

The primary result of Meighen's defeat was to destroy the hopes and plans of those who had arranged his selection as leader in November 1941. With the rebuff in York South, the drive for conscription and National Government fizzled out. In the end, even Meighen was forced to say that he would vote "yes" on the plebiscite.⁶⁵ At the same time the C.C.F. victory gave tremendous impetus to the fledgling social democratic movement. "From that moment," wrote C.C.F. leader M. J. Coldwell, "the CCF ceased to be an interesting minority movement"⁶⁶ and rapidly expanded to the point where it threatened the major parties. Buoyed by the unexpected victory over Meighen, the C.C.F. increased its strength rapidly and in September 1943 the polls showed the socialists leading the old parties in national support.⁶⁷ This was to be a temporary condition, but the effects of the new C.C.F. strength were none the less striking.

The threat of a left-wing government was terrifying to the old-line parties. As a first stage in their attempts to counter the C.C.F., both parties were virtually forced to liberalize their platforms and to adopt extensive social welfare schemes. For the Conservatives, weak even before York South, this urgent movement to progressive Conservatism led eventually to a new party name and a new leader without prior ties to the Conservative party—Premier John Bracken of Manitoba. Meighen's defeat, then, had truly far-reaching effects, both in shaping the course of the war effort in Canada and in moulding the form of society that was to follow the peace.

⁶⁴*Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 10, 1942, p. 5.

⁶⁵Meighen Papers, Statement, March 31, 1942: "True the device of a plebiscite is evasive, dilatory and un-British. . . . But this disgraceful thing is upon us. . . ."

⁶⁶Coldwell, *Left Turn, Canada*, p. 26.

⁶⁷The C.C.F. had 29 per cent, the Liberals and Conservatives each 28 per cent. Letter to author from Mrs. B. H. Sanders, director of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Feb. 7, 1962.

Canada

Quebec: The Revolutionary Age, 1760–1791. Par HILDA NEATBY. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1966. Pp. xii, 300, cartes, gravures. \$8.50.

PERSONNE NE NIERA QUE les années 1760–1791 ont été cruciales dans l'histoire du Canada. Tout effort de recherche et de réflexion pour mieux décrire et mieux comprendre cette période éclaire nécessairement l'évolution historique subséquente de la vallée du Saint-Laurent et de ceux qui l'habitaient à la fin du XVIII^e siècle. Pendant près d'un siècle et demi, suivant la tradition établie par William Smith dans son *History of Canada*, la plupart des historiens qui ont abordé l'étude des premières années de la domination britannique se sont montrés incapables de saisir le sens profond des événements et des faits qu'ils rapportaient. Les plus naïfs ont parlé d'une conquête providentielle qui aurait également profité aux Canadiens et aux *British North Americans*. Les moins aveugles, tout en percevant vaguement quelques-uns des problèmes que soulevait la coexistence des conquérants et des conquis, ont préféré se convaincre que les deux groupes étaient appelés à une collaboration féconde.

Le professeur Neatby rejette l'interprétation optimiste des anciens historiens. Elle se rend bien compte que les Canadiens ont affirmé, dès la première génération après la Conquête, leur volonté de poursuivre leur existence comme collectivité distincte sur le territoire avec lequel ils s'identifiaient depuis la fondation de Québec au début du XVII^e siècle. Même si l'auteur critique sévèrement la politique des généraux (*the Generals' System*) qui aurait eu pour résultat d'encourager le nationalisme des conquis, elle est assez lucide pour se rendre compte que ceux-ci, par l'action de leurs porte-paroles cléricaux et laïques, étaient en mesure de faire reconnaître leurs exigences minima. De leur côté, les administrateurs coloniaux, face à la révolte des colonies américaines et au retour de la France dans l'équilibre politique de l'Amérique du Nord, n'avaient pas la liberté d'ignorer les pressions des seigneurs et du clergé. Si Mlle Neatby rend justice aux marchands britanniques qui s'établirent dans la colonie pour y demeurer avec l'ambition légitime d'en faire "leur" patrie, elle aurait dû s'efforcer également de comprendre le comportement des seigneurs canadiens. Ceux-ci avaient l'ambition tout aussi légitime de conserver "leur" patrie. Même si elle a plus de clairvoyance que les historiens traditionnels, elle se résout difficilement à admettre que deux nationalismes s'opposaient au Québec dès le dernier quart du XVIII^e siècle. Néanmoins, elle constate que chacun des deux groupes en opposition, les Canadiens et les Britanniques, se demande, au moment où se prépare la constitution de 1791, comment il utilisera le système représentatif pour servir ses intérêts collectifs. L'ennui c'est que la plupart des historiens et des politologues du monde anglo-saxon persistent à soutenir que le nationalisme est un phénomène du XIX^e siècle ou même d'origine encore plus rapprochée. Pourtant l'histoire même de la Grande-Bretagne est remplie de luttes nationales depuis les invasions celtiques jusqu'à l'élection récente

d'un député gallois séparatiste au parlement de Westminster! Quand sauront-ils que le nationalisme a toujours existé et que le leur a même une très longue histoire?

L'auteur décrit très objectivement comment les hommes d'affaires britanniques, bénéficiant d'une position privilégiée et favorisés par les circonstances, ont graduellement pris le contrôle de l'économie laurentienne. Même si quelques Canadiens s'enrichirent dans le commerce, les entrepreneurs canadiens ne pouvaient pas survivre comme groupe devant la concurrence des nouveaux venus. Mlle Neatby se croit obligée d'invoquer, d'une façon marginale, le témoignage de M. Fernand Ouellet qui s'en tient toujours à la psychologie des peuples pour expliquer l'élimination des hommes d'affaires canadiens par leurs concurrents britanniques. Mais l'auteur elle-même se charge de réfuter M. Ouellet car les pages qu'elle consacre aux questions économiques démontrent qu'elle a dépassé l'époque du romantisme. Elle sait très bien que les marchands canadiens étaient à la merci de leurs rivaux.

Il serait facile de relever quelques erreurs mais celles-ci sont peu importantes. Le juge Smith est un personnage beaucoup plus complexe que celui que nous présente l'auteur. Les démarches d'Adam Lymburner auprès du parlement de Westminster et des ministres, lors de l'adoption de l'Acte constitutionnel, auraient dû recevoir plus d'attention. La conclusion est plutôt faible. Je me demande si l'auteur, par délicatesse pour ses lecteurs canadiens-français et voulant servir la cause de l'unité nationale fortement compromise, n'ose pas exprimer tout le fond de sa pensée. Chose certaine, si Mlle Neatby est en mesure de mieux décrire les faits de la période 1760-1791 c'est parce qu'elle a réfléchi sur les problèmes contemporains de la coexistence entre les Canadiens et les *Canadians*. Elle a le droit de déplorer la survivance de la collectivité franco-québécoise qui menace aujourd'hui de remettre en question l'unité de l'Etat canadien. Cependant, elle a tort de s'imaginer que l'Acte de Québec et la politique des généraux ont créé la nation canadienne-française. Celle-ci existait avant la Conquête et les conquérants n'ont pas pu empêcher sa survivance. Chacun doit aujourd'hui en prendre son parti.

En terminant, je tiens à dire que j'ai lu ce livre avec profit et plaisir. Mlle Neatby a enrichi l'historiographie anglo-canadienne. A l'avenir, aucun historien ne pourra se contenter de répéter servilement William Smith ou Francis Parkman en parlant de la Conquête anglaise et du sort des Canadiens après 1760. Nous approchons du moment où cette période sera saisie sous toutes ses dimensions. La contribution du professeur Neatby retiendra l'attention de tous ceux qui s'intéressent à ce moment de notre histoire et de ceux également qui veulent comprendre pourquoi la vallée du Saint-Laurent est aujourd'hui habitée par des Canadiens et par des *Canadians*.

MICHEL BRUNET

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Toronto of Old. By HENRY SCADDING. Abridged and edited by F. H. ARMSTRONG. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1966. Pp. xxxiv, 396, map, illus. \$7.50.

The Settlement of Huron County. By JAMES SCOTT. Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1966. Pp. xvi, 328, illus. \$5.00.

ALMOST A CENTURY separates the first publication of Scadding (1873) and Scott's work on Huron County, Ontario. Unfortunately, we can report no improvement in local history writing over this period. Quite the contrary. Scadding remains a classic, vital, informative, graceful. Scott represents local history at its stereotyped worst.

The abridgment has reduced *Toronto of Old* to little more than sixty per cent of its original length, but Professor Armstrong has pruned well. Non-Toronto material has disappeared, leaving the core of the book, the rambles along Toronto's main streets, largely intact. And it has been strengthened by Mr. Armstrong's many informative footnotes. The editor has also appended a sixteen-page introduction, sketching the background of the work. His wide knowledge of Toronto politics and administration makes it a useful capsule comment, although some of his generalizations on Upper Canadian affairs seem rather sweeping.

The book must be approached like one of Scadding's walks, leisurely, a few blocks at a time. The great mass of detail, and the complexity of the author's Victorian prose, make it a book to be read in small pieces. Dipped into for pleasure in this way, or used as a reference work, it is still the best history of early Toronto. Scadding's judgments are always cool, and surprisingly detached for a contemporary, especially one so close to the Family Compact. But the charm and importance of the work rest not on Scadding's political views, but on his gossipy reminiscences of people, places, and events in Toronto before 1841. With unfailing accuracy, with scholarly use of documents, and above all with the informed insight of a contemporary gentleman, he presents the full panorama of the young city.

Scott's book is a total contrast. Like Scadding, it cannot be read at a single sitting, but in this case, it is because of sheer dullness. The writing is clumsy, the approach parochial; none of Scadding's grace is to be found here. Hasty judgments and sloppy errors mar it. And, unlike Scadding, it has been badly edited. The most perfunctory editing should have caught, for instance, the complete garbling of school financial statistics on page 120. Editing could have rescued an index so bad it might well be omitted. Taking a page at random (p. 168), we find twenty-five names mentioned. Only three are properly indexed; four more are in the index, but with no reference to this page; the other eighteen are unindexed. As a result, the book has limited use even for genealogical purposes. Among the innumerable factual errors, some are crippling. For example, Scott explains the changing role of the Canada Company in provincial politics on the assumption that the Reformers won the Upper Canadian election of 1836. Since they were actually decimated in this contest, much of what follows is invalidated.

The book is both more and less than the title implies. It is more than a study of settlement, for it is a grab-bag of information both significant and insignificant. It is less, since it tells little about the actual process of settlement, the causes of migration, the social results or demographic patterns. Nor does it tell anything new about the Canada Company and its massive scheme of planned settlement. The period is viewed entirely, and uncritically, through the eyes of John Galt, Tiger Dunlop, and the Lizars. For anyone familiar with the Lizars' *In the Days of the Canada Company* or recent works on Dunlop, there is little here. And the story is so fragmented and colourless, it is doubtful that even those who have not read this literature will find much of interest. Once past the point where he can rely on these secondary works, Scott falls back on a dry listing of settlers and post offices.

In the rather arid field of Canadian local history, one looks back on a classic like Scadding with both admiration and relief. Its reprinting is a major event. One could only wish the Ryerson Press had shown as much imagination. How much more useful it would have been to have reissued one of the durable classics of local history, rather than adding *The Settlement of Huron County* to the dreary catalogue of forgettable books.

MICHAEL S. CROSS

Minnesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian Northwest: A Study in Canadian-American Relations. By ALVIN C. GLUEK, JR. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1965. Pp. xiv, 311, maps. \$7.50.

THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES of the last century saw the emergence of important commercial connections between the aspiring American towns of the Upper Mississippi region, notably St. Paul, and the Red River Settlement, that transatlantic creation of the Earl of Selkirk's philanthropy and imperialist enthusiasm. In 1859 even the Hudson's Bay Company, ostensibly the guardian of a British North American trading system, substituted north-south transportation *via* the Red River and St. Paul for the older east-west "Bay route," and much or all of Rupert's Land seemed destined to assimilation in a continental economic structure. In the following decade St. Paul businessmen saw a vision of a commercial empire extending to the Rockies and the Arctic, a vast cornucopia emptying its riches at the head of navigation on the Mississippi. When this vision was shadowed by the westward thrust of the Canadian confederation movement, a short-lived (1866-70) but frantic political agitation developed for the annexation of western British North America. Minnesota annexationists, and their supporters in the Grant administration, hoped that the anti-Canadian tendencies of the Red River resistance of 1869-70 would permit the completion of the grand design of continental unity which seemed presaged by the purchase of Alaska in 1867. But the issue was resolved by the co-operation of the United Kingdom and Canadian governments, which permitted the people of Canada to test, in the years which followed, their capacity to develop the northwest. To Winnipeg and Montreal, rather than to St. Paul and New York, were conveyed the glittering opportunities for commercial aggrandizement in this vast tributary domain.

In works by J. S. Galbraith, W. L. Morton, and G. F. G. Stanley, there are more or less extensive references to this phase of Canadian-American relations. But Professor Gluek has provided the most detailed treatment of the subject to date, and while no new interpretations emerge, he has amplified and clarified the evidence concerning the commercial and political interrelations of Rupert's Land and the American midwest between 1821 and 1870. Based on information in the Hudson's Bay Company's archives, he shows the extent to which free traders penetrated much of the Northern Department and describes the moves by which the Company combated the activities of American traders and their associates in the Red River settlement.

The major contribution of the book is its account of the characteristics and achievements of those Minnesota entrepreneurs, H. H. Sibley, Norman Kittson, Anson Northup, the Burbanks, and Alexander Ramsay, who sought to breach the Hudson's Bay Company's fur trade monopoly and who pioneered new forms of commercial enterprise and transportation services in the Red River-Upper Mississippi region. The activities of the famous publicist of commercial and political expansionism, James Wickes Taylor, and of the American *agent provocateur* of the Red River resistance, Oscar Malmros, are also fully delineated for the first time, as are the annexationist views of President Grant and leading members of his administration.

One could question the treatment of some of the events of 1869-70, such as the criticism of the Canadian government's effort to inaugurate a land survey system, and the omission of any reference to Joseph Howe's visit to Red River. And, to this reviewer, A. S. Morton's accounts of the Clarke-Bulger quarrel of 1822 and the Sayer trial of 1849 seem superior. But these matters are peripheral to the main theme—the hopes and frustrations of the American continentalists of a century

ago—which Professor Gluek has presented effectively in *Minnesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian Northwest*. The excellent index, with its extensive subject entries, will help to ensure this book's lasting value as a work of reference.

LEWIS H. THOMAS

University of Alberta

All Things Common: The Hutterian Way of Life. By VICTOR PETERS. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1966. Pp. xvi, 233, illus. \$5.75.

A STRANGER IN WESTERN CANADA is puzzled when he encounters peculiar people dressed in dark, mediaeval garb who are apparently fluent in at least two languages. The stranger has met members of one of the most distinctive ethnic groups in Canada. They live in communities known to the neighbours as Hutterite colonies, they own no property as individuals, and their customs and manners are as simple and old-fashioned as their dress.

Most of the Hutterites moved to Canada from the United States immediately after the First World War and today there are over one hundred colonies in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba and their population numbers well over 10,000. They are multiplying at a faster rate than any other ethnic group and this expansion is cause for some apprehension in the west.

The Hutterites are a group that is of interest to the historian and the social scientist but remarkably little literature is available. There have been a few unpublished M.A. theses, some essays in learned periodicals and a number of articles in popular magazines, one study of mental health among these people, and an official research report on intergroup relations in Saskatchewan. But now Professor Victor Peters of Moorehead State College has published a compact but comprehensive monograph. He has combined the story of Hutterite wanderings and hardships with an analysis of their place in western Canadian life today.

Professor Peters has done his research well. He has not only visited many of the colonies and spent much time with the Hutterites but he has also interviewed many other people who have dealt with the colonists. Furthermore he has traced their history by investigating sources as far afield as Germany. This thorough familiarity has given him the insight to describe sympathetically the kindly, gentle people who are, as they claim to be, "the quiet in the land"; and he shows convincingly their tremendous tenacity for their simple religion and backward culture. But Peters has become so sympathetic that I feel he has painted a distorted picture. He has used too many rosy tints and left out some of the somber hues. In the pleasant colonies he describes I fail to see the colonies I knew with their bleak, square barracks set in bare, dusty yards unrelieved by hedges, flowers, or lawns. He mentions the well-washed interiors and bare walls but does not convey the austerity of homes without pictures, mirrors, wallpaper, or other ornament. They have no music, no musical instruments, no radios or television, they seldom see a newspaper, and they never have a magazine. The author mentions the long church services held every evening and twice on Sundays but I cannot share his appreciation of the community singing which I found unbelievably bad. He refers repeatedly to individuals or groups of Hutterites who are well read or shows them making frequent use of school libraries. The men I knew read little beyond their Bibles and ancient Hutterite sermons and the few elementary books found in a one-room country school were little use in broadening an education that never went beyond Grade 8. One of my strong impressions is

of an ignorant people with little desire for learning. Sports and games of all types are frowned on by the elders. In some ways colony life comes close to a vegetable existence.

There are many plus factors in Hutterite life and the author has shown these clearly. These advantages are strong enough to keep desertion from the colonies to a minimum but they are not enough to attract converts. It is a great pity that these people who practice democracy in their colonies refuse to participate in their country's governments, be they municipal, provincial, or federal. Until they change this attitude they can hardly be considered good citizens.

A. M. WILLMS

Carleton University

The Clergy and Economic Growth in Quebec, 1896-1914. Par WILLIAM F. RYAN. Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1966. Pp. viii, 348. \$12.00.

L'ATTITUDE DU CLERGÉ CATHOLIQUE fut-elle un frein à la croissance économique du Québec? Plusieurs spécialistes l'ont affirmé catégoriquement. Dans ce volume William F. Ryan entreprend de vérifier la validité de ces affirmations. L'étude porte sur la période 1896-1914. Le choix est judicieux puisque le Québec connaît durant cette période une croissance économique rapide.

Dans un premier chapitre, l'auteur décrit la situation économique du Québec durant cette période afin d'illustrer dans quel cadre œuvre l'Eglise. Parce que Montréal présente de graves problèmes méthodologiques, les trois chapitres suivants portent sur les régions de la Mauricie et Chicoutimi-Lac St-Jean qui connaissent un développement industriel rapide durant ces deux décades. "Because industrialization," note l'auteur, "was just getting underway in these regions it is much easier to detect the Church's attitudes and actions than in an older industrial city such as Montreal." Suivent ensuite trois chapitres où l'auteur analyse les attitudes et initiatives du clergé dans les domaines du transport, de l'agriculture, de l'industrie et de l'éducation au niveau provincial. Son but est de découvrir si les constatations qu'il a faites dans les deux régions ci-haut mentionnées sont représentatives des attitudes du clergé dans les autres régions de la province.

La plus grande faiblesse de l'ouvrage réside peut-être dans les objectifs trop restreints que se fixe l'auteur. Il se limite à étudier comment l'Eglise influença le développement économique mais non comment elle fut elle-même influencée par ce développement. Il faut reconnaître qu'une telle étude globale est quasi-impossible en l'absence de monographies. On ne peut toutefois s'empêcher de soupçonner que très souvent, le clergé n'agit qu'après avoir été influencé par les événements et par les hommes. De toute évidence, le clergé s'est fait l'ardent promoteur des caisses populaires mais seulement après que le fondateur, Alphonse Desjardins, l'eut convaincu par une patiente et laborieuse éducation de l'urgence et de la nécessité de ces institutions. On pourrait multiplier les exemples. Dès lors, il me semble que si l'auteur avait pu déborder le cadre étroit de ses objectifs notre compréhension du rôle du clergé aurait été beaucoup plus grande, beaucoup plus complète. Il n'en demeure pas moins que l'ouvrage, dans les limites décrites plus haut, est d'une étonnante richesse.

Après avoir décrit le contexte géographique, démographique, politique et religieux du Québec de 1896 à 1914, l'auteur analyse le développement économique des régions de la Mauricie et de Chicoutimi-Lac Saint-Jean. La première

avec le harnachement des ressources hydro-électriques, la croissance de l'industrie de la pulpe et du papier, de l'aluminium et des produits chimiques est beaucoup plus industrialisée que la seconde. En dépit du contexte local quelque peu différent, les attitudes du clergé n'en présentent pas moins de très fortes ressemblances. Dans les deux cas les évêques et les curés encouragent la colonisation, l'amélioration des techniques agricoles, l'éducation primaire, le développement des transports. D'autre part, dans ces deux régions, l'auteur n'a pu trouver trace d'hostilité du clergé envers les industries géantes qui dominaient l'économie. Au contraire, les relations étaient on ne peut plus cordiales et le clergé se fit un devoir d'épauler, de seconder les efforts des capitalistes canadiens-français et étrangers.

La lecture de ces trois chapitres nous amène à faire un certain nombre de constatations. Le clergé, dont le but primordial était d'enrayer l'émigration aux Etats-Unis, pouvait-il réagir autrement devant les capitalistes étrangers? Il ne semble pas. Au contraire, tout portait les membres du clergé à voir en eux des bienfaiteurs publics et à se faire les ardents promoteurs de leurs intérêts. D'ailleurs les capitalistes étrangers, voyant la place prédominante qu'occupait l'Eglise dans la communauté québécoise, ont vite compris qu'ils pourraient l'utiliser à la défense et à la promotion de leurs propres intérêts. Dans les circonstances, nous assistons à un mariage de raison bien étrange. La recherche du profit chez les capitalistes étrangers permet au clergé de freiner l'émigration aux Etats-Unis et de lutter pour la survie de la nationalité canadienne-française. Les évêques et les curés, bénéficiaires des largesses des industriels étrangers, feront du lobbying auprès des gouvernements pour obtenir à ces compagnies un tronçon de chemin de fer, veilleront au maintien d'un climat d'harmonie entre les capitalistes et les conseils municipaux. D'autre part, et la chose a toute son importance: "The church assured the employers peaceful, competent, sober laborers, for only these were accepted into the Catholic Unions." Seule la question du travail du dimanche assombrissait ces relations harmonieuses.

Dans les trois chapitres suivants les recherches de l'auteur confirment ses premières conclusions: le clergé, au niveau provincial, joue un rôle très actif dans les domaines de la colonisation, de l'agriculture et de l'industrie. Ce faisant, il a conscience de freiner l'émigration aux Etats-Unis et d'assurer la survie de la nation canadienne-française. Le chapitre huit contient de très belles pages sur le clergé et l'éducation. Ce qui ressort de cette analyse c'est l'omniprésence du clergé à tous les niveaux de l'enseignement. C'est là le phénomène important. S'agit-il d'une démission de l'état ou de son incapacité à jouer son rôle à cause de cette omniprésence? Il semble bien que, à supposer que la chose ait été possible dans cette période de laissez-faire, le gouvernement pouvait difficilement adopter une politique d'ensemble cohérente face à la crainte et à l'opposition du clergé à toute intervention gouvernementale.

En conclusion, l'auteur résume tout d'abord les attitudes et les initiatives du clergé. Il a parfaitement raison lorsqu'il affirme que ces attitudes ne peuvent être réduites à un commun dénominateur. Préoccupés par le danger de l'émigration aux Etats-Unis les évêques et les curés encouragèrent tout ce qui pouvait contribuer à la croissance de l'économie québécoise. Selon les circonstances locales leur encouragement et leur appui vont à la colonisation, à l'agriculture, à l'industrie ou aux trois. Ce n'est pas parmi eux que l'on trouve les ardents propagandistes de la vocation agricole des Canadiens français bien que l'auteur ait noté qu'en période de dépression certains documents peuvent le laisser croire. Ces propagandistes on les trouve plus facilement parmi les professeurs, écrivains et orateurs, plus éloignés de la réalité. Il ne faudrait pas généraliser toutefois puisque ce groupe compte des

personnages comme les trappistes, spécialistes de l'agriculture, et comme l'abbé Baillargé, auteur du premier manuel d'économie au Canada.

En résumé, se demande l'auteur, le clergé contribua-t-il positivement à la croissance économique du Québec? Analysant chacun des secteurs de l'économie il conclut que son rôle fut positif "without being either decisive or determining."

Voilà un livre neuf, passionnant, qui ne fera pas l'unanimité mais qu'aucun chercheur ne pourra ignorer. Il a le mérite de poser des questions, de suggérer des réponses, de faire réfléchir.

YVES ROBY

Université Laval

L'Entrée du Canada sur la scène internationale (1919-1927). By CLAUDE LEGRIS. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 1966. Pp. xii, 95. F.6.

A GENERATION AGO Canadian historians plotted with care the constitutional steps up the ladder towards autonomy, rung by rung, with teleological simplicity. It is interesting to see how an historian, and especially a French Canadian, treats the same topic in the 1960's. Unfortunately M. LeGris may be young in years but he belongs in the past. The final end has changed—instead of climbing towards autonomy or independence Canada is seen as moving from the British to the American sphere of influence—but this is only a minor difference. We are still led unswervingly from precedent to precedent.

Even the same familiar precedents are repeated, with the same legalistic assumption that each step was decisive and irrevocable. At the Peace Conference the Dominions once more "affirment devant les Etats étrangers étonnés leur individualité nationale" (p. 13). The Washington Conference "marquait définitivement la nouvelle orientation politique du Canada" (p. 43). Lapointe's signature on the Halibut Fisheries Treaty "constituait une autre conquête pour le Canada" (p. 58). Locarno "conduisait inévitablement à l'affirmation d'indépendance du Dominion à la Conférence impériale de 1926" (p. 70). And with Vincent Massey's arrival at Washington, Canada had finally made "son entrée sur la scène internationale" (p. 87). It is all so familiar and so trite.

This obsession with Canadian status makes it possible to ignore domestic attitudes and opinions; a quotation or two from Bourassa and Dafoe are enough to flesh out the formal despatches and the prime ministers' statements. There is no suggestion that diplomacy is an extension of domestic policy and that prime ministers are also party leaders. The explanation may be that M. LeGris has not consulted any of the private papers for the period and that the most recent article or book cited in his slim bibliography was published in 1958. Whatever the explanation, there is little justification for publishing such a derivative essay.

H. BLAIR NEATBY

Carleton University

The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941: A Study in the Diplomacy of the North Atlantic Quadrangle. By DOUGLAS G. ANGLIN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. xvi, 219, illus. \$6.00.

OF ALL THE UNSOLVED, IF MINOR, MYSTERIES of World War II, few have been so difficult to penetrate as that of the St. Pierre and Miquelon *affaire* of 1941. The

ramifications of this affair, however, have long been suspected of being of extreme importance in the relations between the United States and the French of General de Gaulle, and the effect can be felt today in the present relations between France and the United States. Professor Anglin has given us a thorough and, perhaps for many years to come, a definitive study of the December 1941 "tempest in a teapot."

He has undertaken to study not only the implications of the early dawn capture of St. Pierre and Miquelon by the minute force of Admiral Muselier, but also has provided us with a detailed study of the Gaullist following on these two remnants of France's once great empire in North America. The conditions he describes on St. Pierre and Miquelon cannot be taken as necessarily typical of those in all French possessions—the very homogeneous population, the absence of aboriginals, the close relations and at times rivalry with British Commonwealth countries such as Newfoundland and Canada make St. Pierre and Miquelon unique—but he has without a doubt shown that General de Gaulle enjoyed great popularity in these two little colonies. According to State Department apologists, American reluctance to recognize General de Gaulle's French Committee of National Liberation until after the landings in Normandy was based on the conviction that General de Gaulle enjoyed no significant following among Frenchmen. However, if St. Pierre and Miquelon are to be taken as particular examples, there is little doubt that American policy-makers were seriously mistaken.

General de Gaulle has always claimed that certainty of a Canadian plan to invade the islands and destroy the radio station (the only thing of value there, though its value to the enemy submarine fleet has been much debated) prompted him to ignore the agreement he had made not to disturb the status quo. In doing this he was well aware that he was going contrary to the wishes of the American and, at that time, the Canadian and British governments. The validity of de Gaulle's claim has not, so far, been demonstrable. Anglin has given us here half the answer, for he has traced the existence of a Canadian force, "Q" Force, which was being trained in the second half of 1941 for such an assault. It is not quite clear how much the Canadian prime minister knew of this force, ludicrous though the situation may seem now, and one feels that possibly "Q" Force was somehow conveniently forgotten by Ottawa, perhaps knowingly in certain National Defence Department circles who had their own policy with regard to the defence of the St. Lawrence. What Anglin has not yet discovered—and perhaps it may ever remain a secret—is the individual at the Foreign Office in London who advised General de Gaulle of the presumed imminence of the Canadian attack. What well-intentioned person in that office leaked the information to the Free French and for what reason? Was it in order to remove a debatable danger from the convoy routes so essential to Britain's survival, despite known American objections or was it perhaps—consciously or unconsciously—in order to show the United States whose position *vis-à-vis* Britain was radically changed by Pearl Harbor that the former could not dictate policies indefinitely to its allies?

The possibility is raised by Anglin that de Gaulle had planned the attack on the islands in order to discredit Admiral Muselier, whose presence he found irksome, partly because Muselier outranked him. Anglin suggests that this plan misfired since American displeasure was directed more towards the General than towards the Admiral. However, one must point out that Muselier was removed from the inner circles of the Free French—he resigned in protest on his return to England a few weeks later, and played only a very secondary role in Free French matters thereafter, at least until the North African landings.

Much has been made of the St. Pierre and Miquelon *affaire* as decisive, not only in Franco-American relations, both *vis-à-vis* Vichy and de Gaulle, but also in the relations between Roosevelt and the State Department, more particularly with Cordell Hull. There is no doubt that Secretary Hull's anger was unreasonable, and that this irritated the President, but the latter was inclined by temperament to deal directly with his opposites in foreign affairs and was long suspicious of the State Department. The *affaire* may have increased his predilection for disregarding his Secretary of State but it cannot be said to have created it. In any case Pearl Harbor and the role which had fallen to Roosevelt—Commander-in-Chief of the American forces and in fact of the western world—loom much larger as reasons for the setting aside of the State Department in favour of direct negotiations and personal envoys, such as Harry Hopkins and Robert Murphy.

Roosevelt's prejudice in all matters touching de Gaulle and the Free French remains as much a mystery as ever. It cannot be proved that the St. Pierre and Miquelon *affaire* was decisive in this regard; the Mers-el-Kébir incident, the Dakar fiasco, the handing over to the Japanese of air fields in Indochina, the supposed anti-Gaullism which Admiral Leahy claimed he detected at Vichy, the internecine wars of the Free French and Vichy supporters abroad, were every bit as important, and often more so. The difficulties encountered with de Gaulle after the St. Pierre and Miquelon *affaire* do not belong to this period, but one cannot help but note that the pattern had been set long before the debatable American backing of General Giraud in North Africa and the incomprehensible reluctance of Roosevelt to acquiesce to his military advisers' requests for the crucial Gaullist participation in D-day.

Anglin has given us a fascinating study of a minor incident in the struggles of World War II, and one which carries the reader with the compulsion of a detective novel. He has, above all, kept this "fleabite," "trivial to the point of ridiculousness," in proportion, and has set it correctly within the framework of the North Atlantic Quadrangle.

CHARLOTTE S. M. GIRARD

University of Victoria

Mr. Prime Minister, 1867–1964. By BRUCE HUTCHISON. Toronto: Longmans Canada. 1964. Pp. xiv, 394, illus., \$7.50.

THIS IS A BOOK WITH A SERIOUS PURPOSE. It seeks to shed some more light on the great continuing problems of our nationhood at a time when historical perspectives are badly needed. The method here is to look for these insights in a series of connected sketches of our fourteen prime ministers, for they of all Canadians have had to wrestle with the facts of our case. The author's gifts and experience take him through his theme with maturity and realism and allow him to present it with an engaging unflagging tempo.

It is probably for the best that this first general essay on the careers of our chief executive officers should be by a non-academic writer of the first rank. It is important for the moment that very many more Canadians should begin to think about Canadian issues not as simply stated problems to be solved, but as the very complex continuing experience of millions of people. We live in an age that puts a premium on technical innovation and the projecting of quantitative models for tomorrow and next year; the climate of much of our modern thought assumes that we are a company of Adams dealing *de novo* with a new-found world. Mr.

Hutchison may well have discovered here one of the best means for opening to his countrymen both the nature of their problems, and the lessons to be learned from a hundred years of dealing with them. Hopefully, this volume will speak to a much larger audience than has, apparently, been reached by professional historians. There will be time for the refinement of his statements and conclusions by academic folk in future years.

The present volume is, according to the author, of "modest purpose . . . not a formal book of history. . . . Rather it is a tale of adventure at the apex of Canadian power." As you read, you will not believe the "modest purpose" bit, for the opening pages state forthrightly the position that we are really in; and the plight of our prime ministers appears starkly enough in their crises. Yet the style and argument is perhaps the written equivalent of a stimulating evening's chat between mature, informed adults.

The theme is not presented with an obvious framework of disciplined analysis, but proceeds from era to era and subject to subject guided by the instinct of an interested observer. It depends heavily upon the recognized scholarly biographies where these have been written and, in the last years, upon the author's investigations and recollections of Mackenzie King and his successors. We hasten by, for instance, Abbott and Mackenzie Bowell: and this may be a sound enough procedure. The art of the story teller may not entirely satisfy the needs of a scholar, but both the scope of the prime minister's office and the inherent motifs of Canadian life are here in sharp relief.

There are no very great surprises in the treatment of these fourteen men, though we have here an up-to-date reappraisal of several careers that have recently been neglected. Sir Robert Borden gains in prestige under a new examination. "In the general opinion he had been a good enough Prime Minister, no more. The plain shy man had never caught the imagination of his people and never tried to. That he was a great Prime Minister and his work crucial for Canada, only the sadder and perhaps the somewhat wiser generation of our time has begun to realize." Alexander Mackenzie, "the working man," was the "most tragic of all ex-Prime Ministers." Of Louis St. Laurent he concludes: "while history may give first rank to his work of unity between the races, his imaginative foreign policy and his social reforms at home, they are not his largest monument. Behind all these achievements he had given the office of Prime Minister a new size and status, a people's trust, a certain indefinable flavour of justice and honour untouched by partisan quarrel." Laurier's "supreme achievement was himself—a spirit of moral grandeur unique in the Canadian breed. Perhaps as a man he was the greatest ever known in the Nation's politics, but not as a Prime Minister. In intellect and learning he outranked all who came before and after him. Yet Macdonald had done far more for Canada than Laurier ever did. King would do more in his time. Borden would succeed in a harder struggle." In short, "among our Prime Ministers before Pearson only Macdonald, Laurier, Borden, King and St. Laurent succeeded. . . . most of the others ended in frustration and despair, several in tragedy."

There are at least two useful definitions in this book. The cabinet is a group of geographical representatives—quarrelling. The laws of the office of prime minister: he must appear as an ordinary citizen; must enjoy power and be an autocrat and egotist; must be a gentleman; must be bred, apprenticed, and long trained in his political profession; and must have luck.

This volume may go safely into the hands of everyone from fifteen to ninety-five; and should be there.

PAUL G. CORNELL

University of Waterloo

United States

Benjamin Lundy and the Struggle for Negro Freedom. By MERTON L. DILLON. Urbana and London: University of Illinois Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 285. \$6.75 (US).

THE CAREER OF BENJAMIN LUNDY, pioneer American abolitionist, has received small recognition when compared with that accorded to other figures in the anti-slavery crusade in the United States. He was almost the first to publish an anti-slavery newspaper, the *Genius of Universal Emancipation*, which appeared in 1821 and continued publication until his death in Illinois in 1839. He, more than any other man, kept alive the cause of the slave during the 1820's and at the end of that decade he was the instrument whereby William Lloyd Garrison, most militant of abolitionists, was brought into the struggle. For a brief period the two were associated in the publication of the *Genius* and when they parted company Garrison went on to found the *Liberator*.

Professor Merton L. Dillon of Northern Illinois University has produced the first biography of Lundy since the appearance in 1847 of the brief sketch by Thomas Earle, heretofore almost the sole record. The difficulties facing a biographer were very great since most of Lundy's papers and records were lost when a mob burned Pennsylvania Hall in Philadelphia in May 1838, and because there is no complete file of his newspaper in any library. This is probably the more serious loss since the *Genius* is the most fruitful source for details of his activities. The paper was published at various places—at Mount Pleasant in Ohio, at Greeneville in East Tennessee, at Baltimore, at Washington, and at the last in Illinois. There were occasions, however, when publication took place wherever Lundy happened to be for he carried his mailing list and the bold metal headline of his paper with him as he journeyed far and wide in his search for freedom and a home for the slave. In 1830 he could say that he had travelled more than 5000 miles on foot and more than 20,000 miles in other ways and had made two voyages to Haiti. Within the next five years he added to this record three visits to Texas and the southwest and a winter journey to the western part of Upper Canada always seeking a solution for the problem of slavery in the United States.

His visit to Upper Canada in 1832 was the first made by any American abolitionist and was recorded in three successive issues of the *Genius* (reprinted in Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, XIX, 1922). At Wilberforce, twenty miles north of present-day London, Ontario, he found 32 Negro families settled on clearings with homes already built, together with a sawmill, two schools, and provision for worship. He regarded the prospects of the colony as encouraging though he was somewhat dubious of the climate for settlement of southern Negroes.

Following his visit to Upper Canada Lundy made three journeys to Texas and the southwest, believing this area more suitable for those whom he sought to aid. His visits, however, were made at the height of the Texan movement for independence and he met with endless frustration and delay.

From his experiences and observations Lundy later produced pamphlets that powerfully influenced the mind of ex-president John Quincy Adams, then in Congress. Professor Dillon emphasizes the intimate relations that grew up between the little deaf Quaker and the former chief executive of the nation. Jointly they helped "awaken northern anti-slavery voters to a new awareness of their power

and responsibility to influence elections and to sway candidates toward antislavery positions."

Lundy's removal to Illinois in 1838 seems almost like a tragic postscript to his active career. He was now 49 years of age and was anxious to be with his children whom he had scarcely known through the years. Aided by friends he left Philadelphia in July, possibly with the idea in mind that he would pick up the torch of the martyred Elijah P. Lovejoy, eleven months earlier the victim of a pro-slavery mob. The *Genius* would take the place of Lovejoy's *Alton Observer*. Twelve issues appeared in Illinois, the second last one reporting Lundy's death in Putnam County on August 22, 1839, and his burial in the Friends' burying ground near McNabb. One hundred years later, in August 1939, two thousand people gathered at his grave to honour his memory.

FRED LANDON

London, Ont.

Isolationism in America, 1935-1941. By MANFRED JONAS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1966. Pp. x, 315. \$7.50 (US).

IN THE PREFACE TO HIS BOOK Professor Jonas contends that although the "isolationist viewpoint, as expressed from 1935 to 1941, cannot be elevated to the level of political philosophy . . . it cannot be dismissed as simple obstructionism based on ignorance and folly." Isolationism was the "considered response to foreign and domestic developments of a large, responsible and respectable segment of the American people," and this response can be "understood and evaluated only by examining the validity of the assumptions on which it was based." These remarks establish the temper and direction of the book. Jonas slices through the mass of isolationist writings for this period—letters, articles, Congressional hearings, and speeches—and extracts from them the principles and premises which constituted the "isolationist viewpoint." The isolationists, he argues, were not so foolish as to urge the United States to isolate itself completely from the world, as China and Japan had tried to do early in the nineteenth century, or so close-minded as to deny that the world was much more closely bound in their own time than in the days of Washington and Jefferson, when the policy of isolationism first took root. They none the less maintained that it was not only possible but imperative that the United States remain faithful to this policy by retaining freedom of action in foreign policy decisions (what Jonas calls "unilateralism") and by making the avoidance of war the nation's primary foreign policy interest. Their belief in these two principles was based on a twin assumption: one, that the western hemisphere was immune from attack by a foreign power and the other, that the United States had no moral obligations or vital interests which would compel it to intervene in a foreign war. It was the acceptance of this set of principles and premises which, according to Jonas, gave the isolationism of the 'thirties its meaning and its unity. He avoids one pitfall by emphasizing that the acceptance of this set of beliefs did not make the isolationists a monolithic group with a completely homogeneous ideology. Indeed, isolationists varied widely in background and motives, disagreed on issues of practical policy such as defence appropriations, and sometimes contradicted themselves or shifted positions. Nor is Jonas uncritical of the isolationist viewpoint. He argues quite persuasively that this viewpoint contained serious weaknesses; its principles proved incompatible when put into practice as, for example, in the various Neutrality Acts, and its premises were undermined by the course of events abroad, particularly after the invasion of Poland. The Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor struck a death blow to a set of beliefs which were already seriously crippled. Isolationism, concludes Jonas, did not survive this blow, although its ghost has lingered on to this day.

Anyone familiar with the literature dealing with American isolationism will recognize that Jonas is not completely orthodox in his analysis. Like most scholars he concludes that isolationism was an ineffective and unrealistic response to the Axis threat. Unlike some scholars, he is more inclined to explain isolationism in terms of ideas rather than in terms of ethnic, political, geographical, or socio-economic factors, although he does not entirely dispense with the latter. There is no denying that his approach is both legitimate and fruitful. He produces a wide variety of illuminating conclusions concerning types of isolationism, judicious appraisals of a number of important isolationists, and new information on isolationist proposals such as the Ludlow Amendment. Still, the approach is not flawless. He fails, in my opinion, to demonstrate that the isolationists of the 'thirties were correct in identifying themselves as the true heirs of the isolationist tradition of Washington and Jefferson. In fact, his evidence seems to support an opposite conclusion. He also admits at several points that emotional and psychological factors, not merely reasoned assent, prompted acceptance of the isolationist viewpoint; yet, with the exception of a discussion of the "fear of war," he fails to probe deeply for these factors. This failure to pursue a tantalizing line of argument also mars his statements concerning the public's acceptance of the isolationist viewpoint. He states at one point that it is likely that the isolationism of a majority of the American people was not based on "reasoned adherence to the principles underlying isolationist thought." On what, then, was public acceptance based? Jonas fails to provide a satisfactory explanation. His failure in this regard is lamentable because it raises the larger question of whether his assessment of isolationism, which is based largely on the statements of isolationist spokesmen and publicists, is equally valid for the great mass of inarticulate Americans from whom these men drew their support.

Judged as a whole, however, the book cannot fail to impress. Tightly organized, cogently argued, well researched (except for a strange failure to look at the Hiram Johnson papers), it stands as one of the most perceptive analyses of twentieth-century American isolationism in recent years.

R. D. ACCINELLI

University of Toronto

The Almost Chosen People: Essays in the History of American Ideas. By RUSSEL B. NYE. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1966. Pp. x, 374. \$7.50.

IN THESE SEVEN MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENT ESSAYS Professor Nye discusses ideas of progress, nationalism, free enterprise, mission, individualism, nature, and equality. His purpose has been "to choose a few of those concepts which have influenced—and which have been influenced by—the American experience, and to show how they have begun, developed, matured, and changed, suggesting in the process something as to the place of these ideas in the total pattern of the American mind." After the various meanings of each concept have been initially disentangled and identified, its fortunes are followed through a capsule history of the United States which highlights the influence of social, political, and economic forces.

For example, the early colonists conceived nature as an object for contemplation and also as a field for activity and mastery. Both these responses, in one form or another, have historically determined the American attitude toward the disposition

of natural resources and the formulation of conservation policy. Today the old tension is reflected in the controversy between those who would preserve a portion of the wilderness in its original state and their opponents who think primarily in terms of serving the growing army of tourists and campers. "In effect," the author concludes, "the contemporary concept of conservation, and the attitude toward nature that it implies, is an extension of the ancient and honorable American tradition of exploitation. . . . It is the question of how, and how much, and for whom it is to be used, of course, that separates the modern conservationist from the Jamestown settler, but those are differences of degree rather than of intent." Somewhat similarly, the primitive American faith in progress, stemming from an era of colonial expansion and enlightened optimism, has managed to survive, bent but not broken, into a century where war and social conflict have sparked new support for the doctrine of original sin. "The prevailing modern approach to the idea of progress," writes Nye, "is one of thoughtful acceptance, accompanied by the realization that whatever progress there may be is limited and most certainly not to be taken for granted."

These excerpts are fair samples of the author's way with all seven of the ideas examined. The emphasis is upon change, but mainly upon persistence through change. Readers will be prompted to decide for themselves whether the evidence adduced really points to significant continuity or merely to a long-lived American attachment to particular words. As Nye himself remarks, "The present need of Americans is to find a workable definition of individualism to fit contemporary conditions. . . ." One may wonder, then, whether American intellectual history is perhaps a problem for the linguistic analysts in the philosophy departments. The prickly question of what is meant by ideas and what is the method of making useful historical statements about them is not within the scope of this book. Of those matters that Nye does deal with it is apparent that none is especially novel and most are blandly commonplace: thus, the idea of free enterprise remains strong today, but Americans recognize a legitimately wide area for government intervention; and the American sense of mission remains, but Americans recognize the increasing impossibility of a complete fulfilment of their ideals.

The impression which this book makes is that it was intended principally as a knowledgeable exposition of accepted themes. It is an impression which is reinforced by the easy-going method of presentation, which, while frequently interesting and informative—on conservation legislation, for example—proceeds much of the time by piling unanalysed quotation upon quotation and following one catalogue of names with another. At least ten paragraphs contain anywhere from five to seven different quotations; one paragraph mentions thirteen names, another eighteen. Such heavy reliance upon quotations is coupled with a method of annotation which makes it practically impossible in many cases to locate the source of citation. Given the uncontroversial nature of the argument, this is ultimately of little importance, but obvious imprecision and inaccuracy remains disturbing. (See the quotations from Rufus Choate, George Bancroft, John Winthrop, and Champ Clark, pp. 77, 169, 200.) Again, identification of individuals and documents often seems hasty: Horace Kallen is once a "social philosopher," but twice a "sociologist"; Donald Richberg is an "economist"; the English biologist Alfred [Russel] Wallace is included in a list of Americans; Thomas Skidmore's 400-page tome on property rights is a "pamphlet"; Burke's famous work on aesthetics is misdated by half a dozen years; and finally, to move from the sublime to the ridiculous, the old Chicago ward politician becomes "Hinky Dink" McKenna.

FRED SOMKIN

Queen's University

American Intellectual Histories and Historians. By ROBERT ALLEN SKOTHEIM. Princeton: Princeton University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1966. Pp. xii, 326. \$6.95.

IN *American Intellectual Histories and Historians*, Robert A. Skotheim has provided us with the first extended account of the ways in which historians living in the United States have treated the history of American thought. It is a competent study, focused on major figures who have made a career of intellectual history (Parrington and Morison; Gabriel, Curti, and Miller) and on others who have significantly influenced those who did (Robinson, Becker, and Beard). In addition, it examines prominent historians of the nineteenth century who were unconcerned in the first instance with the history of ideas (Tyler, Eggleston, and Adams), and it also essays some account of contemporary historians who have either modified the discipline in recent years (Commager, Persons, and Boorstin) or employed it in works of general history (Hofstadter, the younger Schlesinger, and Goldman). In short, Dr. Skotheim has aimed at a general survey of the landmarks in the field, and though one who knows it well may take issue with some of his estimates of individual historians, there is no gainsaying the good sense and intellectual modesty with which he has proceeded.

These qualities are especially apparent in his recurrent attempts to identify general patterns of development in the historiography of American thought. On the one hand, he is more or less committed to establishing such patterns, both because he visualizes an evolving professional activity known as the history of ideas and because—as one of its practitioners—he wishes to place the histories he studies in the environment in which they arose. Hence we find a good deal about the “progressive” school of historians, who were interested in ideas primarily as tools of economic or social interests, and whose bias helped in turn to generate a contrary school, which has disregarded the environmental sources of ideas in order to concentrate on their intrinsic meaning or (less frequently) their value. On the other hand, Dr. Skotheim is more or less aware that the extent to which it is possible to identify different “schools” of intellectual history is at best limited, and he devotes a good deal of time simply to pointing out the major characteristics of the major writings of the major figures. The result is a sane and mainly empirical account of what different historians have written.

Unfortunately this is the sort of prudential approach to the subject that ultimately proves not to have accomplished its proper tasks. While identifying main trends and characterizing major authors, the book falls short of really illuminating the practice of American intellectual history; we cannot infer from it what makes good intellectual history, which historians have pursued it most effectively, or what intellectual history is or can be. Obviously these questions are matters of judgment, ones which a scholar of Dr. Skotheim’s relative youth might be excused for avoiding, were it not that they are indispensable elements in the study he undertook.

He believes otherwise. In both his preface and his appendix he argues that he did not seek to assess the accuracy or evaluate the techniques of the historians he examined; instead, he visualized a study of their histories as themselves documents in the history of ideas. It is against the rules of good reviewing to disregard such a *caveat*, yet I suggest that in choosing to limit his analysis to this point Dr. Skotheim also deprived his conclusions of most of their potential significance. If one’s object is to establish a “climate of opinion” that practising historians happened to share with bank tellers and bookmakers of the same generation, there is no very good reason for focusing on written histories as the only docu-

ments that are to be examined. If one's object is to establish something more—for example, the ways in which prevailing opinions caused even professional historians to visualize and quite possibly to rearrange events—a very close scrutiny of the ways in which their minds grappled with historic phenomena is necessary, and some view of the probable truth regarding those events, or at least of the most promising approaches to them, is an invaluable tool of analysis. Certainly the important questions cannot be answered by a mainly descriptive account of what the historians wrote, and wrote about what they had written.

Indeed, Dr. Skotheim is more sensitive to this fact than either his declared intentions or his descriptive observations convey; at intervals his remarks suggest that in his eyes the discipline of intellectual history has acquired certain working assumptions that its practitioners cannot do without. (Among them is certainly the belief that ideas have practical significance in the "real" world; another, that it is essential to comprehend them as cognitive statements, however they may have arisen or been employed.) But these assumptions are only hinted at in the present volume, which invites a more searching and a more philosophical examination of the intellectual histories American historians have written. Meanwhile it will serve as a good general introduction to the field.

RUSH WELTER

Bennington College

Great Britain

Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy, 1485–1588. By R. B. WERNHAM. London: Jonathan Cape [Toronto: Clarke Irwin]. 1966. Pp. 447, maps. \$12.00.

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY in the Tudor age has not been the subject of much attention for a generation or more. Since the days of Pollard's *Wolsey* and Read's *Walsingham*, there has been only Harbison's study of Mary's reign and Mattingly's of the Armada. No general study of English foreign policy in this age has been attempted since Seeley's *Growth of British Policy*, published in 1895. Hence the present study is a work of unusual importance, particularly since Professor Wernham's work as editor of the foreign calendars has made him an authority on the sources of his study. His work has been well done; the study is authoritative, the judgments penetrating and fresh. It is held together by a tight and crisply written narrative. The dimensions of the book are broad; domestic developments and their relations to foreign affairs are kept constantly in view. The quality of the work is such that one can only regret that it is not on a larger scale. Since it is the first general study of the subject in this century and certain to be the authoritative work in the field for a long time to come, one would have liked to see a fuller development of many episodes and, more important still, a much more detailed apparatus. The footnotes are dismayingly scanty for a work to which scholars will so frequently turn in the future.

Professor Wernham's interpretations of the major episodes in early Tudor foreign relations advance our understanding of Tudor policy in important ways. The reputation of Henry VII is considerably augmented. The policy of his later years, sometimes written off in the past as the extravagance of overreaching ambition or the weakness of advancing age, now makes sense, seen in the context of continental developments which followed on the successive deaths of Prince Arthur, Queen Isabella, and Archduke Philip. These events pitted Ferdinand

against his Flemish son-in-law and broke up the unity of the anti-French front with which Henry had joined forces. The king's somewhat fantastic matrimonial proposals of the next few years seem less eccentric if seen in the light of his desperate effort to insure friendship with the Netherlands government and allies against possible friction with France.

The character of Henry VII's prudent and far-seeing conduct of his foreign relations contrasts sharply with the first stages of his son's reign when the old Lancastrian dreams of glory were indulged, at high cost and small return. But the present study offers a new and convincing interpretation of English policy after the first fling of the new king. The author emphasizes that while the conduct of negotiations might be left to Wolsey, final decisions throughout were the monarch's. Moreover, he sees the great war with France in the early 1520's not as a manifestation of Wolsey's papal aspirations or of Henry's continental ambitions but as the product of the king's haunting fears for the future of his dynasty in the absence of a male heir. Alliance with the Hapsburgs followed by a marriage between Charles and Mary might be the best guarantee for the future; at the least the conquest of bases on the continental side of the channel would strengthen England's growing naval power. At the most it might make Henry's daughter queen of a great Catholic realm, fulfilling even more splendidly the mingled hopes for Christian unity and the security of his dynasty that were at the root of Henry's actions in these years.

This interpretation thus ties together the Imperial alliance and the succeeding episode of the divorce since the latter was in part a rejection of previous foreign alignments as well as a radical new solution for the succession problem. It also meant the return of England to the cautious neutrality of Henry VII, which, without isolating England, kept her free from the major entanglements of European politics. To this sober policy Henry remained faithful during the dangerous years of the 1530's.

The middle decades of the century are treated as an epoch of wide-ranging change throughout English society and the effects of religious revolution and of deep internal malaise on foreign policy are lucidly described. The key to foreign relations in this period is Scotland. In this connection Henry is treated not so much as a nascent imperialist but as a worried dynast, fearful for the future of his house at the hands of a restless foreign neighbour with a stake in the English succession. Pressure on Scotland, as Professor Wernham sees it, led to alliance with Charles V against France and thence to the campaign of Boulogne. This entanglement, coupled with instability at home, in turn ended in the humiliating peace with France and the grave risk that England would fall into the orbit of either the Valois or the Hapsburg. Charles' interest in England was proportionately increased when he saw the risk of its sliding into French hands. The chapters which deal with these crisis years are excellent and strong in pinpointing the new elements of public opinion which began to play on foreign—as on domestic—policy, most notably in the instance of Wyatt's rebellion. But, here again, one could wish that the treatment of this general crisis of English affairs were on a larger scale.

The account of Elizabeth's reign is more traditional in some respects than the earlier part of the work. Queen Elizabeth receives high marks as a maker of foreign policy, a position which the author sustains with good evidence. At times—as in the permission given Darnley to go to Scotland—he is driven to represent the queen as pursuing an extraordinarily—and somewhat improbably—Machiavellian policy. For the most part her own views are seen as a continuation of Henry VII's basic position, a cautious but not absolute neutrality backed by sea power. The

war with Spain is interpreted as the outcome of events on the continent—Spain's acquisition of Portugal, the deaths of Orange and Anjou, the formation of the Spanish-backed League in France—which destroyed the equilibrium between the great powers and left England facing a possible Spanish domination of both France and the Low Countries. Hence, the book, in its closing as in its opening chapters, emphasizes the Tudor decades as the point in time when England assumed the stance towards the outside world which she would maintain so long as sea power made insularity a sound policy.

WALLACE T. MACCAFFREY

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The Early Elizabethan Succession Question, 1558–1568. By MORTIMER LEVINE. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1966. Pp. x, 245. \$6.95 (US).

PROFESSOR LEVINE has pulled together much that we know about the problem of the succession and added much that is new. The result is a valuable little book that serves to re-evaluate the problem to its rightfully prominent place in the history of Elizabethan parliamentary and religious struggles.

The choice lay between the Stuart line, pro-French and Catholic, and the Suffolk line, Protestant and insular. On religious grounds the choice should have been clear-cut; yet Elizabeth consistently squashed Suffolk supporters, and even went so far as to have Lady Catherine Grey's marriage to the Earl of Hartford investigated and voided so that Lord Beauchamp was permanently bastardized. Meanwhile she never closed the door to the Stuarts. Why Elizabeth should so favour Mary Stuart, and take such drastic action against Catherine is not altogether satisfactorily explained. Doubtless Elizabeth did not want to turn Mary (and through her France) against her: the Queen of the Scots was the more dangerous claimant. And perhaps that is the whole of it; perhaps not.

The question raised constant flurries in high places. Cecil was for marriage, failing that for Catherine, but he kept his counsel. Elizabeth could silence her clamorous Commons with a vigorous speech, but she could not prevent speculation and debate spilling into the market place through the tracts which appeared for and against the Stuart and Suffolk claims. The Commons and public-spirited citizens were right to be concerned. It was not a trivial matter to be brushed aside and postponed: England's peace of mind and England's religion were involved. No less a champion than John Hales, the Commonwealthman, was imprisoned for proclaiming Catherine's right to succeed in a tract of 1563. Although she could not find one, Elizabeth suspected a conspiracy. She was extremely sensitive, for if Mary was the greater danger to the realm, Catherine was the more dangerous to her person.

The legitimacy of the Suffolk claim depended, according to Levine, on the validity of Henry VIII's last will. After a thorough and judicious investigation he upholds the legitimacy of the will—a conclusion that deepens the mystery of Elizabeth's antipathy to the Suffolks: though her admiration for her father was vast, she could cavalierly dispense with his express provisions.

Mr. Levine describes the struggle in the Parliament of 1566 with gusto and ends his story after the death of Catherine in 1568. If a chapter was finished then, the issue was far from dead. It is, perhaps, unfair to ask for more than the author intended, but since the succession question was so closely entwined with the marriage question, a temperate account of, say, the Anjou affair in the next decade would have been most welcome. And Professor Levine is just the scholar to give us

a probing, level-headed, and non-partisan analysis of Elizabeth's sustained virginity and her persistent refusal to marry. The study seems to cease too soon. Of course, to regret that speaks well of the skill and care with which the early period has been treated. It is an informed, useful and, at times, a provocative and gripping book.

JOHN F. H. NEW

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John Bright, Victorian Reformer. By HERMAN AUSUBEL. New York, London, and Sydney: John Wiley and Sons. 1966. Pp. xviii, 250. \$5.95 (US).

IT HAS BEEN MORE THAN HALF A CENTURY since G. M. Trevelyan's distinguished biography of John Bright first appeared. Professor Ausubel's new study of the career of the great Victorian radical thus invites comparison. How confident Trevelyan was of his readers' patience and taste for elegant style, deep feeling, and moral tone! Throughout his book, broad, sweeping metaphors bind together long and frequent quotations from Bright's speeches and letters. Great ships veer with the tide; organ peels echo back under Gothic arches; bell-like tones of oratory move mountains of prejudice. Bright was a simple man, Trevelyan tells us, selfless, unchangeable, relentless in his lifelong attack on the barriers of deference and aristocratic privilege. Like his father before him, G. M. Trevelyan revered Bright and saw no reason to question the rightness of his goals: free trade, Little Englandism, democracy, and the application of Christian ethics to public policy.

Herman Ausubel's version is, by contrast, spare, condensed, and cool. He does not try the temper of his audience by quoting extensively from his rich sources—gathered from the repositories of Bright manuscripts scattered widely over two continents—although he occasionally feels it advisable to whet faded appetites with bits of doggerel from *Punch*. With our mid-twentieth-century sense of the complexities of human behaviour, we are not surprised to learn that Bright, like other men, was not immune to the temptations of pride and personal ambition. Bright's nervous breakdown in 1856, in the wake of his highly unpopular campaign against the Crimean War was, in Ausubel's view, as much caused by "frustrated ambition" as "outraged patriotism." Further, we are reminded that Bright was the product as well as the opponent of his pragmatic English environment. No rigid doctrinaire, he was willing to comprise his Manchester School outlook and admit that the state should intervene in famine-ridden Ireland and India. But his compromises had to do with means, not ends. Trevelyan's portrait of the cocksure unsubtle man who pursued his goals with remarkable consistency still seems valid. Though an opponent of factory legislation he could consistently defend government action, as did his hero Adam Smith, in spheres where enlightened self-interest and the working of the free market were conspicuously inoperative. Bright's flexibility can be observed even more readily on the question of parliamentary reform. His correspondence with Russell and Gladstone shows that he was ready to settle for democracy by instalments and even to advise caution and moderation during the struggle for franchise reform in 1866 and 1867. Nevertheless, he never disguised the fact that a democracy, not modelled on America but American in spirit, was his aim.

Few today would share Trevelyan's enthusiasm for all of Bright's causes. Although Professor Ausubel's book is curiously sparing of general evaluations, it

is probably fair to assume that he does not think, as Bright did, that retrenchment, free trade, demilitarization, and isolationist foreign policies are self-evident panaceas. Yet most would agree with both Ausubel and Trevelyan that had more middle-class Englishmen been willing to heed Bright's warning about the evils of retaining so many of the institutions and habits of privilege, then the Victorians might have prepared their nation better for the challenges of an industrialized mass democracy.

JAMES WINTER

University of British Columbia

Joseph Chamberlain: Radicalism and Empire, 1868-1914. By PETER FRASER. London: Cassell [Toronto: Longmans Canada]. 1966. Pp. xvi, 349, illus. \$9.25.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN heads the line of professionals in British politics, a queue wherein Harold Wilson at present holds pride of last place. A new book on him is badly needed, since the only place we can go to probe his mystery is still the handsome three-tiered temple erected by J. L. Garvin 35 years ago, to which a recent cupola (of the same materials but of poorer quality) has been added by Julian Amery. But Mr. Peter Fraser, while rightly refusing to don the acolyte's robes, has been content to map the political fields that Chamberlain himself surveyed, and on that ground has built for his hero no home at all.

Nothing vexes a writer more than to be accused of writing the wrong book, but Mr. Fraser has exposed himself to this annoyance. For he has not done this in inadvertence. Beginning with a moot point, he surrounds it with more of the same. He insists that the Garvin volumes "redeemed Chamberlain's policies from any taint of shallowness or opportunism" (p. xi), but thereafter resolutely refuses to discuss why a question of taint ever came up in the first place. One would not know, reading Mr. Fraser, that Chamberlain's *contemporary* reputation was for hardness, rancour, and unscrupulousness. Possibly a lazy school of historians, themselves the biographers of men who clashed with the great Joe, has chosen merely to mirror these charges: but, apart from a slam or two at Gladstone, whose treatment of his junior certainly merits a reappraisal, Mr. Fraser himself avoids analysis and is content to assume that here we have a good man not only wronged but persistently misunderstood. It is a tenable view, but it needs a meticulous advocacy. Mr. Fraser, a master of his political materials, quotes Goschen (31 January 1885), who is up in arms, as was everyone else of any consequence, about Chamberlain's celebrated "ransom" speech. Were the new electors to storm the constitution "on the principle of an enemy storming a town, who demands ransom for abstaining from plunder?" (p. 57). This, says Mr. Fraser, was a distortion of Chamberlain's intentions. Maybe, but it was not a distortion of what he said. What were his intentions? We are later told that Chamberlain sought to remedy, not to replace, the *laissez-faire* system. What kind of remedy he thought necessary is a matter left in the dark.

Yet Chamberlain "never countenanced the idea of economic class war" (p. xiii). Perhaps not, but he certainly worked at laying out an arena in which such a struggle might take place. In his apprenticeship days in 1869 he spoke of the need to emancipate the people from the economic and social oppression of the aristocracy and the established church, and looked on the House of Commons as a preserve of sinister interests inimical to government for the good of the majority (p. 6). As he remarked three years later, one "could not tread on the foot of any vested interest, but the corns of all the others began to ache" (p. 13). Here he showed a shrewder sense of the political atmosphere of his own day than is

displayed by Mr. Fraser, for all his great knowledge of the field of play. For throughout we are given the impression that all these Victorians blocking Chamberlain's progress had no *right* to their own opinions, since these have turned out to be so contrary to the views that a wider-minded posterity holds concerning the nature of society and the duties of its governors. Chamberlain was certainly a paternalist, an autocrat more lofty than any that either the Whigs or the Tories could produce from the ranks of their aristocrats, and he had a truer glimpse of the future: but that some of the misfortunes that fell upon him were his own fault, Mr. Fraser will not allow.

So here we must not go looking for "Jack Cade," for he is not there. Take the ransom speech once more: Mr. Fraser sees its context as "the language of the eighteenth century—and of the Whigs rather than the Jacobins" (pp. 50–1). This is hard not only to justify but to understand: whose was the eighteenth century, Wilkes' or Pitt's, Paine's or Burke's? Nor can we find the man at whom the Irish bayed whenever he rose to his feet, the man whose treatment of his great friend Dilke caused comment even among those who disliked Dilke, the man who confessed to Morley that he had got into "a terrible mess" in South Africa. Mr. Fraser indeed notes (as he can hardly help doing) the distrust with which Chamberlain was generally regarded, but only in order to register his own annoyance: Chamberlain, "in the terms of the Spanish proverb, could not look over a hedge with impunity, while Gladstone could steal horses with general acclaim" (p. 63). It is a good point, but it needs some explanation: why could Gladstone maintain this position while Joe could never even get near it? In a footnote (p. 104) Mr. Fraser quotes Gladstone's famous gibe in the Commons (8 June 1886) about Chamberlain's conduct over the Home Rule bill—and the fact that Gladstone, who had very seldom descended to personalities even with Disraeli, did so descend in this case is of some significance—"He has trimmed his vessel, and he has touched his rudder in such a masterly way, that in whichever direction the winds of heaven may blow they must fill his sails." Most unfair, says Mr. Fraser—but a man who is constantly laying himself open to such imputation has himself to thank. Later indeed Mr. Fraser gives away part of the case he has not made. "Unknown to the Gladstonians," Chamberlain had already before the election reached "a kind of agreement" with the Conservatives (p. 109). But if the Gladstonians did not know, the Conservatives were not sure either. Joe's "kind of agreements" were often of this nature. When Mr. Fraser goes on to say that after 1886 Chamberlain could not foresee that the Gladstonians would do everything they could to make it impossible for him ever to rejoin them, he is (one hopes) doing his hero's sagacity an injustice. There is no trusting to friendship in politics—"a lesson which Chamberlain could never learn" (p. 145). But, what had Chamberlain to give a friend?

Still, he realizes that "the apparent Chamberlain was the real Chamberlain" (p. 112). As he proves in a highly entertaining chapter, Beatrice Potter—later to become, moaning faintly at her fate, Mrs. Sidney Webb—found this out very vividly. This agreeable bluestocking wanted always to discuss Joe's cherished opinions with him, but this was the last thing he wanted. "It pains me," he told her, "to hear any of my views controverted" (p. 114). Although compelled to insist that Miss Potter failed to discover "the genuine idiom and purpose" of Chamberlain's career (and if she, who dearly wanted to, could not, can his other contemporaries be blamed?) Mr. Fraser does allow that Chamberlain had "a very real personal deficiency" (p. 129). That "self-righteous priggery" at which Chamberlain so railed when he found it in the columns of the nonconformist press was also part of his own nature.

But even if Hamlet is absent, his true stature is never in question, and Mr. Fraser gives us an exact study of the politics of his Denmark. Like Dr. Bernard Semmel before him, he stresses the link between collectivism and imperialism and points out that imperialism evolved into a philosophy of society as well as of empire (p. 141): the myth that socialism and imperialism were, or for that matter are, natural enemies is surely now staked out at the crossroads. There is a good persuasive chapter on South Africa, and a fine survey of the rows over state education. Chamberlain's philosophy, never clear, clouded further as he grew older. In a Leeds speech of 1894, he sounds a lot like William Jennings Bryan: away with any plan to "reduce all to one dead level of uniformity, in which the inefficient, and the thriftless, and the idle, are to be confounded and treated alike with the honest and the industrious and the capable" (p. 146). This was what he did not want, but what he did want is doubtful. Mr. Fraser has an answer, that Chamberlain even in his most Radical days, when he had appeared as a Jack Cade leading a proletarian attack on the propertied classes, "had in reality been inspired by a vision of justice and harmony between classes" (p. 151), and admits at the end (p. 311) that it has not been Chamberlain's theories or even his policies but his style and method that have proved of most lasting significance. Yet style and method never took Chamberlain far. He ended in a high place indeed, but he had already been sidetracked: it was not the place he felt his due.

This is, in sum, an interesting book on a man whose enigma is not to be explained by a study of the political scene in which he found himself. To be fair to Mr. Fraser, it can probably never be explained at all.

A. P. THORNTON

University of Toronto

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907.

By IAN H. NISH. London: The Athlone Press, University of London [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1966. Pp. xii, 420. \$10.50.

SURPRISINGLY, the origin of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has received almost as little attention from English-speaking scholars as has the abrogation of this the longest surviving example of the "old diplomacy." A. L. Galperin wrote in Russian and T. Hashagen in German and their counterparts are such preliminary studies as A. L. P. Dennis, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (1923), Chang Chung-fu, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (1931), and C. N. Spinks, "A History of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922" (1936). (This last work, an unpublished doctoral thesis, is omitted from Professor Nish's bibliography.) In addition, Professors Langer, Monger, Grenville, and others have contributed to the study in a fragmentary way.

Professor Nish's book, covering the origins of the alliances of 1902 and 1905, decidedly redresses the balance. His monograph demands the perseverance of the reader, and it often covers familiar ground in a detailed way, but the overwhelmingly important feature of this book is the quality of its research. We are often told how little the recently opened archives reveal that is new or startling. This may be the case but the absence of startling revelations cannot detract from sustained scholarly research which documents carefully and accurately a particular theme. This is what Dr. Nish has done. He is the first western scholar to explore the Japanese archives, fuse them with the great volume of British governmental and private papers, and produce a definitive account.

Professor Nish assesses the political, strategic, and commercial factors which

helped produce the first alliance, while guiding us from the Sino-Japanese war to January 1902. He examines the press, the important personalities, the cabinet debates in Japan and Britain, and the search by both governments for alternative or complementary courses of action, at the same time investigating the abortive Anglo-German agreement on Manchuria. His analysis of the debate in Japan and the role of Ito is the best in the English language. Then by way of the origins and unfolding of the Russo-Japanese War Professor Nish shows us how the alliance was rewritten in the summer of 1905, rather than merely renewed and extended in scope. Draft and counterdraft are examined, the new bargain is sealed, and the alliance is sent on its way only to run foul of the growing opposition of the United States. This is an admirable work of research.

Nevertheless one hesitates to give unrelieved praise because of certain summarizing and analytical statements. Can one accept, for example, the view that for most of the period between 1895 and 1905, British foreign policy was in the hands of or under the supervision of Lord Salisbury (p. 46)? Perhaps, but the important feature of this period is the air of experimentation in London and the sustained debate within a diverging cabinet. Dr. Nish no doubt can justify his phrase but it tends to mislead more than it enlightens. Dr. Nish seems unsure about the value to Britain of the alliance in relation to the European naval balance (pp. 231, 369) and ignores the relevant naval implications of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. He rejects the view that the link with Tokyo was to some degree an alternative to a link with Berlin (pp. 232, 371), but he is not fully convincing. In addition, the phrase Salisbury's "hand to mouth policy" (p. 242) might surprise the reader, who also might contest the views that the alliance virtually removed Britain's anxieties about Russian in central Asia and that Russia gave up all ideas of a war of revenge against Japan (p. 365).

One might, therefore, question some of Dr. Nish's interpretations and judgments. Nevertheless one seeks to emphasize the value of his research which now allows those of us who cannot read Japanese to make informed comments on the policy of Britain's partner. Dr. Nish has redressed the balance and has relegated Langer's *Diplomacy of Imperialism*, as it relates to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, to the level of an interim judgment.

M. G. FRY

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Europe

The Transformation of the Roman World: Gibbon's Problem after Two Centuries.

Edited by LYNN WHITE, JR. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1966. Pp. x, 321, illus. \$6.95 (US).

THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS VOLUME is bolder than its achievement. According to the editor, the contributors intended to survey, "first, what really happened in the age of the Roman world's transformation; second, Gibbon, and why he saw these things as he did; third, ourselves, and why our angle of vision differs from Gibbon's" (p. vi). The result falls short of this programme. Criticizing Gibbon is an old and legitimate exercise. The novelty of this collection, and the terrain on which it thoroughly disappoints the reader, is its aspiration to speak with authority for the historians of our time, to tell us "what happened to Gibbon's problem in the interim, and why." The talent locally available in the Los Angeles area was not equal to such a challenge.

Three of the eleven chapters are exceptionally good: those of Ladner ("The Impact of Christianity"), Lichtheim (on the revival of Coptic and Syriac cultures), and Hoxie ("Mutations in Art"). Three others—by Chambers ("The Crisis of the Third Century"), Hollister ("Twilight in the West"), and Russell ("Teuton and Celt")—are positively misleading, since they are built around interpretations that were aging or discredited early in this century. The remainder falls between these extremes, none of them deserving special notice except Levine on "The Continuity and Preservation of the Latin Tradition."

The chief lesson of the book is unintentional. It resides in the incapacity of the contributors to cope with the late Roman and early mediaeval west. Gibbon is criticized above all for being too much of a westerner, with his vision impaired by classical standards. As the editor tells us, "we have substituted affirmative faith in the pluralism of values for the old faiths in exclusive sets of values" (p. 294). This affirmative faith allows Gibbon's narrowness to be successfully rectified by the historians of art, Christianity, Syria and Egypt, Islam, and Byzantium. We have pluralism of a sort. But do we know our western selves the better for it? If Chambers, Hollister, and Russell are considered as our representative spokesmen, then the answer is emphatically negative. We know other cultures but classical standards continue to alienate us from our past.

Gibbon's illusion lingers on. With him, we still see "barbarians" inhabiting the nether regions beyond the pale, bursting unexpected and unwanted upon "civilization." With him, we still regard the Roman empire as sick and failing, and seek to diagnose its manifold maladies. When the Byzantinists insistently assert that the eastern branch remained healthy, we broadmindedly nod and join with them in chorus to add that, in the west, sickness was unto death. The shadows fell and darkness covered the earth, until one or the other of the now numerous renaissances came along. Here in the 1960's, when compulsory Greek in the schools is forgotten and compulsory Latin is a fading memory, the history of late Rome and of the early Middle Ages still endures what one of the contributors aptly calls "the imperialism of classical scholarship" (p. 123, n. 9).

WALTER GOFFART

University of Toronto

Merchants and Scholars: Essays in the History of Exploration and Trade. Edited by JOHN PARKER. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1966. Pp. 258. \$7.50.

THIS VOLUME OF TEN ESSAYS centres on peripheral aspects of mapping and exploration in the centuries when Europe was discovering the planet. The essays are based on or related to materials in the James Ford Bell Collection of the University of Minnesota Library and edited by the Curator of the Collection, John Parker. The subjects range from productivity in Caribbean sugar production to geographic theories in fifteenth-century Florence. The scholarship and editing are meticulous, and some of the essays are excellent. But in the end, the volume as a whole is precious and inconsequential. The unity of the volume is formal and tenuous, for it is a tribute to a collection of documents "founded by a merchant-industrialist who was a prominent figure in the modern economic history of Minnesota." If the priorities were reversed and a more arms-length relationship between documents and scholarship established, this might enhance the significance of future volumes supported by the James Ford Bell Collection.

In this brief review, attention can only be given to two essays. Burton Stein's study of Coromandel trade in mediaeval India shows an excellent acquaintance with sources but falls short of penetrating the political characteristics of early mediaeval trade organizations. By regarding these organizations as "essentially integrated" with local social and economic institutions, the indispensable requirement of security from arbitrary control of local authorities and neutrality of site for foreigners is disregarded. The trade organizations were shattered only by the invasion of Vijayanagar warriors and the "martialization of South India," whose political significance for foreign merchants the author does not fully appreciate. Similar work on the Malabar coast by Anthony Leeds and on the pre-modern "port of trade" by Karl Polanyi is ignored.

David Quinn's essay on England's role in the St. Lawrence between 1577 and 1602 can be usefully read in conjunction with Harold Innis' work on the cod fisheries. The lure of the walrus, the rivalry with the Basques, an abortive English colonial venture, and finally the shift of attention to New England are woven into a compelling narrative.

ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN

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Renaissance and Revolution: The Remaking of European Thought. By J. A. MAZZEO. New York: Pantheon Books [Toronto: Random House of Canada]. 1966. Pp. xiv, 349. \$8.95.

THE RENAISSANCE CONTINUES TO BAFFLE the most meticulous and erudite of scholars. Two basic reasons may be adduced for this state of affairs, of which the first is the traditional faculty division which exists between, on the one hand, church history (broadly conceived) and, on the other, philosophy, fine arts, literature, and so forth. When clerics dominated civilized life (as in the Middle Ages) this institutional division of learning simply did not arise. When clerics are no longer significant civilizing forces (after 1600) the division is irrelevant. But in the Renaissance (and Reformation), when religion and "secular" activities are both of such great import and their interrelations so complex, this institutional division creates profound historical distortion. The second reason, less institutional and more substantive, relates to the profound methodological difficulty that few Renaissance scholars have faced: how meaningfully to discuss change in the Renaissance, without seeing everything as either simply progressing towards the future (that is, the present) or without creating a stereotyped Middle Ages (frequently identified with Aquinas) which is so obviously a caricature that it provides a worthless backdrop against which to bring Renaissance characters onto the stage. What is needed is a structure of thought sufficiently well articulated to allow one to plot the changes that did occur in the Renaissance against the background of Christianity (Christian values) which continued to play a profound role until the very end of the Renaissance. The so-called secularism of the Renaissance involves not the replacement but the gradual displacement of Christianity, often on grounds specifically Christian (e.g., Luther's critical distinction between the inner man and the outer man). Machiavelli continued to accept (believe in) personal (Christian) virtues; his radicalism came in pointing out that what is good on the personal plane may be harmful on the public plane. A "pious" prince may not be a "good" prince. Machiavelli did not deny the validity of Christian values, but he is to be considered a "secular" thinker because he relegated Christian virtue to the private sphere.

The major reason why the book under review, J. A. Mazzeo's *Renaissance and Revolution: The Remaking of European Thought*, fails to comprehend the complexities of the Renaissance is precisely because it refuses to confront the very great role that Christian values played in the formation of modern attitudes, however different these values may have been from those of the thirteenth century. The result of this lack of confrontation is a book which, although enthusiastic and often full of insight, is without a carefully articulated structure and is therefore not tightly argued or closely reasoned.

After a first chapter devoted to the Renaissance in general, individual chapters are given to Machiavelli, Castiglione, Bacon, and Hobbes, and the book concludes with a chapter on the idea of progress.

The first chapter is confused and confusing. Two types of humanism are distinguished, classical and Christian, and then it is said that humanism is a "secular" movement (p. 17). On the same page it is also suggested that "humanism *per se* was neither religious nor antireligious, north of the Alps," yet "humanism and religion were intimately associated." Thus, not only are we left baffled about humanism, but, since the author has said earlier that the era of the Renaissance "is marked by the process of secularization of culture" (p. 13), we begin to realize that the concept of secularization is so vague as to be meaningless. Were Erasmus, Luther, Loyola, and Hooker "secularizers?" The answer may well be yes; but what is most irksome about this book is that, although it is studded with such terms, sustained analysis is absent.

Not only is this first chapter conceptually weak (thus providing a slippery base on which to erect the later chapters), it is full of slipshod statements. That humanist translations were "greatly superior to anything which existed before" (p. 16) is rather incredible in light of what some scholars have said about William of Moerbeke's Latin translations of Aristotle. It is also contended that the Renaissance obtained "fresh knowledge of previously unknown authors like Plato and Herodotus . . ." (p. 16). Not only was Plato obviously not unknown in the Middle Ages (and I do not simply refer to the two or three works of his which were read in the Middle Ages), it is highly doubtful that Ficino's understanding of Plato was any more historically accurate than that of the Middle Ages.

A comparison of the differences between mediaeval and Renaissance thought is bravely undertaken, but it remains vague. The distinction between the "syncretism" of an Aquinas and a Ficino is not made clear or precise. And we become thoroughly confused when we discover that what is typical of the Renaissance, on page 10, is the "decompartmentalization of thought" (as compared with the Middle Ages), and, on page 13, "a compartmentalization of the mind. . . ." The author may have something important to say, but his terms are so imprecise as to obfuscate his message.

The chapter devoted to Machiavelli lacks clarity and unity. The suggestion that Machiavelli is to be treated as a "literary intelligence" is fruitful, but when this is accompanied by such a statement as the following as a proof for the existence of revolutionary cultural change c. 1513—"political affairs in Italy had reached a point where moral persuasion and ideological abstractions were no longer effective in maintaining order"—we can only wonder. The author has completely fused and thus confused the ideological with the sociological. When, we might ask, had Italian politics (or any politics for that matter) ever been controlled by moral considerations? The point that Machiavelli wished to make was simply that. What is new is Machiavelli's attitude towards the world, not the world of affairs itself. (One wonders when the lesson of Chabod's brilliant essay, "The Concept of the Renaissance," will be learned.)

The chapter on *The Courtier* as "the self as a work of art" is interesting but does not really succeed in exploring the tension, so obvious in this work, between imitation and self-realization. The chapter devoted to Bacon (relying heavily on Anderson's studies) is adequate, but surely an earlier statement that "the great scientific achievements of the late Renaissance and seventeenth century can be viewed as the culmination of the most creative and original elements in humanism" (p. 44) is simply absurd. What about, for example, Randall's work showing how scientific methodology evolved out of a mediaeval Aristotelianism and Crombie's and others' work showing the important relationship between mediaeval and Renaissance science?

The chapter on Hobbes remains diffuse and never really makes contact with the ultimate paradox in Hobbes' thinking. Hobbes' notion of sovereignty (with its concurrent idea of law as coercion) is deduced from the need of enhancing man's self-preservation, the fundamental natural right which man never gives up. If this natural right of self-preservation and the sovereign should ever come into conflict, Hobbes is finally reduced to allowing the individual to preserve his own self from bodily injury, even if this means breaking the contract, for the contract and its resulting sovereign depend, ultimately, on the natural right, not *vice versa*. Hobbes is forced to admit, though not in so many words, that the individual is the ultimate judge of what is beneficial or prejudicial to his own self-preservation. Surely Leo Strauss (who is not mentioned in the notes) is right in stressing that Hobbes belongs fundamentally to the political tradition of individualism. The statements that "only sovereigns possess natural rights" (p. 267) and that "the fundamental law of civil society is the relinquishing of man's natural right to follow the law of nature" (p. 268) are incomprehensible in light of what Hobbes writes in the great, central chapters of the *Leviathan* (13-15, 21, 26). Mazzeo's statement that "the obligation of subjects to obey the sovereign is finally moral" (p. 271) remains so vague as to be devoid of meaning. A better way of putting it would be that there is a moral obligation (based on the natural right of individual self-preservation) on the part of each citizen ultimately to disobey the sovereign, if he judges the sovereign to be bent on destroying the very basis of his position, which is the preservation of individual right.

The final chapter on the idea of progress, although promising, cannot succeed, given what has preceded it.

Mazzeo's study is a classic example of what can happen to fine erudition and a lively desire to synthesize scholarly findings for a broad audience when this knowledge is not placed within a clearly articulated and historically accurate framework. The role of Christianity eludes him completely (and I do not mean to refer primarily to the fact that in a book devoted to the "revolution" underlying modern thought the Reformation is completely neglected). His view of the Middle Ages is simplistic and based on the "golden age" of Aquinas. (Mazzeo does not seem to recognize that many of the values traditionally associated with the Renaissance are present in thinkers such as Occam and Marsilius of Padua). How the historian can effectively plot the changes that have occurred in man's intellectual history without either simplifying the developments so completely or creating a series of contrasts so simplistic that grave distortion takes place is not easy to specify. But until that problem is at least squarely confronted, we shall continue to be disappointed by broad interpretative works on the Renaissance.

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French Revolution Documents, Volume I. Edited by J. M. ROBERTS. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1966. Pp. x, 530. 60s. cloth; 45s. paper.

AS EACH GENERATION examines the past from new perspectives and with novel tools, books which were once valuable frequently lose their former usefulness. When John Roberts and Richard Cobb set out to up-date J. M. Thompson's *French Revolution Documents*, a work which had served students well for over thirty years, they discovered that it was impossible to do justice to recent trends in historiography without abandoning the original structure and creating an entirely new collection. Thompson's documents reflected his own predominant interest in the parliamentary revolution in Paris from 1789 to 1792, whereas recent scholars have probed such matters as the pre-Revolution, insurrection in the countryside and provincial centres, fluctuations in prices and wages, the rôle of the urban lower classes, special agrarian problems, counter-revolution in the Vendée and elsewhere, and the growth and collapse of *gouvernement révolutionnaire*. In their new two-volume collection the editors aspire to illustrate these modern researches.

In this first volume Roberts offers sources illustrating events from Calonne's Assembly of Notables early in 1787 down to the overthrow of the monarchy on August 10, 1792. Although he includes some "official" documents, he prefers selections which reveal social life, economic conditions, popular disorders, and the rich variety of political attitudes. In addition to laws and edicts we are given lively and revealing selections from *cahiers de doléances*, letters, memoirs, pamphlets, diplomatic despatches, municipal registers, minutes of political clubs, and newspaper articles or reports. We confront the crude language of peasants voicing their discontents, the biases and misinterpretations of varied observers, and the inner feelings of Louis XVI and his courtiers. We see the Revolution from below as well as from above, from outside as well as inside Paris. Here is rich fare to excite the curiosity of the student, to puzzle him, to lure him deeper. A skilful teacher should have no trouble using this collection to stimulate interest and provoke argument.

But there are many aspects of the Revolution which the present collection neglects altogether, although they have lately been the object of important investigations. Nothing has been included to illustrate the relation of the Revolution to other disturbances in the Atlantic community which gave the movement its novel international quality. Nothing shows the student how poems, songs, or plays can reveal the spirit of a revolution. Nothing indicates the birth of the *fêtes* which developed into a vital medium of propaganda. And despite the appearance of numerous proposals for educational reform to train citizens for the newborn régime, nothing (except for a brief section in one of the *cahiers*) illustrates this mounting concern. It is, of course, impossible to include everything, but most of these phenomena could have been illustrated by brief selections. If this collection is intended to introduce the student to the full range of modern research, then it falls far short of its goal.

Compared with John Hall Stewart's well-known collection this is a bare bones compilation. Explanatory introductions to the individual selections are either very brief or non-existent. There are no cross-references or bibliographical notes. The collection is obviously not intended as a reference work, but as a text especially designed for tutoring a special subject at Oxford. This, plus the fact that most of the selections are in French, will limit its usefulness in North America.

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French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities. By HENRI BRUNDSCHWIG. Translated by W. G. BROWN, with an introduction by R. E. ROBINSON. New York: Frederick A. Praeger [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern]. 1966. Pp. x, 228. \$9.00.

PROFESSOR BRUNDSCHWIG'S *Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français* must already be well known to students of French expansion. The English edition reviewed here is a revised version of the original, but its basic argument remains unchanged. For Professor Brundschwig, French expansion after 1871 was nationalist rather than economic; its aim was not the creation of new outlets for French trade and investment but the restoration of French prestige and the reassertion of her claims to great power status. The resurgence of nationalism after the disasters of 1870-71 gave birth to a new imperialism. Defeated in Europe, France sought to polish up her tarnished reputation overseas. The Tunisian protectorate was seen as the first step on the road back to greatness. But it was the ratification of Brazza's treaty with the Bateke, intended as a palliative to public indignation over the loss of French prestige in Egypt, which brought African expansion into the arena of international diplomacy. The provisions of the Berlin Act on the notification of protectorates and the establishment of effective occupation kept it there. After 1890 nationalist feeling, intensified by colonial rivalries, became avowedly expansionist and enabled governments to carry out their policies with overwhelming public support.

In this process economic factors were secondary. The new colonialists of the 1870's were not businessmen but intellectuals and professional people associated with the geographical societies. The membership of the colonial movement after 1890 was similarly composed. Although economic interests were represented they were by no means dominant, and economic justifications were never a major weapon in the colonialist armoury. The protectionist argument, for example, was not fully developed until the 1890's; even then it was a myth quite unsupported by the prevailing trends in French foreign trade and investment. Colonies were expensive and unprofitable; those who benefited most were not traders or investors but officials and soldiers for whom colonial service meant rapid promotion and higher pay. The absence of profit, however, was never a serious obstacle to a policy of expansion aimed at increasing French prestige. Nationalism provided its own justification.

Inevitably, such generalizations are vulnerable to detailed criticism. The significance of the Berlin Act, for example, is overrated. The notification and occupation clauses applied only to the coast where the partition was largely complete by 1885. On the other hand the importance of nationalist opposition to expansion, evident in the Tunisian and Egyptian debates and in the outcry over Lang-Son, is seriously underestimated. But the argument is also open to criticism of a more fundamental nature. Few would dispute the importance of the nationalist factor in French expansion, but prestige could involve much more than abstract concepts of *la gloire*. The policy-makers did not ignore the implications of the Tunisian protectorate for France's strategic position in the Mediterranean or for her security in Algeria. Nor was their opposition to the British occupation of Egypt—a crucial theme which Professor Brundschwig fails to discuss—divorced from their fears about its effects upon the Mediterranean balance and the security of the routes to the east. Few too would dispute the marginal significance of colonial expansion for the development of French foreign trade and investment. But the vital question here is not whether the colonies were in fact profitable or

economically important, but whether those responsible for the conduct of expansionist policy thought they would become so. This can only be determined by investigating the motives of the policy-makers; Professor Brunschwig has examined the motives of the colonialists instead. And in a book based almost exclusively on newspaper reports and published material he could hardly have done otherwise. Indeed, he himself accepts the limitations of such an approach. He does not claim to have given all the right answers, or even that all his answers are right. His aim has merely been to provide "some overall view" for the benefit of those engaged in more detailed research. In the process he has constructed a brilliant and probably accurate picture of the nature of French imperialist sentiment and has advanced an hypothesis about the nature of French expansion. The validity of his argument remains to be tested; it will still have to be measured by the yardstick of policy-making. For it is in the official rather than the public mind of French imperialism that the solution to the problems of French colonial expansion must ultimately be sought.

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Ludendorff: Genius of World War I. By D. J. GOODSPEED. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1966. Pp. xiv, 355, maps, illus. \$5.95.

WHILE IT MAY BE UNFAIR to cite any book's dust jacket, the United States' truth in packaging bill would require a warning that Ludendorff was no genius and that Mr. Goodspeed's account of these "world-shaking events . . . from the viewpoint of the man who did more to influence them than any other" is below his usual standards. To begin at the beginning with "The Red House on the Königsplatz," the offices of the Prussian General Staff, there is little evidence in either of the authorities cited for pp. 1-5 that "in common with most General Staff Officers" in the summer of 1911, "Ludendorff took a more sober view" than did "the German people" of "Germany's strategic position," or that, unstable as was later to become, he already "thought he was living in a nightmare." Although the battle accounts which follow this are often excellent, the whole work is so overwritten and old-fashioned that it is neither good biography nor good history.

Of the dozen works most frequently cited, only two—Gerhard Ritter's *Schlieffen Plan* and Admiral Georg von Müller's diary of *The Kaiser and His Court*—are later than 1933. Ritter's more fundamental works on German militarism are not cited, and the same can be said of the works of Ludwig Dehio, Fritz Fischer, Karl Demeter, and other post-1945 historians. To end on Ludendorff's relations with Hitler, Mr. Goodspeed ignores most of the key works on National Socialism, Alan Bullock's biography among them. His final summary of Ludendorff's career is well done, but never really examines why this specialist in logistics, "completely unequipped, by background, training, or talent, to cope with political problems . . . forced his will upon the Kaiser, the civil government [whatever that means, constitutionally, in the Second Reich], and the German nation." The maps are good, the pictures routine. There must be some good ones of the taking of Liège in 1914, the project and battle which launched Ludendorff on his meteoric career.

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Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE AND ANN LIDDELL

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *T.B.R.* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

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Wrangling over Wrangel Island*

RICHARD J. DIUBALDO

THE CONTEST FOR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS in the Arctic, underway for many years, reached its climax late in the nineteenth century. Today, there is little, if any, land in the Arctic that is "unpossessed"; the various insular territories have all been officially claimed, and these claims are generally accepted. Certain nationals—among them citizens of the United States, Denmark, and Norway—have occasionally brought forward claims to such portions of Canada's northern archipelago as Ellesmere Island, the Ringnes Islands, and Axel Heiberg Island. Their governments, however, have been reluctant to press these claims, and Canada's title has gradually become strengthened through years of uncontested continuous occupation.¹ The Wrangel Island episode of 1921–24, touched off by the great explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson,²

*"The author of this article and I find ourselves in disagreement about many of his conclusions and especially with what Henry James would call its 'point of view.' I have granted my permission for him to quote from the Vilhjalmur Stefansson correspondence on condition that he preface his article with this notice." Evelyn Stefansson Nef.

¹The list of works concerning Arctic sovereignty is formidable. Among the most important, however, are the following: Yvon Bériault, *Les Problèmes politiques du nord canadien* (Ottawa, 1942); V. K. Johnston, "Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands," *Canadian Historical Review*, XIV (1933), 24–41; W. F. King, *Report Upon the Title of Canada to the Islands North of the Mainland of Canada* (Ottawa, 1905); V. L. Lakhtine, "Rights Over the Arctic," *American Journal of International Law*, XXIV (1930), 703–17; D. H. Miller, "Political Rights in the Polar Regions," in W. L. G. Joerg, ed., *Problems of Polar Research* (New York, 1928); Elmer Plischke, "Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic" (unpublished manuscript specially prepared for *Encyclopedia Arctica*, compiled under Contract N6ONR-265, NR162-218 between the Office of Naval Research in the United States Navy Department and the Stefansson Library, Stefansson Collection, Baker Library, Dartmouth College); Gustav Smedal, *Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas* (Oslo, 1931); and Gordon W. Smith, "The Historical and Legal Background of Canada's Arctic Claims" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952).

²The most extensive treatment of the subject can be found in Stefansson's *The Adventure of Wrangel Island* (New York, 1925). Just before his death in 1962 Stefansson devoted a chapter to the episode in his autobiography, *Discovery* (New York, 1964), but his account remained substantially unaltered.

could have occasioned a reversal of this course of historical development. The affair not only threatened Canada's assumption of authority over the Arctic archipelago, but involved the dominion briefly in an unpleasant international incident at a time when its government was anxious to gain recognition from the world community.

As far as is known, Wrangel Island, lying 110 miles due north of Siberia, was discovered in 1849 by Captain Kellett, an Englishman, and for many years bore the name of Kellett Land. Less than twenty years later, in 1867, an American, Thomas Long, sailed close by in the whaling bark *Nile*. Long did not know that the island had been discovered by Kellett and placed upon Admiralty charts. Supposing it to be a discovery of his own, he suggested that it be called Wrangel Island in honour of Baron Wrangel, then governor of Russian Alaska. In his early career Wrangel, on behalf of the Russian government, had conducted explorations by sledge northward over the frozen ocean from the mouth of the Kolyma River. These futile expeditions, spanning the years 1822 to 1824, were in response to rumours that a land mass existed beyond the mainland. Captain Long, familiar with Wrangel's unsuccessful efforts, felt that it would be appropriate to name the island in the baron's honour.

The first official landing on the island was made by Captain Calvin Hooper of the United States revenue cutter *Corwin* in August 1881. At this time Hooper raised the American flag, deposited a record of his brief stay, and claimed the island for the United States. Despite a second and longer visit to the island by another American revenue cutter, *Rodgers*, within a few days of the *Corwin*, nothing was done to cement the claim. The island remained derelict until 1911 when a hydrographic party from the Russian ice-breakers *Taimuir* and *Vaigatch* erected a navigation beacon on the southwest portion of the island. Finally, in 1914, the crew of the wrecked *Karluk* of the Canadian Arctic Expedition eked out an existence on Wrangel Island for six months, eventually running up the Union Jack (July 1, 1914) and claiming the island for Canada and the British empire.

Although Vilhjalmur Stefansson was commander of the section of the expedition to which the *Karluk* was attached, he had not been part of the shipwrecked party, for the vessel, a prisoner of the ice, had drifted away while he was absent on a journey to the mainland.³ What is important to remember is that Stefansson's knowledge and interest in the island came to him in second-hand fashion, after many an informal talk with Jack Hadley, a survivor of the disaster. Hadley painted a rosy picture for his commander, outlining the strategic and, especially, the commercial prospects of the island. The apparently resource-filled island fitted into Stefansson's conception of what his

³Stefansson, *Adventure*, p. 24.

Arctic should be: a polar Mediterranean from which Canada and the British empire would derive renewed economic and strategic vigour. The world's centre of activity would drift northward from the more temperate latitudes toward the pole—the northward course of empire.⁴

Stefansson in 1917 returned southward to the mainland after three years of unprecedented exploration among the unknown Arctic islands, anxious to make another good showing for the year 1918. In particular he hastened to prepare an expedition northwestward to Wrangel Island and spent the winter of 1917–18 in a flurry of activity at his Arctic headquarters.⁵ Only serious illness and orders from an economy-minded government prevented the trip. However, after the war, Stefansson returned to his plan and began his campaign for official backing. Aiding him powerfully (as he was well aware) was the international situation in the north Pacific. For the victorious Allies and the United States were bent on checking the emergent and militant Soviet state, and the Americans distrusted Japan's intentions, not only in the Pacific but also in Siberia. Stefansson reasoned that to secure Wrangel Island would be in the best interests of Britain, the empire, and the United States, and that these countries would welcome such a move.

Accordingly, Stefansson made tentative approaches to the Canadian government in 1919, apparently with the blessing of Sir Robert Borden,⁶ though it was not until the fall of 1920 that he began his campaign in earnest. In September and October of that year he approached the new prime minister, Arthur Meighen, and a number of high-ranking individuals in the Canadian government: Loring Christie, legal adviser of the Department of External Affairs and one of the most influential policy-makers in the Meighen government, W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, and J. B. Harkin, commissioner of Dominion parks and an expert on polar problems. Stefansson scoffed at Canada's complacent reliance upon the sector theory, first enunciated by Senator Poirier in 1907,⁷ for "it is no more inevitable that every land north of Alaska should belong to Alaska than it is that a strip of coast from Skagway to the vicinity of Prince Rupert shall belong to us, which it does not."⁸ Such a theory

⁴Stefansson, *The Northward Course of Empire* (London, 1922).

⁵Diary entries for Oct. 20 and Nov. 13, 1917, M.G. 30, C 24, Vols. 2–7, Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.).

⁶Stefansson, *Discovery*, p. 231.

⁷Canada, *Senate Debates*, Feb. 20, 1907, pp. 266–73. To Poirier, this sector extended from the North Pole and was bounded, on the western side, by the 141st meridian, and on the eastern side, by a vague line running through Robeson Channel, Kennedy Channel, Smith Sound, Baffin Bay, and Davis Strait. Official maps of Canada today indicate these as Canada's Arctic frontiers.

⁸Stefansson to L. C. Christie (draft copy), Sept. 25, 1920, Noice Correspondence, 1923–26, Stefansson Collection.

would only serve to bar Canada from enjoying freedom of movement in the Arctic. Once such a nonsensical notion as the sector theory were dropped Canada would be free to acquire islands such as Wrangel. As for Wrangel, it

should be British territory because during the next great war and, indeed, in the course of peaceable development of the next two or three decades, there will be traffic across the polar basin from Europe to Japan, by way of the polar ocean, certainly with dirigibles and submarines and probably aeroplanes. This distance from England to Japan [*sic*] by a great circle drawn through the polar ocean is not much more than a third as great as the distance from England to Japan by way of Montreal and Vancouver. The perpetual daylight of summer will not only make this route feasible in time of war but also advantageous in times of peace. As naval bases for our submarines and as way stations for aircraft we need a chain of islands across the polar basin.⁹

Stefansson's reasoning was prophetic of the coming age of air travel; today his vision is being fulfilled as numerous aviation companies make use of the polar route. However, the greatly increased range of aircraft, as well as the advent of nuclear submarines, has eliminated the need for intermediate bases in modern polar travel.

To Stefansson's way of thinking, Wrangel Island also offered a stepping stone to the yet undiscovered riches that the polar basin had to offer. Only one problem remained—formal possession. The explorer did not believe that the Canadian claim, resting on British discovery, was adequate in itself to secure possession.¹⁰ Even the raising of the British flag in 1914 and six months' occupation by the *Karluk's* crew were insufficient since that claim had lapsed in 1919,¹¹ according to Stefansson's interpretation of existing international law. The only way to safeguard the claim was by continuous occupation. If Canada were to follow up original discovery by exploration, and preferably by commercial development "such as the placing of a Hudson's Bay Company post . . . or other trading enterprise," she would then have the best claim to the island.¹² But, if Canada remained inactive, others would occupy Wrangel Island. To add urgency to his pleas Stefansson alluded to various newspaper reports, eventually confirmed by the Soviet representative in New York, that the U.S.S.R. had leased the northeastern corner of Siberia to a syndicate of American capitalists, presumably the Liebes trading company of San Francisco. To Stefansson, the leasing of an area immediately south of Wrangel Island was

⁹Stefansson to J. B. Harkin, Feb. 7, 1921, R.G. 15, A 2, vol. 2, Department of the Interior, Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch, Miscellaneous Records, P.A.C.

¹⁰Stefansson to W. W. Cory (draft copy), Oct. 30, 1920, Wrangel Island, 1920 file, Stefansson Collection.

¹¹Stefansson to Mackenzie King, March 11, 1922, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 86, fol. 69271, P.A.C.

¹²Stefansson to Christie, Sept. 25, 1920, Noice Correspondence, 1923-26.

an implicit threat to Canadian pretensions there, because such a firm could well occupy the island as part of their lease.¹³ Furthermore, Stefansson concluded that in the long run the granting of such a lease would strengthen the claim of the grantor, in this case the U.S.S.R., as demonstrating the sovereign authority.

Stefansson, in a letter to Arthur Meighen, argued that Canada was faced by two strategic problems in the north, those of Ellesmere Island and Wrangel Island. But because of the prevailing attitude of Denmark he reasoned that it would be sufficient for Canada merely to "assert its claim to Ellesmere Island openly and decisively." The most pressing single polar problem of Canada, in his opinion, was Wrangel Island, for which he suggested as a solution an exploratory expedition led by himself.¹⁴

From the beginning, however, the Canadian government displayed a high degree of reluctance to follow up the proposal and the wheels of government were to turn slowly for Vilhjalmur Stefansson. As early as November 25, 1920, Sir Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, advised Meighen against taking any action. Pope indicated that the tenuous Canadian claim rested upon the fact that Wrangel had been sighted by an Englishman who had never landed there.¹⁵ He disregarded the action of *Karluk's* crew in 1914 on the simple grounds that they had had no authority to claim the island. Though Stefansson was insisting that the gesture had been valid and binding, the instructions given to him in 1913 had only authorized the expedition "to take possession of and annex to His Majesty's Dominions any lands lying to the *north* of Canadian territory which are not within the jurisdiction of any civilized power,"¹⁶ and in no way could "north" be interpreted to include Wrangel Island. Pope concluded that the island in question was "not even in the Western Hemisphere, as the 180th median of longitude falls upon it. Essentially, it is an Asiatic Island." He drove home his department's verdict by reminding the government that any pretensions Canada might have to the island were of an unsubstantial character, "and could only result in weakening our legitimate claims to the Arctic islands contiguous to our own territory. . . ."¹⁷

Still the government dallied and these strong warnings went by the board. On February 19, 1921, Meighen conveyed the following message to Stefansson: "I have discussed the matters which you laid

¹³Stefansson to Cory, Oct. 30, 1920, Wrangel Island, 1920 file.

¹⁴Stefansson to Meighen, Oct. 30, 1920, M.G. 26, I, vol. 13, file 7, fol. 007393-95.

¹⁵Pope to Meighen, Nov. 25, 1920, *ibid.*, fol. 007381.

¹⁶Copy of Report of Privy Council #316, Clerk of Privy Council to Minister of Naval Service, June 2, 1913, R.G. 12, 1654-1, vol. 29, P.A.C. My italics.

¹⁷Pope to Meighen, Nov. 25, 1920, M.G. 26, I, vol. 13, file 7, fol. 007393-95.

before me today and desire to advise you that the government proposes to assert the right of Canada to Wrangel Island, *based upon the discovery and exploration of your expedition*.”¹⁸ According to Stefansson’s account of the episode, these “matters” were reports by the explorer that Mr. Angus Brabant, the fur trade commissioner of the Hudson’s Bay Company, “had a strong inclination to put a post on Wrangel Island,” but had postponed any action because the company did not feel sure the island was British territory. Stefansson had tactfully and conveniently brought this state of affairs to Meighen’s notice; the Prime Minister had therefore presented the Hudson’s Bay Company’s problem before a meeting of the cabinet which, within a matter of hours, arrived at the decision to push ahead with the Canadian claim to Wrangel.¹⁹ Stefansson’s charm and persuasiveness could always work wonders in a face-to-face confrontation.

Armed with such assurances Stefansson then set out to enlist the official support of the Hudson’s Bay Company in London. Mentioning that Brabant had been enthusiastic about the idea of a post on Wrangel Island, Stefansson thought it wise to remind the company of the interest displayed by its competitors. Now that the war was over its chief rival in the western Arctic, N. Liebes and Company of San Francisco, was bound to revive plans to place a post on Wrangel Island, or if not Liebes, then some other trading concern. Stefansson confided that the Canadian Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior were fully cognizant of the danger. In fact, they agreed it would not be proper for them to ask the Hudson’s Bay Company to establish the post but they welcomed such action, for “their plans for making secure the claim of Canada to the island would be materially helped if a British concern were to start a post there in the summer of 1921, and would look with the greatest favour of your doing so.”²⁰ Having more or less manoeuvred the government into making a pronouncement by means of the company, Stefansson was now artfully using it to proselytize the parent company.

The company, interested in expanding its fur-producing territory, reacted favourably,²¹ but this was of little consequence for, within ten days, Stefansson’s schemes had come to naught. Meighen executed an about-face. On March 1, 1921, he curtly informed the explorer that the

¹⁸Meighen to Stefansson, Feb. 19, 1921, M.G. 26, I, vol. 13, file 7, fol. 007416. My italics.

¹⁹Stefansson to Charles V. Sale (draft copy), Feb. 23, 1921, Wrangel Island, main file. Stefansson had other connections with the Hudson’s Bay Company at this time for under its auspices he had been able to form the Hudson’s Bay Reindeer Company in 1920 to raise reindeer and musk-ox on Baffin Island.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹D. M. LeBourdais, *Stefansson, Ambassador of the North* (Montreal, 1963), p. 160.

government's approval had been withdrawn and that its previous disposition should be disregarded.²² On the previous day an annoyed Department of External Affairs had prompted Meighen to squelch the project. This time Loring Christie, slighted because of the administration's disregard of his department's earlier advice, chose to reaffirm his and his department's conviction that the disadvantages far outweighed any possible advantages. Christie took Stefansson's arguments severely to task, reminding Meighen that Wrangel's commercial value was purely "speculative" and based solely on Stefansson's assessment. Besides, Stefansson's arguments based upon the Hudson's Bay Company's quandary could be put aside because trading concerns such as the Hudson's Bay Company could secure fair commercial privileges even if the island were occupied by another power. Furthermore, Christie attached no strategic or military importance to the island and was quite willing to let either Japan or Russia acquire it.²³ Faced by the conflicting advice of the explorer Stefansson on the one hand and of his civil servants Pope and Christie on the other, Meighen had yielded to his official counsellors. In effect, cooler heads had prevailed and Stefansson's hopes that the Canadian government would underwrite his scheme had been thwarted.

The Department of External Affairs and its attitude were not solely responsible for scuttling Stefansson's project. There was another factor, much more difficult to pin down, but, nevertheless, present in the hearts and minds of some Canadian government officials. Stefansson had raised strong personal doubts and hostilities to himself early in the game, perhaps unwarranted, but certainly a result of the 1913-18 expedition. His forceful methods, his reputed publicity-seeking, and, indeed, his unpredictable nature inspired much disgust and some resentment on the part of important individuals in government. Even Harkin, whom Stefansson later acknowledged as a strong supporter of his cause,²⁴ had severe misgivings about the adventurer. On March 2, a day after Meighen's note, Harkin was moved to advise his superior that, since Stefansson was "an exceedingly difficult man to handle," the Department of the Interior should guard against antagonizing him at all costs and make every effort to humour him.²⁵ He even suggested that it would be wise to inform Stefansson that he was the prime candidate to command a secret expedition currently being planned as a means of asserting Canada's sovereignty over the northern archipelago. Stefansson had been lobbying for this appointment since his

²²Meighen to Stefansson, March 1, 1921, M.G. 26, I, vol. 13, file 7, fol. 007419.

²³Christie to Meighen, Feb. 28, 1921, *ibid.*, fol. 007421.

²⁴Stefansson, *Adventure*, p. 78.

²⁵J. B. Harkin to W. W. Cory, March 2, 1921, R.G. 15, A 2, vol. 1.

return in 1918, and this prize might serve to appease him for the frustration of his hopes for Wrangel Island. In fact, the rumoured appointment could be used to retain Stefansson's friendship until this expedition was under way, then he should be sent north "as soon as possible where he would not be able to damage the Canadian cause."

Actually, the government was proposing to place the expedition either under Stefansson or under the British polar explorer, Sir Ernest Shackleton; and Harkin expressed fears as to Stefansson's reactions which serve as an eloquent commentary on the attitude even a sympathetic member of the administration held towards Stefansson:

There is a grave probability that if any aid or recognition is given the Shackleton expedition either (or both) the United States and Denmark may receive advance information from Stefansson . . . because Shackleton proposes to explore the identical regions that Stefansson also proposes to explore. Stefansson was the first person to specifically call attention to the weakness of Canada's claim to the Northern Islands. No one else is more familiar with the weakness of our case. He is aware of Canada's plan for remedying that weakness. He therefore is in a position to ruin the Canadian scheme by tipping off the facts to the United States, or Denmark, or in fact any other country that might have ambitions to acquire new territory. Stefansson is a Canadian in the sense that he was born in Canada but that is all. It would therefore be unwise to bank on his Canadian loyalty too much. The Canadian expedition has been developed in the line of keeping him with us through self-interest.²⁶

Plainly, Ottawa was being indulgent towards Stefansson but nothing he could say or do would allay the deep mistrust of him exhibited behind his back. So unsure was Ottawa of entrusting another expedition to Stefansson, and so apprehensive was the government about giving the command to Shackleton that the cabinet split, and the only solution was to cancel the planned expedition outright. This profound mistrust, this personal dislike, obviously doomed Stefansson's dreams for official Canadian support from the beginning.

But Stefansson was not the man to be frustrated by any government. Checked in his first plan, he secretly set about securing Wrangel Island as a private enterprise in hopes of forcing the Canadian government into accepting its responsibility. To achieve these ends the seemingly harmless Stefansson Arctic Exploration and Development Company, a Canadian company, obtained incorporation on June 23, 1921. Stefansson had raised some money and enlisted four young men as his agents—Alan Crawford, a University of Toronto student and son of a professor there, and three eager, devoted, and experienced Americans—to carry out the company's prime objective, the occupation of Wrangel Island. Crawford, the Canadian, was chosen nominal leader of the expedition because Stefansson was afraid that the undertaking would not be considered British unless a British subject were

²⁶*Ibid.*

at the helm.²⁷ Later, when the time came to apply for government backing, Stefansson was to assert that patriotism and the empire were always uppermost in his mind,²⁸ that his mission was to show the Canadian government the error of its ways. Charges that he hoped to acquire a lease to the island with a view to subletting were unfounded, he asserted. His development company was, in effect, a front "to camouflage our real plans." He had talked of commercial development only to allay suspicions.²⁹

This, however, was not the entire truth. For all intents and purposes Stefansson had given up the life of an active explorer. The Canadian government had dashed his hopes of leading another expedition. Since Stefansson's income now was largely derived from public lectures and royalties from his books, and because his Hudson's Bay Reindeer Company was faring poorly, it would not be at all surprising that he should have been thinking in terms of a good investment for the future. Indeed, to his good and trusted friend, Orville Wright, he would speculate that he could "sublet the island to some fur company for enough to get a handsome annual return on the money so far invested."³⁰

By occupying Wrangel Island with an unofficial party Stefansson was following out both his hopes for private gain and the best strategic plan for gaining official support for his enterprise. As he suggested to a correspondent at this time the main idea in sending the men to Wrangel Island was to establish the fact of British, as well as Canadian, occupation of the territory;³¹ therein, he hoped he would be rewarded:

This would give me a chance to say to the British Government that but for my occupation of the island it might next year have fallen into the hands of either Japan or Russia and that they should, therefore in gratitude to me give me a lease on the island. I have no doubt this argument will work, for Sir Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador, has already told me that it seems to him reasonable and that he knows the temper of the present British Government is such that they will be ready to recognize the validity of exactly that kind of argument.³²

Stefansson was determined to secure the island for himself and his company no matter what the circumstances. He transmitted private orders to Crawford on August 15, 1921, that the island should be

²⁷Stefansson, *Adventure*, p. 77.

²⁸"Statement by Vilhjalmur Stefansson Regarding Men Now in Danger on Wrangel Island" (draft copy), Aug. 8, 1922, Wrangel Island, main file.

²⁹Stefansson, *Adventure*, p. 88; cf. Stefansson to O. S. Finnie (draft copy), March 16, 1923, *ibid.*

³⁰Stefansson to Orville Wright (draft copy), Aug. 24, 1922, Katherine Wright, 1925 file, Stefansson Collection.

³¹Stefansson to Dr. George Jennings (draft copy), Aug. 30, 1921, Wrangel Island, main file.

³²*Ibid.*

claimed "in the name of King and Empire," as a continuation of the "right to the island already established by the Stefansson Canadian Arctic Expedition of 1913-18. . . ." ³³ The flag raising, photos, and deposition of a record of the event, he warned Crawford, "should be done *no matter if men of our or any other nations are already on the island*" ³⁴ for Stefansson had to think of his business interests too.

Stefansson's junior partners fulfilled this task immediately after the *Silver Wave* deposited them on Wrangel Island, September 16, 1921. But in carrying out Stefansson's bidding Crawford was indiscreet. He raised the British flag in front of the predominantly American boat crew, who returned to Nome charging they had been duped. During the winter of 1921-22 the grumblings of irate Alaskans to the American State Department reached the ears of the *New York Times*. ³⁵ Stefansson thereupon announced the news of the "adventure" in the *Times* before any other versions could cloud the issue. His report was soon followed by American press notices that an agitated State Department was planning to claim the island, but they remained only rumours. The entrepreneur remained confident, knowing his disciples had been safely in occupation of the island for the past six months. In effect, he was the master of Wrangel Island.

By this time the Canadian government had changed hands, Meighen having suffered defeat at the hands of Mackenzie King. For Stefansson here was a new opportunity, a new man to impress, another chance to gain official Canadian support. On March 11, 1922, just before the story broke in the *New York Times*, Stefansson wrote to Mackenzie King to emphasize "the need of adopting at once a definite policy towards the polar regions in general and in particular towards Wrangel Island." ³⁶ He called King's attention to the fact that the latest maps issued by the Intelligence Division of the United States indicated that the northern boundary of Canada was at Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait, and that, by inference, the islands north of that did not belong to Canada. Even the islands that had been discovered by him were Canada's by right of discovery alone, but this was not enough. According to Stefansson's understanding of international law, Canada's claims to the northern archipelago would lapse by June 1922; the 1914 claim to Wrangel Island, he contended, had already lapsed in 1919. ³⁷ He pleaded with the government to abandon its passive reliance upon sectoral claims and to begin a new and vigorous policy of actual occupation. To illustrate the necessity for actual occupation, Stefansson envisioned the probable fate of Wrangel Island had he not had the

³³Stefansson to Crawford (draft copy), Aug. 15, 1922, Wrangel Island, main file.

³⁴*Ibid.* My italics.

³⁵Stefansson, *Adventure*, pp. 118-23.

³⁶Stefansson to Mackenzie King, March 11, 1922, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 86, fol. 69270.

³⁷*Ibid.*, fol. 69271.

foresight to occupy it: "I take it for certain that had the Japanese moved in to Wrangel Island and had we then protested, an international court would have awarded the island to the Japanese in view of the fact that our claims had lapsed and we had shown no definite intention of confirming our rights by continuous occupation."³⁸ Fortunately, however, the Stefansson Arctic Development Company had saved the day. But now it was in dire straits, for it had acted privately and was at the mercy of the American State Department which might at any time intervene on behalf of the Alaskans whose interests his associates had challenged. The project needed the cloak of official protection, recognition of the deed by the Canadian government.

Mackenzie King, new to his role as prime minister, was hardly in a position to give a forthright answer. He turned to more experienced heads for advice. What should he do? The venerable Sir Joseph Pope indicated that the views of his department remained unaltered; the quicker the administration dissociated itself from such a "far fetched claim" and such "fantastic pretensions," the better.³⁹

Nevertheless, King, along with the Minister and Deputy Minister of the Interior, Charles Stewart and W. W. Cory respectively, and the director of the Northwest Territories, O. S. Finnie, met with Stefansson on May 2, 1922, and the conversations were sufficiently encouraging that on the following day Stefansson submitted a formal proposal regarding Wrangel Island. Making no mention of compensation or a cash settlement, he asked that an exclusive, long-term lease be granted to his company or to himself.⁴⁰ In view of this encouragement from such influential officials, coupled with the knowledge that a lease would be forthcoming within twenty-four hours after receipt of word from the government to go ahead,⁴¹ Stefansson felt he was about to achieve his goal. To all appearances the new Canadian government had reversed its predecessor's stand. Or was Ottawa playing the same old game until the issue could, in some way, be resolved without alienating Stefansson or jeopardizing the international situation?

In actual fact, the attitude of the Department of the Interior at this time was essentially the same as that of External Affairs and for basically the same reasons.⁴² All agreed that *if and when* the government gave the go-ahead they would not oppose the issuance of the lease, but that they considered such a development regrettable. Once

³⁸*Ibid.*, fol. 69274.

³⁹Pope to Mackenzie King, March 21, 1922, M.G. 26, J 4, Wrangel Island File.

⁴⁰Stefansson to Finnie, May 3, 1922, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, File 1005-5-1, Wrangel Island, U.S.S.R., General File (hereafter N.A.N.R.). The Department has now assumed the title of Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

⁴¹Alfred J. T. Taylor to Stefansson, June 26, 1922, Wrangel Island, main file.

⁴²J. D. Craig to Hensley R. Holmden, April 5, 1923, N.A.N.R.

the die was cast, however, the government would have to stand behind the act in every way. If such a contingency arose, the Department of the Interior claimed that it should "be provided with the funds sufficient to complete immediately its program for maintaining Canadian sovereignty in the north instead of spreading it over a number of years as is the present intention."⁴³ Yet, like the Department of External Affairs, this department too was supremely confident that the present administration knew its true feelings and would never allow such a folly to transpire.

Then the impossible happened. During a debate on the Naval Service estimates, on May 12, 1922, Meighen, now leader of the opposition, questioned the government on its policy toward Wrangel Island:

Mr. Meighen: Will the Ministers state what is the policy of the Government towards the Northern islands, with particular reference to those covered by the Stefansson Expedition 1913-1918, laid claim to on behalf of Canada, and to Wrangel Island.

Mr. Graham [Minister of Militia and Defence]: It is a delicate matter to state the policy of the Government on that question.

Mr. Meighen: Has the Government any policy?

Mr. Fielding [Minister of Finance]: What we have we hold.

Mr. Meighen: I would recommend the Government never to fall away from that principle.

Mr. Graham: Some people have failed to do that.

Mr. Meighen: The Government failed once, but I think if they had the same thing to do over again they would act differently.

Mr. Graham: The old Government.

Mr. Meighen: Yes, the old Government my hon. friend was in. It is well known there is a dispute as to Wrangel Island. The question of the proper attitude of Canada towards the Island is doubtless before the Government. This vote has to do with these matters and I am asking if the Government is in a position to say what its views are with relation to the retention of Wrangel Island or the continuance of Canada's claim thereto; and the same words apply to the other islands covered by the expedition.

Mr. Graham: The policy of the Government, as I understand it, is as just expressed by the Minister of Finance—what we have we hold.

Mr. Meighen: Well, have we Wrangel Island?

Mr. Graham: Yes, as I understand it, and we propose to retain it.

Mr. Fielding: We had it in December, and we have not let it go.⁴⁴

The fat was in the fire; the government had made its policy statement before the House of Commons. Whether King had anticipated such a turn of events is not clear, but he heaped coals upon the fire, for he was now forced to back his ministers and declare that "the Government certainly maintains the position that Wrangel Island is part of

⁴³Craig to Finnie, May 10, 1922, April 9, 1923, N.A.N.R.

⁴⁴Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, May 12, 1922, p. 1751.

the Property of this country.”⁴⁵ By so doing the government hoped to outmanœuvre the opposition and to escape the charge that the Liberals, as usual, had failed to uphold national and imperial interests. But the random remark was to leave responsible civil servants muttering incoherently.

It seems reasonable to assume, however, that King did not mean what he had said in parliament, for his government took no action to give Stefansson his lease. Instead, Stefansson was kept at bay until King could extricate himself and his government. Yet King's statement had created an official position and Canadian policy began to encounter international opposition. On July 15, 1922, an embarrassed Colonial Office forwarded a note from the Soviet government agent in the United Kingdom to Governor General Byng. The Soviet note, dated June 2, was obviously inspired by King's declaration. The Russian government appeared disturbed, intimating that Wrangel Island had been discovered by a Russian officer in the 1820's, that the Russian flag had been hoisted there when a hydrographic expedition (1910-15) had been sent out by the Russian admiralty, and that, in reality, there never had been any question but that Wrangel Island was a Russian possession.⁴⁶ For its part, the Colonial Office expressed serious concern over the Canadian position and sought an explicit policy statement.

Mackenzie King was perturbed, not sure of himself or of the position his government should maintain. Recant, or follow through and fight—either course was politically explosive. King inquired anew “whether any action on his part was required and, if so, what step should be taken next.”⁴⁷ The Departments of External Affairs and the Interior made their intransigence known. Christie, sensing that the government's hand was being forced by an “impudent” adventurer, explained that his department's negative attitude was shared by others. The Department of Trade and Commerce had never supported the idea as economically feasible. As for the island's strategic possibilities, neither the Air Board nor the Naval Service Department had, in his opinion, recommended the acquisition of the island.⁴⁸ The naval strategists, like their colleagues in External Affairs, were aware of the changing power balance that was taking place in the Far East. To recognize Russia as owner of the island might contribute to the restoration of the balance of power there. The United States should be denied the establishment of substantial influence and advantage in the Siberian region; at the

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶Pope to Mackenzie King, April 5, 1923, M.G. 26, J 4, Wrangel Island File.

⁴⁷Christie to Mackenzie King, Aug. 9, 1922, *ibid.*

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

same time Russian interest might be allowed to grow in the northwest Pacific to partially offset a truculent Japan. Christie could even foresee American support for Russia⁴⁹ but for different reasons. Washington, no doubt, would reason that if Canada acquired the island such action would enhance the British strategic position and, by association, that of its former ally, Japan. The United States might therefore feel pressed to prefer a claim. However, a hostile United States was the last thing Britain desired or Canada could afford, so ". . . the matter should be dropped altogether, and . . . the Government should decline to give either support or recognition to Mr. Stefansson's venture."

Meanwhile, T. L. Cory, legal adviser of the Northwest Territories Branch of the Department of the Interior, also supported this opinion though he was constrained to advise King that Canada's claim was in accordance with existing international law: "If, for example, colonists establishing themselves in an unappropriated country declare it to belong to the state of which they are members [,] a simple adoption of their act by the state is enough to complete its title, because by adoption the fact of possession and assertion of intention to possess, upon [which] the right of property by occupation is grounded, are brought fully together."⁵⁰ This precept, Cory acknowledged, could give Canada the best legal claim to Wrangel Island. Cory went on, however, to emphasize the folly of pressing a Canadian claim and the possible disadvantages Canada and the empire would derive from its acquisition. By claiming the island Canada would anger the United States which, most likely, would "rush a party into the Arctic and settle on some of our Northern Islands in retaliation" before Canada could strengthen her tenuous hold upon the Arctic archipelago.

King returned Cory's memorandum without comment, ignored the British query, and proceeded naïvely to advance a worried Stefansson \$3,000 solely for the relief of his expedition, without any idea of giving formal support to the enterprise.⁵¹ Stefansson, apprehensive about the condition of his party on Wrangel Island, had petitioned the King administration for \$5,000 to cover the chartering of a ship and supplies. His own money and credit exhausted, he hoped to secure an advance, "details of repayment, etc., to be settled later."⁵² The government was banking on the probability that Stefansson, who had sunk an enormous amount of his own money into the scheme, would thankfully take this scrap, remove his men from the island, and drop the matter in grati-

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰T. L. Cory to W. W. Cory, June 15, 1922, N.A.N.R., as cited in W. E. Hall, *International Law*, pp. 102ff.

⁵¹W. W. Cory to Stefansson (telegram), Aug. 12, 1922, N.A.N.R.

⁵²"Statement Regarding Men In Danger on Wrangel Island," Aug. 8, 1922, Wrangel Island, main file.

tude to the government's humanitarian act. This proved to be an error in judgment, for Stefansson could work wonders even with the slightest of materials. The relief ship, the *Teddy Bear*, only sailed in September and thus failed to reach its objective because of the lateness of the season. Yet the American State Department was aroused because Stefansson advertised the journey not as a rescue mission at all but as evidence of the Canadian government's determination to aid Stefansson's occupation. Stefansson always maintained that the ship had been a "supply ship"⁵³ and that the \$3,000 allowance was "to help us continue the Wrangel Island enterprise."⁵⁴

Because Stefansson took such pains to make it appear that his enterprise implied formal recognition on the part of Canada, the United States decided to enter the fray. On September 27, 1922, the United States ambassador to Great Britain forwarded a memorandum to the Foreign Office dealing with the "national status" of the island. This American note did not advance any specific claim but merely reviewed the history of the discovery and exploration of Wrangel Island, significantly emphasizing the American participation in 1881, the fact that the *Karluk's* crew had been rescued by an American vessel, and finally, that Crawford's crew, which included three Americans to begin with, had been transported to the Arctic island by the American sloop *Silver Wave*.⁵⁵ The American note came at the height of the Chanak crisis and was put aside; the Colonial Office did not inform Canadian officials of this development until the Chanak affair had been swept under the carpet. On November 4 the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, indicated to Lord Byng that consideration of the status of Wrangel Island might be warranted.⁵⁶ Finally, late in February 1923 the impatient Colonial Office counselled Byng that Great Britain had to be advised of the official Canadian attitude toward the island.⁵⁷ King could not afford to procrastinate any longer. So once again the Prime Minister turned to his ministers and their deputies for a definite answer.

Pope, along with Loring Christie and Charles Stewart, thought it best that the Colonial Office be advised that Canada did not consider it expedient to put forth any specific claim.⁵⁸ There, it was hoped, the matter would end, to the satisfaction of both the Soviet Union and the

⁵³Memorandum by Stefansson, March 16, 1923, N.A.N.R.

⁵⁴Stefansson to Finnie, March 14, 1923, *ibid.*

⁵⁵U.S. Memorandum, Sept. 27, 1922 enclosed in a despatch from Devonshire to Byng, Nov. 4, 1922, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 85, fol. 68853-54.

⁵⁶Devonshire to Byng, Nov. 4, 1922, *ibid.*, vol. 85, fol. 68852.

⁵⁷O. D. Skelton, acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to A. F. Sladen, Governor General's secretary, April 9, 1923, *ibid.*, vol. 103, fol. 80358.

⁵⁸Pope to King, March 22, 1923, M.G. 26, J 4, Wrangel Island File.

United States. But this unequivocal advice was not adopted. The persistent Stefansson appeared able to convince the Canadian cabinet that, strategically, the empire as a whole would gain immeasurably. Byng, on behalf of the administration, was advised to inform the Colonial Office that Canada would not press a claim, but it was hoped that Stefansson would be allowed to make a personal statement about the strategic importance of Wrangel to imperial authorities.⁵⁹ The explorer himself had recently been stressing this possibility and the Canadian government took advantage of this lever. The Colonial Office had never even hinted at an interest in the matter but King turned the tables to his government's advantage by arguing that the question was really an imperial rather than a Canadian one. Thus he hoped to rid himself of a persistent and troublesome individual and place the onus for the retention or abandonment of Wrangel Island upon British authorities. Also, by making the matter an imperial affair, King ensured that the acquisition of Wrangel Island would not be a Canadian action and hence need not occasion retaliation by the United States, Denmark, or any other country with respect to the northern islands claimed by the dominion.

Once Devonshire, probably assuming that authorities in London were more competent to handle the problem, accepted Byng's proposal that Stefansson be allowed to cross the Atlantic,⁶⁰ Stefansson's pet project gained another lease on life. King could now wash his hands of the affair, feeling perhaps that by dumping Stefansson and his problem in the British lap he was in small measure avenging himself on Britain for the inconvenience of Chanak.

The spring and summer of 1923 brought two new developments in the controversy: first, the partial Americanization of Vilhjalmur Stefansson; second, a disposition on the part of Great Britain to assert its rights to the island.

By way of insurance Stefansson had approached various Washington officials in March 1923. His attempts to influence the State Department were a failure,⁶¹ but his friend and schoolmate, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, turned a sympathetic ear, and through Roosevelt Stefansson was enabled to meet several American admirals.⁶² Of these, the most enthusiastic was Admiral Moffett, Chief of the United States Bureau of Aeronautics. Wrote Moffett, "I am familiar with what you have written and what you have done in regard to Wrangel Island. I'm only sorry that one of

⁵⁹Skelton to Sladen, April 9, 1923, *ibid.*, J 1, vol. 103, fol. 80358.

⁶⁰Devonshire to Byng, May 11, 1923, R.G. 7, G 21, vol. 411, no. 10045.

⁶¹Stefansson to Orville Wright, April 18, 1923 (draft copy), Katherine Wright, 1923 file.

⁶²Stefansson to Sir Samuel Hoare, June 28, 1923, Wrangel Island, 1925 file.

my fellow countrymen did not have the vision to do what you did. I am in entire agreement as to the importance of Wrangel Island and its future use.”⁶³ Stefansson was to receive similar flattering remarks in conversation with such eminent advocates of air power as General Billy Mitchell.⁶⁴ The explorer was delighted by this support, but it placed him in a rather awkward position. As he confided to his loyal friend, Orville Wright, if he had had “any notion the Americans wanted Wrangel Island, I should probably have gone to them rather than the Canadians,” especially after the Canadian authorities had sloughed the matter off to the British.⁶⁵ Now, he informed Wright, he would have to be content with seeking out responsible and influential Americans in Washington to aid with the acquisition of Wrangel Island, should the British renege.⁶⁶

Though Stefansson doubted the American interest in developing the island, he strove to interest a general board of the United States Navy on May 7, 1923, when he was invited to appear before it. When queried as to the political and commercial possibilities of Wrangel Island and the island’s possible use as a stepping stone for an Arctic air route, Stefansson handled such questions adroitly. He pointed out, somewhat inaccurately, that the 1914 expedition which had raised the flag on Wrangel had been commissioned to take possession on behalf of the King of England and reaffirm prior British rights to the island, but that the effect of such claims had lapsed. He belittled the argument that the 1914 claims had been reaffirmed by the 1921 expedition: “The boys ran up the British flag, but I don’t think that counts.”⁶⁷ Stefansson went on to relate how disheartened he was that some Americans, and noticeably the Hearst papers, had charged him with grabbing American territory: “. . . I have lived in the United States since I was a year old, and it never had occurred to me that I was doing anything with which Americans would find fault. I thought Americans would prefer it to be British rather than Japanese.” Stefansson promised the Navy Board that he would do what he could to acquire Wrangel Island for the United States, should the British relinquish their prior rights. “Of course, I don’t own it and I cannot give it away, but there might be something I can do.”

The Arctic explorer and adventurer had thus found himself, in his

⁶³Cited in *ibid.*

⁶⁴Stefansson to Orville Wright, April 18, 1923 (draft copy), Katherine Wright, 1923 file.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷“Substance of Remarks Made Before the General Board of the U.S. Navy by Vilhjalmur Stefansson,” May 7, 1923 (copy), Canadian government, 1923 file, Stefansson Collection.

own words, "trying to cram down the throats of the British something they do not want and for which the Americans show at least a reasonable appetite."⁶⁸ It was to be one of his policies henceforth to attach the island to the United States, whose claim, in his opinion, was second to Britain's. This is not to suggest that Stefansson ever thought to undermine possible British rights, for nothing is further from the truth. All Stefansson was really worried about and hoped to insure against was a possible and deliberate abandonment by the British of Wrangel Island to the Russians, which would also have betrayed the United States' claim. It would also have destroyed his personal enterprise.

Such was Stefansson's position as stated to Devonshire during his visit to England:

Although I am a British subject by birth, I have lived in the United States all my life. . . . I know how anxious America is to get Wrangel Island. While I want to evade nothing in my urging that the Empire shall continue possession, I want to urge also that we publish also no decision which will lessen their chances to make good their claims. . . . It would seem an exceedingly uncomfortable situation for me personally, to have spent all I had and all I could borrow in making sure of our rights on Wrangel Island, if the result were to profit us not at all and in some way injure the United States, which country . . . next to the British Empire—I should have liked to serve.⁶⁹

Even as he was writing, the British government was on the brink of reversing its stand. The Foreign Office may have continued in its doubts, but British military authorities had reappraised the situation and reached a more favourable conclusion. By the Washington Conference of 1922 the United States had been placed in a weakened position *vis-à-vis* Japan in the Pacific. Great Britain, too, had been adversely affected, for not only had she lost a powerful ally in Japan but she too was handicapped by the restrictive nature of a number of the treaties. British air and naval authorities, like their American counterparts, were intent upon finding any toehold in the Far East which would offset their weakened position. Might Wrangel Island not, in some limited fashion, bolster the British strategic position?

Stefansson arrived in England convinced that he must convert the British strategists and politicians to his way of thinking. He began his campaign by contacting experts in both the Admiralty and Air Ministry; it was from these meetings that Stefansson became intimately acquainted with the energetic Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, and Colonel L. S. Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, a staunch imperialist.⁷⁰ Both individuals, it seems, took Stefansson's cause under

⁶⁸Stefansson to Katherine Wright, May 9, 1923, Katherine Wright, 1925 file.

⁶⁹Stefansson to Devonshire, June 9, 1923, D-General, 1923 file, Stefansson Collection.

⁷⁰Stefansson, *Adventure*, pp. 144-9.

their wing and were instrumental in guiding British policy in this instance. The results were not disappointing.

The Admiralty concluded that, although Wrangel was not of great immediate value, either strategically or commercially, "the island is the only territory in a vast area to which Great Britain has any claim, and the Admiralty considers that it would be short sighted policy to surrender our claims to it."⁷¹ Not a strong recommendation for retention but, nevertheless, a reassuring one. For its part, the Air Ministry was of a similar opinion: "From a service point of view the Air Staff does not consider that Wrangel Island can be of value at present, but . . . they feel that its retention would prove a valuable adjunct to the development of British air policy."⁷² This conclusion was reached after a number of factors had been reviewed by the Air Staff. It decided that regular meteorological observations from a station in the vicinity would be of assistance to long-range weather forecasting, particularly for Canada; in addition, the establishment of a wireless telegraph would further aid meteorological reporting and assist the navigation of aircraft using any projected polar route: "It is almost unnecessary to add that the station would be of inestimable value, if not actually indispensable to the working of an air route through the Arctic Circle." With the development of long-range heavier-than-air craft, the report pointed out, the island could serve as a maintenance and re-fuelling depot. The Air Staff, like the visionary Stefansson, shared the conviction that a polar air route, say from London to Tokyo, would cut flying distances by as much as three thousand miles.

But these optimistic responses met with firm opposition from the Foreign Office which naturally examined the problem from a political point of view. For one thing Mackenzie King's administration had finally turned thumbs down on Stefansson indicating Canadian disinterest in the affair. Also, on May 25, two days after Stefansson had set foot on English soil, the Soviet government had sent a formal note to the Foreign Office. Although the issue had been raised at an earlier date, the Soviet government felt constrained at this time "to approach the British Government requesting it to use its good services with the Canadian Government in order to put an end to these raids."⁷³ The agent, a member of the Russian Trade Delegation, also informed

⁷¹Cited in a Foreign Office Memorandum on the History, Value and Ownership of Wrangel Island, June 2, 1923, Foreign Office document #A 3956/750/45, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 100, fol. 78267.

⁷²Secret Air Staff memorandum on the incorporation of Wrangel Island within the British Empire, June 1, 1923 (copy), Air Ministry, British, 1923 file, Stefansson Collection.

⁷³Russian note of May 25, 1923 (copy), enclosed in a despatch from Devonshire to Byng, Aug. 20, 1923, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 103, fol. 79827.

Britain that the Soviet Union was adopting measures "for the prevention in future of the violation of its sovereignty over the island in question." With the Baldwin administration toying with the idea of recognizing the Red régime and establishing trade relations, the Foreign Office thought it quite unwise to do anything to upset the U.S.S.R. The Soviet note was followed by an American inquiry on June 4 which, although no American claim was enunciated, made it clear to the Foreign Office that the State Department was not indifferent to the fate of Wrangel Island.⁷⁴ The question of Wrangel Island therefore was referred to the whole cabinet where it would undergo close scrutiny.

Realizing the weakness of his position Stefansson set out in earnest to educate and convert unimpressed or hostile members of the British ministry.⁷⁵ Yet for all his endeavours Stefansson could not win the full backing of the British cabinet. From his partisans Stefansson learned that those ministers who had an opinion to express all supported his views, although they wished to move cautiously in view of Canadian "lukewarmness."⁷⁶ Out of consideration for Canadian sensibilities, as well as to forestall unfriendly action on the part of the U.S.S.R., Lord Robert Cecil suggested that it would be best "to continue occupying quietly as we have done—privately."⁷⁷ Stefansson's plans had been dealt a heavy blow and he knew he could only accept the cabinet's decision or face outright rejection. The Baldwin administration would not even go as far as the Canadian government had done in the year previous, for, warned by that experiment, it refused to advance him any money for another "rescue" mission for fear that Stefansson would try to turn it into an official imperial expedition. By the end of July, Stefansson knew he had to "go it alone," a prospect that his combative pride and stubbornness welcomed.

The British cabinet's decision was vindicated within two months. The British had been anxious to ascertain the United States' reaction in the event the United Kingdom was to press a claim.⁷⁸ It was thought too risky to broach the question directly to the State Department; instead a number of discreet and unofficial inquiries were made. On August 15, the British charge d'affaires in Washington, H. G. Chilton, reported that the American government would protest and that the United States were "considering the possibility of creating an air base

⁷⁴American note, June 4, 1923 (copy), enclosed in *ibid.*, fol. 79828.

⁷⁵Stefansson to Hoare, June 28, 1923, Wrangel Island, 1925 file.

⁷⁶Stefansson to Taylor, Aug. 15, 1923 (draft copy), Wrangel Island, main file; cf. Stefansson diary, Aug. 1, 1923, Stefansson Collection.

⁷⁷Stefansson diary, July 25, 1923.

⁷⁸Curzon to Chilton, Aug. 10, 1923 (copy), enclosed in a despatch from Devonshire to Byng, Aug. 25, 1923, M.G. 26, J-1, vol. 103, fol. 79834.

on Wrangel Island."⁷⁹ Still later, on September 21, 1923, Group Captain Christie, the British air attaché in Washington, reported to Chilton that

. . . at your request I have made one or two private inquiries amongst Army and Navy Officers, one of whom had been recently in personal touch with Stefansson both here and in London [presumably Archibald Roosevelt] and I gained the impression that the British-Canadian claims to Wrangel Island are considered very weak. Apart from the earlier landing of the U.S.S. *Corwin*, American whalers are stated to have used the Island from time to time in recent years; the fact that Stefansson's party of occupation consisted of 3 Americans and one Canadian is also being emphasized. One informant indicated to me that suggestions had been made within Navy Circles that the British-Canadian claim should be supported in return for the occupation of certain small islands outside the Treaty Zone in the Pacific by the U.S.A. which might be of strategic value to the U.S. Navy, but that this scheme had not materialized owing to the attitude of the Japanese. Apart from any political considerations, the opinion was fully expressed that Wrangel Island from the geographical aspect obviously belongs to Russian Siberia.

I have gained the impression from my conversations that [while] the U.S. Government would contest a British-Canadian claim, [it] would not, however, press its own case, but would probably support Russian Sovereignty. I imagine U.S. Naval officers, who still harbour suspicion of cooperative intentions on the part of Great Britain with Japan against the U.S.A. in case of war, would probably point out the threat which a British Air Base established on Wrangel Island would present against American Naval Bases and wireless stations in Alaska and Aleutian Islands, and against the operations of the U.S. fleet in the North Pacific Ocean.

It is not unlikely that the incident might be followed by American occupation of some other islands to the immediate North of the Canadian Dominions, for instance in the neighbourhood of the Parry Islands. In this connection, General Mitchell once dropped the remark to me that one of the American Geographic societies has proposed a scheme to him for a survey of the Arctic islands in the North of Canada by aircraft.⁸⁰

Thus, for Great Britain to do anything to encourage official support would be to stir up a hornet's nest in Washington. The only diplomatic action the British had taken was to inform the U.S.S.R. that Stefansson's relief attempt was private and unofficial, that the question of ownership of the island was in no way raised, and that any Soviet attempt to interfere with the rescue would be frowned upon by Great Britain.⁸¹

Stefansson, forced to proceed alone, eventually scraped up enough money from private subscribers in Britain to pay for a relief expedition—comprising twelve Alaskan Eskimos and, significantly, one

⁷⁹Chilton to Curzon, Aug. 15, 1923 (copy), enclosed in *ibid.*, fol. 79840.

⁸⁰Christie to Chilton, Sept. 21, 1923 (copy), enclosed in a despatch from Devonshire to Byng, Oct. 12, 1923, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 103, fol. 80047-48.

⁸¹Foreign Office note to its agent in Moscow, Sept. 1, 1923, enclosed in a despatch from Devonshire to Byng, Sept. 17, 1923, N.A.N.R.

American—who were to continue the private occupation of the island by his company. On August 3 the *Donaldson* departed from Nome to deposit this second colony on Wrangel Island. It returned to Nome on August 31 bringing bad news: the party of fourteen had been landed but of the original colonizers only the Eskimo seamstress, Ada Black-jack, was found alive. The British government grew totally disenchanted with the whole episode and considered itself lucky that it had not been an official party to the disaster. Almost overnight Stefansson's "friendly arctic" had become "The Unfriendly Arctic."⁸² The Canadian government in particular came under fire, for a large segment of the press and Crawford's parents held the government, along with Stefansson, responsible for the death of young Crawford. The aggrieved parents received front-page coverage as they proceeded to attack the stunned Stefansson.

Now that his activities were coming under fire from all sides, Stefansson knew he was fighting a losing battle. Baldwin's administration could not be drawn into further comment and it wisely ignored his pleas for compensation. He found little consolation in unofficial reports that the United States had reluctantly entered the squabble: "If the foreign departments of the United States and Great Britain were to flip a coin for the possession of Wrangel Island, I should not care much whether it turned up heads or tails. I have done all I can for the Empire and now it is up to others."⁸³ But this was only a temporary reaction; though Stefansson may have claimed it was up to others now that Great Britain had given him the cold shoulder, he again attempted to persuade the State Department to underwrite the enterprise.

Stefansson's sale of his company to Carl Lomen, the reindeer king of Alaska, was certainly an attempt to involve the United States and to strengthen the American case. Equally, it was a way to relinquish his responsibilities, and let someone else shoulder the burden which had placed Stefansson on the verge of bankruptcy.⁸⁴ As the Arctic explorer explained to his friend and associate, Lomen, the sale would spare him another year of negotiations and would lead to eventual American ownership of Wrangel Island.⁸⁵ Financially exhausted and

⁸²*Saturday Night*, Sept. 15, 1923.

⁸³Stefansson to Amery, Sept. 5, 1923 (draft copy), British Admiralty, 1923 file, Stefansson Collection.

⁸⁴Stefansson to Taylor, June 3, 1924 (draft copy), Wrangel Island, main file. By this time Stefansson was deeply in debt for, in addition to the \$17,000 he had sunk into the Wrangel Island promotion, he received news that his Hudson's Bay Reindeer Company had fallen through. The Lapp herders he had hired for the Baffin Island project pulled up stakes and returned to Norway. *Discovery*, p. 267.

⁸⁵Stefansson to Carl Lomen, April 29, 1924 (draft copy), Lomen, 1924 file, Stefansson Collection.

weary, Stefansson relinquished his company's interests in May 1924.⁸⁶ Now it was up to the reindeer king to carry the torch. In the end Lomen's efforts, during the fall of 1924 and in the spring of 1925, to persuade the State Department to take action were stopped dead in their tracks.⁸⁷

In any case, the fate of Wrangel Island never had rested with the United States. As long as nothing overt was done to claim the island by the British or Canadian governments the American government seemed content to leave the problem alone. The Anglo-Soviet conference, held in London in July and August 1924, brought about a final diplomatic solution. Prior to that conference the Foreign Office had canvassed the various interested departments once more, and they reiterated that Wrangel Island was of little strategic or economic significance and that "His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to adopt an attitude calculated to create difficulties with the Soviet Government, unless substantial interests were at stake."⁸⁸ This was a recognition on the part of Great Britain that the U.S.S.R. now had sufficient power to force a decision on the island. The British position was made known to Canada, and presumably to the United States. The Colonial Secretary simply inquired whether the King administration had "any observations to offer" but he knew in advance what sort of answer he would receive. Canadian officialdom was sick of the whole issue; Mackenzie King, for his part, had managed to side-step for two years. On July 18, 1924, the same day that the inquiry was made, Byng hastily, and no doubt with relief, despatched a telegram stating that the British attitude was shared by the Government of Canada.⁸⁹ When the issue did reach the conference table in London, Mr. Ponsonby, in his reply on behalf of the British delegation declared that: "His Britannic Majesty's Government lay no claim to the Island of Wrangel."⁹⁰ To which his Soviet counterpart, Mr. Rakovski, replied: "I am glad that one of the points, although a small point, which caused misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and Great Britain has been removed and I would suggest that this should be recorded in the minutes of the Conference."⁹¹

⁸⁶Stefansson, *Adventure*, p. 300.

⁸⁷Evan E. Young to Leonard Baldwin, Oct. 20, 1924, enclosed in a note from Baldwin to Stefansson, Oct. 20, 1924, General File, 1924, Stefansson Collection, "... the Department does not contemplate making any statement in respect to Wrangel Island."

⁸⁸J. H. Thomas, Colonial Secretary, to Byng, June 18, 1924 (copy), M.G. 26, J 2, vol. 121, fol. 91841-43.

⁸⁹Byng to Thomas, July 18, 1924, *ibid.*, fol. 92015.

⁹⁰Declaration made on behalf of the British Delegation at the Anglo-Soviet Conference, Aug. 6, 1924, copy enclosed in Arnold to Byng, Sept. 10, 1924, M.G. 26, J 1, vol. 122, fol. 92334.

⁹¹*Ibid.*

This pronouncement was made on August 6, 1924. Within three weeks the Russian warship *Red October* was removing the twelve Eskimos and one American who had been making Wrangel Island their home since August 1923. To justify this action the U.S.S.R. claimed that the party had been operating on Russian territory without a licence and without proper authorization.⁹² The American schooner *Herman*, on its way to rescue the party at the identical time, failed in its attempt to reach the island, so an unwanted confrontation between the Russians and the Americans was avoided.⁹³ According to the press, the American vessel had been beaten back by Arctic gales after managing to reach Herald Island, forty miles east of Wrangel. The *Red October* spirited the colonizers to Vladivostock where their American leader, Charles Wells, died from pneumonia.⁹⁴ The Eskimo survivors, eleven in all, eventually were returned to their home in Golovin Bay, seventy-five miles east of Nome.⁹⁵

As a result of this alleged territorial violation, the U.S.S.R. was led on April 15, 1926, to incorporate the sector principle into her own national legislation to protect her Arctic interests, basing the statement upon a Russian imperial decree of September 1916. Wrangel Island became a component part of the U.S.S.R. within the sweeping claim now put forth by the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.:

All discovered lands and islands as well as those that may in the future be discovered, which are not at the date of publication of this decree recognized by the Government of the U.S.S.R. as a territory of a foreign power, are declared to be territories belonging to the U.S.S.R. within the following limits:

In the Northern Arctic Ocean, from the northern coast of the U.S.S.R. up to the North Pole, between the Meridian 320° 4' 35" east longitude from Greenwich, passing along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the Triangulation mark on Kerkursk Cape, and Meridian 168° 49' 30" west longitude from Greenwich passing through the middle of the straight which separates Ratmanov and Kruzenstern of the Diomedé group of islands in the Bering Straits.⁹⁶

⁹²*Toronto Daily Star*, Jan. 22, 1925.

⁹³*New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1924.

⁹⁴*Toronto Daily Star*, Jan. 22, 1925.

⁹⁵*Indianapolis Star*, Feb. 14, 1925. Carl Lomen protested to the State Department, asking it to intervene. However, Evan E. Young of the State Department advised Lomen to file a formal private complaint against the Soviet government protesting the *Red October's* activities. Lomen did so to the tune of \$30,000. It is interesting to note that the United States government, upon the failure of the U.S.S.R. to recognize Lomen's claim, eventually did pay Lomen \$46,630, \$16,630 of which was interest, as compensation for losses incurred in his colonization venture. All one can conclude from this is that the United States had promised Lomen its support but had changed its mind and decided to make up Lomen's loss in recognition of a mistake or failure in policy. Lomen himself reported that the colonization attempt he had adopted from Stefansson had the backing of Secretary of State Hughes: "I had already seen Secretary of States Hughes before we went there, and he urged me to and hold the island." Ralph Brown, "Wrangel Island Has Had Fantastic History," *Anchorage Daily Times*, Feb. 10 and 11, 1960.

⁹⁶From T. A. Taracouzio, *Soviets in the Arctic: An Historical, Economic and Political Study of the Soviet Advance into the Arctic* (New York, 1938), p. 320.

The Soviet sectoral claim, like the Canadian, has never been accorded international recognition. However, since 1926 the Russians, their claims uncontested, have occupied, colonized, and developed Wrangel Island and islands similar to it, to their own benefit. To the Russians the incorporation of Wrangel Island was a stage in the growth of Soviet internal control over the territories of the czars and signalized the frustration of another diabolical capitalist scheme of encirclement.⁹⁷

Though much still remains to be learned about this splendid little affair, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions in terms of British, Canadian, and Arctic diplomacy of the postwar period. Canada, the public pronouncements of the King government assure us, was most anxious to assert her diplomatic autonomy, and Chanak is held up as King's answer to an overbearing and imperially-minded mother country. Yet the Wrangel Island episode of 1921-24 perhaps indicates that in the early years the King autonomist policy was not fully formed and that the King administration to a considerable extent was playing Canada's new role in external affairs by ear.

In contrast with Chanak, when Canada refused to accept a commitment, Wrangel Island initially was a Canadian affair which, having become too hot to handle, was foisted on the Imperial government. Indiscriminate remarks by various Canadian officials, including Mackenzie King, and vigorous efforts by Stefansson had kept the matter in the public eye and caused a flurry of concern among members of the international community. If King had rejected Stefansson's scheme, the matter would quietly have come to an end during the summer of 1922. Instead, the Prime Minister withheld a clear-cut decision until he had roused the ire of the Soviet Union and the apprehensions of the United States. Canada had mishandled the affair and helped to create an international incident.

An embarrassed King government had conveniently turned the tables and had argued that the matter was really an imperial affair. Months earlier, in refusing to co-operate with imperial policy at Chanak, King had implied that the dominion could pass judgment on just what was or was not a Canadian interest and act on that premise. The Wrangel Island controversy extended this principle for the dominion attempted to dictate the course of action Imperial authorities should take—something the British had failed to convince Canada of in September of 1922. For their part, had the British so wanted, they could have declared themselves incompetent to deal with the controversy. One wonders what the Canadian reaction to such a position would have been. Yet the British government had felt duty bound to

⁹⁷M. Velichko, "On Wrangel Island," *Soviet Woman* (1948), pp. 26-8.

relieve the colonials of their predicament, and to act circumspectly, deferring to Canadian views at every step.

Apart from Stefansson, whose reputation, unfortunately, was to suffer—and possibly the Soviet Union—no one really wanted the island and everyone, it seems, was glad to see the last of it. Canada, Great Britain, and the United States were all content to see the island given to Russia, but a peculiar train of events had complicated the matter, breeding apprehension and distrust. Canada, when she did give the matter serious thought, concluded that the island was not worth keeping, since recognition of her claims there would have completely destroyed her still tenuous claims to the Arctic archipelago. For expediency's sake, then, the Anglo-Canadian claim was dropped in favour of the principle of contiguity, and of the practical goal of promoting amicable relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.

The unilateral Soviet declaration of 1926 was something of a landmark, a convenient and logical solution to the vexing problem of territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. If the sector principle had come to be universally accepted and formally incorporated into international law, Canada's title to all the Arctic territories she claimed would automatically be validated. In that case, there would have been no need to rely upon occupation or any other modes of acquiring territory. Perhaps it is fortunate for Canada that the sector theory has never been recognized in the realm of polar jurisdiction, for, given the precarious nature of the Canadian claim, Canada has been forced to earn and enhance her title to this theoretically unclaimed territory. After having been side-tracked by this tempest in a teapot, Canada was now free to turn without any logical inconsistency to the task of securing effective sovereignty over the northern islands.

The Frontier Policy of Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, 1713-1725

YVES F. ZOLTVANY

AMONG THE URGENT TASKS facing New France after the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht in 1713 was the protection of a long and vulnerable frontier from the expansionist forces of the English colonies. Three areas of vital economic and military importance were involved: the Great Lakes country, the Mississippi Valley, and the New England border. The policy that enabled the French to cope with English pressure in these regions was formulated by a small group of senior colonial administrators headed by the Governor General, Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil. It consisted essentially in the formation of a network of Indian alliances whose member tribes, it was calculated, would resist the English advance wherever it might occur. While isolated aspects of this policy have been studied in the past, no attempt has so far been made to show in what manner they were grounded on common principles and integrated into one basic strategy. It is the purpose of this article to provide such a study and also to present an assessment of the important but traditionally underrated role played by Vaudreuil in the shaping of this policy.

This governor is not one of the better known figures of the history of New France. In spite of his twenty-two-year term of office and of the important developments that occurred during that time he has never been the object of a book-length study and his personality remains shadowy and uncertain. With the exception of Gustave Lanctot, who has briefly noted his talents as a diplomat,¹ he is usually described as a mediocre or at best an average governor, free perhaps of serious shortcomings but lacking also in those essential qualities that make a superior administrator. "Qui sont ces administrateurs?" asks Lionel Groulx in speaking of Vaudreuil, of his successor Charles de Beauharnois, and of the intendants Michel Bégon and Gilles

¹G. Lanctot, *Histoire du Canada* (3 vols., Montreal, 1959-64), III, 34.

Hocquart. "Non, certes, des personnages médiocres, mais des hommes moyens qui ne dépassent jamais la moyenne que modestement. Personnages assez malaisés à définir comme tous les hommes de leur espèce, à qui manquent les qualités maîtresses, le relief vigoureux."² This appraisal, which has never been revised, does not adequately summarize the character of Vaudreuil's administration, particularly during the years from 1713 to 1725. In that period he appeared as a bold and resourceful administrator, with a clear idea of French interests in North America and with a policy to defend them.

Two major reasons for this lack of recognition of Vaudreuil's achievements may be advanced. In the first place Vaudreuil's term of office, unlike Talon's, did not coincide with a period of prosperity and expansion. From 1696 to 1713 New France suffered greatly from a depression brought on by the bankruptcy of the beaver trade and by the War of the Spanish Succession which had drained the French treasury and forced cutbacks in colonial expenditure. Although recovery began with the peace of Utrecht, it was only with the advent of Frédéric de Maurepas to the Ministry of the Marine in 1723 that colonial policy was finally revitalized. Secondly, unlike Frontenac's, Vaudreuil's administration was not one of spectacular feats of arms. After 1701 Anglo-French rivalry for control of the fur trade and territorial expansion became a diplomatic contest for the mastery of the Indian tribes. Because many of the episodes connected with this struggle lack colour and drama, Vaudreuil often seems a rather lacklustre governor.

The problems facing New France after 1713 were difficult ones indeed. The peace of Utrecht had not only deprived the colony of economically lucrative lands but also breached its defences at several points. In the seventeenth century for instance the French had won control of the Mississippi Valley by establishing commercial and military links with the key tribes inhabiting that region, but clause 15 of the treaty decreed that henceforth the English would also be authorized to trade in that area.³ The obvious purpose of this stipulation was to enable the traders of Pennsylvania and the Carolinas to compete with those of Canada and Louisiana for the commerce of the interior, but other, less evident, motives may also have been involved. By means of their cheaply priced, high quality trade goods, the English perhaps hoped to undermine the economic basis of the Franco-Indian alliance and thus destroy the greatest obstacle to their own expansion into the West.

²L. Groulx, *Histoire du Canada français depuis la découverte* (4 vols., Montreal, 1950-52), II, 27-8.

³*Treaty of Peace and Friendship . . . concluded at Utrecht the 31/11 day of March/April 1713* (London, 1713), p. 75.

The clause was also designed to facilitate New York's infiltration of the Great Lakes country. Until 1713 the Albany traders had relied on the Iroquois to bring them their supply of pelts and had made only one attempt, under Thomas Dongan in 1686, to send their own trading missions to the interior. But now the Iroquois were declared "subject to the Dominion of Great Britain"⁴ and thus reduced to the status of British dependents. The New Yorkers could push westward toward the Great Lakes under cover of this clause and the French would be deprived of a legal basis for protest or interference. Naturally, this strategy could only succeed if the Iroquois allowed the Albany traders a passage through their land. At first sight this appeared improbable for the Six Nations had traditionally opposed the western expansion of New York in order to protect their own position as middlemen in that colony's fur trade. But the power of these Indians had declined in the early eighteenth century and they had been forced to modify their historic policy. As early as 1701, for example, they had allowed some western Indians to travel to Albany to barter their furs instead of attempting to bar the way and thus risk another war with them.⁵ Twelve years later, they were unlikely to oppose a westward thrust by New York.

New France and New England were also disputing the location of the border between their settlements and this controversy contained the seeds of fresh discord. According to article 12 of the treaty, Acadia had been ceded to Great Britain "with its ancient boundaries";⁶ but these boundaries were not specified and, as a result, each side interpreted the clause in the way most favourable to it. New England maintained that the ancient boundaries of Acadia included most of the land below Quebec south of the St. Lawrence River.⁷ The French promptly challenged such claims; to have recognized them would have enabled the English to draw perilously near to Canada and in case of war to strike quickly and destructively at the heart of the colony. They thus argued that Acadia was limited to the Nova Scotian peninsula. On the mainland, the border should be drawn at Casco Bay, a body of water lying slightly westward of the Kennebec River.⁸ By

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

⁵Y. F. Zoltvany, "The Problem of Western Policy under Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, 1703-1725," Canadian Historical Association, *Report*, 1964, p. 11.

⁶*Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1713*, pp. 72-3.

⁷T. Jefferys, *The Conduct of the French with Regard to Nova Scotia from its First Settlement to the Present Time* (London, 1754), *passim*.

⁸Mémoire du Roy pour le comte de Broglie, ambassadeur en Angleterre, 11 avril 1724, Archives nationales, Archives des Colonies (henceforth A.N., Col.), série B, vol. 46, pp. 72-3; copie d'une lettre écrite par Vaudreuil au gouverneur de Boston, 30 oct. 1724, A.N., Col., série C^{11A}, vol. 46, p. 137. Ramezay et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 7 nov. 1715, Archives nationales, Archives de la marine (henceforth A.M.), série B¹, vol. 8, p. 328v.; Charlevoix, Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie, 19 oct. 1720, A.N., Col., série C^{11B}, vol. 2, p. 63.

such a settlement, present-day Maine and New Brunswick would become a buffer zone between the English and French settlements.

Of the two boundary definitions that of the English was undoubtedly the sounder. Jérôme de Pontchartrain, Minister of the Marine until 1715, had recognized in one of his briefs to France's plenipotentiaries at Utrecht that in 1667 Acadia had extended as far as the Kennebec River.⁹ But if legalities favoured New England, the presence of the Abenakis on the disputed territory favoured New France. These Indians, as a result of their conversion to Catholicism in the seventeenth century and of frequent attempts by the settlers of Massachusetts Bay to appropriate their land, had become staunch Canadian allies. In the early eighteenth century they were divided into three bands that clustered around the Jesuit missions of Medoktek on the St. John River, Panaouamské on the Penobscot, and Norridgewok on the Kennebec. The last of these had been entrusted to Father Sébastien Rasle and was of great strategic importance. Not only did it lie the closest to the English settlements but it also commanded the strategic Kennebec-Chaudière River system that joined the St. Lawrence a few miles above Quebec.

On the morrow of the peace of Utrecht, the French found themselves threatened on every side by English expansionism. Vaudreuil soon understood the gravity of the situation and urged the Regent, the Duke of Orleans, to take immediate measures to build up French power in North America. There was a note of urgency in his plea for he was certain that the English would eventually renew their attempts to conquer New France. Economically, he pointed out, the loss of North America would be a damaging blow for it would cripple French fishing operations off the coasts of Newfoundland and Cape Breton Island. But this was not all. Like other government and business leaders after 1713, Vaudreuil had begun to realize that the basis of Great Britain's wealth and strength lay in the colonies. It thus stood to reason that this nation's might would grow enormously if it ever conquered the vast territories of Canada and Louisiana.¹⁰ This deduction, simple as it was, held the seeds of a new imperial policy that would blossom thirty-five years later, under La Galissonnière. For the first time, it had been argued that the colonies were not to be viewed simply as economic ventures, whose utility could be measured in terms of profit and loss, but also as power factors in any future struggle for European hegemony.

⁹Mémoire concernant les colonies, le commerce et la navigation pour Mess^{rs} les plénipotentiaires du Roy, Archives des Affaires étrangères (henceforth A.E.), série Mémoires et documents Amérique, vol. 24, pp. 23v.-26.

¹⁰Mémoire de Vaudreuil au duc d'Orléans, régent du Royaume, fév. 1716, *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec* (henceforth R.A.P.Q.), 1947-8, p. 292.

To preserve New France, Vaudreuil stated, two basic measures were necessary. In the first place, emigration to Canada would have to be greatly increased. To strengthen his plea for more settlers the Governor wrote that the English colonies might field a force of 60,000 men in case of war, while New France could only mobilize 4,484 militia and 628 regulars from the depleted ranks of twenty-eight companies of *troupes de la marine*. Because of this great discrepancy in manpower, immediate steps should be taken to bring the companies up to strength and to increase the number of *habitants*. Fortunately, he thought, conditions in France favoured the raising of men for the colonies. A large number of soldiers had been discharged from the army at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession and many of them could be easily transferred to North America.¹¹

In the second place, the Governor insisted on the need to strengthen the system of alliances with the Indian tribes. Indeed, this was the most important part of his programme for all his experiences in New France since 1687 had served to impress upon him the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the natives. The fur trade depended on their willingness to trade with the French and would collapse if they ever turned to the English for their economic needs. Furthermore, the western Indians had fought on the French side throughout the second Iroquois war and this had so impressed Vaudreuil that he had even attributed New France's ultimate victory in the conflict to the aid of these allies.¹² Unfortunately, over the past twenty years, the connecting links between the colony and the western tribes had been growing weaker. Since the collapse of the beaver trade in the mid-1690's the Indians had received next to nothing for their pelts on the Montreal market and, in growing numbers, had been taking them to the Dutch and English merchants at Albany. To make matters worse Pontchartrain, by an edict issued on May 21, 1696, had abolished the twenty-five *congés* and ordered the garrisons and commanding officers to withdraw from the western posts.¹³ This measure was meant to interrupt, or at least to reduce, the beaver trade and thus accelerate the recovery of the market, but it had also eliminated from the West the most important agents of French influence and had caused the practical breakdown of the colony's Indian diplomacy.¹⁴

During the War of the Spanish Succession Vaudreuil had frequently

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 291-3.

¹²Vaudreuil au ministre, 4 nov. 1706, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 24, pp. 215-215v.; and Vaudreuil et Raudot au ministre, 14 nov. 1708, vol. 28, pp. 8-8v.

¹³Déclaration du Roy, *ibid.*, série F³, vol. 7, pp. 387-8; Mémoire du Roy à Frontenac et Champigny, 26 mai 1696, *ibid.*, B, vol. 19, pp. 91-2.

¹⁴Y. F. Zoltvany, "New France and the West, 1701-1713" *Canadian Historical Review*, XLVI (1965), 301-22.

urged Pontchartrain to repeal the edict, and the expansionist tendencies of the English colonies that emerged after 1713 caused him to re-emphasize the importance of revitalizing the network of alliances with the Indian tribes. The programme he recommended called for the revival of the twenty-five *congés*, the legalization of the brandy trade at all the western posts, an increased gift fund for the Indians, and the authority for him to establish the posts he might judge necessary without having to obtain the court's prior permission.¹⁵ He expected that these measures would make the French alliance economically attractive and politically effective and thus offset the growth of English influence in the interior.

Finally, along the eastern frontier, Vaudreuil had to defeat a determined bid by Massachusetts Bay to introduce settlers and build forts on Abenaki lands.¹⁶ Because of Indian hostility, these goals had always eluded the English in the past, but they now hoped to break down the resistance of the natives by offering to pay high prices for their beaver and to put up trading houses for their convenience.¹⁷ The Abenakis showed interest in those propositions and they even invited their kinsmen who had settled at the Canadian missions of St. François and Bécancour to take their trade to New England, where they would receive more for one pelt than the French gave them for three.¹⁸ Vaudreuil was seriously alarmed by these developments, for he understood that Abenaki resistance was the principal obstacle to New England's eastward expansion. To keep the Indians from faltering he asked the metropolitan authorities to provide extra funds to enhance the economic appeal of the Canadian alliance and to cover the cost of new chapels at the eastern missions.¹⁹ Obviously, he had been influenced by the counsels of Michel Bégon, the intendant, and of Sébastien Rasle who both thought that Catholicism was one of the strongest bonds in the Franco-Abenaki connection.²⁰

The Council of the Marine, which took over the administration of the colonies shortly after the death of Louis XIV on September 1,

¹⁵Mémoire de Vaudreuil au duc d'Orléans, fév. 1716, *R.A.P.Q.*, 1947-8, pp. 293-4.

¹⁶R. H. Lord, J. E. Sexton, E. T. Harrington, *History of the Archdiocese of Boston in the Various Stages of its Formation* (3 vols., Boston, 1945), I, 99-100; C. Headlam, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies* (henceforth *C.S.P.A.*) (London, 1910-36), 1716-17, p. xlvii.

¹⁷Lord, Sexton, Harrington, *History of Archdiocese of Boston*, I, 104.

¹⁸Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 14 oct. 1716, *A.N.*, Col., C^{11A}, vol. 37, pp. 37-37v.

¹⁹Mémoire de Vaudreuil au duc d'Orléans, fév. 1716, *R.A.P.Q.*, 1947-8, p. 295; Vaudreuil au ministre, 16 sept. 1714, *ibid.*, pp. 268-9.

²⁰Sébastien Rasle à son neveu, 15 oct. 1722, in R. G. Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (73 vols., Cleveland, 1896), LXVII, 94; Bégon au ministre, 25 sept. 1715, *A.N.*, Col., C^{11A}, vol. 35, pp. 117-117v.

1715, began by implementing a number of the measures recommended by Vaudeuil. It revived the *congés*, legalized a limited brandy trade, increased the gift fund for the Indians, and authorized the Governor to build new posts and to appoint the commanding officers of his choice.²¹ Unfortunately, this resolute policy was gradually altered to satisfy the demands of other pressure groups. The Jesuits had given early indication that they absolutely opposed the sale of brandy to the natives; their superior, Father Germain, had even stated that the *congés* too might have to be abolished if effective measures could not be taken to prevent their holders from trafficking in alcohol.²² The marketing problems facing the Company of the Occident, which had been granted a twenty-five-year monopoly of the beaver trade in 1718, added extra weight to Jesuit demands. According to its letters patent, the company was obliged to purchase all the beaver pelts brought to its stores.²³ But since France and Holland jointly consumed only 102,000 *livres* weight annually,²⁴ restrictions were necessary to keep production within those limits. These considerations caused the Council of the Marine to reverse its earlier stand and to abolish both the *congés* and the brandy trade in 1719.²⁵

The changing character of European politics in the post-Utrecht period also affected the Council's attitude toward colonial problems. Louis XV, the sickly child who had become king of France in 1715, appeared doomed to an early death. Should his throne become vacant, Philip V of Spain, who had never accepted the clause of the peace treaty stipulating that the crowns of France and Spain must be forever separate, could be expected to claim it for himself. In such a case the Duke of Orleans, Regent of France and next in line of succession, would need British help to defeat the aims of the Spanish Bourbon and to secure his nation's crown. Similarly Stanhope, the principal minister of George I, needed French assistance to repress the Jacobites who were hoping to overthrow the Hanoverians and restore the Stuarts. The need for mutual aid experienced by these two great powers led to the Anglo-French alliance of October 1716 which

²¹Etablissements nouveaux faits par les Français sur le fleuve Mississippi et autres établissements proposés pour les pays d'en haut, 7 nov. 1715, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 36, p. 222; Déclaration du Roy portant rétablissement des vingt-cinq congés . . . , 28 avril 1716, A.N., Col., F³, vol. 9, pp. 356-7; Mémoire du Roy à Vaudreuil et Bégon, 15 juin 1716, R.A.P.Q., 1947-8, pp. 299, 300.

²²Les Jésuites missionnaires du Canada au Conseil de la marine, n.d., A.M., B¹, vol. 8, pp. 270v-271; and le père Germain, supérieur à Québec, au Conseil de la marine, n.d., pp. 282v-283v.

²³Lettres patentes . . . portant établissement d'une compagnie de commerce sous le nom de Compagnie d'Occident, août 1717, A.E., Mémoires et documents Amérique, vol. 6, pp. 204v-205.

²⁴Nouvelle régie des castors, n.d., A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 36, p. 349.

²⁵Mémoire du Roy à Vaudreuil et Bégon, 5 juil. 1718, *ibid.*, B, vol. 40, p. 469v.

revolutionized European politics.²⁶ But this development, while it did pacify Europe, only rendered more complex and delicate the task of policy-making in America, for now the expansionism of the English had to be resisted while maintaining good relations with them. The Council of the Marine attempted to resolve the dilemma by repeatedly instructing Vaudreuil to exercise a policy of gentle firmness toward his southern neighbours,²⁷ in hopes that he might thus succeed in protecting French interests without endangering the alliance with Great Britain.

Vaudreuil informed the Council in his replies that he would maintain friendly relations with the English governors and not oppose their attempts to erect forts and trading posts, provided these occurred in areas that were not contested between the two crowns.²⁸ But even as he was writing those words he was realizing that English policy along the eastern frontier and in the Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley regions would make peaceful co-existence very difficult. He considered that New France's vital interests were at stake in those areas and that they had to be defended at almost any cost. In 1714, he had begun to formulate a defensive programme that differed sharply from the one the metropolitan authorities would prescribe. Recalling that only by inciting the Abenakis to wage war on New England had he been able to keep them in the Canadian alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession, he had written:

J'ose dire par raport non seulement aux Sauvages [the Abenakis] mais encore à toutes les nations qui sont dans nos Intérêts que la guerre avec l'Angleterre nous estoit plus favorable que la paix, je ne scay même par raport à nos véritables intérêts, s'il n'est pas à souhaiter que la guerre avec les nations d'en haut dure encore quelques années plutôt que de faciliter aux Anglois les moyens de se les attirer Entièrement . . . c'est une réflexion du Père Marest . . . qu'il y a longtems que je fais moy-mesme.²⁹

In the fall of 1716 Vaudreuil began to implement the new expansionist programme by ordering the establishment of a chain of posts in the region of the western Great Lakes. One reason for the choice of this area lay in its great commercial and military value. Not only was it inhabited by some of the most important tribes in the French system of alliances but it also commanded one of the principal gateways to the Far West and to the new beaver breeding grounds.³⁰ Since 1712, furthermore, it had been disturbed by a war between the Fox

²⁶P. Roberts, *The Quest for Security, 1715-1740* (New York, 1947), pp. 18-20, in W. L. Langer, ed., *The Rise of Modern Europe*.

²⁷Ramezay au Conseil de la marine, 16 sept. 1715, A.M., B¹, vol. 8, pp. 291v.-292; Mémoire du Roy à Vaudreuil et Bégon, 15 juin 1716, A.N., Col., B, vol. 38, p. 224; le Conseil de la marine à Vaudreuil, 26 juin 1717, A.N., Col., B, vol. 39, p. 222v.

²⁸Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 12 oct. 1717, A.M., B¹, vol. 29, pp. 24-24v.

²⁹Vaudreuil au ministre, 16 sept. 1714, R.A.P.Q., 1947-8, p. 269.

³⁰Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 12 oct. 1717, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 124, p. 49.

Indians and several other nations which had disrupted the fur trade badly.³¹ In 1716, an army commanded by La Porte de Louvigny and made up of *coureurs de bois* and Indian auxiliaries had defeated the Fox and forced them to sue for peace, but it did not appear likely that order could be maintained unless the French were strongly represented in the region.³² A second reason for choosing this area was Vaudreuil's desire, in keeping with the instructions of the Council of the Marine, to avoid a confrontation with the English at this early date. Building up a zone of French influence in the remote interior and drawing the Indians to it appeared safer than establishing posts among the tribes settled in the vicinity of the British colonies.³³

While taking these initial measures in the Great Lakes country Vaudreuil was also closely following developments along the eastern frontier. During his leave of absence in France from 1714 to 1716 he had informed the Council that the Abenakis should be secretly encouraged to resist the extension of the English settlements. Otherwise, their desire for peace and the English trade might undermine their will to protect their land.³⁴ It is true that in 1715, during a conference with the Governor of Port Royal, Francis Nicholson, they had refused to allow settlers on their territory and declined to swear an oath of fidelity to George I.³⁵ But divisions had begun to appear in their ranks two years later when they met with Samuel Shute, the new governor of Massachusetts Bay. Shute was hoping to persuade the Indians not to molest the persons who had recently taken up land east of the Kennebec River.³⁶ Forewarned of this meeting, Vaudreuil instructed the missionaries to encourage the Indians to reject Shute's demands, but his tactics achieved only partial success. The Penobscots showed little inclination to spoil their good relations with the English. The Norridgewoks, however, stood unflinchingly by the French. Their spokesman Wiwurma, speaking of his land "*avec une fierté sans égale*," denied Shute's contention that they were British subjects living on territory ceded by France at the peace of Utrecht. In 1718 the Norridgewoks took matters one step further and began to destroy English establishments on the Lower Kennebec.³⁷ "*Je ne cesseray pas d'entretenir comme j'ai fait jusqu'à présent tous ces sauvages dans le sentiment que la terre où ils sont est à eux, qu'ils la doivent conserver*

³¹Ramezay au ministre, 18 sept. 1714, *ibid.*, vol. 34, p. 355v.

³²Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 12 oct. 1717, *ibid.*, vol. 124, pp. 49v.-50v.; Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 28 oct. 1719, *ibid.*, vol. 40, p. 179.

³³Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 12 oct. 1717, *ibid.*, vol. 124, pp. 46v.-49.

³⁴Mémoire de Vaudreuil au duc d'Orléans, fév. 1716, *R.A.P.Q.*, 1947-8, p. 295.

³⁵Ramezay au Conseil de la marine, 16 sept. 1715, *A.N.*, Col., vol. 35, pp. 77-78v.

³⁶Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 27 Feb. 1717, *C.S.P.A.*, 1716-17, p. 262; Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Nov. 9, 1717, *C.S.P.A.*, 1717-18, pp. 100-1.

³⁷Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 31 oct. 1718, *A.N.*, Col., C^{11A}, vol. 39, pp. 157-60.

et ne pas souffrir que l'Anglois s'en empare," Vaudreuil wrote significantly. If the English exercised reprisals on the Indians, he was of the opinion that the French should come to the latter's assistance.³⁸

News of these mounting tensions alarmed the Council of the Marine and impelled it to take measures to maintain Anglo-French harmony. It sent a memoir to Abbé Dubois, French ambassador at Whitehall, which explained in what manner New England's expansionist policy threatened the security of New France and prescribed a course of action to correct the situation. The Ambassador must ask the British government to issue orders forbidding all intrusions by its colonials on territories disputed between the two crowns and also convince it that the time had now come to form the joint commission on boundaries called for by the Treaty of Utrecht.³⁹ Dubois appears to have pursued the matter with some diligence for the British commissioners arrived at Paris in the summer of 1719 to discuss the situation in America with their French counterparts.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, nothing came of this meeting. For reasons that are not clear, negotiations collapsed at an early date and the commission broke up, leaving the problems in the colonies unresolved.

The failure of this attempt to define the Anglo-French boundary shifted almost the entire burden of frontier defence onto Vaudreuil's shoulders, and after that time a noticeable change occurred in his policy. It became progressively more ruthless and more daring as he strove desperately to prevent the English from gaining control of areas that were commercially and militarily vital to New France. To pursue such a course of action and not cause the breach with Great Britain which the French government wished to avoid was difficult, but he thought that he could accomplish this feat of brinkmanship by his manipulation of the Indian tribes. Past experience had taught him that New York was helpless without the active assistance of the Six Nations. As for the New Englanders, whom he had regarded with a degree of contempt ever since the failure of their attack on Quebec in 1690, he expected them to withdraw west of the Kennebec rather than risk another war with the Abenakis.⁴¹ The success or failure of his strategy, then, would largely depend on whether or not he could persuade the Indians to do his bidding.

Late in 1719 Vaudreuil was once again turning his attention to the

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 161-161v.

³⁹Le Conseil de la marine à Dubois, 22 mars 1719, A.N., Col., B, vol. 41, pp. 56-56v.; and Mémoire sur les limites de l'Amérique septentrionale, n.d., pp. 56v.-57v.

⁴⁰Chammorel au Conseil de la marine, A.E., série Correspondence politique, Angleterre, vol. 325, pp. 87-8; and Chammorel au Conseil de la marine, 21 juil. 1719, vol. 326, pp. 41-42; H. LeClercq, *Histoire de la régence* (3 vols., Paris, 1921), III, 352; V. W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier 1670-1732* (Ann Arbor, 1959), p. 224.

⁴¹Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 8 oct. 1721, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 43, p. 377.

West. By that time the New York traders, capitalizing on clause 15 of the peace treaty, had succeeded in opening a direct trade with New France's western allies from the shores of Lake Ontario.⁴² This development showed that the French posts located deeper in the interior could not counterbalance the lure of the low-priced English trade goods. Yet, unless Canada re-asserted its authority over the western tribes, it might eventually lose the commerce of the interior. As early as 1715 Michel Bégon and Le Moyne de Longueuil had recommended the building of a post at Niagara, in order to bring this highly important commercial passage under the control of the French and thus enable them to intercept the natives before they reached the New York settlements.⁴³ The home authorities, however, had not immediately accepted their plan because Niagara was located on the hunting grounds of the Iroquois, which had been placed under British suzerainty in 1713. Any attempt to erect a post on the site might precipitate another intercolonial war, and the Council of the Marine was obviously not prepared to run such a risk.

So as not to endanger the Anglo-French alliance, Vaudreuil had initially avoided measures that might have given the English reasons for complaint. Although the penetration of the Great Lakes country by the New York traders was a most disturbing development, he had simply lodged written protests with the Governor of New York and asked him to prohibit trading missions to the interior until the boundary was defined.⁴⁴ Such tactics, however, never achieved appreciable results. Indeed, according to reports reaching Canada in 1719, a party of Albany traders was preparing to journey to Niagara in order to build a trading house at that point.⁴⁵ Vaudreuil understood that such an establishment would enable them to divert most of the Indian convoys coming from the West and to cripple the Canadian trade. Notwithstanding the risks involved he now decided that he had to forestall the New Yorkers by occupying Niagara first.⁴⁶ The obstacle of clause 15

⁴²Wraxall, Peter, *An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs contained in Four Folio Volumes, Transacted in the Colony of New York from the Year 1678 to the Year 1751*, ed. C. H. McIlwain (Cambridge, 1915), pp. 112-13; Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, n.d., A.M., B¹, vol. 29, p. 24v.

⁴³Bégon au ministre, 12 sept. 1714, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 34, pp. 310v.-312v.; and Ramezay et Bégon au ministre, 7 nov. 1715, vol. 35, pp. 25-25v.

⁴⁴Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, n.d., A.M., B¹, vol. 29, p. 26.

⁴⁵Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 26 oct. 1720, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 41, p. 388.

⁴⁶Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 26 oct. 1719, *ibid.*, vol. 40, pp. 58-58v.; and Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 26 oct. 1720, vol. 41, p. 389. No evidence can be found to substantiate the allegation of the Rev. Durant, the Récollet chaplain of Fort Frontenac who went over to the English in 1721, that the order to establish the Niagara post came from the French court in 1718. E. B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (henceforth N.Y.C.D.) (15 vols., Albany, 1853-87), V, 588.

might yet be overcome if the Senecas, the westernmost of the Six Nations and the one on whose territory Niagara was located, allowed the French to have a post there. To carry out the delicate assignment of presenting his request, Vaudreuil selected Chabert de Joncaire the elder, one of his most trusted aides.

The Governor had good reasons to regard Joncaire as the most likely to succeed in eliciting a favourable response from the Senecas. Many years before, these Indians had made him their adopted son in recognition of the valour he had displayed while their prisoner and since that time he had commanded both their respect and their admiration. To gain their assent to the post, Joncaire skilfully and somewhat unscrupulously exploited their trust in him. Early in 1720 he presented himself at the Seneca settlements and called for an assembly of the chiefs. When they had gathered he informed them that he had always derived great pleasure from his visits to their villages. In fact, he ventured, he would come even more often if he possessed a dwelling of his own where he could retire. The chiefs informed him in reply that, as one of their sons, he was free to build a house for himself wherever he chose. This was all Joncaire had been waiting to hear. He hurried to Fort Frontenac, chose eight soldiers, and proceeded directly to Niagara. On the south shore of the river, some nine miles below the falls, the group built a trading house and raised the French colours. Shortly afterwards, two small posts were built at Toronto and at Quinté.⁴⁷ By the end of the summer the French were entrenched on Lake Ontario.

Upon hearing this news, the New York government and the Albany traders immediately took measures to clear their rivals from the area. They began by urging the Iroquois to demolish the Niagara house and for a time it appeared possible that the Six Nations would accept, for dismay was growing among them as they realized that the French were now in a position to control their hunting and trading activities. But they also remembered that in the past they had fought New France and her western allies almost singlehanded; now, they refused to take action unless the New Yorkers promised them their active support.⁴⁸ The latter would perhaps have liked to extend their assistance but, no more than the French in Canada, could they be allowed to endanger the alliance between the mother countries by provoking an armed encounter in the colonies. To oblige New France to relax its grip on Niagara, they would have to use non-violent means.

New York had thus only one recourse left: to impress upon

⁴⁷F. X. de Charlevoix, *Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France* . . . (3 vols., Paris, 1744), III, 226-7; Mr. Durant's Memorial relative to the French post at Niagara, *N.Y.C.D.*, V, 588-91.

⁴⁸Conference between Colonel Schuyler and the Indians, 25 Aug. 1720, *N.Y.C.D.*, V, 562-9.

Vaudreuil that the trading house was a violation of the peace of Utrecht and of a deed of 1701 by virtue of which the Iroquois had placed their hunting grounds under British protection.⁴⁹ Peter Schuyler, an influential member of the Albany mercantile community, and the new Governor, William Burnet, called Vaudreuil's attention to English rights over Iroquois territory.⁵⁰ In his courteous but firmly worded note Burnet informed his French counterpart that the new post was illegal because the Six Nations were British subjects and also because it prevented the western Indians from going to Albany and thus violated the stipulations on freedom of trade contained in the peace treaty.⁵¹ In a clever reply Vaudreuil argued that by discovery and exploration the French had acquired prior rights to the Great Lakes country and were entitled to build posts there if they so desired.⁵² Although the argument was a dubious one only a commission on boundaries was competent to pass judgment on it. Since there was little likelihood of this body meeting again in the near future, the English must now have realized that the French were at Niagara to stay.

The success of this audacious stroke encouraged Vaudreuil to adopt bolder measures on the eastern frontier. The situation there was uncertain for the Abenakis were still divided over the attitude they should adopt toward the advancing settlements of New England. The Norridgewoks were trying to stem the movement by threatening the settlers, killing their cattle, and occasionally destroying their buildings,⁵³ but the Penobscots and Medokteks do not appear to have followed their example. Indeed, an influential peace party even existed among the Norridgewoks and it was working hard to restore harmonious relations with New England. In 1720 it was able to convince the members of the tribe to deliver four hostages to Boston as proof of their willingness to compensate the settlers for the damage caused to their property. The Massachusetts Bay authorities attempted to capitalize on this gesture of goodwill by inviting the Norridgewoks to send their deputies to a conference at Arrowsick where the whole question of land policy could be discussed.⁵⁴ The importance of these

⁴⁹Deed from the Five Nations to the King of their Beaver Hunting grounds, *ibid.*, IV, 908-10.

⁵⁰Schuyler to the Lords of Trade, 13 July, 1720, *ibid.*, V, 550.

⁵¹Copie d'une lettre à M. de Vaudreuil du 11 juillet 1721 par M. William Burnet, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 44, pp. 148-50.

⁵²Copie d'une lettre écrite le 24 août 1721 par M. de Vaudreuil à M. Burnet, *ibid.*, vol. 44, pp. 143v.-146v.

⁵³Dummer to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 Feb. 1720, C.S.P.A., 1719-20, pp. 365-6; Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 26 oct. 1719, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 40, 45v.-46.

⁵⁴Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 8 oct. 1721, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 43, pp. 372-272v.

projected negotiations was obvious. If New England should succeed in winning the assent of the Indians to its programme of eastern extension, Canada would be reduced to the same state of helplessness in that region as New York had been on Lake Ontario by lack of Iroquois support.

Vaudreuil quickly realized that the peace party might prevail and cause the collapse of Abenaki resistance. To prevent this from happening, he and the missionaries worked feverishly to pack the delegation with French partisans. The alert Father Rasle dispatched six Norridgewoks to Quebec with instructions to invite the Hurons of Lorette and the Abenakis of St. François and Bécancour to send their deputies to Arrowsick. Accompanied by Vaudreuil, Rasle's envoys visited the missions and, in response to their joint appeal, the residents agreed to send their representatives to the forthcoming conference. Travelling with them on their eastward journey was Father La Chasse, now superior of the Canadian Jesuits but missionary among the Penobscots for many years before. Both at his old mission and at Norridgewok, La Chasse campaigned vigorously on behalf of the French party and also appealed to the Medokteks for volunteers. By these tactics, the size of the delegation was increased to 250 men and the pro-Canadian elements secured a solid majority. Led by Rasle and La Chasse, the group proceeded to Arrowsick in full war attire.⁵⁵ After an angry exchange with the New England representatives about the return of the hostages, La Chasse read an ultimatum in the name of the Indians, ordering the settlers to withdraw within three weeks from the lands they had usurped since the peace of Utrecht. If this was not done, it was warned, "je croirai que tu veux te rendre maître de ma terre malgré moi."⁵⁶

A war with New England now seemed imminent. Realizing this, the Abenakis appealed to Louis XV for assistance. Their message called the King's attention to the unflagging devotion they had always shown for the French cause in North America and pointed out that he could now show his gratitude for these past services by using diplomatic pressure, or force if necessary, to compel the English to withdraw from Indian territory.⁵⁷ The Canadian officials supported their demand. Vaudreuil feared that failure to appear openly on the side of these allies in case of war would leave them no choice but to come to terms with the English.⁵⁸ Father Charlevoix, in his comprehensive memoir

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 372v.-374v.

⁵⁶Parole de toute la nation abénakise et de toutes les autres nations sauvages ses alliés au gouverneur de Boston, au sujet de la terre des Abénakis dont les Anglais s'emparent depuis la paix, oct. 1721, A.N., Col., F³, vol. 2, pp. 413-415v.

⁵⁷Parole des Abénakis au Roy, oct. 1721, *ibid.*, pp. 410-411v.

⁵⁸Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 8 oct. 1721, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 43, pp. 376v.-377.

on the Acadian problem, stated that it would be morally unjustifiable as well as strategically unsound for the French to incite the Abenakis to war if they did not intend coming to their assistance. Such an uneven conflict could only result in the defeat of the Indians and leave victorious New England master of their land. On the other hand, he was certain that the English would retreat rather than engage in a war with the natives reinforced by the French.⁵⁹

The final decision rested with the Council of the Marine. Vaudreuil's dispatch of October 8 was discussed by this body on December 19, and on December 28 a message was hurried to Dubois at Whitehall. The Ambassador was instructed to advise the government of George I that his colonials must refrain from settling on Indian lands until the boundary question was settled. Refusal to comply would oblige the King of France to come to the aid of the Abenakis.⁶⁰ Dubois was asked to forward England's reply to this note by March 1, 1722, to allow sufficient time for the drafting of the Canadian dispatches. But by June 1, with the King's vessel fitting out at Rochefort for the voyage to Quebec, Dubois had yet to be heard from.⁶¹ With nothing to go on from England, the Council instructed Vaudreuil to extend secret assistance in arms and ammunition to the Abenakis in case of war.⁶² This turned out to be the final position of the home authorities on the matter. "Le Roi de France," it was later written, "préfère conserver l'union avec la couronne angloise que de permettre aux François de se joindre à l'Abénaki."⁶³

Meantime, Anglo-Abenaki relations were gradually growing worse. After the Arrowsick episode, Shute had asked Vaudreuil to remove the missionaries from among the Indians and to instruct the latter to behave peacefully.⁶⁴ Vaudreuil had stated in reply that the missionaries were not on New England territory; as for the Indians, they had come to Arrowsick under arms because from past experience they had learned to distrust the English. He also warned Shute against resorting to violence in his dealings with the natives, for the French would not stand idly by while their allies were destroyed.⁶⁵ Although he did not yet know what policy the court would prescribe, Vaudreuil was using the threat of a new war in the hope of frightening New England into a retreat.

⁵⁹Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie, 19 oct. 1720, *ibid.*, C^{III}, vol. 2, pp. 64, 67v.

⁶⁰Le Conseil de la marine à Dubois, 28 déc. 1721, *ibid.*, B, vol. 44, pp. 120v.-121.

⁶¹Le Conseil de la marine à Dubois, 1 juin 1722, *ibid.*, B, vol. 45, pp. 320v.-321.

⁶²Le Conseil de la marine à Vaudreuil, 5 juin 1722, *ibid.*, B, vol. 45, pp. 804-5; le ministre à Vaudreuil, 14 oct. 1723, *ibid.*, C^{III}, vol. 45, p. 11.

⁶³Mémoire du Roy pour le comte de Broglie, ambassadeur en Angleterre, 11 avril 1724, *ibid.*, B, vol. 46, pp. 78-9.

⁶⁴Shute à Vaudreuil, 21 juil. 1721, *Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France* (4 vols., Quebec, 1883-5), III, 55-6.

⁶⁵Vaudreuil à Shute, 22 déc. 1721, *ibid.*, III, 63-4.

Unfortunately, he had miscalculated. Instead of giving in, Shute next attempted to break Abenaki resistance by removing the *agents provocateurs* from their midst. In December 1721, his raiders surprised and captured the half-breed St. Castin at his Penobscot residence.⁶⁶ The following month, a party of one hundred men burst upon the Norridgewok mission in the hope of capturing Father Rasle. Warned of their coming, the missionary managed to escape but the attackers ransacked his house and the chapel.⁶⁷ Finally, in the spring of 1722, the inevitable occurred: a New England patrol clashed with a party of Abenakis and blood was spilled. Open hostilities were inevitable after this incident and Shute declared war on the Indians on July 25.⁶⁸ This dramatic development placed Vaudreuil in a most awkward position for the Council of the Marine's instructions prevented him from entering the fray. All he could do to help his allies carry on the war was to extend secret assistance and he may well have wondered if this would be enough.

The critical situation on the eastern frontier was not Vaudreuil's only concern. He had also become involved in a bitter controversy with the authorities of Louisiana over a question of territorial jurisdiction in the Mississippi Valley. Friction between these two colonies, it should be said, was nothing new. Canadians had looked upon Louisiana as a competitor for the western fur trade almost from the date of its foundation and their resentment had increased considerably in 1717 when the Illinois country, hitherto a Canadian dependency, had been annexed to the junior colony. The Council of the Marine had made this transfer because the territory reportedly held rich silver deposits and was thus expected to increase the economic potential of Louisiana to which John Law's Company of the Occident had just been granted proprietary rights.⁶⁹ The Canadians gave no sign of being interested in the mineral wealth of the Illinois but they did fear that the loss of the country would have a disruptive effect on the fur trade. To make matters worse Boisbriant, the commanding officer sent to the new Louisiana dependency, disagreed with the Quebec authorities on the territory's boundary. The latter insisted that his jurisdiction ended at the Illinois River, where the land of the Fox and Maskoutins began,

⁶⁶Extrait de la réponse de Vaudreuil et Bégon du 17 octobre 1722 au Mémoire du Roy, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 44, pp. 303-303v.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 303v.-304; Vaudreuil à Shute, 7 juin 1722, *Collection Mss. Nouvelle-France*, III, 79-80.

⁶⁸Extrait de la réponse de Vaudreuil et Bégon du 17 octobre 1722 au Mémoire du Roy, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 44, pp. 304v.-305; de Mézy au Conseil de la marine, 1 sept. 1722, A.N., Col., série C^{11C}, vol. 15, p. 234v.; Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, July 27, 1722, *C.S.P.A.*, 1722-3, p. 117.

⁶⁹Notations of the Conseil de la marine on Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 12 oct. 1717, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 124, p. 50v.

but Boisbriant maintained that his command extended along the entire Mississippi and tributary streams as far as Lake Winnipeg.⁷⁰ Should his point of view prevail, the numerous tribes inhabiting the region of the upper Mississippi would become Louisiana dependents and their commerce might well be lost to Canada.

The renewal of the Fox war in 1719 gradually brought these difficulties to a head. The Fox's decision to resume hostilities appears to have been linked to attempts by Canada and Louisiana to open a direct trade with the Sioux tribes. The Fox carried on a commerce of their own with the Sioux and they also exercised a sort of political tutelage over them. To protect their commercial interests, they began to deploy the strategy that was meant to close the Far West to the white intruders. In order to drive away the traders from the southern colony, they obliged the Sioux to attack the ones who ventured into their land⁷¹ and simultaneously began a war of their own against the Illinois tribes and the settlements of upper Louisiana. To sever Canada's communications with the upper Mississippi region, they encouraged the Sioux to attack the Lake Superior Indians.⁷² These tactics succeeded in sharply reducing the volume of the Louisiana trade and caused the New Orleans government to demand that Vaudreuil take measures to destroy the Fox.⁷³

The Governor of Canada's attitude, however, was a strangely ambiguous one. Shortly after the resumption of the war in 1720 he had advised the Council of the Marine that he would arrange for the Canadian allies to march against the Fox, unless the latter put down their arms,⁷⁴ but no such counter-offensive had materialized by 1723, although this troublesome tribe had intensified its war against the Illinois. Vaudreuil explained that the western allies had refused to mobilize unless they were joined by French contingents, a request that could not be granted because of the expense it would have entailed.⁷⁵ For the first time he also claimed that the Illinois bore the responsibility for the war and could still bring it to an end by releasing the Fox prisoners detained in their villages.⁷⁶ While these reasons seem plausible enough, they do not entirely dispel the impression that Vaudreuil's inactivity was motivated by other considerations. It appears that somehow he had reached an understanding with the Fox

⁷⁰Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 4 nov. 1720, *ibid.*, vol. 43, pp. 102v.-106v.

⁷¹Boisbriant, *Mémoire du poste des Illinois*, fév. 1725, A.N., Col., série C^{13A}, vol. 8, pp. 449-449v.; and lettre du Conseil, 14 jan. 1723, vol. 6, pp. 394-394v.

⁷²Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 4 nov. 1720, *ibid.*, C^{11A}, vol. 43, pp. 99-100v.; and Longueuil et Bégon au ministre, 31 oct. 1725, vol. 47, p. 134.

⁷³Boisbriant, *Mémoire du poste des Illinois*, fév. 1725, *ibid.*, C^{13A}, vol. 8, pp. 449-449v.

⁷⁴Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 22 oct. 1720, *ibid.*, C^{11A}, vol. 42, pp. 164v.-166v.

⁷⁵Vaudreuil au Conseil de la marine, 2 oct. 1723, *ibid.*, vol. 45, pp. 136-40.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*

by virtue of which he agreed not to attack them if, in return, they did not molest Canada's traders and native allies. The fact that the Fox soon broke off hostilities with the Canadian Indians and never troubled the commercially important post at Green Bay, located deep in their territory, even as they were ravaging the Louisiana outposts, heightens the impression that they had an entente with the Governor of Canada.

This attitude toward the Fox serves to illustrate the double dimension of Vaudreuil's policy. On the one hand, as his memoirs to the Regent indicate, he was a French imperialist and was undoubtedly aware of Louisiana's strategic importance; but by ties of marriage and interest he was also a member of the Canadian ruling class. In the Fox war his loyalty to Canada clashed with and was given priority over his duty to the empire. A general war on these Indians would have plunged the western hinterland into turmoil, forced a withdrawal from several of the posts, and disorganized the fur trade⁷⁷ just as Canada was beginning to reap the economic benefits of his reorganization and pacification of the interior. *Engagés* had left for the West in record-breaking numbers in 1723.⁷⁸ The number of posts had been increased to ten, and now cut a broad swath across the Great Lakes country. The colony, in brief, was enjoying peace and prosperity and Vaudreuil was unwilling to compromise all this for the sake of Louisiana, a political ally but an economic rival.

Unfortunately, the successes of 1723 were not repeated in his lifetime. Since his arrival in New York, Governor William Burnet had nursed the ambition of breaking French control of the West and by November 1720 he had planned a programme to achieve this end. Knowing that the Canadian merchants relied heavily on British merchandise to carry on their commerce with the Indians, he prevailed upon the New York Assembly to pass an act forbidding the export to Canada of goods used in this trade. Secondly, again as a result of his urgings, the Assembly passed a 2 per cent duty act on all European goods imported into the colony in order to finance the building of trading posts in the Great Lakes country to compete with those of the French.⁷⁹ The Albany mercantile community, however, was opposed to this programme which threatened the comfortable trading habits of the past and its evasion of the two key measures⁸⁰ considerably

⁷⁷Observations de Vaudreuil sur la dépêche de Ramezay et Bégon du 13 septembre 1715, A.M., B¹, vol. 8, pp. 255v., 257.

⁷⁸See R.A.P.Q., 1929-30, pp. 207-50, for the number of trading permits issued annually for the upper country between 1703 and 1725.

⁷⁹Burnet to the Lords of Trade, 26 Nov. 1720, N.Y.C.D., V, 576-80; H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the XVIIIth Century* (2 vols., New York, 1924), II, 418-22.

⁸⁰The Lords of Trade to Burnet, 17 June 1724, N.Y.C.D., V, 707; Burnet to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 1724, N.Y.C.D., V, 711; Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, pp. 140-1.

softened the blow aimed at the French positions. But instead of giving up Burnet tried to co-operate with the merchants on other grounds by encouraging them to send commercial expeditions as far as Lake Ontario. In the fall of 1721, Peter Schuyler, Jr., led a party of ten men to Irondequat with instructions from the Governor to "use all lawful means to draw the fur trade thither by sending notice to the Far Indians that you are settled there for their ease and encouragement."⁸¹ Impressed by the success of the experiment, Burnet now decided to build a trading house at Oswego, "where the chief trade with the Far Indians lie."⁸² At a conference held in September 1724, the Iroquois authorized him to put up a building on the site.⁸³

As late as November 1724 Vaudreuil had confidently assumed that Joncaire had matters well in hand on Lake Ontario.⁸⁴ Only the previous year his lieutenant had again demonstrated his great influence over the Iroquois by obtaining their permission to replace the trading house at Niagara by a wooden stockade large enough to accommodate 300 defenders.⁸⁵ He was therefore completely unprepared for the news that these Indians had suddenly turned a deaf ear to the exhortations of his representative and given their blessing to an English post at Oswego. Stunned by this development, he rushed to the conclusion that they might next join forces with the New Yorkers in order to drive the French from Niagara and thus sever the principal link between New France and the West. Since the wooden stockade might prove inadequate to resist an attack, Vaudreuil decided to have a stone fort built in its place.⁸⁶ The extent to which his confidence in Joncaire had been shaken is indicated by his choice of Longueuil to present to the Senecas the all-important request to make the change.

Thus did Vaudreuil prepare to take the most crucial and perhaps also the most debatable step of his administration. Fortifying a strategic point on disputed territory in peacetime was a measure that only a desperate situation could justify. In deciding that such a situation did in fact exist the Governor appears to have assessed Iroquois intentions incorrectly. He had looked upon their support of the Oswego project as the prelude to a desertion of the French and, possibly, to an attack on Niagara. A few years later an analyst of the Ministry of Marine expressed a substantially different opinion. He wrote that the

⁸¹Burnet's Instructions to Captain Peter Schuyler, Jr., 16 Oct. 1721, *N.Y.C.D.*, V, 641-2.

⁸²Conference of Governor Burnet with the Indians, 15 Sept. 1724, *ibid.*, V, 716.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil de la marine, 17 oct. 1722, *A.N.*, Col., C^{11A}, vol. 44, p. 299; and Vaudreuil et Bégon au ministre, 14 oct. 1723, vol. 45, p. 36v.; and Vaudreuil et Bégon au ministre, 2 nov. 1724, vol. 46, p. 37v.

⁸⁵Mémoire du Roy à Vaudreuil et Robert, 30 mai 1724, *ibid.*, B, vol. 47, p. 1144.

⁸⁶Vaudreuil au ministre, 22 mai 1725, *ibid.*, C^{11A}, vol. 47, pp. 166-166v.

Iroquois had encouraged the English to settle at Oswego as part of their policy of balance—once both the European rivals had establishments on their territory it was unlikely that one would permit the other to become unduly powerful.⁸⁷ It could not, then, have been their intention to force the French from Niagara since their presence there was necessary to counterbalance that of the English a few miles away. That an administrator of Vaudreuil's experience should have failed to understand this can only be attributed to a state of panic brought on by the realization that once the breakthrough to Oswego was accomplished the hopes he had entertained of excluding New York from the Great Lakes region would be doomed forever.

The war on the eastern frontier, in progress since the summer of 1722, must also have had an unnerving effect on him. Divisions among the Abenakis had hampered their war effort and obliged the Governor to intervene frequently in order to prolong the conflict. He supplied his allies with arms and ammunition and also encouraged the Canadian mission Indians, including Iroquois, Algonquins, Hurons, and Nipissings, to come to their rescue. In response to his proddings as many as four hundred of these warriors, divided into small parties, descended upon New England and ravaged the border settlements.⁸⁸ Their intervention was perhaps the only factor that prolonged hostilities until 1726. Otherwise the Medokteks and Penobscots, who had always been peacefully inclined, might have come to terms with the English in order to end a war which had reduced their people to misery, and the weakened Norridgewoks would have been obliged to follow suit. New England was aware that Vaudreuil was chiefly responsible for the prolongation of the war. William Dummer, acting Governor of Massachusetts Bay, accused him of meddling in the domestic affairs of an English colony by inciting the Indian subjects of George I to rebellion.⁸⁹ This denunciation of his policy did not intimidate the veteran Governor of New France. In his reply, he maintained that the English, not the French, had caused the hostility and violence of the Abenakis by invading their territory and by presuming to make their subjects those who had always been the allies of Canada. Once the New Englanders had razed their forts and withdrawn from Indian land he

⁸⁷"On a lieu de croire qu'ils [the Iroquois] y avoient excité les Anglois pour balancer dans leur pays les forces des deux nations" (*Sauvages iroquois*, 1731, *ibid.*, C^{11A}, vol. 56, p. 278); "Je pense mesme que toute leur [the Iroquois'] attention n'est à présent d'empescher que les François non plus que les Anglois ne soient pas les plus forts dans le pays qu'ils habitent" (Le ministre à Beauharnois, 4 avril 1730, *ibid.*, B, vol. 54, pp. 425-6).

⁸⁸Vaudreuil et Bégon au ministre, 14 oct. 1723, *ibid.*, C^{11A}, vol. 45, pp. 20v.-21; and Longueuil et Bégon au ministre, 31 oct. 1725, vol. 47, pp. 67v.-68.

⁸⁹Dummer à Vaudreuil, 15 sept. 1724, *Collection Mss. Nouvelle-France*, III, 106-7

assured Dummer that he would co-operate with him in order to restore peace.⁹⁰

Even this solution, which had been his constant objective since 1713, no longer satisfied Vaudreuil by 1725. In that final year of his life his frontier policy had become ruthless and uncompromising. Since the peace of Utrecht he had observed English efforts to capture the western fur trade and to overrun Abenaki lands. Unable to conceal any longer his doubts and fears for the security of New France in the face of these tactics, he freely expressed his feelings in a dramatic dispatch to Maurepas written less than five months before his death. "Nous devons être persuadés que cette colonie sera toujours l'objet de la jalousie des Anglois," he stated prophetically. "Nous n'avons point d'ennemis plus dangereux à craindre."⁹¹ To maintain French positions in North America Vaudreuil, for the first time, openly proposed to contain the English by a policy of force.

Such a *dénouement* was inevitable. To protect New France's frontiers and hinterland, the Governor had relied since 1716 on his ability to influence the Indian tribes. By 1725, with the natives showing a mounting indifference for the French cause,⁹² he almost automatically fell back on the principle, enunciated in 1714, that the interest of the colony might better be served by war than by peace. "Rien n'est plus opposé à nos intérêts que la paix des Abénakis avec les Anglois," he had told Maurepas.⁹³ Even if New England did subscribe to the conditions he had laid down in his letter to Dummer the previous year, the French settlements would only gain a temporary respite. The English would still be in a position to trade with the Abenakis and to win them to their side by economic concessions. Once this was done, their colony's eastern expansion would begin anew. The brutal solution to the eastern problem that Vaudreuil now proposed consisted of a permanent state of war between the English and the Indians. Although the latter had won no victories since 1722 they had at least contained the expansionism of Massachusetts Bay and could be expected to continue doing so as long as hostilities lasted.⁹⁴ The mere fact that the Governor could express such views shows that he had come to regard the Abenakis as pawns to be sacrificed to the cause of Canadian security. At the same time, he was also beginning to despair of the situation in the West. The French trade on Lake

⁹⁰Copie d'une lettre écrite au gouverneur de Boston le 30 octobre 1724, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 46, pp. 140v.-141.

⁹¹Vaudreuil au ministre, 22 mai 1725, *ibid.*, vol. 47, p. 170v.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 169v.; Longueuil et Bégon au ministre, 31 oct. 1725, *ibid.*, p. 129.

⁹³Vaudreuil au ministre, 22 mai 1725, *ibid.*, p. 157v.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 158-9.

Ontario was declining⁹⁵ and the Indians, in growing numbers, were resorting to Albany to trade.⁹⁶ The stone fort projected at Niagara was his supreme hope for checking these developments; should the Iroquois refuse to allow it, he thought that the French would have no alternative but to defend their empire by the force of arms. He pleaded with Maurepas for more recruits, guns, and ammunition to place the colony and the western posts on a war footing.⁹⁷

That Vaudreuil should have adamantly refused to alter his attitude toward Louisiana in this crisis is something of a mystery. With the English threat mounting rapidly it seems that he should have laid his grievances aside and concluded a working alliance with the southern colony to protect the Mississippi Valley. But his hostility toward Louisiana had grown instead. In 1724, violence had broken out between the Fox and the Chippewas and Le Marchand de Lignery, commandant at Michilimackinac, was instructed by the Governor to conciliate these warring tribes. Lignery succeeded in arbitrating a settlement but, with cynical disregard for Louisiana, allowed the war between the Fox and the Illinois to continue. Anticipating criticism, he and Vaudreuil explained that the Fox had refused to come to terms with their old enemies. The latter had too often provoked them in the past and still detained several of their tribesmen in captivity.⁹⁸ But when they were questioned on these points by the Louisiana government the Illinois indignantly denied having ever angered the Fox and swore that all prisoners had been released long ago.⁹⁹ Three missionaries ministering to the Illinois supported these statements.¹⁰⁰ Both at Versailles and at New Orleans the feeling grew that Vaudreuil was not only tolerating the war but also arranging for it to continue in order to prevent Louisiana from sharing in the western fur trade.¹⁰¹

Vaudreuil died on October 10, 1725, at the age of eighty-two, in a

⁹⁵From 29,297 *livres tournois* in 1724, the value of the French trade on Lake Ontario fell to 9,151 *livres* in 1725 and to 8,108 in 1726. *Estat des pelleteries provenant de la traite faite au Fort Frontenac, à Niagara et dans le fond du lac Ontario pendant les années 1724 et 1725*, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 47, pp. 263-5; pour l'année 1726, vol. 48, p. 274.

⁹⁶Longueuil et Bégon au ministre, 31 oct. 1725, *ibid.*, vol. 47, pp. 126-126v.

⁹⁷Vaudreuil au ministre, 22 mai 1725, *ibid.*, vol. 47, pp. 171v.-172v.

⁹⁸Copie de la lettre de Lignery à Boisbriant et du Tisé, 23 août 1724, *ibid.*, vol. 56, pp. 257-8; and copie d'une lettre de Vaudreuil à Boisbriant, 17 août 1724, pp. 256-256v.

⁹⁹Copie de la harangue faite par un chef illinois au Chat Blanc, chef saki, concernant la guerre des Renards, n.d., *ibid.*, pp. 252-252v.

¹⁰⁰Copie d'une lettre des pères Kerebin, Boulanger et Thomur, missionnaires, à M. du Tisé, 10 jan. 1725, *ibid.*, pp. 267-267v.

¹⁰¹"Vous pouvez écrire un mot à M. Raudot [A. D. Raudot, intendant of Canada from 1705 to 1711, then intendant of naval classes in France and a director of the Company of the Indies] car M. de Vaudreuil amuse la cour [sic] et mandera que c'est notre faute si nous n'avons la paix. Il parroit n'ovoir [sic] d'autres veues que de faire couler la vante de castor et empêcher en laissant le Renard frapper sur nous le pays de

period of crisis with the English colonies and of worsening relations with Louisiana. Under his successor, Charles de Beauharnois, there was a gradual return to normality. The long-postponed war of extermination against the Fox finally got under way in 1728. In the east the Penobscots, who had emerged as the most powerful group among the Abenakis, concluded a preliminary peace treaty with the English in 1726.¹⁰² The French government had wanted to prolong the conflict¹⁰³ but Vaudreuil's tactics had finally revealed to the Indians that the primary purpose of the war which had cost them so dearly had not been the preservation of their land but the protection of the frontiers of New France.¹⁰⁴ On Lake Ontario, however, the crisis at first continued to deepen. The Iroquois had given Longueuil permission to put up a stone fort at Niagara and work on the project was rapidly pushed forward in the summer and fall of 1726.¹⁰⁵ The aroused New York Assembly retorted by voting a sum of £300 to erect a fortified block-house at Oswego. In the spring of 1727 workmen and two hundred traders "armed as militia and ready to join in defence of the building and their trade" arrived on the site to begin work on the fortifications.¹⁰⁶ Beauharnois immediately dispatched an officer to order the New Yorkers not to proceed with their plans.¹⁰⁷ When this produced no result he mobilized two thousand militiamen and prepared to take military action.¹⁰⁸ But after reflecting upon the far-reaching consequences this unauthorized step might have he prudently decided against armed intervention¹⁰⁹ and an uneasy truce finally descended on Lake Ontario.

By 1727 the Anglo-French "cold war" in North America gave signs of easing. To arrive at a valid assessment of Vaudreuil's frontier policy during those years one must keep in view the circumstances under which it was formulated. In the first place the English trade goods, with the exception of firearms and gunpowder, were of better quality and cheaper than those of the French. This economic inferiority

s'établir et fermer le commerce entre son gouvernement et le vostre" (*ibid.*, p. 267v.). See also de la Chaise, de Boisbriant et Fleuriau à la Compagnie des Indes, 27 juil. 1725, A.N., Col., C^{13A}, vol. 9, p. 60; le ministre à Vaudreuil, 5 juin 1725, A.N., Col., B, vol. 48, p. 862.

¹⁰²Résultat des conférences tenues par les Anglois avec quelques sauvages abénaquis à Falmouth dans le Casco Bay, 1 août 1726, A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 48, pp. 117-117v.

¹⁰³Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Dupuy, 14 mai 1726, *ibid.*, B, vol. 49, p. 662v.

¹⁰⁴Longueuil et Bégon au ministre, 31 oct. 1725, *ibid.*, C^{11A}, vol. 47, pp. 62-3.

¹⁰⁵Longueuil au ministre, 23 juil. 1726, *ibid.*, vol. 48, pp. 396-8; and extrait de la lettre de M. Noyan à M. de Beauharnois, 22 sept. 1726, p. 160.

¹⁰⁶Burnet to the Lords of Trade, 4 Dec. 1726, 9 May 1727, N.Y.C.D., V, 783-5, 818-19.

¹⁰⁷Observations sur le Canada, n.d., A.N., Col., C^{11A}, vol. 50, p. 372.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, vol. 50, p. 375v.; and Dupuy au ministre, 20 oct. 1727, vol. 49, p. 311.

¹⁰⁹Observations sur le Canada, n.d., *ibid.*, vol. 50, p. 377v.

weakened New France's system of Indian alliances and placed Vaudreuil at a disadvantage, for his entire strategy ultimately rested on the loyalty of the natives. Secondly, the home authorities repeatedly failed to provide him with the firm diplomatic support he required to close the fissures opened in the French North American empire by the peace of Utrecht and further weakened his hand by yielding to the Jesuits on the question of the brandy trade. Finally, the Governor's Canadian ties resulted in his hostility to Louisiana and prevented active co-operation between that colony and Canada. All these factors contributed heavily to the gains registered by the English in the years that followed Utrecht.

But even when these failures are taken into account the fact remains that Vaudreuil did give New France the type of protection it urgently required. After 1713 the policy of the English colonies became openly expansionist. Under her capable governors, Robert Hunter and William Burnet, New York concentrated on the task of breaking up New France's western trading empire, and only Vaudreuil's willingness to take bold measures in the Great Lakes area saved the situation for the French. Similarly, had he not relentlessly pursued a policy of containment *vis-à-vis* New England, the settlers of that colony would have expanded eastward, consolidated positions close to the Canadian border, and probably won the alliance of the Abenakis. In case of war they would have been in a good position to strike quickly at the centre of New France. To prevent this, Vaudreuil had encouraged the Indians to resist English expansionism and once again he met with a measure of success. As a result of Abenaki opposition, the New Englanders were unable to advance beyond the St. George River, a short distance east of the Kennebec, and agreed to recognize this stream as the boundary between their settlements and those of the Indians in the peace of 1726.¹¹⁰ No more here than in the West, it is true, had Vaudreuil been able to prevent the English from gaining ground; but in both regions, by his daring and at times ruthless tactics, he had limited the damage suffered by New France during a most critical period of her history.

¹¹⁰Résultat des conférences tenues par les Anglois avec quelques sauvages abénaquis à Falmouth dans le Casco Bay, 1 août 1726, *ibid.*, vol. 48, pp. 117-117v.

Constitutional Crisis and Civil Strife in Newfoundland, February to November 1861

E. C. MOULTON

THE HISTORY OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT in Newfoundland from its inception in 1855 until its demise in 1933 was one of difficulty and crisis. Though the main problems were economic and financial, the period was not without its political crises. One of the most interesting and important of these occurred in 1861, less than a decade after the establishment of responsible government.

The troubles of 1861 originated in the deep-rooted sectarian antagonism which had prevailed in the colony for generations and had become reflected in its political organization. During the era of representative government the political life of the colony was controlled by the English Protestant establishment although Irish Roman Catholics formed nearly one-half of the population. In the early 1850's, for example, the majority of members of the House of Assembly were Roman Catholic, but nine of the ten members of the Executive Council were Protestant.¹ Leading Roman Catholics resented this domination and, supported by a few progressive Protestants, began an organized movement for the establishment of responsible government. Philip F. Little, a Roman Catholic lawyer who had been a member of the Assembly since 1850, led this liberal reform movement while the Roman Catholic bishop, the Right Reverend John Mullock, gave it his strong support. Governor Darling was also sympathetic and despite the vigorous opposition of the Protestant or Tory party the British government agreed to the inauguration of responsible government in 1855. In the general election of that year Little's Liberal party won eighteen of the thirty seats. Three of the Liberals were Protestant and Little, who was anxious that his government should not become identified

¹Newfoundland, House of Assembly, *Journal*, 11 Oct. 1854.

with one religious group, included two Protestants, one from the Assembly and another from the Legislative Council, in his cabinet. The opposition party which was led by Hugh W. Hoyles, a high church Anglican and a prominent St. John's lawyer, was exclusively Protestant and had fought the election largely on the religious issue. Little, however, attempted to keep religion in the background and to distribute patronage equitably. Through his political acumen and the friendly co-operation of the Governor, the transition from representative to responsible government was smoothly effected. This auspicious beginning was, however, deceptive.

In 1858 Little resigned his position to become a judge of the supreme court. He was succeeded in the premiership by John Kent, a fiery Irishman who had immigrated to Newfoundland in the first part of the century. Kent was a less astute leader than Little and his government soon became immersed in difficulties. Although Kent retained two Protestants in the cabinet, the parties continued to be based largely on sectarian differences and in the general election of 1859 violence erupted in Harbour Grace, a town notorious for such incidents. A committee of the Assembly appointed to inquire into the conduct of the election there concluded that one of the Liberal members, James L. Prendergast, had not been legally elected and that his return should be declared null and void.² As a result Prendergast was unseated and a by-election held. On this occasion Prendergast was returned without a contest, but a number of Harbour Grace citizens claimed that the opposition candidate had been forced to withdraw because of the threat of mob violence and petitioned the Assembly for another election.³ A select committee was appointed to consider the petition, but the Assembly was dissolved before it reported.

Charges of electoral corruption were not confined to Harbour Grace. Hoyles and Edward Evans, the defeated candidates for the Burin district in the election of 1859, charged in a petition to the Assembly that Liberal supporters had used bribery, intimidation, and violence to achieve their ends.⁴ They alleged that some polling officers had campaigned for the Liberals and included in the returns the names of people who had not voted or were not legally entitled to vote. Although these allegations were not proved, they were widely publicized in the Protestant Conservative press and helped to undermine the position of the government.

The first real evidence that the Liberals were losing their hold came in 1860 when Bishop Mullock, hitherto their most influential patron, openly attacked the Kent government. The reason for his attack was

²*Ibid.*, 19 April 1860.

³*Ibid.*, 14 Dec. 1860.

⁴*Ibid.*, 13 Feb. 1860.

the failure of the government to provide a steamboat service between St. John's and the fishing villages around the coast. A strong advocate of public improvement, Mullock had looked forward to the introduction of such a service as a means of reducing the isolation and backwardness of the outports. The government, however, though it had previously provided £3000 a year for a steamboat service, rejected a charter which Judge Little had made on its behalf for the use of an American steamer.⁵ The government maintained that the steamer in question was untrustworthy, but Mullock was not convinced. He concluded instead that the government had never had any real intention of introducing the service. In a public letter to his parishioners, he denounced the members of the government as state paupers more interested in their own salaries and in creating useless offices for political patronage than in providing this important public service.⁶ He charged that the members "only consider Outport voters as fools to be cajoled by empty promises, to be bribed by eleemosynary doles of meal or road-jobbing, and useful only as qualifying their Representatives for a place, and enabling them to put their hands into the public chest." The Bishop admitted that his name had previously been used to prop up the Liberals, but now repudiated his connection with "a party who take care of themselves, but do nothing for the people."

These were harsh words, but the government's subsequent handling of the problem of poor relief showed that they were not without considerable justification. In the mid-nineteenth century the economy of Newfoundland was based solely on the fishery, a singularly unstable industry. Even in successful years the mass of the population lived dangerously close to a subsistence level. Whenever the fishery failed there was mass impoverishment and the government was obliged to distribute large sums in poor relief. During the period of representative government relief had become a permanent and increasingly large item of expenditure. In 1854, for example, the government spent £17,500, nearly one-quarter of its total expenditure, on poor relief. The new Liberal government recognized the gravity of the problem and made some retrenchment, but after 1858 expenditure began to increase once again. The problem became acute in 1860 when an unsuccessful fishery, together with a failure in the potato crop, resulted in such widespread destitution that the Assembly was obliged to meet in December—nearly two months before the usual time—to vote extra funds for relief. The Assembly gave the Executive Council a free hand to distribute such assistance as was needed.⁷

⁵Minutes of Executive Council, 1855–61, 2 July 1860, Newfoundland Provincial Archives (N.P.A.).

⁶Mullock to Catholics of St. John's, June 1860, printed in *Patriot*, 4 June 1860.

⁷House of Assembly, *Journal*, 13 Dec. 1860.

Although the need for special measures was widely recognized on this occasion, some concern was expressed over the continuing absence of any organized and controlled system for distributing relief. The Governor, in his speech opening the legislature, criticized the prevailing practice of indiscriminate distribution.⁸ Bishop Mullock, in a letter to the Executive Council shortly afterward, accused it of permitting excessive expenditure on poor relief and urged the adoption of a carefully controlled system of administration.⁹

The government, probably influenced to some extent by these criticisms, drew up a series of regulations for the distribution of relief early in 1861.¹⁰ In future no able-bodied person would receive assistance unless he produced a certificate of need signed by a magistrate or clergyman. The poor commissioners were henceforth to keep lists of the recipients of relief and these were to be reviewed weekly by a committee of the Executive Council and then published. These regulations, by placing the distribution of relief largely outside the realm of political influence, would undoubtedly have gone a long way in eliminating corruption.

Despite the obvious need for such a reform not all Liberal members of the Assembly were prepared to relinquish control over what hitherto had been a useful source of patronage. When the government laid its proposals before the Assembly, Patrick Nowlan, Liberal member for Harbour Main, introduced a resolution in which he maintained that "any regulations made on the subject of poor relief should not ignore the just influence of the Representatives of the people, who are the constitutional and responsible guardians of the public welfare."¹¹

The subsequent debates on this subject revealed bitter dissension among the Liberals. Anxious to gain majority support for the reforms the government leaders frankly acknowledged the corruption of the existing system. Kent declared that funds had been squandered upon the able-bodied poor, upon drunkards and impostors, much of it without either the knowledge or authority of the Executive Council.¹² G. J. Hogsett, the Attorney General, charged that Joseph Shea, the Poor Commissioner, spent as much as £12,000 a year without either consultation or control.¹³ Hogsett also condemned Nowlan for trying to undermine the government and charged that he was merely acting

⁸*Ibid.*, 3 Dec. 1860.

⁹Referred to in Kent to Mullock, 27 Dec. 1860, Letter Books of Colonial Secretary's Office, 1858-64, N.P.A.

¹⁰Kent to Receiver General, 3 Jan. 1861, *ibid.*

¹¹House of Assembly, *Journal*, 22 Jan. 1861.

¹²Newfoundland, House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 23 Jan. 1861, printed in *Newfoundlander*, 28 Jan. 1861.

¹³*Ibid.*, 24 Jan. 1861, printed in *Newfoundlander*, 31 Jan. 1861.

“as the catspaw” for the Speaker, Ambrose Shea, who had “bullied and brow-beaten” the government for months. Shea, perturbed by these charges, reminded Kent that if he, as leader of the government, had permitted improper expenditure it only proved that he was unfit to remain in that position.¹⁴ These outspoken allegations produced such excitement in the Assembly that Shea adjourned the sitting in order to avert violence.¹⁵

The government was now in a serious position. Kent’s leadership had been attacked by one of the most capable members of the party while four other Liberals were in open revolt against the new relief regulations. Government leaders realized the gravity of the situation and attempted to reach an understanding with the rebel members. When the House met again on January 28, Kent announced that the differences had been settled. However, agreement was achieved only by the government giving way to the demands of the dissident group. Members of the Assembly were to be on boards for relief distribution in their respective districts and to possess the same powers as magistrates and clergymen.¹⁶ Nor were the lists of recipients of relief to be published. In short, there was nothing to prevent the abuse which the government had so openly admitted to exist.

The government’s surrender on this important question led to renewed attacks by Bishop Mullock. In his annual pastoral letter, he called upon the clergy, as the real guardians of the poor, to watch closely the distribution of relief in their parishes, to make sure that the really destitute were not neglected, and to expose political squandering of the poor funds.¹⁷ In a private letter to the Governor (not revealed to the Kent government¹⁸) Mullock was even more critical. He maintained that if members of the Assembly were allowed to distribute relief freely much of it would be used for political bribery and the colony would be bankrupt in a few years.¹⁹ “The whole system,” he declared, “was one of robbery and demoralization on all sides; for the distribution of Poor Relief among the idle and improvident and for political purposes, was the worst species of political robbery, debasing as it did the distributors (if anything could do that) and debasing and demoralizing the recipients nearly to the level of their corruptors.”

¹⁴*Ibid.*, printed in *Daily News*, 25 Jan. 1861.

¹⁵*Newfoundlander*, 23 Jan. 1861.

¹⁶House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 28 Jan. 1861, printed in *Newfoundlander*, 4 Feb. 1861.

¹⁷Printed in *Newfoundlander*, 11 Feb. 1861.

¹⁸Kent to Governor, 12 Dec. 1862, Miscellaneous Papers and Despatches of the Governor’s Office, 1862, N.P.A.

¹⁹Mullock to Governor, 10 Feb. 1861, extracts quoted in Coen to Kent, 11 Dec. 1862, *ibid.*

Despite the estrangement of the Bishop and its own internal dissension, the government might have weathered the storm had it not been for the growing hostility of the Governor, Sir Alexander Bannerman. In contrast to his predecessor, Darling, who had retired in 1857, Bannerman was far from reconciled to the system of responsible government. In his opinion this system increased rather than diminished the responsibility of the governor. "When advice is tendered to me which I believe to be erroneous," he wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "I cannot forget that responsibility rests on the Governor alone, and none whatever (except to their constituencies) on his advisers."²⁰ To his credit Bannerman made no secret of his views. Shortly after taking up his appointment he informed Kent that during his term as governor of Prince Edward Island he had once dissolved the Assembly in opposition to the unanimous opinion of his responsible advisers.²¹ He warned Kent that he would never hesitate to reject his advice if he considered it to be wrong.

No responsible ministry could be expected to agree with such views and Kent's was no exception. It was not surprising, therefore, that Bannerman and the government were in almost constant friction. At times, according to Bannerman, Kent and the cabinet threatened resignation to pressure him into accepting their decisions.²² The Governor, on his part, seriously considered dismissing the cabinet in 1859 over its failure to inform him promptly of the election riots in Harbour Grace. Bannerman believed that the information had been withheld deliberately and was not convinced by the government's claim that it was unintentional.²³ "If any occurrence of a similar nature shall happen in future," he warned, "and I am kept in the dark by those whose duty it is to pursue a very different course to that which they have adopted on the present occasion, I shall have only one alternative left, and that will be to dispense with their services."²⁴ He had not dismissed them on this occasion because he believed that were a general election held at that time the Liberal government would have been returned to power.²⁵ By 1861, however, the situation had changed. The Liberal government, as we have seen, had lost the support of Bishop Mullock and was torn by internal dissension.

These developments pleased Bannerman whose own contempt for

²⁰Bannerman to Labouchere, 26 Oct. 1857, C.O. 194/150, P.R.O. (microfilm in N.P.A.).

²¹Bannerman to Kent, 18 Aug. 1858, Miscellaneous Letter Books of the Governor's Office, 1855-58, N.P.A.

²²Bannerman to Lytton and enclosure, 31 Dec. 1858, C.O. 194/153, and to Newcastle, 5 March 1860, C.O. 194/161.

²³Bannerman to Newcastle, 16 Jan. 1860, C.O. 194/161.

²⁴Bannerman to E. D. Shea, acting Colonial Secretary, 14 Dec. 1859, Miscellaneous Papers and Despatches of the Governor's Office, 1859.

²⁵Bannerman to Newcastle, 3 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

his ministers had steadily increased. He agreed with Mullock that the term "legalized robbers" aptly described them.²⁶ He maintained that Kent was unworthy of his position and that the Liberals had been able to gain a majority in the Assembly only through corruption during elections.²⁷ He thought that the Bishop's criticism of the government had begun to open the eyes of the people to its corruption.²⁸ He thought, too, that if a suitable occasion arose Mullock would not be averse even to the dismissal of the government.²⁹ Bannerman hoped, as he informed the Colonial Office late in 1860, "to remain long enough here to lower some of them a peg when the opportunity offers and also try to get the Colony out of some of the difficulties which they have contrived to get it into."³⁰ What Bannerman regarded as a suitable opportunity occurred early in 1861.

During an Assembly debate on February 25, Thomas Glen, the Receiver General, announced the withdrawal of a currency bill because the Governor had objected to some of its provisions.³¹ The bill had been designed to eliminate confusion in the colony's finances resulting from the use of both British sterling and Newfoundland sterling, the latter being of slightly lower value. In future all financial transactions of the government were to be in Newfoundland sterling. For some time past the government had been paying salaries in that medium though its legality in doing so had been questioned by some prominent judges and their petition was pending before the supreme court. The currency bill would, therefore, have superseded the petition of the judges and denied them a hearing in the court. It was on these grounds that Hoyles, the opposition leader, criticized the bill in the Assembly. Hoyles declared that the judges considered the bill so unjust that, on his advice, they had petitioned the Governor against it.³² Kent had not been informed of their petition and was indignant at receiving the news from Hoyles. He bluntly charged that "the Currency Bill . . . was defeated by the minority acting in concert with the Judges and the Governor."³³

Bannerman, who claimed that his objections to the bill had not been influenced by the judges, reacted strongly against Kent's allegations. He wrote immediately to Kent asking whether the press reports of his

²⁶Bannerman to Blackwood, 7 June 1860, C.O. 194/161.

²⁷Bannerman to Newcastle, 5 and 20 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

²⁸Bannerman to Newcastle, 3 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

²⁹Bannerman to Newcastle, 19 Nov. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

³⁰Bannerman to Fortesque, 19 Dec. 1860, C.O. 194/161.

³¹House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 25 Feb. 1861, printed in *Newfoundlander*, 7 March 1861.

³²*Ibid.*

³³House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 25 Feb. 1861, printed in *Daily News*, 27 Feb. 1861.

speech were correct.³⁴ Kent curtly replied that he did not consider the Governor had any constitutional right to question him about anything which he had said in the Assembly.³⁵ Bannerman disagreed and the following day informed the Premier that he was responsible to him for both his language and actions in the Assembly and could not refuse an explanation. "I consider it impossible for me to carry on the public business of the Colony with the present Government," Bannerman continued, "and it becomes my duty to inform you that I must dispense with the services of yourself and your colleagues, and that you hold offices only until a new Government shall be formed. . . ."³⁶

This sudden dismissal without a second opportunity to explain or retract came as an intense shock to the government and aroused an immediate furore among its supporters. The *Patriot*, edited by a Liberal member of the Assembly, termed the reason given by Bannerman for the expulsion of his Executive Council as "a mere pretext . . . vilest of shams."³⁷ The *Newfoundlander*, whose editor, E. D. Shea, was a member of Kent's government, took a similar view and accused Bannerman of having a burning desire to take the opposition into his services.³⁸ Kent himself took much the same position. In a speech in the Assembly he condemned Bannerman for taking such precipitate action without bringing the matter before the Council or asking him to come to Government House for a personal meeting. He charged that Bannerman had been influenced by the Conservative minority to dispense with the entire government. "A despotism at Government House," he declared, "were determined to get rid of the present Government and they made my language in this House an excuse for doing so."³⁹ There was considerable truth in Kent's assertion. When Bannerman received Kent's letter of February 27 refusing to explain his statements in the Assembly, he was uncertain which course he should follow and called in Hoyles, the Conservative leader, to advise him.⁴⁰ Hoyles was a distinguished lawyer though his opinion in this instance was hardly likely to be an unbiased one. He advised Bannerman that his only course was to dismiss the government, but asked him to wait until he consulted another lawyer.⁴¹ Hoyles consulted F. B. T.

³⁴Bannerman to Kent, 27 Feb. 1861, quoted in Bannerman to Kent, 28 Feb. 1861, printed in *Public Ledger*, 5 March 1861.

³⁵Kent to Bannerman, 27 Feb. 1861, *ibid.*

³⁶Bannerman to Kent, 28 Feb. 1861, printed in *Public Ledger*, 5 March 1861.

³⁷Editorial, 4 March 1861.

³⁸Editorial, 4 March 1861.

³⁹House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 4 March 1861, printed in *Daily News*, 5 March 1861.

⁴⁰Bannerman to Newcastle, 20 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

Carter, another prominent opposition lawyer. Carter endorsed Hoyles's views. It was on the basis of this advice and after receiving a promise from Hoyles to form a new government that Bannerman informed Kent of his dismissal.

Bannerman must have realized that the ousting of a Liberal, and predominantly Roman Catholic government, and the appointment of a Protestant Conservative one would result in bitter sectarian strife. It was undoubtedly in an attempt to minimize this, as well as to gain the support of a majority in the Assembly for the Conservatives, that Bannerman advised Hoyles to form a coalition.⁴² Bannerman probably hoped that the offer of cabinet positions to Roman Catholics would ensure the support of Bishop Mullock for the dismissal of the Kent government and thus divide the Liberal party on the issue. Hoyles accepted the Governor's advice and informed the Assembly that three cabinet posts would be reserved for Roman Catholics. Lawrence O'Brien, a Roman Catholic Liberal and President of the Legislative Council, accepted Hoyles's invitation to join the government. Hoyles also invited Ambrose Shea, the prominent Liberal member of the Assembly who had attacked Kent's leadership, to accept office but he refused.⁴³ Apparently, no further effort was made to induce Liberals into coalition. In the Assembly, therefore, Hoyles still had only the support of the Conservative minority.

Hoping to avoid an election in the spring when many fishermen would be at the seal hunt, Hoyles offered the Liberals the option of his continuing the business of the session until the autumn. The Liberals refused and instead introduced a resolution of no confidence in the government.⁴⁴ The resolution was adopted by a vote of sixteen to twelve. Bannerman now had no alternative but to dissolve the Assembly. This he did on March 7. A general election was planned for the end of April.

Bannerman had acted unwisely in his high-handed and hasty dismissal of his Liberal ministers and was now in a potentially embarrassing position. Despite his attempts to justify his behaviour and to minimize the danger of the situation, even the officials in Whitehall were not impressed. In the first place, they largely disagreed with the arbitrary dismissal of the government. For example, Sir Frederic Rogers, permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office, wrote in a confidential memorandum:

⁴²Bannerman to Newcastle, 14 March 1861, C.O. 194/165.

⁴³House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 4 March 1861, printed in *Daily News*, 6 March 1861.

⁴⁴House of Assembly, *Journal*, 5 March 1861.

I confess I feel much doubt whether Mr. Kent's conduct was such as to justify Sir A. Bannerman in resorting to what is somewhat in the nature of a "coup d'état." Certain direct and unbearable results would no doubt warrant the representative of the Sovereign . . . in appealing to the Country for protection against the existing House of Assembly and the Ministry which it supported. But considering Colonial habits of speech, I can hardly view Mr. Kent's expressions as of so extreme a character as to call for an extra-constitutional step.⁴⁵

The Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State, shared this view. "Nothing," he commented, "can justify this extreme step except that which is generally held to justify strong measures—success."⁴⁶ Success of course depended upon whether Hoyles gained a majority in the forthcoming election. If he did not and Kent and his party were victorious at the polls, Newcastle realized that the Governor would be placed in a virtually impossible situation. "If an Assembly is returned by the Constituents favourable to Mr. Hoyles," Newcastle wrote, "all will be well . . . and Mr. Kent may spit fire and fury as much as he likes—but if the reverse should be the result, he [Bannerman] has played his last card, has brought Government to a deadlock, and must probably resign or be recalled."⁴⁷ Newcastle was less candid in his correspondence with Bannerman though he did express his concern over the implications of a Liberal electoral victory.

Though Bannerman undoubtedly believed that the Colonial Office would stand by him in any crisis, he, too, was worried about the election outcome. His greatest immediate anxiety was over the position which Bishop Mullock would take in the controversy. He did not have long to wait. In a public letter, about three weeks after the dismissal of the government, Mullock came out strongly against Bannerman's action and realigned himself firmly with the Liberals.⁴⁸ He admitted that he was no apologist for the Kent government, but maintained that the Liberals alone had improved the country by building roads, providing grants for education, and establishing a more efficient postal service. The opposition, he charged, had resisted every public improvement. Mullock deplored the way in which recent events had fanned sectarian antagonism. He declined to comment on the rumours that the government had been dismissed because of Tory charges that it was a Roman Catholic administration. He did, however, appeal for Catholic unity to avert the danger of Protestant-Tory ascendancy. He wrote:

⁴⁵Minute, Rogers, n.d., C.O. 194/165, pp. 153-8.

⁴⁶Minute, Newcastle, n.d., *ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸Mullock to Editor of *Record*, 21 March 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 16 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

My advice then to the Catholic electors is this—Divide and conquer has always been the rule of your enemies, by this they have succeeded in enslaving you, by this they hope to do so again. . . . Your civil and religious liberty are concerned, your schools, your colleges, everything which you value as Catholics; for it is a melancholy fact which history will not allow us to contradict, that wherever Protestants got *undivided* power, they invariably used it in old times, and even now where they can . . . for the enslavement of the Catholic people and the destruction of their religious establishments. . . . Be divided and you will be what you were 40 years ago.⁴⁹

Mullock's highly charged statement undoubtedly aroused the emotions of the Roman Catholic population while it also intensified Protestant antagonism. To make matters worse, the Bishop of the Church of England, Dr. Edward Field, an opponent of responsible government and a firm supporter of Protestant ascendancy, entered the political arena. In a letter published early in April, he charged the Kent government with incompetence and praised Bannerman for his action.⁵⁰ He maintained that the Hoyles government was composed of men far superior to those of the former ministry and was confident of a Tory victory in the elections. Field, like his Roman Catholic counterpart, only added to the danger of an already explosive situation.

Though political and sectarian feeling was strongly aroused there was no highly organized election campaign. Contests were held in only four of the fifteen districts and in one of these the contest was between rival Liberal candidates. The Tories were returned by acclamation in the districts they had formerly held, as well as in Burin, a traditionally Liberal district. Altogether fourteen Tories were returned without a contest. If the Liberals were to maintain their majority they would have to hold the other sixteen seats. The only districts in which a Liberal victory was in doubt were Carbonear and Harbour Grace, districts which like Burin had returned Liberals since 1855 but which had slight Protestant majorities. In view of the importance of the voting in these two districts and of the traditional religious antagonisms prevailing there, the Governor took the wise precaution of stationing one hundred men of the Royal Newfoundland Company in Harbour Grace just before the election.

In Harbour Grace the two former Liberal members, John Hayward, a Protestant, and James Prendergast, a Roman Catholic, were nominated, along with Henry Moore, a second Protestant candidate. Shortly after the nominations on April 26 fighting broke out between the supporters of the Protestant candidates and Prendergast's Roman

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰Field to Editor of *Telegraph*, 6 April 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 17 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

Catholic followers.⁵¹ R. J. Pinsent, the stipendary magistrate, called out the military forces, partly in an attempt to prevent the entry into the town of some four hundred Catholics from Carbonear who had come to support their co-religionists. The troops failed in their attempt and the Prendergast party, now greatly strengthened, gained control of the main street where they inflicted considerable damage on property belonging to the supporters of the Protestant candidates. Pinsent tried to stop the depredations by marching the troops back and forth through the streets. Although this proved largely ineffective, Pinsent refused the "last and deadly resort" of ordering the troops to open fire.⁵² The mob inflicted little personal injury and Pinsent feared that if the troops opened fire there would be considerable loss of life. Although he was subsequently suspended by Bannerman for his failure to take more decisive action, Pinsent was no doubt right.

No further rioting occurred in Harbour Grace, but the atmosphere remained tense and the Protestant community was in great anxiety. On April 27, W. H. Ridley, a local Protestant magistrate, wrote to a member of Hoyles's government: "We are in an awful state, there is no power in the country civil or military that can in the slightest manner allow liberty of action, or freedom of election; the state of public feeling here is so intense that rather than allow the second candidate to be returned to support Hoyles the whole town and the lives of the Protestants would be sacrificed by the Roman Catholic Party. . . . They are like madmen—Protestants are not safe by day or night."⁵³ In view of the gravity of the situation, Moore, the second Protestant candidate, withdrew his nomination on April 29, three days before voting was to begin. Because of the circumstances of his withdrawal, the returning officer, instead of declaring Hayward and Prendergast elected, left it to the Assembly to decide whether they should be allowed to sit in the House.⁵⁴

In the neighbouring town of Carbonear tension was also high. Fearing the outbreak of riots on April 25, the local magistrates requested military protection from Harbour Grace. Pinsent went immediately to Carbonear with twenty-one soldiers but finding only a few drunken men in the streets returned to Harbour Grace. The following day the former representative of the district, Edmund Hanrahan, a Roman Catholic Liberal, was nominated along with a Protestant Conservative candidate.⁵⁵ There was one brief clash between the rival parties though

⁵¹Pinsent to acting Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 3 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³Ridley to Carter, 27 April 1861, *ibid.*

⁵⁴Bannerman to Newcastle, 8 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

⁵⁵Rorke to Carter, 7 May 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 3 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

little damage resulted. Tension continued to mount, however, and threats were made against the life and property of the Protestant candidate. He therefore withdrew his nomination on April 27. Although the circumstances were similar to those of Moore's withdrawal in Harbour Grace, in Carbonear Hanrahan was declared elected.

There was trouble, too, in the capital, a Liberal Roman Catholic stronghold. In St. John's West, where three candidates were to be elected, John Casey, Henry Renouf, and Thomas Talbot were nominated for the Liberals. P. M. Barron was nominated as an independent Roman Catholic candidate and Kenneth McLea, a Protestant merchant, represented the Tories.⁵⁶ After the nominations a group of Liberal supporters gathered near McLea's business premises. The occupants of the store, either as the result of an attack or the fear of one, opened fire on the crowd wounding six or seven people.⁵⁷ Fortunately some Roman Catholic clergy arrived on the scene in time to prevent retaliation by the mob. Shortly afterwards Barron and McLea withdrew their nominations and following the Carbonear pattern the three Liberal members were elected. In St. John's East disturbances were avoided even though the three-man Liberal team was opposed by a Protestant candidate. Although there was little doubt of a Liberal victory, probably the main reason for the absence of violence was Bishop Mullock's appeal to Roman Catholics on polling day to behave peaceably.⁵⁸ The three Liberals were elected each with a majority of three to one over their Protestant opponent.⁵⁹

The disturbances so far discussed were the result of clashes between Roman Catholic Liberals and Protestant Conservatives. However, in Harbour Main, where the most serious riots occurred, the contest was between two rival sets of Roman Catholic Liberals who differed over the question of clerical interference in politics. According to a Tory newspaper, two of the candidates, Patrick Nowlan and Thomas Byrne, were opposed to such interference.⁶⁰ The other candidates, G. J. Hogsett and Charles Furey, had no such objections and were in fact supported by the Roman Catholic clergy. Indeed, the Reverend Kyran Walsh, parish priest of Harbour Main, actively campaigned for their election.⁶¹ Whereas the latter candidates had a large backing in the

⁵⁶*Public Ledger*, 30 April 1861.

⁵⁷Henry Winton, a Tory, in *A Chapter in the History of Newfoundland for the Year 1861* (St. John's, 1861), p. 11, claimed that the mob invaded McLea's store. The *Patriot*, a Liberal newspaper, in an editorial of 6 May 1861 alleged the Liberal supporters did no damage.

⁵⁸*Patriot*, 6 May 1861.

⁵⁹*Royal Gazette*, 7 May 1861.

⁶⁰*Public Ledger*, 17 May 1861.

⁶¹Evidence of Walsh, House of Assembly, *Journal*, 1861, appendix, pp. 58-61. The reason for this may have been partly that Hogsett had strongly supported Kent's efforts to reform the relief system whereas Nowlan had led the opposition to such reform.

town of Harbour Main, support was divided in some of the neighbouring villages and it was there that trouble erupted.

The polling regulations stipulated that the people of Salmon Cove, known supporters of Hogsett and Furey, were to vote at Cat's Cove, where the majority favoured their opponents. Fearing that this might lead to violence, Hogsett and Furey requested that the Hoyles government permit the Salmon Cove electors to vote at Harbour Main.⁶² However, Nowlan and Byrne opposed such a change and Hoyles decided that the polling places established by the former administration should not be altered.⁶³ This decision was no doubt unwise in view of the existing tension in the Harbour Main district.

During the election campaign the Cat's Cove people threatened not to allow Salmon Cove electors to vote there. Consequently, on polling day about one hundred and fifty supporters of Hogsett and Furey from Harbour Main accompanied the Salmon Cove voters to Cat's Cove. Father Walsh, who accompanied the crowd, maintained that it was orderly and unarmed.⁶⁴ The Cat's Cove people, however, feared that there would be rioting if the supporters of Hogsett and Furey entered their village and had taken measures to protect themselves. They blockaded the road into their village and about fifty men, many of them armed with guns, stood guard there as the outsiders approached. At the request of Father Walsh one of the Cat's Cove men promised that the Salmon Cove voters might enter the community if the rest of the crowd retired. When the crowd failed to do so some of the Cat's Cove men, fearing an assault on their position, opened fire. George Furey of Harbour Main was killed and nine others were injured, some of them seriously. The villagers stood their ground and the crowd, thanks no doubt to the influence of Father Walsh, retreated without retaliating.

The Salmon Cove electors, having been forcibly prevented from voting at the place legally appointed, then went on to Harbour Main where thirty-six of them recorded their votes for Hogsett and Furey. As it turned out their votes were crucial—if they were accepted Hogsett and Furey had a majority; if they were rejected victory went to their opponents. As one might expect, strong disagreement arose over the legality of these votes. To protect the returning officer, Patrick Strapp, who was caught in the centre of this controversy, Bannerman sent a strong military force from St. John's to Harbour Main.⁶⁵ Before it arrived, however, Strapp issued a certificate declaring

⁶²House of Assembly, *Journal*, 16 May 1861.

⁶³Bannerman to Newcastle and enclosure, 16 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

⁶⁴Evidence of Walsh, House of Assembly, *Journal*, appendix, pp. 58–61.

⁶⁵Bannerman to Newcastle, 8 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

Hogsett and Furey elected.⁶⁶ He later confessed that Hogsett had written the certificate and that he had felt compelled to sign it "from threats . . . that the lives of myself and family would be taken and my property destroyed if I did not do so."⁶⁷ He admitted that the outcome hinged upon the legality of the Cat's Cove votes. Under these circumstances the Hoyles government decided to reject the Harbour Main returns and to leave it to the Assembly to decide who should represent the district. Whatever Hoyles's motives, this decision was politically expedient for the disfranchisement of this Liberal district along with that of Harbour Grace meant that the membership of the new Assembly would be fourteen Tories to twelve Liberals. Newcastle's criterion of "success" had been met.

The violence of the election and the fact that the Hoyles government achieved victory only by disfranchising two districts helped to intensify sectarian bitterness. The extreme gravity of the situation was reflected not only in the hostile comments of rival newspapers but in the worsening relations between Bishop Mullock and the Governor. At the time of the election Mullock informed Bannerman that he feared "a war of extermination" had begun against Roman Catholics and that his clergy might not be able to prevent retaliation.⁶⁸ Bannerman denied that there were any grounds for the Bishop's apprehension but alleged that the Roman Catholic clergy used their influence for peace only after violence had actually occurred.⁶⁹ This charge, which was largely unjust, aroused Mullock's indignation. He defended his clergy and placed the blame for violence squarely upon the Protestant community.

Every insult that a ruffian press . . . could heap on them [Roman Catholics] and their religion, every calumny that malice could invent were daily disseminated among an excited people. Continued appeals to the Protestants to arm themselves with revolvers . . . appeals to the most ignorant portion of the Protestant population to take the law into their own hands. . . . All this going on for months . . . has at length produced the fruit to be expected from it. Add to this a general belief among Catholics, disseminated I know not how, but which I always endeavoured to combat, that the authorities were in direct opposition to everything Catholic, and that every effort would be made to deprive Catholics . . . of the rights guaranteed them by Responsible Government.⁷⁰

To make matters worse, this correspondence was published in the *Record*, a Roman Catholic newspaper friendly to the Bishop, shortly before the opening of the legislature on May 13.⁷¹

⁶⁶House of Assembly, *Journal*, 1861, appendix, p. 122.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁶⁸Mullock to Bannerman, 29 April 1861, printed in *Public Ledger*, 14 May 1861.

⁶⁹Bannerman to Mullock, 29 April 1861, *ibid.*

⁷⁰Mullock to Bannerman, 30 April 1861, *ibid.*

⁷¹Minute, Bannerman, 20 May 1861, C.O. 194/165, p. 293.

The atmosphere in St. John's that day was tense. Liberal extremists had not accepted the validity of the government's disfranchisement of the two districts. When the Assembly opened, two of the Harbour Main candidates, Hogsett and Furey, entered and seated themselves although they had not been legally declared elected or sworn in as members. Hoyles requested them to withdraw. Furey complied but Hogsett refused and was evicted by the police.⁷² The ejection of these two Roman Catholics aroused the feelings of the large crowd of Liberal supporters gathered outside the Colonial Building. They openly jeered Bannerman on his return to Government House and shouted threats against Conservative leaders; only the presence of a strong military guard averted their efforts to force their way into the Colonial Building.

The crowd, which gradually dispersed from around the Colonial Building, gathered late in the afternoon on Water Street, the main thoroughfare and business section of St. John's. Led by Hogsett, they damaged the premises of two Roman Catholic businessmen who were relatives of Nowlan, one of the rival Harbour Main candidates.⁷³ Local magistrates, hearing of this property damage, requested Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, the commander of the St. John's garrison, to call out the troops to prevent further depredations. The appearance of the troops increased public excitement and led more people to congregate.⁷⁴ The soldiers were regarded as an instrument of repression by the crowd and quickly became the main object of their anger. For about an hour Grant, the magistrates, and members of the Roman Catholic clergy tried without success to persuade the people to disperse.⁷⁵ As night approached, the crowd became more turbulent. One man, apparently intoxicated, attempted to knock Grant from his horse. His arrest further angered the mob and it harassed the troops more than ever. To ensure the safety of the troops, Grant decided that a crowd gathered above them on Church Hill had to be dispersed. Adjutant Arthur Quill, with a force of eighty-four men, was ordered to clear the hill. Quill later testified that he "kept exhorting the men to steadiness under the volleys of stones, which struck, not only almost every man of the leading section, but individuals in every section of the column," and that he "noticed several men of the troops bleeding profusely from severe head-wounds."⁷⁶ Nerves were tense and tempers frayed on both sides. A gun went off among the crowd and the leading section of fourteen troops immediately opened fire. When the smoke

⁷²House of Assembly, *Journal*, 13 May 1861.

⁷³Bannerman to Newcastle, 17 May 1861, C.O. 194/165.

⁷⁴Grant estimated the crowd at over two thousand.

⁷⁵Evidence of Grant, 15 May 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 2 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁷⁶Evidence of Quill, 16 May 1861, *ibid.*

cleared a few seconds later, three members of the crowd were fatally wounded and a number of others seriously injured. Among the latter was Father Jeremiah O'Donnell, one of the Roman Catholic priests who had been working fervently to prevent violence.

Fearing that the crowd would quickly reassemble to avenge themselves on the troops, Judge Little and the Roman Catholic clergy implored Grant to withdraw the troops to the barracks.⁷⁷ Little and the clergy promised to be responsible for the peace of the town and assured Grant that they would have the full support of Bishop Mullock. Grant agreed to give them a chance. Although the troops were stoned as they retired, none was seriously injured.

As the troops withdrew the bells of the Roman Catholic cathedral pealed forth over the city summoning the crowd, by now five thousand strong, to their church. There, Bishop Mullock implored them to be calm and return peacefully to their homes. His task was not easy. A contemporary source states that not until the Bishop "produced the chalice containing the sacred host, and adjured the excited thousands by this holiest symbol of their faith, did he prevail to exact a muttered pledge that they would return in peace and order to their habitations."⁷⁸ His efforts were successful and except for the burning of some property belonging to a Protestant judge the night passed without incident.

An uneasy peace prevailed in St. John's the following day. Mullock, deeply worried by the situation, visited Bannerman and informed him that he had heard that riots were planned for the coming night. He warned that ten thousand men in St. John's were armed with sealing guns and feared that "the town might be destroyed and plundered."⁷⁹ He promised, however, that if the troops were not called out again he and his clergy would do all in their power to keep the people quiet. Bannerman, realizing that the Bishop had prevented a disaster on the previous night, promised to use his influence to keep the troops in the garrison. Once again the Bishop's efforts were successful. The following night Hoyles's summer cottage was burned to the ground, but that was the last incident in the St. John's area. There were further outbreaks of violence in Conception Bay, but military reinforcements soon re-established order there.

Once peace had been restored, the government was faced with the difficult question of the representation of Harbour Grace and Harbour Main. The Assembly received two petitions from Harbour Grace: one

⁷⁷Evidence of Magistrate Bennett, 15 May 1861, *ibid.*

⁷⁸Winton, *History of Newfoundland 1861*, p. 15.

⁷⁹Bannerman to Newcastle, 17 May 1861, C.O. 194/165. These were Bannerman's words.

demanding that the former Liberal candidates, Hayward and Prendergast, be declared elected; the other that either Moore and Hayward be seated or a by-election held.⁸⁰ The Assembly appointed a select committee to inquire into the question, but it failed to submit a report and, for the time being, Harbour Grace remained disfranchised. A decision was reached in the Harbour Main dispute. A majority report, signed by the five Conservative members of the select committee, concluded that Nowlan and Byrne had a majority of legal votes and that they should be declared elected. The two Liberal members of the committee dissented from this conclusion and recommended that Hogsett and Furey should be seated or the election declared null and void. The other Liberal members of the Assembly largely favoured the minority report. Although Nowlan and Byrne were expected to sit with the Liberals they were opposed to clerical influence in the party and thus were unlikely to be as staunch in its support as Hogsett and Furey. The Assembly decided the issue on a party basis, the Conservatives securing the adoption of the majority report. The party allegiance of Nowlan and Byrne was not put to the test in that session for the House was prorogued the day after they took their seats. In subsequent sessions, however, they generally voted with the Liberals.

The government also conducted inquiries into the various riots, but, like the Harbour Main electoral decision, they failed to satisfy many Liberals because Bannerman and the government were largely exonerated from blame for the outbreaks. Many Liberals believed that the riots would never have taken place but for Bannerman's precipitate dismissal of Kent's government and his open preference for the Conservatives. They therefore decided to petition for the Governor's removal. When public meetings held to get support for the petition did not prove very successful, the petition was placed for signing at the entrance gates of the Roman Catholic cathedral in St. John's on two successive Sundays.⁸¹ After being signed by about eight thousand people, including the two Roman Catholic bishops in the colony,⁸² copies of the petition were sent to the Queen and the British parliament.⁸³

The petition⁸⁴ blamed Bannerman for the riots and claimed that he had betrayed the constitution both by appointing a minority government and by conniving with Hoyles to disfranchise Harbour Grace and Harbour Main in the general election. It charged him with co-operating with the Conservatives to institute a "Reign of Terror, Tyranny

⁸⁰House of Assembly, *Journal*, 21 May and 14 June 1861.

⁸¹Bannerman to Newcastle, 31 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁸²There was a second bishop in Harbour Grace.

⁸³Bannerman to Newcastle and enclosure, 13 Aug. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

and Fraud.” “In consequence of the maladministration of the Government . . . by . . . Bannerman, and of his total disregard of the constitutional rights and privileges of the people, and of his gross partizanship [*sic*] with a few of the Mercantile body . . . he has,” the petition declared, “rendered himself personally obnoxious to a large class of the People of Newfoundland.” It appealed for his removal and the dissolution of the existing Assembly.

Bannerman regarded the petition as a series of lies and did not take it too seriously.⁸⁵ He believed that the efforts to secure his removal stemmed from the Roman Catholic clergy and not from the Roman Catholic population as a whole. There seems to have been much truth in this. Only eight thousand people out of an adult Roman Catholic population of some thirty thousand had signed the petition. Indeed, Bannerman believed, again with considerable justification, that many prominent Roman Catholics “greatly deprecate the course which their Bishop has been taking over the last four or five months.”⁸⁶ Only three Liberal members of the Assembly had signed the petition and through all the strife the Roman Catholic, Lawrence O’Brien, remained president of the Legislative Council and a member of the Hoyles government.⁸⁷ In Bannerman’s opinion, the petition was designed to further religious dissension and anti-British feeling in Newfoundland and elsewhere. He believed it was especially intended for Ireland “to show that Newfoundland is a nest of Orangeism . . . determined to put down all Roman Catholics.”⁸⁸ To Bannerman the issue at stake was whether the Queen, through her representative, was to govern Newfoundland or whether, to use Hoyles’s words, it was to be ruled by “a purely Romish despotism, masked by nominally free institutions.”⁸⁹ Bannerman was determined that the former system should prevail.

The British government rejected the petition for Bannerman’s removal, but Newcastle was becoming tired of his continual lamentations on Newfoundland affairs. On one of Bannerman’s letters complaining of seditious attacks by the Roman Catholic press, Newcastle commented: “This is one of Sir Alexander Bannerman’s periodical laments. There is nothing to be done about it from hence. Local officers must keep the peace, not the Secretary of State.”⁹⁰ He turned down an urgent request from Bannerman for a permanent increase in

⁸⁵Bannerman to Newcastle, 31 July 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

⁸⁷Bannerman to Newcastle, 13 and 14 Aug. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁸⁸Bannerman to Newcastle, 31 July 1861, C.O. 194/166. There was as yet no Orange Society in the colony but the Roman Catholic *Record* frequently charged Bannerman and Hoyles with being part of an Orange faction.

⁸⁹Quoted in Bannerman to Newcastle, 28 Aug. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁹⁰Memo, Newcastle, n.d., C.O. 194/166, p. 287.

the size of the St. John's garrison from one hundred fifty-eight men to at least three hundred. Newcastle regretted that rioting accompanied the working of responsible government in Newfoundland, but emphasized that these disturbances must be controlled by a local police force and not imperial troops.⁹¹ He also suggested that a public investigation into Bannerman's behaviour be held in the colony if the Liberals demanded it. For obvious reasons, however, the Hoyles government avoided such an inquiry.

Although the petition and the flurry of mutual recrimination which it aroused in the Newfoundland press helped to preserve tension, the government decided to hold a by-election in Harbour Grace in November. "The question to be determined," Hoyles declared, "is one between law and order and the constituted authorities, on the one side, and the will of Bishop Dalton, operating through an ignorant, but fanatical mob . . . to prevent by violence and intimidation the free exercise of the rights of the electors of Harbour Grace on the other."⁹² Since the House was now divided at fourteen members each, the election was of vital concern to both parties. The chance of Liberal victory was reduced, however, by renewed internal dissension. R. J. Parsons, Liberal assembly member and editor of the *Patriot*, admitted in an editorial in October that many members of the party had little confidence in Kent. He argued that the party needed to be organized better and that "the Leader, whoever he may be, must take the whole party for his guide and refrain from destroying them by his impetuosity and imprudence."⁹³ The Liberals were playing into Conservative hands just as they had done earlier in Harbour Main.

Violence during the election seemed almost inevitable. The magistrates and leading Protestant members of the community expected trouble and appealed to the Governor for military protection.⁹⁴ Roman Catholic extremists, however, strongly opposed sending troops and the *Record* defiantly warned Bannerman against such a course. "The first moment he [Bannerman] moved a body of troops against the constitutional independence of the people—that moment a civil war was proclaimed, his allegiance to the Crown became forfeited, he stood before the Country a traitor to his Sovereign; and as a traitor he should have to be dealt with by the people. Repeat this experiment. . . . Try it Sir Alexander—if you dare."⁹⁵ Fortunately for the peace of

⁹¹Newcastle to Bannerman, 12 Aug. 1861, C.O. 194/166, pp. 141–3.

⁹²Hoyles to Bannerman, 26 Aug. 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 28 Aug. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁹³*Patriot*, 18 Oct. 1861.

⁹⁴Minutes of Executive Council, 26 Oct. 1861.

⁹⁵Quoted in Bannerman to people of Harbour Grace, 4 Nov. 1861, printed in *Royal Gazette*, 5 Nov. 1861.

the colony Bishop Mullock dissociated himself from such extremism. He informed Bannerman that he had no special connection with the *Record* and had not seen the editorial until after the paper was published.⁹⁶ More important still he issued a pastoral letter to the Roman Catholic people of the colony urging them to obey the laws. He implored his people to avoid quarrelling and rioting and to shun drunkenness, which he believed was the cause of much of the evil in the colony.⁹⁷ He emphasized that those who committed unlawful attacks on persons or property not only injured their own souls but discredited their church.

The Bishop's urgent appeal for peace, combined with the presence of military and naval forces sent by the government, were sufficient to prevent disorders in Harbour Grace on November 20, the election day. There was an unprecedented turnout at the polls. Over 1300 people voted compared with 482 in the 1859 election. The two Protestant candidates, Moore and Hayward, were elected by large majorities. Although Bishop Dalton, the head of the Roman Catholic diocese of Harbour Grace, had instructed his parishioners to return a member of their religion,⁹⁸ Prendergast secured less than half the votes polled by each of his Protestant opponents.⁹⁹ Hayward, who had formerly supported the Liberals, switched his allegiance to the Conservatives, serving as solicitor general, an office which he had held during the Kent administration. The election thus gave the Conservatives a majority of two members in the Assembly. Hoyles and Bannerman had achieved their objective.

Much as Bishop Mullock may have continued to regret the way in which Hoyles had been brought into office, he now became reconciled to the situation. He was undoubtedly shocked by the violence which had occurred and he redoubled his efforts to prevent further outbreaks. In a letter to the clergy early in 1862 he instructed them to use every means in their power to prevent breaches of the peace and to announce to the "people that the sentence of Excommunication is hereby pronounced against any person using firearms with the unlawful intention of killing or wounding."¹⁰⁰ The seriousness of the riots of 1861 apparently convinced both him and the head of the Anglican church, Bishop Field, that they should hold more aloof from political struggles in order to preserve peace in the divided colony. In fact, the 1861

⁹⁶Mullock to Bannerman, 9 Nov. 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 19 Nov. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁹⁷Pastoral letter, 1 Nov. 1861, printed in *Public Ledger*, 19 Nov. 1861.

⁹⁸Capt. Mesham to Grant, 18 Nov. 1861, enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 3 Dec. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

⁹⁹The results were: Hayward, 888; Moore, 870; Prendergast, 432.

¹⁰⁰Enclosed in Bannerman to Newcastle, 28 Feb. 1862, C.O. 194/168.

election marked the end of outright and widespread clerical activity in politics in Newfoundland.

The disturbances of 1861 clearly demonstrated the danger of having the two political parties based so closely on religious affiliation. The Liberals had always recognized this danger and their party had been non-sectarian in membership and in principle. In practice, however, it was predominantly Roman Catholic. The Conservatives had shown no desire to be non-sectarian until 1861 and then, as we have seen, Hoyles had been unable to persuade any Roman Catholic members of the Assembly to join his government. Nevertheless, Hoyles determined that all classes and creeds should have a fair share in the offices and patronage of government.¹⁰¹ This was an important decision in the interest of peace and harmony for the riots of 1861, as Bishop Mullock later observed, were largely "a disreputable struggle for place, not principle, for a means of living at the public expense, not for the public good."¹⁰² How soon the Hoyles government adopted this principle of equitable denominational distribution of patronage is not clear. Kent, in 1864, denounced the Conservatives because of "the sectarian character of their distribution of patronage, and . . . their insincere profession of a desire to form an administration on non-exclusive principles."¹⁰³ D. W. Prowse, a Conservative member of the Assembly during the period, stated that the system of dividing patronage proportionately among the major denominations dated from the disorders of 1861 and that it was put into operation after "a short respite."¹⁰⁴ Certainly the proportional division could not be complete as long as no Roman Catholic members of the Assembly were in the Executive Council. This important step was achieved in 1865 when Ambrose Shea and John Kent entered the cabinet under the new Conservative Premier, F. B. T. Carter, to form a coalition government. From that date political parties in Newfoundland ceased to be based exclusively on sectarian lines and the system of distribution of patronage according to denominational strength came into full operation, a system which tended to preserve peace if not always to create real harmony. The system is still followed to a large extent though the original reasons for its institution have ceased to be important.

¹⁰¹Bannerman to Newcastle, 28 Aug. 1861, C.O. 194/166.

¹⁰²Pastoral letter, n.d., *Record*, 8 March 1862.

¹⁰³Kent to Editor of *Newfoundlander*, n.d., the *Newfoundlander*, 8 Sept. 1864.

¹⁰⁴D. W. Prowse, *A History of Newfoundland* (London, 1895), p. 491.

Foster on the Thompson-Bowell Succession

S. MORLEY SCOTT

THE NUMEROUS AND RAPID CHANGES in the leadership of the Liberal-Conservative party in the early 1890's contributed substantially to its calamitous defeat in the election of 1896. Sir John Macdonald died in June 1891; Sir John Abbott, an ailing and reluctant premier, resigned in December 1892; Sir John Thompson's death, which occurred in England on December 12, 1894, if not totally unexpected, was unexpectedly early. Sir Charles Tupper, otherwise an obvious possibility for the succession, was then absent as high commissioner in London, and, further, was much disliked in Government House. Sir Mackenzie Bowell, a senator, was senior minister and acting Prime Minister. George Eulas Foster, Minister of Finance, had been Thompson's seatmate in the Commons, but had little chance of being accepted as *primus inter pares* even by that chamber; nor was it likely that the party leaders could agree upon any person as so describable. Thompson having designated no successor, and Bowell being modestly unwilling to suggest one, on December 13 Lord Aberdeen invited Bowell to form the new government. Within the next eighteen months this ministry was riven by the sudden and simultaneous desertion of seven of its members, patched together with the addition of Sir Charles Tupper, and replaced by a new ministry under Tupper; this in turn was destroyed by the election of June 1896, which sent the Conservatives into opposition for fifteen years.¹

To go back to December 1894. Midway between the death of Thompson and the swearing in of the new cabinet, Foster set down his thoughts on the situation in a longish, handwritten, "private" letter to a personal friend and political ally, S. D. Scott. Since entering

¹The liveliest description of these events appears in Lady Aberdeen's diary, *The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen, 1893-1898* (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1960), to be read with its scholarly introduction by John T. Saywell.

politics in 1882 Foster had represented his home county of King's, New Brunswick, which immediately adjoined Saint John County. During roughly the same period S. D. Scott had been editor of the *Saint John Daily Sun*, the recognized organ of the Conservative party in New Brunswick and a leading newspaper in the Maritime Provinces. Very little of Scott's private political correspondence survives, but he did keep Foster's letter of December 18, in spite of the writer's suggestion that it be "sent to *Nirvana*." Private letters from Foster in the period are not numerous, and the one here printed seems to deserve publication.²

Private

Minister of Finance
Canada

Ottawa, Decr 18 1894

My dear Scott

I have your letter re matters political etc. The awfully sudden and overwhelming stroke left us at first filled with grief and dismay. While all of us who knew Sir John's state of health felt that his active help would probably be taken away from us within the year, we none of us looked for so sudden a termination of our political connection and still less of his society and friendship with us even though he was not to be much longer our chief and colleague. The blow is heavier far than either of the preceding ones, and though he was always on the point of remedying the fault of Sir John Macdonald i.e. leaving a weak government to his successor, he never really took it up, and so in this respect we have not the advantage we might have had. And above all we lose his personality in the House and in the Country. No one knows so well as I who sat beside him, and watched with him the development and consummation of every piece of Opposition tactics, what resources are necessary and what ready and quick judgment must be brought into requisition by a Leader, and were brought into play by him. My heart fails almost when I fancy the operations on, and no Sir John to lean upon. Most of all we lose the superior Minister of Justice whose opinion dominated almost without question the House, and was received by the Country as that of no other ever has, or probably ever will be again. And I remember how only less necessary he was to break the crude opinions, and modify the absurd ideas of too many of his colleagues.

This may appear frank, but I suppose it is true of all govts and cannot be urged simply in ours.

He is gone—who are left? And yet the world moves and "hope springs eternal" etc. Already the necessity of action and the return tide of public life has set us moving again. You see in what the moves have resulted. I doubt if it was the move the Country or the Party would have most wished, I am sure not that which the House or the Colleagues of the late Chief, or that he himself would have desired. The chain of odd circumstances was so woven that it is as it is

²The original is in the possession of the present writer. Snowden Dunn Scott (1851-1923) will be found in the 1888 and 1912 editions of H. J. Morgan's *Canadian Men and Women of the Time* (Toronto).

and being as it is, is better to be acquiesced in and strengthened, rather than opposed with all that division etc. means. We must now do our very best each in his sphere. The Govt while so weakened in one respect will be strengthened somewhat in others, at once in part, and in part gradually. Montague³ will fill a large want in Ont. and if Kenny comes a most important business influence will be imported, if he does not Dickey will be a good man. Ferguson will give a wise counsellor and a prudent economic influence. These two (Montague and Ferguson) will be without portfolio for the present at least. Time will change this in one if not in both cases. And before long Ontario will be further strengthened. Quebec is weak—very. I hope for a better representation but by a gradual process. What else may develop is not yet apparent. As for myself I am in some doubt and fear. My duties and responsibilities may be greatly increased, and my health is but slowly bettering. To do what I can and not overdo is the trouble—for if one once puts on the harness, it cannot be worn loosely and at intervals. The House is a “tough brute” to ride, and the inevitable comes to the new jockey—tricks and surprises etc etc.

Still someone must do it, and we must try and get the one who will best do it, even though he do not do it perfectly. I am not yet fully able to say what will be done.

B. is old, vain, and suspicious to a degree. What freak he may take no one knows, and this is really the most to be feared in the development of the thing.

The general opinion expressed that this is a temporary arrangement naturally worries him, and he sees a cabal in every two who converse together. Maybe too this inclines him to rather look upon me as a rival and as there has been some pretty plain talking my opinion is that he will not be inclined to see anything good in me. The history of the whole matter is interesting and has an intensely comical side—which however in view of the consequences that hang upon present action cannot be long contemplated.

So far as I am concerned as to the Leadership of the House I am not raising a little finger. If I am a necessity I will have to try it. If not I shall not put myself in the position of demanding what I may be reproached with not being able to fill. The vacancy left by Sir John is uncomfortably large for any one of his Colleagues to attempt to occupy, and I should approach it, if asked with great humility of pretension, yet with a determination to do my best.⁴ All has not been done that I should have liked to see done but then it is a most difficult thing to remodel a Govt. Time is often an element of necessity and too great precipitation might result in less good effect.

Weldon would have been a good man but no arrangements seemed possible to effect his appt.

³Of the four possible new ministers mentioned here by Foster, E. H. Kenny refused office; A. R. Dickey and W. H. Montague joined the ministry, “bolted,” and rejoined in January 1896; Senator Donald Ferguson joined without portfolio, played a confusing and confused part in the events of January 1896, but did not “bolt.” Neither Chief Justice William Meredith nor R. C. Weldon (the latter mentioned later by Foster, probably in response to suggestions by Scott) accepted office, if indeed they were invited. In the winter of 1896 Weldon was active in a project to have Meredith replace Bowell. (S. D. Scott’s papers include several letters to or from Weldon during 1896, as well as an account by Ferguson, written a decade or more later, of his own activities during the crisis.)

⁴Foster retained the Finance portfolio and assumed the government leadership in the Commons. In 1896, he “bolted” and rejoined.

Meredith would not come from the Bench I think—if he were willing he is at present impossible in view of the Ontario standpoint.

I was glad to get your letter and would like to hear from you oftener. I shall find time to read, though sometimes it puzzles me to find time to write with my own hand, as some letters must be written.

...⁵

This letter is strictly confidential and after reading is safer sent to *Nirvana*.

Yours etc
G. E. Foster.

⁵A rather obscure passage dealing with local New Brunswick politics is here omitted.

Canada

A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power. Edited by NORMAN WARD. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1966. Pp. x, 419, illus. \$8.50.

THIS IS A SPLENDID AND DELIGHTFUL BOOK. Professor Norman Ward has taken Senator Power's tape-recorded and written reminiscences and skilfully combined them with many hitherto unpublished documents and memoranda. The result is unfailingly good-humoured, interesting, an important contribution to history, and certainly the best of Canadian political memoirs.

Chubby Power's public career spans most of the years of this century. Since 1908, when he first acted as secretary to the Liberal organization in Quebec West, he has been intimately involved with the mechanics of politicking. A wounded veteran, decorated with the Military Cross, he was elected to the House of Commons as a devoted Laurier Liberal in 1917. Power sat there continuously until 1955 when he was named to the Senate, where he has now entered his fiftieth year in parliament. From 1935 until his resignation during the conscription crisis of 1944 he was in the cabinet where he held four portfolios at various times, and in 1948 he was a contender for Mackenzie King's place. In addition, he was *organisateur en chef* for the Quebec provincial election of 1931, an astonishing tribute to the organizing skills of an Irish Catholic, and a key figure in the federal organization until 1962.

Because of this wealth of experience in what Senator Power frankly calls "machine politics," the chapters on party organization are probably the most valuable in the book. When he was named to head the Taschereau organization in 1931, Power says, he demanded as a condition of his acceptance that "it should be made perfectly clear that the organizer has neither influence nor authority" in matters of patronage. (Hardly the reaction to be expected of a party politician!) His duties included the tasks of arranging publicity and conventions, gathering together a staff, including the hiring of "groups of partisans" to police Liberal meetings, and most important, distributing campaign funds. Fortunately, he adds, the collection of money was in the hands of Donat Raymond of Montreal, who handled this delicate chore at both the federal and provincial levels at least until 1940. The turning point of the 1931 election came with the decision of the federal Conservatives to throw their support behind Camillien Houde, the provincial *chef*. "Marriage between Houde and Bennett consummated," Power wired his organizers. "Liberals everywhere must hammer unemployment, butter, and Bennett." Hammer they did, and Houde was beaten with federal issues. Power, who tells stories with a true Irish flair, also recounts that Taschereau had told him to hold back the Liberal campaign in Trois-Rivières. The Tory candidate there, one Maurice Duplessis, was "a gentleman with a good family background,"

and he would become a leading candidate for party leader after Houde was defeated. Duplessis, Taschereau said, "would be a far more acceptable leader of the Opposition insofar as we are concerned."

There are more revelations in every chapter. Power confirms what has long been suspected when he says that he had to persuade King, Lapointe, and Cardin to fight Duplessis in the fall of 1939. He reveals that the federal organization took complete control of Godbout's campaign, and he tells us a good deal about the financing of this election. Jimmy Gardiner, the federal Minister of Agriculture, put up the first \$25,000 for the race from Saskatchewan party funds and also raised substantial sums of "patriotic money" in Toronto from "prominent imperialistic Conservatives who saw in a favourable result for the Liberals something like support for the war." Senator Power tells us, too, that it was he who suggested an early dissolution and a spring election in 1940 to Mackenzie King: "King listened with apparent sympathy to my views. Three or four days before Parliament was to meet, he called me aside and told me that he would probably follow my advice. . . ."

The characterization of Mackenzie King, as could be expected, is an interesting one. Power obviously was not amused by the personal peculiarities of his long-time leader, but he seems to have felt a grudging affection for him. His reactions were probably similar to those of another Liberal who, Grant Dexter reported to J. W. Dafoe of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, "simply can't stand the worm at close quarter—bad breath, a fetid, unhealthy, sinister atmosphere, like living close to some filthy object. But get off a piece and he looks better and better. . . ." Power too, I suspect, found Mackenzie King looking better and better. "I doubt that anyone would have taken off his coat to fight for Meighen had his name been mentioned with disrespect," he says, "but such a thing could easily have happened for Laurier or even for King." That "even for King" speaks volumes. For Meighen, Power had feelings of awe. The Tory leader was a "cold and hard" man who believed that his job was to justify Tory policy to Tories, not to convert opponents. Laurier had the gift of being loved, Power adds, but Meighen had only "the gift of being admired by those who agreed with him." That characterization says just about all there is to say of Arthur Meighen.

There is far more in this magnificent chronicle. Power tells us about the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election and the conscription riots in Quebec City. He talks frankly of conscription and the cabinet in the Second World War, and he provides us with significant new information on the "Canadianization" of the R.C.A.F. More often than not, the point of view is that of a Quebec City politician, and if anyone else was talking that might be a serious fault. But because it is Chubby Power holding forth, the results can only be engaging.

J. L. GRANATSTEIN

York University

Love and Work Enough: The Life of Anna Jameson. By CLARA THOMAS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 252. \$6.50.

THE PASSIONATE INDUSTRY OF A BIOGRAPHER can be justified on a number of disparate counts. Occasionally he has found a subject who is genuinely interesting in his own right, or sometimes it is one who has participated actively in a period of significant transition. More frequently, the subject of a biography tends to be a figure who has rubbed shoulders with the famous or whose shadow has brushed the periphery of great events. Certainly the life of Anna Jameson was interesting

enough to provide more than the material for a piece of book-making. Clara Thomas' biography of Mrs. Jameson, *Love and Work Enough*, is a competent work, marred by no egregious faults, and it clearly reflects a good deal of research. Unfortunately, its grey flat tone, its plethora of badly organized detail, and its wavering progression of events place it more in the category of theses than of works of art.

Anna Jameson (1794-1860) was the daughter of a genteelly indigent Irish miniature painter. Unless a suitable suitor came along, life promised nothing for her except the ladylike humiliation of a position as governess. A suitable suitor did not come along, but Anna was a girl of determination and ambition, and the various families who retained her were impressed by her energetic literary bent. While still a young woman she created quite a little flurry of welcome attention with the publication of *Diary of an Ennuyée* and *Characteristics of Women*. These books opened up a world of fascinating connections for her. The Carlyles, Henry Crabb Robinson, and the Kemble family were heady fare for the intense Anna.

Unfortunately, a suitor did eventually turn up, and after a lukewarm courtship, Anna agreed to marry him. By then thirty-one, she seems to have succumbed to the greatest fear of any Victorian female, the pitying condescension with which people regarded a spinster. She probably could not have made a worse choice than Robert Jameson. Both stubbornly intractable, their marriage had little chance of success from the outset, but none at all once her husband transported her away from her literary set to the gloomy wastes of Upper Canada in December 1836.

Jameson was appointed vice-chancellor of the colony, a position of some importance, but this did not mean a giddy round of social activities for the taciturn Jameson was something of an aggressive misanthrope. However, Anna Jameson's reaction to Toronto indicates that she did not feel that she was missing much. "Your wish that I might find here a sphere of happiness and usefulness is not realized," she wrote glumly to a friend; "I am in a small community of fourth-rate, half-educated, or uneducated people, where local politics of the meanest kind engross the men, and petty gossip and household cares the women." By spring her restless nature spurred her on to an unconventional trip, mostly by water, through the western part of Upper Canada. Out of these experiences she wrote one of the source books of pioneer life in the colonies, *Winter Studies and Summer Rambles in Canada*. (One regrets that Mrs. Thomas did not infuse this episode in Mrs. Jameson's life with more vitality, particularly as it would have so much relevance for Canadian readers.) Had Mrs. Jameson possessed the patience to last out another year, we might have had a fascinating account of the Rebellion.

By September, realizing that she could not face the rigours of another Canadian winter, she left her husband forever. Back in England she scraped along on a meagre allowance and a number of fervent friendships, of which that with Lady Byron was the most turbulent. She also enjoyed a degree of increasing fame for a series of art books. Ruskin was scathingly scornful of her qualifications as a connoisseur of art, but Mrs. Thomas assures us that she did much to mould Victorian taste.

Anna Jameson liked to think of herself as an Anglicized Madame de Staël. The person who emerges from this biography is a self-willed, impulsive, chubby little woman, not entirely likable. But that was the sort of person an emancipated Victorian female had to be.

PHYLLIS GROSSKURTH

University of Toronto

Protestant Church Colleges in Canada, A History. By D. C. MASTERS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. x, 225. \$7.50.

BY TRACING THE HISTORY of denominational liberal arts colleges and theological seminaries in Canada the author shows how the influences of an increasingly secular society have wrought changes in both the organization and curriculum of such institutions. The peculiar Canadian practice has been to federate church-related colleges to non-denominational universities. Of the nineteen institutions examined only four have retained both their independence and their religious character. The remainder have either been secularized or affiliated with larger universities on terms that have reduced their denominational, and presumably their religious, nature. This is proof of the presence in Canada of the same secular trend that has appeared in higher education in virtually every country during the last century and a half.

Professor Masters distinguishes five chronological periods of development in Canada. The earliest lasted until 1829, during which time the principle of joint church and government participation in higher education was accepted. The golden age lasted until Confederation—twelve institutions had been created and three of them secularized in the flush of voluntarism. From Confederation to 1890 Canadian higher education was influenced by the new scientific disciplines and their religious counterpart, biblical criticism, but not until the fourth stage did the full impact of the "new learning" make itself felt. The present age, since 1920, has been marked by the ideological conflict of theological liberals and conservatives, with the outcome of that conflict still uncertain.

Certain denominational traditions have appeared within Canadian higher education. Our Methodist colleges, says Professor Masters, have been more ready to venture into new fields of study, Presbyterian institutions have always stressed moral philosophy, while Anglican colleges have emphasized the classics. Yet all have become quasi-secularized and the change, in the author's opinion, began with the rise of liberal theology towards the end of the nineteenth century. His analysis of the changing basis of theological thought and of the consequent influence on Canadian college organization and outlook is both valuable and succinct. But this reviewer feels that insufficient attention has been paid to the growth and continuance of regional traditions and practices.

The major part of the book consists of brief reviews of the development of specific institutions and thumbnail biographies of leading educators who created traditions. Unfortunately the narrative occasionally lapses into a catalogue of names and dates, but as a survey of major trends this book is a useful reference. The inclusion of extensive calendar material is a doubtful asset since it clogs the narrative without providing an adequate basis for the analysis of curricula. In a volume of such a general nature the omissions and errors are surprisingly few. John A. Macdonald's imaginative bill of 1847 at the height of the university question in the province of Canada passes without a mention; the *Christian Guardian* is described as Egerton Ryerson's newspaper—a popular but incorrect opinion; and Bishop Alexander Macdonell is credited with a letter on the university question six years after his death!

JOHN S. MOIR

University of Toronto

The Cross in Canada: Vignettes of the Churches across Four Centuries. Edited by JOHN S. MOIR. Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1966. Pp. xviii, 244. \$4.95.

AS THE FIRST COLLECTION OF READINGS on the history of Christianity in Canada, the publication of this book is a matter of some note. It compares favourably with recent source books in general Canadian history, a comparison which does not, however, lift it above criticism. The work comprises ninety-six readings divided into thirteen chapters, each vividly sampling the "varieties of religious experience" of a period or region. The readings are selected from a wide range of documentary sources, biographies, histories, and, in a few cases, fiction. Each is presented with an apt and very informative introduction. The whole collection is ably served by John W. Grant, the perspectives of whose introduction are more comprehensive than S. D. Clark's combination of Troeltsch and Turner (church-sect and frontier theses) and suggest a complex interaction of metropolis and frontier, older and newer traditions, and the original impulse of the gospel with all of these.

For the most part, Moir's selection reflects Grant's perspectives. One expects to find, of course, the old salts without which Canadian history could hardly be told—Jesuit martyrs, the flinty Strachan, the crusading Free Kirk, and diehard ultramontanes. And it is not surprising that there is little new illustrated in the period up to the Quebec Act, although most of the readings themselves will be unfamiliar to all but specialists. It is in the eight chapters covering the subsequent century that the great wealth of the collection lies. A brief sampling would include: the first Protestant service, 1759; Bishop Briand's *mandement* for loyalty in 1775; preaching in Gaelic and English to Maritime Presbyterians; trials of a Methodist circuit rider; the "profane and intolerable nuisance" of dogs at frontier church services; W. L. Mackenzie's description of the Quakers and their Sharon Temple north of Toronto; the religious tyranny of Norman McLeod over his model community of St. Anne's; an account of the linguistic genius, Dr. Rand, who admired most the language of the Micmacs among whom he worked; the problem of properly burying a priest who died in the isolation of the outports; Egerton Ryerson's visit with the Pope; Father Lacombe negotiating with the Indians over the C.P.R. intrusion. Through a very informative, interesting, and often entertaining series of readings, Moir not only glimpses a broad spectrum of the religious history of the period, but suggests a social history of great variety.

As the *fin de siècle* approaches, however, a quite inclusive collection becomes disappointingly slight. Apart from readings on œcumenism, and on padres in two wars, five vignettes are made to carry the weight of the Cross in the twentieth century. A few suggestions will outline the extent of Moir's oversight: W. A. Douglass' Christian Gospel of the Single Tax and the *Christian Guardian's* reaction; Hart Massey and the Gospel of Wealth; reactions to the great wave of immigration; the variety of Christian expression of the immigrants themselves; that "terror" of the drinker—the W.C.T.U.; the "true Christianity" of labour-socialist millennialism; Henry Wise Wood's instruction of the clergy on the Social Gospel for U.F.A. Sunday; church sponsorship of the first national congress on social problems. Still untouched would be such salient subjects as the struggles over Darwinism, historical criticism, women's rights, personal moral discipline, church response to depression and drought, and the agonies of conscience as war twice approached. Throughout the book as a whole, the homely relation of church to family life and daily work is conspicuous by its absence, and at a time

when sermon literature is becoming recognized as an important source for the history of ideas in Canada, it is astonishing that a few apt examples do not sprinkle these pages.

It is not clear for whom the volume was intended. It is accessible to the general reader. It will be useful as an auxiliary reader in high school and undergraduate work in Canadian social history. But its value becomes marginal for the undergraduate as he tries to work out the intersections or confluences of Canadian religion with our political and economic history. A single volume, of course, cannot be complete, and rather than carp over omissions it is better to rejoice that so good a beginning has been made in this type of literature in Canada.

Along with H. H. Walsh, *The Christian Church in Canada* (1956), and John Grant's edition of essays, *The Church and the Canadian Experience* (1963), this book forms a useful, if not altogether satisfying, trilogy of basic handbooks on the history of Christianity in Canada. In 1959, A. R. M. Lower, reviewing Walsh, hoped it would be the swallow of a coming spring of studies of religion in Canadian history. A repetition of the same hope is hardly warranted in the light of recent lists of theses and dissertations pertaining to Canadian history. Perhaps it is time for the churches to endow a council for religious research in Canada. Surely it is past time for an ambitious multi-volumed documentation of the role of religion in our history. It is not enough to say of Canadian historians, as Grant does in his introduction, paraphrasing Diderot on God, that perhaps they have no need of that hypothesis. They have to eat while they do their research. Dr. Moir shows us how engaging such research can be.

A. R. ALLEN

University of Saskatchewan
Regina

Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955. By THOR THORGRIMSSON and E. C. RUSSELL. Ottawa: Naval Historical Section, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Department of National Defence. 1966. Pp. vi, 167, illus. Available from the Queen's Printer. \$6.00.

Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada. By Lt. Col. HERBERT FAIRLIE WOOD. Maps by Sergeant E. H. ELLWAND. Ottawa: Queen's Printer by the authority of the Minister of National Defence. 1966. Pp. x, 317, illus. \$8.50.

ON THE EVE OF THEIR INTEGRATION into a single armed forces historical section, the army and navy historical sections have each produced an official volume on Korea. It seems unlikely that there will be a matching air force volume because the function of the R.C.A.F. in that conflict was limited to transportation except where individuals were attached to other forces.

The naval historians show with pride that when Canadian participation in U.N. operations in Korea was announced, only the R.C.N. was ready to go immediately. The army had to recruit and train a special force. Both the naval and the military operations in which Canada was involved were essentially similar to those of former wars. Therefore, although they served as precedent for Canada's important involvement in future U.N. operations of a very different kind, the military problems of these operations are more numerous than the political implications suggested in Colonel Wood's subtitle.

Some of the implications in Colonel Wood's narrative about the relations between national components of international forces are extremely suggestive. As with the earlier relations of Commonwealth military forces, and as with the international forces in the "United Nations" alliance in the Second World War, national units were committed in Korea on the understanding that their commander had a right of direct reference to his government if he thought that his troops were endangered or misemployed by higher military command. Although this right was not much used, "waving the paper" was a frequent practice.

In orthodox military theory, such a degree of independence on the part of a subordinate commander could only weaken the effectiveness of the force as a whole. But Colonel Wood gives much evidence to suggest that this was not in fact the case. The Americans in Korea (and the Chinese also) favoured virtually continuous lines set out towards the foot of slopes facing the enemy; Commonwealth and Canadian units on the other hand prepared unconnected defensive localities on the tops of hills and relied on careful patterns of cross-fire coverage. The Americans favoured fixed outposts of considerable size; the Canadian forces used smaller standing patrols to give warning of attacks. The American outposts were often overrun before any knowledge of an attack reached their base; the Canadians, we are told, were accustomed to give artillery support to their patrols when an attack developed. Some American commanders made a practice of ordering that there must be a fixed number of patrols each week without reference to the nature of the locality or the current situation; Canadian commanders believed in more flexibility. Colonel Wood seems to believe that Canadian tactical doctrine was much sounder than American and that the relative independence of the Canadians was therefore beneficial.

On one occasion the Commonwealth commander manœuvred his American superior into issuing a statement against regular patrolling when the American Corps H.Q. had obviously been on the point of ordering it; and towards the end of the war the Americans published and circulated the British manual on which Commonwealth tactical doctrine had always been based. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the size of a military force is not necessarily related to its soundness in doctrine and that its liability to error can possibly be corrected if some of the units under its command possess some degree of independence. Few professional military men will accept such an heretical doctrine, but it is clearly revealed in this official history.

The R.C.N.'s operations in Korea gave rise to fewer speculations of this kind. It seemed to matter little whether the Canadian ships were under American or British command. As they had little naval opposition to face, their activity consisted either in acting as escorts for the carriers from which air strikes were launched (which they found dull), or in operating as single ships on missions to control the population of the off-shore islands. These latter duties, which the Canadian sailors enjoyed, were naval obligations only because ships were necessary to reach the islands. Once ashore the sailors did work that any serviceman could have taken on. Thus, although these two books seem to stress the separation between the two services since there is little reference to the operations of the other service in either of them, yet in fact much of the work of the navy in Korea was hardly "naval" at all. In view of the present dispute about integration and unification, which appears to have been oversimplified by protagonists on both sides, this Korean experience may need careful assessment.

Both volumes live up to the high standards of the official histories in so far as scholarship and presentation are concerned. Both of them are suitable for the general public as well as for the professional serviceman and historian. It is

unfortunate indeed that they have appeared ten years after the war ended (though that is quite soon by comparison with earlier official histories). The subject is now stale and arouses little interest. However, few military and naval histories appear in time to affect the conduct of the operations in the next conflict. In that respect, although late for Vietnam, these volumes may perhaps have more influence than their predecessors.

RICHARD A. PRESTON

Duke University

Rapport du Comité des dépenses électorales. Ottawa: Imprimeur de la Reine et Contrôleur de la Papeterie. 1966. Pp. x, 562. \$5.50.

IL FAUT LOUER LES MEMBRES DU COMITÉ, et ceux qui les ont assistés, pour la haute qualité de ce rapport qui marquera sans doute une étape importante dans la réforme de la loi électorale fédérale. On peut d'ailleurs espérer que les gouvernements provinciaux s'inspireront également de ce rapport pour réformer certains aspects de leur loi électorale, ou même, dans certains cas, l'ensemble de la loi.

Le rapport lui-même des membres du Comité n'occupe que 68 pages dans ce gros volume de 562 pages. On commence par nous expliquer que pour atteindre son but le Comité a orienté son enquête sur trois plans : l'examen de la situation au Canada, l'expérience des autres pays, et les opinions sur la question des individus, groupes, hommes politiques, et collaborateurs des partis. Il est résulté de cette triple démarche trois chapitres qui constituent l'essentiel du rapport : un sur l'historique des lois fédérales au sujet des dépenses électorales, un autre sur la nécessité de modifier la législation canadienne sur les finances électorales, et un dernier qui contient les recommandations des membres du Comité. Le reste du volume est fait de onze études spéciales dont la plupart sont de bonne qualité, ainsi que d'annexes où l'on trouve entre autres des tableaux utiles sur les dépenses électorales déclarées des candidats, et le coût des élections générales défrayé par le Directeur général des élections.

Un des aspects les plus positifs du rapport me semble résider dans son réalisme, ou plus exactement dans le parti pris adopté par les auteurs de ne pas recommander des contrôles qui peuvent être facilement contournés. Soit le problème de la limitation des dépenses électorales : au lieu de proposer une limitation globale, exprimée en dollars (comme c'est le cas dans l'actuelle loi électorale de Québec), le Comité recommande plutôt que la limitation porte sur l'utilisation toujours contrôlable des organes d'information par les candidats et les partis. Même chose pour ce qui est de la limitation des revenus des partis politiques. Le Comité estime qu'il ne sert à rien d'interdire, comme certains lui ont proposé, les contributions exceptionnellement élevées. "Les témoignages recueillis et les enquêtes du Comité, nous dit-on, lui ont permis d'établir qu'il est facile de contourner la limitation portant sur les fortes contributions" (p. 50). Une telle contribution peut être répartie, par exemple, entre un certain nombre de donateurs symboliques. Pour réprimer, sinon supprimer, les abus actuels il faut plutôt compter sur la vérification et la divulgation des revenus, mesures que recommande d'ailleurs le Comité.

A ce propos la suggestion qui est faite d'encourager par le dégrèvement d'impôt la contribution financière des particuliers aux candidats et aux partis politiques, semble très heureuse, à la fois pour contrebalancer quelque peu l'influence des associations et des entreprises puissantes, et pour inciter les

individus à surmonter leur apathie envers les partis politiques. C'est là une des recommandations pleines d'à propos de ce rapport qui en comprend plusieurs.

S'il fallait exprimer quelques réserves, je les ferais porter sur deux recommandations qui concernent l'une le remboursement aux candidats des dépenses pour l'utilisation des organes d'information (p. 43), et l'autre la remise, aux candidats également, de leur dépôt (p. 54). Le Comité propose que pour avoir droit à ce remboursement et à cette remise, un candidat devra avoir obtenu 15 pour-cent et 12½ pour-cent respectivement des votes valides données dans sa circonscription. Ces pourcentages semblent un peu arbitraires. D'ailleurs tous les pourcentages le sont dans ce domaine. On regrettera seulement que contrairement à ce qui caractérise la plus grande partie du rapport, les auteurs n'aient pas justifié davantage ces chiffres, à partir de l'expérience et des principes démocratiques.

Quoiqu'il en soit, nous avons là, dans l'ensemble, un ouvrage remarquable, dont la réputation, je n'en doute pas, s'étendra vite au delà de nos frontières.

VINCENT LEMIEUX

Université Laval

Nationalism in Canada. Edited by PETER RUSSELL. Toronto, New York, London, Sydney: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada for University League for Social Reform. 1966. Pp. xx, 377. \$6.95 paper.

THIS BOOK, the second volume to be published under the auspices of the commendable University League for Social Reform, presents a reviewer with the same problems as did its predecessor. It consists of twenty-two separate pieces, all well done, representing almost as many points of departure. Grounds for disagreement with any particular chapter are not easy to find, since a main purpose of the book was precisely to offer differing approaches, drawn from differing backgrounds. The critic is further disarmed by a foreword by Frank Underhill, and a twenty-third chapter by the editor, which are themselves reviews of the book.

Frank Underhill, for example, says that the authors "have passed beyond two of the forms of Canadian nationalism that have flourished in the past century. They abandon the myth of the Canadian as the strong silent he-man of the North, deriving his un-American and anti-American virtues from his mystic communion with the northern lights of the Arctic. . . . They also abandon the concept of *British* North America as defining the Canadian identity. . . . our authors are all post-Wasp in their outlook. On the other hand, they do not quite come to grips with the two major problems that have always confronted us as Canadian nationalists: the relations between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority; and the relations between Canadians and Americans". Professor Underhill is quite right, and to his observations may be added two others: the book does not include a consideration of the relationship between education and nationalism, or (with one possible exception) a really radical voice from the left wing in either English or French Canada.

Not much else is omitted. The book is divided into five parts: The Land, The People, The Federation, Policy, Culture, New Perspectives, and Ideology. From two to six essays are grouped under each of these titles, all of them interesting, and none of them unworthy of publication. The League has imported four non-Torontonians for the volume (Alfred Dubuc, Michel Brunet, Donald Smiley, and Stephen Hymer), not to attempt any regional representation, but because of the

well-founded belief that these writers had something relevant to say. Of unusual interest, because they break away from conventional ways of thinking about nationalism, are James Guillet's "Nationalism and Canadian Science," Maurice Careless' "Metropolitanism and Nationalism," Melville Watkins' "Technology and Nationalism," and Charley Hanly's "A Psychoanalysis of Nationalist Sentiment." An essay on the Ukrainians by Elizabeth Wangenheim partially saves the book from what could have been a serious weakness, a tendency to equate English Canada with Ontario, to the neglect of those areas where the "Third Force" is so powerful a factor.

To single out a few essays is not to denigrate the rest. English-speaking readers, and French Canadians outside Quebec, will undoubtedly find much food for thought in Michel Brunet's chapter, which ends with the resounding assertion that "the French Canadians' long search for a fatherland is ended"; and Alfred Dubuc's, whose premise is that "a constitution is a political institution which mirrors an entire society," and whose conclusions include: "The Constitution has lost its economic and social bases; it can no longer prevent political chaos." For French-speaking readers, Kenneth McNaught's frank statement of the viewpoint of *les Anglais* will undoubtedly be revealing; and probably irritating, since it argues that "French Canadians mistake the nearly silent and the usually flexible English-speaking attitude as an absence of conviction or determination."

Much of this book will help end the silence. The flexibility, as these varied essays demonstrate, remains.

NORMAN WARD

University of Saskatchewan

Great Britain and the Commonwealth

The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900: Tables of Contents and Identification of Contributors with Bibliographies of Their Articles and Stories. Volume I. Edited by WALTER E. HOUGHTON. Associate Editors: JOSEF L. ALTHOLZ, EILEEN CURRAN, HAROLD E. DAILEY, ESTHER RHOADS HOUGHTON, JOHN A. LESTER, Jr. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1966. Pp. xxiv, 1194. \$75.00.

FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE AND THOUGHT in Victorian England, the periodical press of the day yields perhaps the richest and the most varied harvest of primary materials. In the nineteenth century, the periodical was the major vehicle for the dissemination of considered opinion, and for the provision of home entertainment. Works of fiction and non-fiction often made their first appearance in serial form. Editors and contributors ranked among the most distinguished minds of the age; and national and sometimes international audiences eagerly followed the lusty expressions of partisan opinion, the full-scale reviews and debates on science, philosophy, religion, and politics, and the trials of the heroes and heroines of fiction. Publishers saw to it that there was a journal to suit every taste.

While in preparation, the *Wellesley Index* was already rendering a service to Victorian scholars through the generosity of its editor, Professor Walter E. Houghton of Wellesley College. Volume I, now published, contains an elaborate and superbly prepared catalogue of the tables of contents and of the works of contributors of eight outstanding periodicals: *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, *The Contemporary Review*, *The Cornhill Magazine*, *The Edinburgh Review*, *The*

Home and Foreign Review, *Macmillan's Magazine*, *The North British Review*, and *The Quarterly Review*. The outside dates chosen by the editor are 1824 and 1900, except for the *Edinburgh Review*, which is indexed from its origin in 1802. Volume II, which promises to add another 30 periodicals, will make its appearance in a few years, and one hopes, though in the more distant future, we shall see the publication of the subject index and the book review index which the editor has projected in his overall plan.

Anonymous and pseudonymous articles and stories were the rule in Victorian periodicals (though there were notable exceptions). For the period before 1870, about 97 per cent of the items published were not signed, or were written under a pseudonym, and for the whole period covered by the *Index*, about 90 per cent. While there have been previous attempts to identify and catalogue authors, the *Wellesley Index*, which has wholly, or partially, removed the veil of anonymity from all but about 3 per cent of the articles in the periodicals covered, stands in a class by itself for its thoroughness and reliability. The work is the product of an immense, and obviously well-directed, co-operative effort. It promises to enlarge our appreciation of Victorian life and to open up new avenues for studies and analyses of authors and subjects, as well as of the periodicals themselves.

The volume is divided into three major parts. Part A is a complete table of contents of the periodicals (with the exception of verse, which is not listed). Each title is followed by author, source of attribution, and, where available, the volume or collection in which the piece has been reprinted. Where clarification is called for in a title, the editors have supplied the pertinent material, as in the case of "Two radicals of the old school [J. A. Roebuck and Francis Place]." A brief introduction precedes the table of contents of each periodical, and while the quality of some introductions is not as high as that of others, they are all indispensable gates through which the initiate must pass on the way to the main body of the work. Part B is an alphabetic index of 4,780 authors and their contributions to the eight periodicals, and Part C provides us with the first index of English pseudonyms.

The *Wellesley Index* is more than a book of reference, and students will find it worth their while to examine its contents with care. Moreover, it is essential for the reader who wants to make full use of its scholarship to acquaint himself with the "Editor's Note" and with the introductions to each part (as well as to each periodical), for he will soon want to be able to distinguish between an attribution followed by "prob." or "P", and between the meaning of "signed" and "signature." The "Notes on Attributions," included in the introductions to the individual periodicals, list and analyse the sources consulted for the identification of authors, and the "Bibliographical Note" supplies precise references for further study of the review and those associated with it. Readers will appreciate the use of bold type and the double-column arrangement.

In the light of what the *Index* achieves, it is hardly worth quibbling over minor deficiencies. It makes little sense to quarrel with an editor over the time span he has selected, though some readers will, no doubt, regret the cut off at 1900, and others will miss the early years of *Blackwood's* and the *Quarterly*, even though these have been covered in monographs. More cross-references in the introductions to the periodicals would have been helpful. We learn in the introduction to the *Home and Foreign* that in April 1864 Lord Acton terminated this liberal Catholic quarterly (p. 548), but no reference is made to the purchase of a successor in 1869 by "a group of liberal Catholics, led by Lord Acton" until the introduction to the *North British* (p. 664). The omission of even unimportant pieces of information can be frustrating when the context requires that they be

supplied. In the introduction to the *North British*, we read that the total printing in 1846 was 3000, that between 1850 and 1857 it "reached its peak" (no figures given), that it underwent a decline in the following years (still no figures), and that in the 'sixties, under better direction, its circulation rose to 3000 again (p. 664). Arabic numerals used to designate volume numbers of periodicals are difficult to distinguish from date and page reference. Sometimes citations in footnotes are not entirely clear. The first footnote in the introduction to *Blackwood's* (p. 7) reads as follows: "Mrs. Margaret Oliphant (see Bibliographical Note), I, 100." The Bibliographical Note, however, does not appear until page 10; the volume and page in the footnote refer to Mrs. Oliphant's work, which could just as easily have been cited. These remarks are not meant to suggest that the *Index* is anything but an extraordinary achievement. Professor Houghton, his editorial staff, and all those who contributed their knowledge, their skill, and their financial support to the preparation of this volume deserve to be congratulated. Victorian scholars will long be grateful for their efforts.

SYDNEY EISEN

York University

Disraeli. By ROBERT BLAKE. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode [Toronto: Methuen]. 1966. Pp. xxvi, 819, illus. \$19.75.

IT IS A BRAVE MAN who undertakes to write a serious full dress life of Disraeli in face of the six massive volumes of Monypenny and Buckle. Various short popular biographies have been written, for the most part hewn out of the quarry provided by the official biographers, and one recent work of independent research, that of Professor B. R. Jerman, has gone into the seamier side of Disraeli's earlier life, some aspects of which Monypenny chose to glide over with discretion. Nevertheless, Mr. Blake has taken it all in his stride and produced an excellent major biography, well balanced, well documented, and well written. Most of the story is, of course, to be found buried in the endless pages of Monypenny and Buckle, and Blake is meticulous in making references to them where they suffice. It is clear, however, that he has himself carefully sifted the great mass of Disraeli's papers as well as other relevant manuscript collections, and that he makes good use of the wide range of historical research completed in the field of English nineteenth-century history since the official biography was published. Blake would be the first to recognize the great achievement of the official biographers—there was not much that was significant that they overlooked—but he clearly surpasses them on both scholarly and artistic grounds. His account is both more sophisticated and more readable than theirs, although their six volumes will continue to be a mine of select correspondence of value to the student. Inevitably he follows them along the main path where they have left few stones unturned, but he does bring us down some interesting sideroads that they have missed or purposely avoided. Although a long book, it is still very much shorter than theirs, since it is less garrulous and does not contain the long selections from Disraeli's papers.

Blake writes with a scholarly detachment and objectivity that is exemplary and yet manages to combine this with human sympathy for and understanding of the mysterious person whom he seeks to interpret. He largely substantiates the less attractive aspects of Disraeli's earlier life as they were revealed by Jerman some years ago, but it remains something of a mystery how "this shady adventurer" of the 'twenties and 'thirties became the great Victorian statesman of later decades. The parallel with Louis Napoleon is not without some relevance.

It would have been difficult for the friends of their youth to have imagined that either man would reach the high position he ultimately occupied and, at least in Disraeli's case, fill it with such credit. Yet the wastrel philanderer in middle age settled down to a happy marriage and an arduous political career. By the end of his long life, thanks to the help of devoted friends and admirers and the income from his later novels, he even managed to leave his once chaotic financial affairs in good order.

Blake is particularly skilful in putting problems into their proper context and in indicating the broader significance of the events that he narrates. He recognizes Disraeli's genius, but he never tries to claim more than the facts warrant, as for instance with the Reform Bill of 1867 of which he gives a particularly good account. Although calling the social legislation of 1875 the "biggest instalment of social reform passed by any one government in the nineteenth century," he does not claim that the Conservatives held any basically different principles from the Liberals in this area, or that it was "the principal or even a leading secondary preoccupation of Disraeli." In the early 'seventies Disraeli had begun to sound a new Conservative note of English nationalism, which for so long had been appropriated by Palmerston and the Whigs. As prime minister he was mainly concerned with foreign and imperial affairs, but even here Blake frankly recognizes his limitations. He was not really very knowledgeable about foreign countries, nor on coming into office, we are told, had he any very clear ideas as to what he wanted to do. His *forte* lay in reacting quickly and imaginatively to situations as they arose, as in the case of the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, although, as Blake points out, his much quoted account of this affair was singularly inexact. In the end he came well out of the Eastern Crisis with his diplomatic triumph at Berlin, but the reader is left with the impression that his pro-Turkish policy was in part a reaction to the anti-Turkish crusade of Gladstone, just as Gladstone's advocacy of a £5 franchise made Disraeli a champion of household suffrage.

Blake acknowledges Disraeli's predominantly opportunist approach to political questions and his cynically partisan handling of patronage (which is dealt with more fully and frankly than in the official biography), but he also recognizes Disraeli's "innate Conservatism" from which sprang his strong belief that England's greatness depended upon the ascendancy of her landed classes. Paradoxically, despite the mutual attachment of Disraeli and Queen Victoria, he remained, as Blake observes, essentially "an un-Victorian figure."

J. B. CONACHER

University of Toronto

The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England. By CLAYTON ROBERTS. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1966. Pp. xii, 467. \$12.00.

PROFESSOR ROBERTS, in this uncommonly interesting and well-written book, has set out to tell a major part of the story of the growth of responsible government in England. He defines responsible government as being "all those laws, customs, conventions, and practices that serve to make ministers of the King rather than the King himself responsible for the acts of the government, and that serve to make those ministers accountable to Parliament rather than to the King" (p. viii)—a twofold process. He begins his story in 1610, when parliament unsuccessfully asked James I for permission to arrest and sue a couple of his allegedly delinquent

officials, and ends it in 1717, with the failure of the impeachment of Harley and George I's decision to cease to attend cabinet meetings because, as he said, his ministers were answerable to the nation and he could no longer protect them.

Even before the seventeenth century it was established that the king could not act by himself, because he could not be sued, and if he did wrong, the subject would have no remedy. His agents must act for him, must act lawfully, and—very important—must not be permitted to plead the king's command to justify an unlawful act or to shelter behind his pardon if they committed one. The weapon which parliament used against the king's servants was impeachment, and this book is as much an account of the vicissitudes of impeachment, from its revival in 1621 to deal with Mompesson and Bacon until the final failure of 1717, as it is of responsible government. Impeachment was a clumsy weapon, as the Commons found out soon enough. It could not even bring down Strafford; ministers could hide behind the doctrine of collective responsibility; and the king discovered that, by refusing to protect ministers convicted after impeachment, he could justify the retention in his service of those men whose advice and actions were unpopular rather than illegal. So the Commons had to find another device, and they did, in the refusal of supply, and, as Professor Roberts writes, "by a studied obfuscation of what was unlawful with what was unpopular, by a constant identification of the grievous with the criminal . . . the House of Commons transformed the duty to disobey an unlawful command into a duty to resign before performing an unpopular one" (p. 223).

Professor Roberts has another tale to tell, that of the repeated efforts to create harmony between king and parliament. One way was that of the undertaker, the man who sought harmony by bringing into the government those men who commanded the confidence of the Commons. The second path was that of the manager, the courtier or minister who sought to build a majority in Commons by the prospect of material reward for those who voted right. It is the author's view that the former principle won out in Queen Anne's reign, on account of "the triumph of party over patronage in the management of Parliament" (p. 378). He has stated this rather too baldly; after all, eighteenth-century governments rarely if ever lost an election. There are some other points with which this reviewer would take issue—the matter of the character and aims of Charles II, for instance, and Professor Roberts's attempt to read the doctrine of separation of powers into the development of the English constitution. These are venial sins, however; the book is a very important contribution to our understanding of constitutional history and should be required reading for all students of the Stuart period.

MAURICE LEE, Jr.

Rutgers University

Ireland since the Rising. By TIMOTHY PATRICK COOGAN. New York: Frederick A. Praeger [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern]. 1966. Pp. xii, 355. \$8.50.

IN THIS SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY IRELAND and its recent past, Mr. Coogan provides a readable introduction to Irish society since independence which reflects the moderate views of second-generation revolutionists who are, somewhat belatedly, gaining positions of influence. It is, perhaps, a commentary on the conservative aspects of the revolution that, since 1922, Irish politics has been dominated by men who fought in the war of independence, and that the fiftieth anniversary of the rising of 1916 finds one of its heroes still president of

the Irish republic. While the author is not a rebel against the older generation—indeed, there is no longer much point in such revolt—he looks on its achievements with a benevolent detachment that would have been hazardous even ten years ago.

In the first fifty pages, Mr. Coogan presents an indifferent summary of the events between 1916 and 1922 which might have been improved by the use of such recent works as Richard Bennett's *The Black and Tans*. Yet this makes little difference as the author's real subject is the history of Ireland since 1922 and the present condition of the country. As presented by Mr. Coogan, it is a story with a reasonably happy ending. He sees the rivals of the 'twenties and 'thirties, Cosgrave and De Valera, as partners in building what has become a relatively prosperous and well-governed state.

Chapters six to ten provide an up-to-date handbook on Irish society in which the economy, religion, education, the Gaelic movement, and the state of Irish culture are considered. While these chapters provide solid, if not exciting material, the final chapters on the I.R.A. and the north should be of special interest to Canadians concerned with recent terrorism in Quebec.

While Mr. Coogan presents the nationalist case against partition, he does so with an evident desire to be fair to protestant Ulster and concludes on a note of optimism. Yet in his detailed analysis of the postwar I.R.A., he considers that it will remain a factor in Irish politics. Although few Irishmen today are in sympathy with the I.R.A., political terrorism has deep roots in the Irish past. Terrorists command respect and, if they are killed, sympathy, even though their activities are regarded as futile and dangerous. Mr. Coogan suggests that Costello's proclamation of a republic in 1948 was designed to cut the ground out from under the I.R.A., and he points out that if this was the purpose, it certainly failed. For the handful who keep the I.R.A. alive, terrorism is a way of life not to be abandoned as long as the six counties remain outside the republic. And although annexation might bring the I.R.A. to an end, it would certainly bring into being Protestant terrorist splinter groups which would create the problem in a different form. For the present, it would seem that partition is the solution which divides Ireland least.

H. SENIOR

McGill University

The British Imperial Experience. By ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK. New York and London: Harper & Row. 1966. Pp. xiv, 225, maps. \$4.00 (US) paper.

THE BRITISH IMPERIAL EXPERIENCE consistently lacked coherence. This problem which was a practical one for former colonial secretaries of state is now one for the historian who attempts to understand and analyse what was done. The lack of a first-rate account of the history of the British Empire-Commonwealth as a whole reflects the disparate and incompatible nature of the materials. The Canadian portion of British imperial history is too different from the Indian portion to be accommodated by the traditional narrative of constitutional progress along the road to dominion status. Increasingly the parts have become more important than the whole, but an analysis of these parts can yield important insights into the uses of power and the nature of human relations—especially that between the weak and the strong and between the white man and the Asian or African.

Professor Huttenback declares in his introduction that he makes no attempt at full chronological coverage. Rather, he seeks to "analyze those incidents,

persons, and movements that altered the character of the Empire and influenced its governing philosophy." Beginning with the initial advancement of the idea of trusteeship in the trial of Warren Hastings, important events are used to elucidate major themes: Durham's *Report*—responsible government, Amritsar massacre—race relations, annexation of Sind—mechanics of expansion.

The material encompassed in this slim volume is not new. There is no attempt at revision. He has, however, by keeping the chapters selective and specific, managed to say a great deal about imperialism in general and the British imperial experience in particular. Well-annotated maps, effective quotation—some rather lengthy and especially good, and artful descriptive passages make this a very useful volume for the classroom.

The field of British imperial studies is particularly ill served with readily available and reasonably priced literature for the university student. At a time when each new announcement of an interesting title is generally accompanied by a price that reduces its availability to one copy in a university library, the combination in Huttenback's book of readability and utility in an inexpensive paperback edition is to be greatly applauded.

MILTON ISRAEL

University of Toronto

Convicts & the Colonies: A Study of Penal Transportation from Great Britain & Ireland to Australia & Other Parts of the British Empire. By A. G. L. SHAW. London: Faber and Faber [Toronto: Queenswood House]. 1966. Pp. 399. \$11.25.

THE RECENT PUBLICATION of L. L. Robson's more statistically based *The Convict Settlers of Australia* (Parkville, 1965) and of A. G. L. Shaw's study here under review has illuminated an important factor in British colonization. This prolonged experiment in a peculiar form of selective emigration has not been totally ignored by earlier historians, of course. Father Eris O'Brien's *The Foundation of Australia, 1786–1800: A Study in English Criminal Practice and Penal Colonization in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1936) set a standard of scholarly excellence which marked the coming of age of Australian historical scholarship. But in the two recent works the entire span of the penal transport system in Australia is examined, not just the early decades.

Despite the reference in Professor Shaw's subtitle to other parts of the British empire the book deals primarily with transportation to Australia. After an opening chapter treating transportation to the American colonies prior to the American Revolution there are but passing references to proposals to send the convicts to west Africa or to such remote areas as the Falkland Islands or the future British Columbia. Focusing as he does on the Australian experiment, the author still attempts to cover a wide range of subjects: the origins of the convicts within the United Kingdom, the changing nature of the judicial system which was to sentence them, their outward voyage, the use made of services, their subsequent careers (all subject to modifications over the years), debate in Britain and the colonies of the utility of penal transportation as a deterrent to crime and as a means of reforming the criminal or of providing an effective labour force to develop the country.

Shaw's citations testify to the wide range of sources consulted over the decade and a half in which this study was in the making. Despatches, official committee and commission reports, contemporary comment, and a wide range of secondary

sources, including a broad sampling of graduate dissertations, are all represented in the footnotes. Despite three impressive references on p. 172, however, this reader still is not convinced that an average three-quarter-acre Irish plot could produce more than seven tons of potatoes annually in the early nineteenth century!

K. A. MACKIRDY

University of Waterloo

A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-64. Edited by WILLIAM B. HAMILTON, KENNETH ROBINSON, and C. D. W. GOODWIN. Durham: For Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center by Duke University Press. 1966. Pp. xx, 567. \$12.50 (U.S.).

THIS SET OF TWENTY-FOUR ESSAYS clearly shows the Commonwealth has agencies, formal and informal, to grapple with its two most important objectives: to stamp out racism and to stop the growing gap between rich and poor nations. These essays also show the association lacks the determined will and common interest to exploit these agencies effectively. Indeed, though most contributors are modestly optimistic about the Commonwealth's performance, past and future, they do not ignore its amorphous nature, its inability to act on its ideals, and its possible collapse. Despite the formation of the Commonwealth secretariat and the Commonwealth Foundation in 1965, events since have amply justified their caution.

Frank Underhill said in 1955, "all roads in the Commonwealth lead to Washington." Exaggerated though it might have been then, his statement, as these essays indicate, was by 1964 not far off the mark. American influence is evident in education, in technical and military assistance, in aid for development, even, in one instance at least, in norms for bureaucratic organization. The book reflects too American scholarly interest in the association. The volume itself is a product of a conference held in 1964, arranged jointly by Duke's Commonwealth-Studies Center and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London and aided financially by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Leverhulme Trust. About a third of the contributors are American scholars although five Commonwealth countries are represented.

The volume is comprehensive. Scholars from a variety of disciplines, as well as a few government officials, examine political, international, economic, administrative, legal, and educational questions. These are not confined to the decade 1955-64: Professor Hamilton treats the transfer of power in historical perspective and Joseph Spengler probes the past potential of the empire to absorb and articulate economic theory. Nor are all the articles limited to a Commonwealth focus: W. H. Morris-Jones's observations on political institutions in new Commonwealth states are relevant to political transition in other developing areas. Calvin B. Hoover and other contributors do not restrict their remarks on aid programmes to underdeveloped countries within a Commonwealth framework. Realistically they raise fundamental questions about how much aid rich nations can be expected to give and in what form, and how poor nations can best use it. "By far," Professor Hoover concludes, "the greater part of the economic resources necessary for economic growth in underdeveloped countries must come from the internal resources of these countries."

Attempts at inclusiveness inevitably lead to many general observations and tentative conclusions. No doubt the subject itself is broad and vague and general articles have their place. But opportunities for studies in depth are passed up.

Even though Taylor Cole uses Canada and Nigeria as case studies of the federal process in the Commonwealth he admits his analysis is "most cursory." The phrase aptly describes such other contributions as Pius Okigbo's probe of capital and skills in member states of Africa and Ralph Bribanti's comparative study of bureaucratic élites in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Malaya since independence. Many of the tables compiled by the economists are imprecise and incomplete particularly because, as in the case of Craufurd Goodwin's economic analysis of Commonwealth economic growth, no attempt was made to use the statistical services of individual nations. For the most part, however, the articles are well documented providing leads for more detailed studies. While they also avoid overt western ethno-centrism and Afro-Asian biases they do not set out critically the implications of American wealth and power taking up and expanding certain roles which Britain is now less willing or able to play in relation to other Commonwealth members.

ROBERT KUBICEK

University of British Columbia

Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE AND ANN LIDDELL

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *T.B.R.* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

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LIONEL GROULX, HISTORIEN NATIONAL

LA MORT SOUDAINE DU CHANOINE LIONEL GROULX, mardi matin le 23 mai 1967, à sa maison de campagne de Vaudreuil, le jour même où il devait assister au lancement de son dernier ouvrage, *Constantes de vie*, a surpris tous ceux qui le connaissaient. Et ils sont nombreux ! La réception eut lieu quand même et quelque six cents invités s'assemblèrent dans les salons des Editions Fides pour rendre hommage au grand disparu.

Chacun se rappela alors que Lionel Groulx avait plus de 89 ans, étant né le 13 janvier 1878. Son dynamisme, le rythme de ses publications, sa présence régulière à plusieurs manifestations publiques, ses interventions fréquentes dans les débats qui agitent actuellement le Canada et le Canada français, une émission récente à la télévision d'état où il avait évoqué ses principaux souvenirs, la dernière réunion annuelle de l'Institut d'Histoire de l'Amérique française, sa participation remarquée et remarquable à un colloque sur l'histoire tenu au Pavillon de la Jeunesse de l'Expo 67 quinze jours auparavant avaient laissé croire qu'il demeurerait toujours le maître historien avec lequel trois générations de lecteurs et d'étudiants avaient pris contact lorsqu'elles atteignaient l'âge adulte. Chacun d'entre nous le voyait au moment où nous avions vingt ans, à cette étape de notre vie où il nous avait révélés à nous-mêmes et suscité en nous des options qui ont influencé l'orientation actuelle de la collectivité. C'est pourquoi nous lui prêtons une éternelle jeunesse. Dans les salons de chez Fides, des invités dont l'âge variait entre vingt et soixante-quinze ans en parlaient comme d'un homme appartenant à leur propre génération.

Carrière unique et étonnante que celle de Lionel Groulx ! Elle se compare à celle d'un George Bancroft dont l'œuvre historique a forgé l'unité de la nation américaine. L'historien Allan Nevins a eu raison d'écrire que si Abraham Lincoln et sa génération ont entrepris et mené à terme la tâche de sauver l'Union en 1861-1865 c'est parce que les enseignements de Bancroft leur avaient donné foi en eux-mêmes et dans le destin des Etats-Unis. Lionel Groulx, héritier spirituel et continuateur de François-Xavier Garneau, un contemporain de Bancroft, a complété la mission que les circonstances avaient confiée à celui qui fut le premier historien national du Canada français.

Fils de paysans peu instruits, qui se méfiaient même de ceux qui avaient l'ambition de poursuivre leurs études — ils avaient été si souvent trompés par les beaux parleurs, inspiré par une mère admirable qui avait décelé chez lui un talent exceptionnel, obligé de s'imposer de lourds sacrifices pour aller à l'école, formé dans un milieu dont les valeurs ne pouvaient être que celles d'une société rurale traditionnelle, il se révéla, dès les débuts de sa carrière, un homme du XX^e siècle. En 1906, il dénonça dans des articles vraiment révolutionnaires un système d'éducation qui ne préparait pas la jeunesse canadienne-française aux tâches de

l'âge industriel et urbain. Ses écrits scandalisèrent les esprits timorés qui constituaient alors une puissante majorité et lui valurent de profondes inimitiés. Ces réactions hostiles ne diminuèrent nullement son audace. Il n'a jamais craint les polémiques et a toujours cru en la liberté de l'intellectuel et du chercheur. Il fut, au Canada français, un grand défenseur de la liberté académique. Admirateur des précurseurs du catholicisme social en France, il voulait donner la preuve qu'une éducation catholique peut former des hommes conscients de leurs nouvelles responsabilités envers la société et prêts à les assumer dans un monde qui ne retournerait pas à l'âge pré-industriel. Ses élèves du Séminaire de Valleyfield, où il enseigna de 1903 à 1906 et de 1909 à 1915, ont tous été marqués par cet éveil leur d'hommes et le culte qu'ils lui avaient voué illustre leur reconnaissance profonde envers l'éducateur qui leur avait ouvert de nouveaux horizons.

Son ambition d'action intellectuelle et son souci d'atteindre à des résultats concrets l'amènèrent aux études historiques. Chargé de donner un cours d'histoire du Canada au collège où il enseignait, il constata avec un étonnement bien compréhensible que les élèves avaient jusqu'alors utilisé des manuels, des résumés et des tableaux chronologiques rédigés à l'intention des écoles élémentaires. L'un de ces abrégés était même la traduction d'un livre en usage dans les écoles anglophones du Québec et de l'Ontario. A cette époque, l'état avancé d'assimilation où se complaisaient les principaux porte-parole de la collectivité canadienne-française avait spontanément engendré le manuel unique, c'est-à-dire celui du groupe dominant. Pour l'édification de ceux qui ignorent quel était alors le servilisme des milieux officiels qu'il suffise de rappeler que les candidats au Prix du Prince de Galles, décerné par l'Université Laval au finissant de la Faculté des Arts qui rédigeait la meilleure dissertation, furent invités une année, à composer le discours d'un membre de la *General Court* de la colonie Massachusetts proposant une expédition militaire d'extermination contre la Nouvelle-France ! Devant une telle situation, Lionel Groulx décida de rédiger lui-même un cours d'histoire nationale pour ses élèves du Séminaire de Valleyfield. Une nouvelle voie s'ouvrait devant lui.

Ayant remarqué combien ses compatriotes ignoraient leur histoire, en particulier l'évolution constitutionnelle du pays depuis la Conquête, Henri Bourassa déplora dans *Le Devoir* le fait que cette discipline était gravement négligée dans les collèges et à l'Université. Son intervention provoqua de nombreuses réactions et discussions. Lionel Groulx et quelques autres professeurs de collège, parmi lesquels Emile Chartier, qui deviendra plus tard doyen de la Faculté des Lettres et vice-recteur de l'Université de Montréal, informèrent le directeur du *Devoir* que la situation ne les laissait pas indifférents et qu'ils cherchaient à y remédier en poursuivant des recherches originales dans le but d'enrichir leurs cours d'histoire. Bourassa les félicita mais revint à la charge pour réclamer l'institution de chaires d'histoire du Canada à l'Université. En 1915, Thomas Chapais inaugurait ses cours d'histoire du Canada à l'Université Laval de Québec et Lionel Groulx devenait le premier titulaire d'une chaire d'histoire nationale à la succursale montréalaise de l'Université Laval. Un demi-siècle s'était écoulé entre la mort de Jean-Baptiste Ferland et les premiers cours de ses successeurs à l'Université. Quel peut être le sort d'une discipline qui n'a pas été enseignée au niveau universitaire pendant une si longue période ? Ceux qui se scandalisent de constater aujourd'hui que plusieurs domaines ouverts à la recherche historique n'ont pas encore été abordés devraient se rappeler ces faits avant de lancer leurs jugements téméraires.

Le nouveau professeur avait la tâche de préparer cinq conférences publiques par année. La première eut lieu le 3 novembre 1915 et on lui avait annoncé son

engagement au cours de l'été précédent. A quelques semaines d'avis, on lui demandait de préparer un volume ! Pour cette entreprise, il recevait des honoraires de \$50.00 par année, soit dix dollars par conférence. Pour acquérir les volumes dont il avait absolument besoin et pour couvrir les frais de ses déplacements lorsqu'il allait poursuivre ses recherches à Ottawa, à Québec ou à Londres, il devait compter sur la générosité de quelques amis et bienfaiteurs. Philippe Perrier, curé de la paroisse Saint-Enfant-Jésus-du-Mile-End, lui accordait gratuitement le gîte et le couvert à son presbytère. Quelques cours payés à la leçon à la Faculté des Lettres et à l'École des Hautes Études Commerciales, où il enseigna l'histoire universelle et l'histoire du commerce, lui rapportaient un revenu inférieur à \$800.00 par année. Telle était le sort d'un universitaire de carrière dans le domaine des humanités au Canada français durant les années 1915-1926 ! Pourtant, selon la mythologie officielle, les Canadiens français n'étaient-ils pas supposés entretenir une tradition humaniste ? Ils n'y mettaient certes pas le prix ! Il faut, cependant, tenir compte du dévouement inlassable et de la fidélité absolue de quelques hommes et femmes d'élite qui avaient compris, longtemps avant les autres, le rôle que jouait cet intellectuel et ce chercheur d'avant-garde. Parmi ces collaborateurs qui l'ont soutenu sans défaillance, personne ne peut oublier sa nièce, Mme Juliette Rémillard, qui lui a servi de secrétaire et de recherchiste, à un taux de bénévolat, pendant trente ans. La Fondation Lionel Groulx, due à l'initiative de Maxime Raymond, l'un de ses étudiants lorsqu'il enseignait au Séminaire de Valleyfield, et de quelques autres admirateurs et amis poursuit aujourd'hui cette tradition.

Membre de l'équipe qui organisa les premières facultés de l'Université de Montréal quand celle-ci obtint son indépendance en 1920, il connut toutes les difficultés dont durent triompher ceux qui tentèrent d'établir un enseignement supérieur au Canada français. Le jour où il jugea qu'il ne pouvait pas poursuivre une carrière d'écrivain et de chercheur en demeurant professeur à la leçon et sollicita, après de longues hésitations, un traitement annuel convenable, il fut invité par les autorités universitaires à signer un engagement de loyauté envers les institutions et les hommes politiques du pays. N'était-il pas directeur de l'*Action française* et n'avait-il pas, à ce titre, dirigé l'enquête sur *Notre Avenir politique* (1922) où la possibilité d'une rupture de la Confédération était envisagée ? Ses idées, sa franchise, son indépendance d'esprit, sa recherche de nouvelles hypothèses de travail, son refus des poncifs officiels, son souci de justice et de promotion sociale pour ses compatriotes québécois, sa remise en question des institutions politiques héritées du passé, son inquiétude économique dérangeaient les bien nantis, les détenteurs du pouvoir, ceux qui n'avaient aucune raison de se plaindre de l'ordre établi puisqu'ils en profitaient.

Lui, si bon, si indulgent, il découvrit, non sans chagrin, qu'il comptait beaucoup d'envieux et même des ennemis. Ceux-ci voulaient le réduire au silence. Conseillé et soutenu par ses amis et disciples, il ne céda pas aux pressions subies et confondit même ceux qui avaient intérêt à mettre en doute la valeur de son enseignement et le caractère scientifique de son œuvre historique, parmi lesquels un collaborateur de la *Canadian Historical Review* qui se jetait comme un oiseau de proie sur chacune de ses publications pour la déchiqueter. Avec fermeté et fierté, il avait fait triompher le principe de la liberté académique, le droit pour l'universitaire de choisir les avenues de sa recherche, d'intervenir dans les débats publics, de se prononcer sur les hommes et les institutions dont il a observé le comportement et l'évolution. Les universitaires du Canada français contemporain, qui jouissent actuellement d'une liberté qui se compare très avantageusement à

celle de leurs confrères des autres universités nord-américaines et dont le statut ressemble plus à celui du professeur européen qu'à celui du *college teacher* anglo-américain ont contracté une grande dette de reconnaissance envers Lionel Groulx, ce pionnier de l'action intellectuelle et de l'engagement dans le milieu universitaire, en dehors des voies tracées et imposées par l'*Establishment*. Son exemple et celui de ses successeurs ont préparé les voies à la nouvelle charte de l'Université de Montréal, la plus respectueuse de la liberté des universitaires et l'une des plus démocratiques du monde atlantique.

Quelques esprits bornés ou en quête d'explications simplistes, incapables de saisir les multiples dimensions et les différentes étapes de la carrière prestigieuse de ce chercheur toujours en alerte, de cet écrivain particulièrement doué, de ce travailleur acharné, de cet orateur éloquent véritable semeur d'énergie, de ce maître à penser, ont voulu l'enfermer dans des formules toutes faites. Ils l'ont accusé de racisme, parce qu'il a employé le mot « race » à une époque où celui-ci signifiait collectivité, nationalité, ethnie, groupe culturel ou nation. A-t-on soutenu qu'André Siegfried était raciste parce qu'il a publié, en 1906, *Le Canada : les deux races* ? Plusieurs se sont entêtés et persistent encore à voir en lui un doctrinaire maurassien. Ont-ils même lu son œuvre et celle de Charles Maurras ? Il ne leur est jamais venu à l'esprit qu'un penseur canadien-français pouvait poursuivre un itinéraire intellectuel indépendant simplement en observant avec un regard neuf et pénétrant la réalité canadienne et nord-américaine. A la remorque eux-mêmes des idées mises en circulation par des auteurs étrangers — que la plupart du temps ils n'ont pas compris — et impuissants à les adapter au milieu pancanadien, ils s'imaginent que les autres chercheurs souffrent de leur propre mimétisme de colonisés intellectuels.

Enfin, les grands mots furent lâchés, la suprême condamnation prononcée : Lionel Groulx aurait été anglophobe. La haine ou l'envie n'ont jamais troublé la vision de cet homme aux idées larges et généreuses, de convictions démocratiques parce qu'il croyait dans le bon sens inné du peuple lorsque les politiciens s'efforcent de le renseigner plutôt que de le tromper, respectueux des opinions émises par un adversaire honnête, d'une politesse raffinée qui manifestait sa pleine maîtrise de soi. Cependant, si tout Canadien français qui refuse d'épouser les idées et les conceptions de la majorité anglo-canadienne et de se soumettre servilement à son leadership, qui se reconnaît solidaire de l'ethnie dont il est membre et désire travailler à son progrès souffre d'anglophobie, admettons alors que tous les Canadiens qui ne sont pas complètement assimilés aux *Canadians* sont anglophobes. Dans ces conditions, il existe donc quelque 5,000,000 de Canadiens français atteints d'anglophobie au Canada. En appliquant les mêmes critères au Canada anglais, celui-ci compterait également quelque 15,000,000 de *Canadians* francophobes. Le moment n'est-il pas venu, à l'aurore du deuxième centenaire de la Confédération, de mettre fin à ces débats puérils qui appartiennent à une époque révolue où la maturité politique ne florissait pas au Canada ?

Tous ces jugements erronés s'appuient sur un aveuglement tragique d'accusateurs improvisés juges et sur leur ignorance de l'œuvre de libération intellectuelle accomplie par celui qui, après François-Xavier Garneau, a joué le rôle et assumé les lourdes responsabilités d'historien national du Canada français. Il sera le dernier à mériter ce titre car une collectivité peut difficilement avoir plusieurs historiens dits nationaux. Aux Etats-Unis, George Bancroft n'a pas eu de successeur et le Canada anglais, à cause de circonstances particulières, parmi lesquelles un état d'esprit colonial prolongé occupe la première place, n'a pas eu d'historien national. Celui-ci se manifeste habituellement dans les sociétés qui ont été victimes d'un

statut de subordination et qui ont dû lutter pour s'en libérer. Chaque petite nation de l'Europe centrale et méridionale qui s'est détachée des anciens empires ottoman et austro-hongrois a eu son historien national. Quelques historiens ont joué ce rôle dans une Allemagne que l'Espagne, la France, la Suède et l'empire austro-hongrois avaient tour à tour tenue morcelée et ouverte à leurs ambitions impérialistes. Aux Etats-Unis, l'œuvre de Bancroft a justifié la Révolution de 1776 et consolidé l'unité d'une nation démocratique qui cherchait à se faire reconnaître face à une Europe hostile et monarchique. En lisant leur historien national, les Américains du XIX^e siècle ont pris confiance en eux-mêmes et en leur destin. Une étude de l'historiographie et de l'évolution politique de la plupart des anciennes colonies d'Amérique latine, d'Afrique et d'Asie, devenues nations indépendantes, révèle le même phénomène.

Lionel Groulx a été, au Canada français, le maître-artisan d'une émancipation globale. Fils d'humbles paysans, son milieu d'origine, contrairement à celui des élites traditionnelles, n'avait pas subi les conséquences de la lente assimilation ou acculturation que subissaient les familles canadiennes-françaises qui, depuis deux ou trois générations, s'étaient hissés au sommet de la société. Songeons, par exemple, au cas d'un Thomas Chapais. Celui-ci était, par héritage familial et psychologique, lié à l'*Establishment*. Sa vue du passé et du présent demeurait, dans une large mesure, celle de l'équipe gagnante, *a Whig interpretation* selon l'expression d'Herbert Butterfield. Groulx aborda l'étude de l'histoire avec un esprit bien différent, même si ses premières œuvres révèlent qu'il avait absorbé en partie l'interprétation officielle du passé jusqu'alors généralement acceptée dans les milieux bien nantis et bien pensants : sa sévérité trop grande envers la France de Louis XV, ses jugements injustes à l'égard des hommes qui administraient le Canada durant les dernières années de la colonisation française, l'idée que le défi apporté par l'occupation britannique avait été un stimulant pour les Canadiens, la thèse selon laquelle ceux-ci avaient consolidé leur nationalité en se voyant forcés de rompre avec la France et de renoncer aux aventures continentales, les bienfaits apportés par l'introduction des institutions britanniques, la prospérité matérielle due à l'esprit d'entreprise des capitalistes britanniques et autres lieux communs de la même veine.

Ses recherches, ses lectures, ses observations, ses réflexions, ses contacts intimes avec les milieux populaires québécois — qui sont en état de résistance passive depuis les débuts de l'occupation britannique au lendemain de la Conquête et demeurent les moins touchés par le processus assimilateur — lui permirent de se ressaisir et de se libérer rapidement de certains postulats que se transmettaient sans autocritique les dirigeants et porte-parole des générations précédentes. Déjà, alors qu'il était jeune écolier, il avait vibré à l'unisson des siens lorsqu'au foyer et au village ses aînés protestaient contre l'exécution de Louis Riel. La guerre des Boers le scandalisa. Il y vit, comme la majorité des Canadiens français, une manifestation brutale de l'impérialisme britannique contre un petit peuple livré sans défense aux abus de pouvoir d'une grande puissance. Plusieurs citoyens de la Grande-Bretagne eurent la même réaction. L'attitude passionnée et chauvine des *British Americans* lui révéla le racisme et le nationalisme anglo-saxons du Canada anglais. La sale guerre que poursuivent aujourd'hui les Etats-Unis au Vietnam a un impact semblable sur la conscience des nations qui résistent à l'hégémonie des pays et des groupes dominants. Les persécutions scolaire au Manitoba et en Ontario l'émurent profondément. Le sort pénible de ses compatriotes obligés d'émigrer aux Etats-Unis réveilla en lui un intérêt particulier pour les problèmes économiques et sociaux du milieu. La prolétarianisation massive des Canadiens français,

établis dans les villes, frappa son imagination. Il élargit sa vision du passé et se préoccupa d'introduire dans ses études historiques les aspects économico-sociaux de la vie en société. L'histoire des idées retint également son attention. Il fut l'un des premiers à voir les faiblesses d'une histoire écrite limitée exclusivement aux problèmes politiques et constitutionnels. Il ne craignit pas de s'interroger sur la constitution de 1867 et se demanda si elle devait être considérée comme un point final mis à l'évolution historique du Canada. Il dégonfla le mythe selon lequel la Providence avait permis la Conquête britannique afin de protéger les Canadiens français contre la « méchante » Révolution française. Toute son œuvre et son action ont contribué à désassimiler les Canadiens français qui se reconnaissent aujourd'hui comme membres d'une collectivité distincte dans la vallée du Saint-Laurent que l'histoire a associée à la nation *Canadian*.

Pionnier et précurseur en plusieurs domaines qu'explorent aujourd'hui les historiens, les sociologues, les économistes et les politicologues du Canada français, il scandalisa souvent les profiteurs de l'ordre établi et provoqua leur colère. Au Congrès de la langue française de 1937, il leur déclara brutalement qu'ils appartenaient « à la génération des morts » et que l'Etat français, idéal poursuivi par la collectivité depuis la fondation de la Nouvelle-France au XVII^e siècle, serait l'œuvre de « la génération des vivants ». Ses adversaires et ses critiques de l'époque, qui s'étaient créés une popularité facile chez les Canadiens français assimilés, chez les bonne-ententistes invétérés et invertébrés et au Canada anglais, ont subi l'humiliation d'être oubliés et enterrés avant même de mourir. Quand on pense qu'ils se croyaient dans le sens de l'histoire !

L'un des grands moments de sa carrière fut le jour où la Société historique du Canada, lors de sa réunion annuelle à Montréal en 1961, accorda un certificat de mérite à l'Institut d'Histoire de l'Amérique française et à sa revue qu'il avait fondés quinze ans auparavant et lui décerna également le titre de membre honoraire à vie. Même s'il avait reçu auparavant de nombreux témoignages d'admiration et de multiples honneurs, le geste posé par ses confrères historiens de tout le pays le toucha profondément. Oubliant les critiques malveillantes dont la *Canadian Historical Review* avait parfois été le canal et les jugements injustes que des observateurs mal renseignés ou hostiles du Canada anglais avaient portés sur sa personne, il avait la grande consolation de constater, après avoir œuvré près d'un demi-siècle dans le domaine de la recherche historique, que les professionnels de l'histoire avaient enfin atteint un niveau de maturité et d'objectivité qui permettait un véritable dialogue entre hommes de science.

La dernière réunion des Sociétés savantes du Canada à Ottawa, où des historiens, des économistes et des politicologues ont démontré qu'ils peuvent dorénavant analyser les problèmes du Canada en se libérant des émotions et des préjugés qui ont longtemps paralysé le progrès des sciences de la société, a démontré avec éloquence que la manifestation de 1961 n'était qu'une première étape dans un itinéraire intellectuel et scientifique pancanadien. Nous nous acheminons rapidement vers un point de rencontre où les définisseurs de situation des deux Canadas emploieront les mêmes mots pour décrire les phénomènes de la coexistence entre Canadiens et *Canadians* et donneront des définitions acceptées de tous aux problèmes que nous affrontons en commun. Leur solution deviendra alors certainement plus facile ou moins difficile.

Lionel Groulx a obtenu la faveur de poursuivre assez longtemps sa carrière pour se rendre compte qu'il avait vu juste. Son audace intellectuelle et ses écrits ont favorisé au Canada français l'éclosion d'une pensée collective mieux adaptée à notre époque et dont nous commençons à voir les résultats bienfaisants au

niveau de notre action quotidienne. A sa mort, un phénomène unique et révélateur s'est produit au Québec. Au moins trois générations se sont rencontrées pour reconnaître leur dette envers lui. Le Canada anglais lui-même a voulu se joindre aux Canadiens français. Ses principaux journaux ont rendu à Lionel Groulx un témoignage d'estime qu'ils n'auraient jamais songé à publier il y a vingt ans. C'est un autre signe des temps.

Dernier historien national du Canada français, Lionel Groulx a également contribué au progrès de l'historiographie canadienne-anglaise. Son œuvre, ses nouvelles hypothèses de travail, les disciples qu'il a inspirés dans tous les domaines de la recherche en sciences de la société, les hommes politiques qui ont puisé chez lui une information utile ont obligé les historiens, les sociologues, les économistes et les politicologues du Canada anglais à se rendre compte qu'ils ne marchaient peut-être pas toujours dans le sens de l'histoire et qu'ils n'avaient pas toujours le privilège de la possession tranquille de la vérité. Le défi que lui-même et ses héritiers spirituels leur ont lancé les a amenés à reviser leurs points de référence, leurs postulats de départ et leurs anciens préjugés. En ce sens, il aura été un historien doublement national puisque sa féconde carrière a servi les deux Canadas, c'est-à-dire le Canada tout entier.

MICHEL BRUNET

RONALD STEWART LONGLEY

RONALD STEWART LONGLEY, widely known teacher, historian, and university administrator, died in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, on January 7, 1967, following a brief illness. Since his retirement in 1964 he had continued to live a very active life and to pursue his keen interest in history and in community affairs.

A descendant of New England planters who settled in Nova Scotia in the 1760's, Dr. Longley was born in Paradise, N.S., in 1896 and spent most of his life in his native province, making an outstanding contribution to its educational life. Following his early schooling in Paradise, he attended Acadia University in Wolfville. His studies were interrupted by the First World War, during which he served in the 10th Siege Battery, R.C.A. He graduated from Acadia in 1921, with a B.Sc. degree, for as an undergraduate he was especially interested in chemistry. He then became attracted to the study of history and proceeded to Harvard University to prepare for a career as a history professor. He received his A.M. degree from Harvard in 1924, followed by a Ph.D. in 1934. During the 1920's he obtained some valuable teaching and administrative experience in high schools in Nova Scotia, in such centres as Parrsboro, Truro, and Liverpool.

His university teaching career began in 1929 when he was appointed to the history department of Acadia University. For the next thirty-five years, his life was devoted to the service of Acadia University, which profited greatly from his wisdom and his high standards and his skill as teacher and administrator. Dr. Longley was promoted to full professor in 1939, and in 1950 he became Head of the History Department at Acadia. His particular interest was the history of Canada and his enthusiasm for it was imparted to a large number of students who recognized in him a sound scholar and an ardent patriot.

During the course of his lengthy career at Acadia University, Dr. Longley became deeply involved in administrative work, with a heavy load of responsibility falling upon his shoulders. He was Dean of Men from 1940 to 1945; Provost

from 1945 to 1956; Dean of Arts and Science from 1948 to 1962; Dean of Arts from 1962 to 1964; Academic Vice-President from 1957 to 1964; and, for a brief period in 1964, acting President. He was very much interested in community affairs also and rendered very capable service to Wolfville in the capacity of mayor from 1956 to 1961. He was for several years chairman of the Apple Blossom Festival Committee, which organizes one of the most celebrated annual attractions of Nova Scotia.

Dr. Longley was well-known as a faithful worker on behalf of the Baptist Church. In 1940-41 he was president of the Maritime Baptist Convention and for several years he was chairman of its Home Mission Board. He later became a vice-president of the Baptist Federation of Canada. Locally, he was very active in church affairs in his home town. He wrote the 175th anniversary history of the Wolfville Baptist Church. He was also very prominent in the Masonic Order, in which he became Deputy Grand Master for Nova Scotia in 1947 and Grand Master in 1964. He was president of the Canadian Authors' Association from 1964 to 1966. He served on the Canadian Social Science Research Council and various other bodies.

Of his published works, the best known is his biography of Sir Francis Hincks, completed in 1944, which was a revision of his doctoral thesis for Harvard. He also wrote a history of Acadia University's first century, 1838-1938, and a number of historical articles. In 1954 Dr. Longley was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He was the recipient of honorary degrees from McMaster and Acadia universities.

Dr. Longley will long be remembered for his unselfish devotion to duty, his high ideals, and his capacity for leadership. In the classroom, in the office, and in the community, he revealed his genuine desire to serve and to render assistance. He was a quiet, unpretentious man, but a true scholar, a very kind and understanding gentleman, and a public-spirited citizen. Through the example which he set, he has left an indelible imprint upon Acadia University, where all who were privileged to know him, either as students or as colleagues, recognized that he was a dedicated man of great integrity and sincerity, who cared deeply about his university, his community, and his church and who served them all with untiring zeal.

He is survived by his wife and three brothers.

A. W. MACINTOSH

HISTORIANS IN CANADA

THE DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS OF HISTORY DEPARTMENTS in Canada continue to be change and expansion in personnel. At the University of British Columbia, Brian Harrison, Harvey Mitchell, Fredrick L. Lehmann, F. Murray Greenwood, H. Keith Ralston, and Allan C. L. Smith have joined the department. Wm. Stull Holt has been appointed Visiting Professor and John M. Norris, A. Norbert MacDonald, and Daniel M. Klang are on leave of absence during 1967-68. John Money and Christopher Rowe have joined the department at the University of Victoria. Simon Fraser University has appointed Richard Hill, James B. Parsons, and Ronald C. Newton as Visiting Professors. Charles L. Hamilton, A. P. Kup, D. S. Kirschner, John P. Spagnolo, John Baird, D. Huitson and I. Mugridge have been appointed to the department.

Professor Hilda Neatby has been awarded the Canadian Women's Press Club gold medal for historical writing for her *Quebec, The Revolutionary Age*. P. M. Swan, Geoffrey Bilson, Sylvia C. McIntyre, and Terilyn J. McKenzie have been appointed to the department at the University of Saskatchewan and Ivo N. Lambi will be on leave of absence. F. D. Blackley has been named Associate Chairman of the department at the University of Alberta and F. A. deLuna and B. L. Evans are on sabbatical leave. Hazel J. Jones, W. R. Sampson, C. S. Mackinnon, Lelia al Karmy, and G. A. Burden have joined the department. At the University of Calgary, J. B. Toews has been appointed Acting Chairman and A. J. G. Knox, D. G. Whitefield and S. A. Silverman have joined the department.

McMaster University has appointed A. Cassels, J. M. Bumsted, and George Grinnell to the department. Alfred Hoermann will be on leave from Brock University and Roberta Styran and Wesley Turner have accepted appointments there. F. A. Hagar and Robert Page have been appointed to the department at Trent University. K. A. MacKirdy will be on leave from the University of Waterloo, and Keith D. Eagles has joined the department there. Donald M. Schurman and John H. Archer have joined the department at Queen's University. Mr. Archer will also become the archivist at the Douglas Library. Fred Somkin will be on leave to study at Harvard University. F. L. Thompson has been granted sabbatical leave from the Royal Military College of Canada and D. B. Hunt and Gerald Rubin are new members of the department there. Professor Marcel Trudel of the University of Ottawa has been awarded the Governor General's medal and le Prix des Concours littéraires et scientifiques du Québec. Serge Gagnon, Cornelius Jaenen, Lawrence C. Jennings, and Michel Rheault are new appointments at the University of Ottawa.

At Carleton University Fernand Ouellet has been awarded le Grand Prix littéraire de la ville de Montréal for his *Histoire économique et sociale du Québec de 1760 à 1850*. H. Blair Neatby will be on leave of absence. Richard G. Glover, Karel D. Bicha, and Richard T. Clippingdale have joined the department and Geoffrey H. Martin has been appointed Visiting Professor. Lewis Hertzman has been named Acting Chairman of the department at York University. Arthur Haberman, Paul R. Swainey, Bernard Zelechow, David B. Griffiths, John M. P. McErlean, F. H. Mathews, and F. Micheal Quealey have joined that department. Donald G. Pilgrim has been appointed to the Glendon College department and John Bruckmann will be on leave. Michael H. Kates and Margaret M. Knittl have joined the Atkinson College department. Donald G. Creighton of the University of Toronto has been named a Companion in the Order of Canada. J. M. S. Careless has been elected President of the Canadian Historical Association. A. P. Thornton has been appointed Chairman of the department. R. M. Saunders, R. H. McNeal, W. A. Goffart, and J. M. Beattie are on sabbatical leave and J. Kornberg, A. Rossos, E. L. S. Shorter and T. M. Brady have joined the department. R. W. Greaves will be a Visiting Professor at Toronto for 1967-68.

Mlle Lucienne Cnochaert has been appointed to the department at Université de Sherbrooke and Bernard-Louis Holtzmann will be Visiting Lecturer for 1967-68. Eugene D. Genovese, Charles L. Bertrand, and Sanford H. Elwitt have been appointed to the department at Sir George Williams University. Said A. Shaw has been named Visiting Professor and Stephen J. Scheinberg will be on leave of absence.

Raymond MacLean has been appointed Head of the department of history at St. Francis Xavier University and A. Balawyder has joined the department. D. Alexander, C. J. B. English, J. W. Larner, and Keith Mathews have been appointed at Memorial University. At Dalhousie University P. B. Waite will be

on sabbatical leave and H. S. Granter has been appointed Acting Head of the department. Tamara K. Hareven is on leave of absence and John Flint, R. M. Haines, L. D. Stokes, and Judith Fingard are new members of the department.

A NEW RESEARCH CENTRE IN HISTORY

IN DECEMBER 1966, Saint Paul's University, in conjunction with the Department of History of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ottawa, decided to establish the Research Centre in Canadian Religious History. The Centre was inaugurated on April 6, 1967.

One of the goals of the Centre is the promotion of studies in Canadian church history. Its first task will be to prepare an inventory of Canadian religious history, to make lists of the items of interest to historians to be found in archives, and to promote the publication of scientific studies on the religious history of the country. The new organism will also centralize historical documentation, and, as it develops, will endeavour to furnish scholars with material not readily available. At the present time, a great number of documents are already available to those interested in the subject. Graduate courses in religious history are also contemplated.

The Centre is bilingual and œcumenical in character and is under the direction of a three-man council and a consultative committee composed of Canadian historians of various languages and religious convictions.

JOINT CHA-AHA MEETING

THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION has received a grant of money to provide assistance for members travelling to the joint Canadian Historical Association-American Historical Association Meeting to be held in Toronto at the end of December 1967. Members wishing such assistance should apply to the Treasurer of the Canadian Historical Association, Public Archives, Ottawa, before December 8, 1967, stating the amount of assistance they are receiving from other sources. First consideration will be given to applicants presenting papers or having special duties to perform at the meeting, and also to those travelling from more distant points.

CONTRIBUTORS

RICHARD J. DIUBALDO, who is completing a doctoral dissertation for the University of Western Ontario, is presently employed as an historian for the National Historic Sites Service.

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A one-time teacher of history at the University of Michigan, S. MORLEY SCOTT is a retired Canadian diplomat.

William Lyon Mackenzie, First Mayor of Toronto: A Study of a Critic in Power*

F. H. ARMSTRONG

I

EVALUATING MACKENZIE has always been something of a problem. His "cause" might be said to have won, even if he personally lost, and the question of how much of the final victory could be credited to his efforts has never been settled—nor probably ever will be. His reputation has not suffered from the odium which has gathered around the very name "Family Compact"; his published biographies have been universally laudatory, beginning with that written by his son-in-law, Charles Lindsey, in 1862. The only adverse biography, written by William Dawson LeSueur in the first decade of this century for the *Makers of Canada Series*, was suppressed by legal action on the part of the Lindsey family. In more recent years, the idolization of his grandson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, has further helped to confuse the issue. The two most balanced interpretations of his career, provided by Aileen Dunham and Gerald Craig in their magnificent histories of Upper Canada, seem to have done little to shake his image—though the first appeared as long ago as 1927—and his supporters continue to credit him with a decided policy and search for consistency in his activities.

In all the evaluations of Mackenzie, however, little account has been taken of the one time he was really in power—the few short months of his mayoralty in Toronto in 1834. His biographers passed it

*The writer would like to thank those who helped him in the preparation of this research. Professor J. M. S. Careless of the Department of History, University of Toronto, and Miss Edith G. Firth of the Toronto Public Libraries were particularly helpful and gave unstintingly of their time and advice. I take full responsibility for the interpretation of Mackenzie's mayoralty, and any faults it may contain.

off with a brief eulogy; Dunham and Craig had no opportunity to examine it in their more extended histories. Although there were twice Reform majorities in the Upper Canadian Legislative Assembly, it is here, as first mayor, that Mackenzie may really be said to have had an opportunity to show what he could do as the "government" for the only time in his many years in politics. As an opposition leader, his talents and faults have long been obvious, but it is from an examination of his career as mayor of Toronto that we can best judge his ability as a practical administrator. As mayor, he was literally the premier of a responsible government, with an absolute majority behind him, powers of patronage and taxation, and, above all, no Legislative Council to veto his programme. Thus, in any evaluation of Mackenzie, these few months in 1834 are of the utmost importance in answering the question of whether he was just a rabble rouser or whether he was something more, a man who could have set up a successful administration in Upper Canada had the Rebellion of 1837 succeeded.

II

The 1834 Act of Incorporation which erected the Town of York into the City of Toronto provided that the first municipal elections were to be held within three calendar months from the date it received royal assent; however, Sir John Colborne promptly called the first elections for March 27, just 21 days after he had signed the Act. Probably his only thought was to get the new corporation going as soon as possible, because there was so much to be done. Mackenzie, who had recently been elected last warden of the Town of York, saw the early date in another light and claimed that Colborne had called the sudden election at the request of the Tories so that the Reformers would not have time to organize.¹ That his complaint was hardly justified is shown both by the zeal with which the Reform party rushed into the election and by the fact that they were the victors. Having spent at least a decade organizing provincial elections and local demonstrations, it was a well-prepared body. If anything, the Tories were placed in a difficult position by the early election, because their grass-roots political organization, the British Constitutional party, had been formed only two years before and had never fought a provincial election. Both groups were, of course, factions rather than parties in the modern sense.

The election which followed in Toronto was naturally characterized by some confusion; there was no experience with the new level of

¹*Advocate*, March 20, 1834.

government, or with its regulations, and generally new candidates, who were not already involved in provincial politics, had also to be found. In the end, most of those who ran had never sat in the Assembly. This first civic election contest, and those in the years following, were much more like provincial elections than the non-party municipal elections of today. Both sides, Tory and Reform, produced full slates of candidates, and, although they could hardly be said to have had platforms, both were divided on reasonably clear lines of principle.

Mackenzie began the Reform campaign on March 18 by calling for a meeting of the "Mechanics and Labourers of Toronto" to be held at the Old King's Bench Court House on the evening of the nineteenth, with the object of forming ward committees and arranging for meetings in the individual wards. There were five of these named for the four patron saints of the British Isles with St. Lawrence thrown in to add a Canadian touch. Each was to elect two aldermen and two common councilmen. Mackenzie also published lists both of those Reformers who were ready to run and of those who declined. Unfortunately the second list included most of the well-known Reformers who were available: Jesse Ketchum, William Warren Baldwin, Robert Baldwin, and Dr. John Rolph (who was to change his mind) among them. The list of available candidates, who were, according to Mackenzie, "the professed friends of peace, quietness and order, the frugal husbandmen of public money," included several men of wealth, but few who had had much experience with politics in an elective capacity. Mackenzie's former partner, James Lesslie, was one, as were the wealthy Joseph Cawthra, the well-known city doctor, Thomas D. Morrison, and Mackenzie himself.²

The Tories were also holding meetings and selecting candidates; a printed handbill listing their potential nominees included some leading merchants, such as George Monro and Thomas Carfrae, Jr., as well as such wealthy landowners as the Hon. John Elmsley and Colonel George T. Denison. Dr. Rolph, who the Reformers were sorry to see was not running, was listed as an approved aldermanic candidate for St. Patrick's Ward along with Colonel Denison—the handbill saying that he was the only man of ability among the Reformers, a eulogy hardly likely to enhance his Reform party support. Mackenzie naturally saw the Tory nominations in a less favourable light. In his *Advocate* of March 20 he listed the candidates of the Tory or "spend-thrift" party and added that he "should be very sorry indeed to see any of that party elected under the charter. Even a *sprinkling* of men of their principles might be very injurious." He also claimed that Dr. Grant Powell would be the mayor if the enemy succeeded although

²*Ibid.*

it seems more probable that Dr. Christopher Widmer was the Tory nominee.

In Toronto's early years elections were normally held in taverns, one being chosen for each ward, except for St. David's Ward, where they were held in the Court House, and St. Lawrence's Ward, where except for the first civic election they were held in the City Hall. For the first election, the locations were selected by the provincial executive and the returning officers by the sheriff; after that both the locations and the returning officers were picked by the retiring City Council. Consequently elections moved from tavern to tavern depending upon whether the City Council was Tory or Reform. The selection of the taverns for the 1834 election was rather surprising, for the proclamation, signed by Robert S. Jameson, the Attorney General, and Duncan Cameron, the Provincial Secretary, both of whom would have qualified as leading members of the "reptile crew" in Mackenzie's eyes, named taverns which were owned by men of both political affiliations: Edward Wright, the proprietor of Wright's Inn, was even a Reform candidate.³ Mackenzie was to hold his organizational meetings for the wards at the polling stations themselves, while the Tories went elsewhere.⁴

The returning officers, selected by Sheriff Jarvis, were also divided in their allegiances; James Hervey Price, the returning officer for St. Patrick, was to be appointed first City Clerk by the Reform victors, but John H. Spragge, named for St. Lawrence, was a Tory, as was William Hepburn for St. Andrew, who was also the Deputy Clerk of the Peace for the district. Without more evidence to back such a supposition, it would be too much to say that in view of the Reformers' complaints Colborne probably ordered moderation in the appointments. But there was certainly a remarkable lack of governmental effort to control the elections in the important preliminary stage of nominations—especially when one considers that both the bars and the voting were open.

The election was a lively one. Though the *Correspondent* on March 29 said that the Tories employed every stratagem, there is little evidence that they were in a position to do much to influence the results. In the edition of the *Advocate* which followed the election (April 3), Mackenzie gave an account of the voters in most of the ridings. Some of the leading Tories, including Judges Sherwood, Macaulay, and Powell, and Colonel Rowan, Colborne's secretary, did not vote. Though it might well be argued that all these men should have stayed out of politics because of their positions, their abstention does

³*Patriot*, March 21, 1834.

⁴*Advocate*, March 20, 1834.

not indicate that the Tories were using every stratagem. Moreover, such Tories as Captain Bonnycastle, and the Clerk of the Executive Council, Beikie, voted for Reformer Wright. Nor did the Baldwins vote, but the professors of Upper Canada College and Archdeacon Strachan all turned up to vote a straight Tory ticket. In St. Patrick's Ward Mackenzie noted that Dr. Rolph was the only Reformer to receive the vote of such Tories as D'Arcy Boulton and Duncan Cameron. The leading figures in the Bank of Upper Canada also turned out to vote Tory. John Maitland, the bank messenger, voted Reform. For this indiscretion, Mackenzie claimed, he was dismissed, but there is no other evidence to support the charge. Mackenzie also stated that the bank (whose director, Dr. Christopher Widmer, was a defeated candidate) "as a pitiful revenge . . . sent a message to this office never again to publish their notices ordered to be published in all the provincial papers."

III

When the results were in the Reformers had been victors in twelve seats and the Tories in eight. The reasons for the Reform victory were no doubt complex. The city, with its three Reform newspapers had, of course, been one of the centres of Reform strength. Further that there was a swing towards the Reform party in the province at the time is shown by its victory in the provincial elections during the same autumn. This tendency in Toronto had been greatly accelerated by the "persecution" of Mackenzie in his expulsions from the Legislative Assembly, and by the highhanded way in which both houses of the legislature had handled the city's incorporation bill, disregarding the fact that the citizens had registered their wishes in a series of public meetings. Also, the appointed Tory magistrates had hardly been very successful in solving the former Town of York's problems, and some voters may have felt the other side should be given a chance to inaugurate the new government.

Reform victory naturally was regarded with horror by the Tories. An example is the gloomy opinion given by Robert Stanton in a letter to John Macaulay in Kingston after the newly elected city government had had a chance to prove its worth. Writing on April 16 he remarked:

Your congratulations on the beautiful working of our City Corporation are well merited—what a plight we are in! the body is ill assorted and already bickering & quarrels are going on which afford us the delectable certainty that nothing either useful or ornamental is likely to be done for dirty Toronto—our streets are worse and worse—you never saw such a mess of filth and dirt. The fear of losing their popularity prevents them even attempting anything, & though they sit down from day to day nothing is done. The duties are certainly onerous and important,

but with the fools he has to work with it is more than even Mackenzie's industry can go though he has a majority, but not a working one, they are in fact a set of ignorant fellows, & though they may *vote* for him & his measures, there is not one among them who can *work* for him—the little fellow must sink under the task & we must only hope that the evil is one which will cure itself in time. The character of our city is certainly degraded, & in the mean time we must be content to bear matters as well as we can.⁵

Stanton was soon to change his opinion of Mackenzie. But when one looks at the other members of the City Council, how well do they appear to deserve this castigation? In both Tory and Reform camps there were moderates who were ready to co-operate in managing the government as well as extremists who, by their votes, seem to have been mainly interested in battling with their opponents. Most of the Reformers were only to remain on the City Council for a brief period; many were defeated in the 1835 election; those few who remained were wiped out in that of 1837. Consequently they never had the opportunity to develop with experience. On the other hand, it is rather doubtful, considering their actions while on the Council, whether many had the capacity for much development. There were, however, some able men: James Lesslie and Thomas D. Morrison were obviously in that category, and John Doel, the brewer, and William Cawthra were successful businessmen.

On the Tory side some of the first Council members were to remain in office for years; John Craig, who resigned in 1849, and George Gurnett, who sat until 1851, were the last to disappear. The Tory group included two other leading businessmen who were to play a prominent part in the government: Thomas Carfrae, Jr., and George Monro, though Carfrae's career was brief, since he retired to his collectorship of Customs after 1835. Monro became mayor in 1841, and Gurnett was to hold that distinction in four different years, in 1837 and from 1848 to 1850, before he left office to become the city's first full-time police magistrate in 1851. Another leading figure was Colonel George T. Denison, Sr., the first of a family which has had more representatives on the City Council than any other. Generally, Craig, Gurnett, and Denison were the most anti-Reform in their votes.⁶

With the Council duly elected, it remained to be seen who the members would elect as mayor. The Act provided that all twenty members of the Council had the right to vote for mayor, but only the ten aldermen were eligible for the office. The contest obviously lay between two aldermen, Dr. John Rolph and William Lyon Mac-

⁵Ontario, Department of Public Records and Archives (P.A.O.), John Macaulay Papers, April 16, 1834.

⁶Jesse E. Middleton, *The Municipality of Toronto* (3 vols., Toronto, 1923), I, 95, confirmed by the votes recorded in the Journal of the City Council (City of Toronto Archives).

kenzie. *Persona grata* to the Tories Rolph could only be suspect to many of the Reform group. As we have seen he had received Tory support in the election campaign, and the conservative newspapers generally leave the impression that he was "socially acceptable." His equivocal part in the election is typical of his entire political career, because, for all John Charles Dent's efforts in his histories of the period, Rolph remains a figure for whom it is difficult to feel much sympathy. There is a fair amount of evidence, however, that in spite of Tory approval Rolph had been promised the support of most of the Reformers and probably of Mackenzie himself.⁷ The fact that he so quickly resigned from the Council when he was not elected would support this interpretation for he had apparently only run in the expectation of becoming mayor. Mackenzie, on the other hand, was an unquestioned Reformer. The *Patriot*, possibly anticipating Tory defeat, had begun attacking him even before the election. On March 25, it said: "MARK OUR WORDS. If you make McKenzie [*sic*] LORD Mayor you brew trouble for the City. If you make him Alderman you brew trouble for the LORD Mayor; if you make him Common Council man, you brew trouble for the Alderman. It would be difficult to see where you could bestow him, and not make trouble for somebody." Such attacks naturally must have played into Mackenzie's hands. They enhanced the feeling that he should receive some compensation for the numerous wrongs he had suffered, especially the expulsions from the House. It is evident, moreover, that Mackenzie wanted to be mayor and did what he could to press for his election. That he was the last town warden, and did not hesitate to sign himself as such, possibly provided a certain "legitimacy" for his claims to higher office.

Scadding, writing in 1884, declared that the switch of Reform support from Rolph to Mackenzie, as party candidate for mayor, came at a party caucus on March 31 where Rolph was persuaded to waive his claims in view of the harsh treatment that Mackenzie had received. Apparently he bowed to the will of the majority, though he had none too high an opinion of Mackenzie.⁸ Scadding further claimed that Rolph decided then to withdraw from the Council and gave Morrison a letter to that effect to be read at the first meeting. This would appear to be correct as far as the course of events went but the date is apparently a little early, and possibly the procedure followed was a bit more blunt. The *Patriot* of April 4 said Rolph had been told that those who were not his friends would have to vote him in. Certainly the Tories

⁷Toronto Public Libraries (T.P.L.), Carfrae Scrapbook, and Henry Scadding and John Charles Dent, *Toronto Past and Present: Historical and Descriptive* (Toronto, 1884), p. 154.

⁸Scadding and Dent, *Toronto Past and Present*, p. 154.

were hoping to have Rolph elected by a Tory-moderate Reform combination. To sound him out on that possibility Carfrae and Monro had visited him on April 2. They stated afterward that "Dr. Rolph expressly declared to them that he would accept the office of Mayor if elected thereto, and that he would be personally present at the hour of election, and authorized the deputation to say so to the members of the Corporation."⁹ As this meeting had only taken place the day before the actual election, the Reform caucus must have been held just before the election itself. After he withdrew from the contest at that meeting Rolph gave Morrison a note to deliver to Carfrae which stated his intentions.

When the Council convened for the election at noon on April 3, Morrison gave this note to Carfrae. In it Rolph had stated that "notwithstanding his promise of yesterday, he had made up his mind not to serve in the office of Mayor, but to withdraw from the corporation altogether!"¹⁰ The meeting opened with John Doel being asked to preside *pro tem*, and Mackenzie was nominated. The Journal of the City Council then merely notes: "On which Debates ensued." But debate was stopped by Morrison reading his letter from Rolph "withdrawing himself from the Corporation, and resigning his seat." This was confirmed by Carfrae who said he had a similar letter from Rolph. The vote was then held. The results are worth recording, as they show the typical pattern of division during the following year.

Yea —Doel, Turton, Jackes, Drummond, Lesslie, Bostwick,
Harper, Wright, Arthurs, Morrison: 10

Nay—Craig, Gurnett, Trotter, Monro, Denison, Armstrong,
Carfrae, Duggan: 8

Although Mackenzie could hardly know it, he had attained the highest dignity of his political career.

IV

Contested elections were the first problem facing the Council. In the 1830's elections were disputed whenever any possible excuse could be brought forward. Soon there were petitions contesting elections in three of the five wards. The battles in the City Council which surrounded the hearing of the first of these were a prelude to the altercations and confusion which were to follow its debates all year. Indeed, Mackenzie and his majority quickly put themselves into the embarrassing position of carrying on in exactly the same arbitrary manner for which they had so often condemned the Tory Legislative

⁹Carfrae Scrapbook.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

Assembly. The first, and only, contested election actually to be tried was the return of Tory aldermen Monro and Duggan in St. George's Ward. Under the Act of Incorporation the Council had the right to try its own contested elections, but the Act did not provide any regulations on how this should be done. Inevitably, there was confusion as to procedure. This was compounded by the holy hatred between the two factions, Mackenzie and his supporters being ready to do all in their power to get rid of the two Tories and to bring in the two defeated Reform candidates.

Hearings began on April 25 with Monro and Duggan sitting on the Council and the petitioners appearing before that body along with a host of witnesses subpoenaed by both sides. Early in the proceedings Mackenzie ordered that the Council chamber be cleared and the matter discussed behind closed doors. Gurnett objected; the room was ordered cleared by a straight party vote, 10 to 7. According to the Reform (though anti-Mackenzie) *Canadian Freeman* on May 1, Mackenzie then ruled that Aldermen Monro and Duggan should not be allowed to sit in the Council and should retire as did the ordinary spectators on the closing of the doors. At this Duggan departed accompanied by Gurnett, Carfrae, and Denison, all exclaiming as they rushed out, "that they never saw such high-handed tyranny as was carried on by the Mayor." Monro, however, refused to leave, "stating that he would retain his seat as the legal representative of the St. George's Ward, unless driven from it by violence." Immediately Mackenzie sent for the High Bailiff, who dragged the alderman out. Accounts differ as to whether he was dragged off to the police office, but this seems doubtful. With the rules for such hearings yet to be set, it is difficult to assign blame. Monro was bullheaded perhaps, but, before he ordered the ejection, Mackenzie should have remembered his own expulsions from the Assembly and foreseen the political capital that the Tories could make out of the incident. Even with Monro evicted the Council were unable to proceed as the returning officer had failed to appear with the poll book, and the whole process was adjourned until the next day. In the end a scrutiny of the voting was only held in the third session and after another three days' discussion Duggan was unseated and Cawthra declared elected in his place. As another Reformer, Dr. John E. Tims, had been elected to succeed Rolph this gave Mackenzie a majority of 13 to 7.

No action was taken on the contested elections in the other wards, where Reformers' seats were in dispute, until mid-June. The *Patriot* on June 13 reported that the Tories tried to force action on the election in St. Andrew's, but that when they were apparently about to gain the support of the majority of the Council Mackenzie told Lesslie,

Tims, and Doel to "toodle off." Then when they had departed he adjourned the Council on the grounds that there was no longer a quorum. Subsequently, postponement followed postponement, until at last on October 20 the petitioners in despair agreed to withdraw their petitions and the Council accepted the withdrawal.¹¹

V

While the Council had been preparing to start hearings it had managed to accomplish a fair amount of routine business. At the first meeting on April 8 James Hervey Price, an able barrister and moderate Reformer, was appointed City Clerk. He was accepted by 15 to 3, gaining the support of such Tories as Carfrae, Duggan, and Monro, and only being opposed by Denison, Gurnett, and Craig.¹² The meeting then appointed three special commissions. The first was charged to make the arrangements for setting up the city offices in the north-west corner of the Market buildings. This project included not only the establishment of council chambers, but also of a police office and offices for the mayor and clerk. The second committee was given the duty of designing the city seal. The third committee was assigned the task of drawing up rules for the Council. It was able to prepare a report in the remarkably short space of three days, so that the suggested forty rules could be read and accepted on April 11. They covered all the usual regulations for such a body: voting, notice of motions, method of presenting petitions, standing commissions, etc.¹³ On April 14 the Council set up eight standing committees on finance, situations (appointments), fire and water, buildings and repairs, streets and roads, harbours and ferries, police and prisons, and finally markets. Appointments to the committees were by vote of the Council; generally, two Reformers and one Tory were put on each. Mackenzie became a member of the committees on situations, finance, and the markets—the three most important.¹⁴

In May the City Council completed its appointments and also set up offices. The Committee on Appointments to Office naturally recommended Reformers, and the City Council naturally followed these suggestions. Although nothing better might be expected at the period, the results were not in the long run too satisfactory. The politics of the City Council changed every year between 1834 and 1837; consequently there was a constant turnover of officials that was hardly good for the city. Fortunately, however, neither the City Clerk nor the Chamberlain (Treasurer) changed after the first year. For the latter

¹¹Journal of the City Council, Oct. 20, 1834.

¹³*Ibid.*, April 11, 1834.

¹²*Ibid.*, April 8, 1834.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, April 14, 1834.

office the committee had at first picked Matthew Walton who was duly elected by the Reform majority without difficulty.¹⁵ But his tenure of office was very brief, for he died in the cholera epidemic only three months after his appointment.

Finding satisfactory offices for the city administration proved to be difficult. The Council had hoped initially to house the city government in the Court House, but its application was promptly turned down by the Tory magistrates of the Home District (which body included Monro and Denison) on the grounds that it would be a great inconvenience.¹⁶ The city then decided to open offices in the Market, but ran into immediate problems because the rooms occupied were intended for shops or granaries. Moreover, the more space appropriated for municipal purposes, the less that could be rented out to pay off the debt for Market construction which the city owed to the Home District under the Act of Incorporation. In order to make the offices usable a considerable amount of remodelling had to be done, and for a time accommodations must have been quite inconvenient and inadequate.

With the rules of the Council established, quarters acquired, and committees appointed, the time had come to get down to major items of business. One of the most outstanding problems, the traditional York mud, was dealt with by the Committee on Streets and Roads which reported on May 20.¹⁷ Extensive recommendations for improving the city were certainly sound but represented an outlay of money which the taxpayers were hardly able to afford. Actual accomplishments hardly matched the recommendations, but did include plank sidewalks on many of the major streets. Squared logs were laid at the main intersections. Except for main streets such as King, however, where four-foot planks were used, most of the planking was only two feet wide.¹⁸ This led to some alleviation of conditions, but, basically, dirty little York had merely become dirty big Toronto, and the mud problem was to remain for a long time to come.

Turning to legislation, the record of the corporation was none too impressive in view of the large number of problems awaiting the Council's attention. Only nine by-laws were passed, and all of these fell within the brief period of May 10 to June 19, after which absolutely nothing was accomplished. Of the nine, the first established fire regulations and the second and seventh regulated the market and hay sales. By-law 3 was only concerned with the duties of the chamberlain.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, May 19, 1834.

¹⁶P.A.O., Minutes of the Court of the Quarter Sessions of the Home District, April 29, 1834.

¹⁷P.A.O., City Council Papers, May 20, 1834.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1834.

Number 4 provided fines for a variety of offences, being particularly aimed at putting a stop to animals running loose on the streets and people throwing garbage and wastes into the streets or harbour. The fifth by-law provided for a tax on dogs and the sixth for licences for selling alcoholic beverages. Number 8 established a civic Board of Health and also regulated certain basic sanitary precautions such as operating hospitals, reporting sickness, draining stagnant water, burials, removing offal, and cleaning privies. Finally, by-law Number 9 regulated the streets and sewers.

This was the sum total of legislation which the Mackenzie mayoralty managed to put on the books. Much of it was to prove inadequate, partly because of inexperience, and had to be redrawn the next year. Yet by the time this first flurry of legislation was completed, the work of setting up the government, and much of the work on the sidewalks had been accomplished. Though Mackenzie and his supporters had hardly run the city brilliantly, they had at least accomplished something during these first three months, even if they had spent far too much time squabbling with Tory members of the Council. Although equally ready to fight, the Tories deserve some credit also for the legislation, and for the handling of the problems of setting up a new government, because they too sat on the committees and helped in the drafting. Though there were still some six months left to run in the first Council's term, its days of accomplishment were over. The tale of the rest of the mayoralty is a dismal account of Reform failure, a failure which to a very large extent can be laid at Mackenzie's door.

VI

Even while the City Council was organizing the government and passing its few by-laws, complaints were arising about its administration. Often these were voiced against the whole Council, and not just the Reform majority.¹⁹ By July the Reform-oriented *Canadian Freeman* was accusing Mackenzie and his colleagues of turning their interest to the coming provincial elections rather than municipal business.²⁰ The complaint was a justified one, for Mackenzie editorially and otherwise was showing less and less interest in his civic office and was not providing the leadership the city needed. His publication in the *Advocate* of May 22 of Joseph Hume's famous letter accusing the mother country of "baneful domination" had already set off an unedifying debate in the Council. Meanwhile some major problems were obviously outstanding.

¹⁹T.P.L., S. P. Jarvis Papers, Jarvis to A. McLean, May 29, 1834.

²⁰*Canadian Freeman*, July 24, 1834.

One of these was finance. On May 19 the Council voted a tax for the year of two pence per pound assessment, in addition to the rates payable to the Home District.²¹ This was only half the tax allowed under the Act of Incorporation, and certainly was too light in view of the expenses ahead. But people who have not been taxed hate to see new taxes imposed and there was naturally resentment which was fed by the Tory Council members. These gentlemen either absented themselves on the day the tax was voted or voted against it.²² Even though they knew how necessary it was, the chance to blame the Reformers for an unpopular measure was too good an opportunity to miss. The uproar was not helped by either the obviously unequal method of assessment or the incompetent manner in which the taxes were collected.

Borrowing money was still another problem the Council seemed unable to handle. On June 7 the Corporation had authorized the borrowing of £1000 for road repairs,²³ but the loan was more easily approved than arranged. Application was promptly made to all likely quarters, with negative results. The Bank of Upper Canada refused flatly, the Commercial Bank of the Midland District said it wanted no part of the loan, and both the Receiver General and Clark L. Street, the Niagara Falls financier, sent their regrets.²⁴ They can hardly be blamed, for among the members of the City Council William Cawthra could have made such a loan but gave no sign of doing so; and there were others who could have advanced at least a part of it. The city was saved at this juncture by the new Toronto financial partnership of Truscott, Green & Co. which agreed to assume the entire amount.²⁵

While the financial troubles were developing, Mackenzie was also being attacked for the way in which he was handling the other half of his duties, as presiding magistrate for the City Quarter Sessions. The Mayor's Court, as these were called, was held at the Court House four times yearly in the same manner as the District Quarter Sessions, with the mayor presiding assisted by one or more aldermen. For a mayor who, like Mackenzie, was untrained in law, the court was not only a major drain on his time, but also a political liability, for sentences he handed down which were too Draconic could be used against him by his opponents. The cases he heard were largely larceny, with assault running a close second, but affray, riot, and misdemeanour cases also appeared. As can be expected in a frontier town with large poor districts and many taverns, there was a surfeit of sordid cases. The

²¹Journal of the City Council, May 19, 1834.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*, June 7, 1834.

²⁴City Council Papers, June 18-21, 1834.

²⁵*Ibid.*, June 20, 1834.

judgment which got Mackenzie in the most trouble, and became the delight of the Tory opposition, was his decision in the case of Ellen Halfpenny. Described as a "common scold" she appeared before the mayor for drunken and disorderly conduct and was ordered to be put in the stocks and also set to cleaning prison cells.²⁶ The stocks in Toronto, which were of the type which confined head, feet, and arms, were still standing, but had evidently not been used for some years. Mackenzie should have known that sentencing a woman to such punishment for what was a relatively minor crime was bound to cause a furor, but evidently he lost his temper.²⁷

Thus by the end of July Mackenzie was being attacked for failing to get the city government under way, for improper handling of finances and taxation, and for incompetent judgments. Then, suddenly, on July 30, came the first major tragedy in the city's history: the collapse of part of the balcony in the Market courtyard during a public meeting which resulted in five being killed and about fifty injured. As Mackenzie had called the meeting to discuss taxes, he was blamed by the Tory press, but he was hardly more at fault than anyone else and was not even at the second session of the meeting when the accident took place. Other Reformers may have been responsible for chasing some of the Tories to the section of the balcony which collapsed because of overloading; conversely the Tory forces were struggling just as fiercely to dominate the assembly as the Reformers. Before the city could recover from this tragedy, fate struck again. The very next day cholera broke out in the jail and the city was suddenly faced with a repetition of the epidemic which had first struck in 1832. It remained, in 1834, to see if the City Council would be any more efficient than the magistrates of the Home District had been during the first wave of the cholera. In both years the Boards of Health were faced by an almost impossible problem. There were no sewers or scientific ideas on sanitation; the poorer areas were crowded; and many of the populace had an innate suspicion of hospitals.

In 1834 the Tories and Reformers were soon quarrelling over the best methods of action and there were various changes in the Board of Health because of their disagreements. Mackenzie's part is not completely clear, but he seems to have been guilty of unnecessary interference in the activities of the health officers.²⁸ Certainly he did not deserve the plaudits given to him by some of his biographers; the real heroes of the epidemic were the doctors and Governor Colborne who

²⁶*Advocate*, June 26, 1834.

²⁷Scadding and Dent, *Toronto Past and Present*, p. 162.

²⁸Macaulay Papers, Robert Stanton to Macaulay, Aug. 6 and 9; *Patriot*, Aug. 12; and Carfrae Scrapbook.

made hospital accommodation and money available. When the coming of the cool weather brought the scourge to an end it had taken some 500 victims in the city.²⁹ Most of these came from the poorer classes, though the sickness also carried off some of the more prominent citizens. Lardner Bostwick was the only member of the Council who was a victim; yet Matthew Walton, the Chamberlain, died on August 7 and the City Clerk, Price, and Mackenzie were both taken ill, but recovered.

VII

Bostwick's death meant that there had to be a by-election for a common councilman to replace him in St. Lawrence's Ward. Both sides regarded this as a test of popular support for the administration.³⁰ The Reformers put up Charles Baker, a tailor who was a friend of Mackenzie, and the Tories Joshua G. Beard, who won handily by 72 votes to 35.³¹ Mackenzie played the results down, saying that both sides had stayed away.³² Though his prestige might be damaged, he still had his majority, the standing now being twelve Reformers to eight Tories.

Mackenzie was now, however, beginning to have difficulties with his own Reform majority. These had first blown up during the Board of Health disagreements and continued over the selection of a new chamberlain. On August 26, the Committee on Appointments to Office, in a report signed by Mackenzie and Lesslie, recommended Andrew T. McCord as Walton's successor and he was duly elected on September 15. Mackenzie, who had changed his mind, petulantly protested that McCord was "personally obnoxious to him" and asked that his name be taken off the Committee on Finance and Lesslie's substituted. He announced that he could not stay on if the Council thought fit to appoint persons contrary to his expressed wish and attacked his own followers for not backing him, saying that "such opposition astonished him."³³ In the division which followed both factions split and Mackenzie was only removed by his own casting vote. Such activities did nothing to increase the financial community's confidence in the city government, and the City Council soon found that Truscott, Green & Co. were demanding payment of the £500 still owing on their loan. The Council found it impossible to raise funds elsewhere to pay this off, and the bankers were only willing to continue the loan provided they were given a new note signed by the

²⁹Macaulay Papers, Aug. 21, 1834.

³¹*Christian Guardian*, Sept. 10, 1834.

³³Carfrae Scrapbook, and *Patriot*, Sept. 19, 1834.

³⁰*Patriot*, Sept. 9, 1834.

³²*Advocate*, Sept. 11, 1834.

entire City Council. The Council agreed to this on September 25 although only fifteen members signed.³⁴

Mackenzie's main interest in September was the provincial election. He was nominated in the Second Riding of the County of York and was elected by the overwhelming majority of 334 votes to 178.³⁵ Unfortunately for Toronto, however, he so threw himself into writing and speaking that the city government was badly neglected. Further, with the election over, he began to devote much of his time to the Legislative Assembly instead of city business. He did, however, cease his activities as an editor on November 4, turning his *Advocate* over to the *Correspondent*.

In mid-November the City Council met to fix the salaries for the year. The Committee on Finance had recommended that the mayor receive £250 "he being understood to act as Police Magistrate daily," but in the Council this was cut to £100 (which was the minimum under the Act). Most of the Tories present, and Morrison, seem to have been against voting him anything. The main financial arguments, however, arose over the payments to Marshall Spring Bidwell as city solicitor. When the city was first incorporated the attorney general of the province had acted as solicitor and only charged £10 for the advice he had to give. In mid-August, however, Mackenzie and Lesslie, as members of the Committee on Appointments to Office, had recommended that Bidwell become solicitor. Accordingly he had been appointed and paid a retainer of £50.³⁶ The payment was slipped through the Committee on Finance in the absence of Gurnett, the only Tory member, and was not voted by the Council at the time, though the appointment was approved. The *Patriot* in November claimed that Bidwell was an honest man and that he would return the money after he came back from a Florida holiday, but there is no evidence that he did so.³⁷ What the *Patriot* does not seem to have known is that a second payment of £50 had been made on September 24.³⁸ That the city as yet had no need for a solicitor is shown by the fact that there was no further appointment until Clark Gamble was nominated in 1840. Also, the payments were very high, completely out of line with what the corporation could afford. The whole incident would appear to be simply a barefaced example of patronage to a political ally. Though nothing else could really be expected at the

³⁴The note is in the Toronto Public Library.

³⁵Charles Lindsey, *The Life and Times of William Lyon Mackenzie* (2 vols., Toronto, 1862), I, 318-19.

³⁶Journal of the City Council, Aug. 18, 1834, and City Council Papers, Aug. 26, 1834.

³⁷*Patriot*, Nov. 14 and 21, 1834.

³⁸City of Toronto Archives, City Council Cash Book, Item #48, Aug. 26, 1834 and Item #63, Sept. 24, 1834.

period, coupled with earlier appointments the Bidwell case serves to show that Mackenzie, had he ever been in power provincially, would probably have not acted very differently from the Family Compact on patronage matters.

Mackenzie also left himself open to criticism by renting one of the granaries in the City Hall as a printing office for his *Advocate* on June 18, for a two-year term, at a rent of £18 currency per annum.³⁹ Though the rent would appear to be reasonable in itself, he had the corporation remodel the granary making it airtight and adding a ceiling; considering the limited corporation funds, he thus left himself open to charges of misuse of his powers as mayor.⁴⁰

The last great battle of 1834 in the Council chamber came at the end of November over the appointment of a successor for City Clerk James Hervey Price who resigned on November 12, the Tories claiming that the reason for his resignation was his thorough disgust with Mackenzie.⁴¹ The debate which took place is worth examining in detail for it represents the nadir of the Council's deliberations. The Committee on Appointments to Office, composed of Lesslie and Mackenzie, recommended that one William Thomas Kennedy, an inhabitant of Kingston, be appointed Price's successor.⁴² The Tories claimed that they had never heard of Kennedy and that the only reason for recommending his appointment was his backing of the Reformer, ex-Father O'Grady, when he had run for election in Kingston. This was to be a return for his activities.⁴³ On November 25 Lesslie and Jackes recommended that Kennedy be appointed at a salary of £150 per annum.⁴⁴ Gurnett then rose to say that most of the Council had never heard of the man before, and that he wondered if he had the qualifications for office. He further suggested that a Toronto taxpayer should be appointed to the post, and concluded:

I really think, sir, that it is *not decent* again to call upon the Council to sanction the appointment of a person who is utterly unknown to the most of us; and of whose abilities to discharge the important duties of the office in question, the members who signed the report have not condescended to give this Council one word of information. I repeat, sir, I think it is *indecent* to call upon us to sanction the proposed appointment under such circumstances.

Mackenzie broke in: "You cannot, Mr. Gurnett, describe anything which is recommended by a Committee of this Council as 'indecent'—you are quite out of order Sir!"

³⁹Journal, Jan. 25, 1835.

⁴⁰City Council Papers, Aug. 3, 1835.

⁴¹Carfrae Scrapbook, clipping out of *Courier*, Nov. 25, 1834.

⁴²City Council Papers, Nov. 12, 1834.

⁴³*Patriot*, Nov. 28, 1834.

⁴⁴The following account of the incident is based upon the entries in the Journal of the City Council, the *Patriot* (Nov. 28, 1834), the *Courier* (Nov. 27, 1834), and the Carfrae Scrapbook.

The two then began arguing, and the discussion degenerated with a series of cries of "order, order" from the Reformers, while Mackenzie told Gurnett to sit down. Mackenzie repeated this demand several times, but Gurnett consistently refused. Then Cawthra added "Take him into custody! Punish him!" Seizing on the idea Mackenzie promptly ordered High Bailiff Higgins to do so; Gurnett was taken by the arm, led from the table, and Mackenzie stood down from the chair and delivered a lecture on "observing strict order—paying proper respect to the chair, and to each other." Reformers and Tories began fighting over whether Gurnett's statement was a violation of the dignity of the Council or not. At last, Carfrae charged that many of the Reformers had been allowed to speak in language ten times stronger and "some of them had conducted themselves in such a way as was disgraceful: did not every person at the board remember one of the members of that party coming to the Council in a most disgraceful state, and yet nothing was done to him." He was then interrupted by further roars of order, but he moved that Gurnett should be allowed to resume his seat, since the proceedings were ridiculous. Dr. Tims promptly moved an amendment that the whole affair was a misunderstanding and no violation of the rules of the Council had been intended. Though his suggestion made good sense it was declared out of order. A vote called on Carfrae's motion went down on pure party lines, 6 to 9.

After a further motion to get Gurnett back to his seat, Morrison and Lesslie moved an amendment: "that it be resolved that the Rules of this Council are obligatory on its Members and the Mayor as Chief Officer is required to see them enforced, and that any Member called to order by him is bound to obey subject to an appeal to the Board—That Mr. Gurnett in refusing to sit down at the instance of the Mayor is guilty of a high Breach of Privilege, and that he be placed at the Bar of this Council to be admonished from the Chair." The motion was not surprisingly carried by 9 to 6. The *Courier* described the scene which followed:

Here Mr. Gurnett took up his hat and was walking out of the Room—when the Mayor called out "Higgins! stop Mr. Gurnett! Bring him to the bar!" Mr. G. declared he would not stay a moment to listen to the proposed harangue unless he were detained there by violence. Here the constables were ordered to assist the High Bailiff in detaining Mr. G., when the Mayor proceeded to talk for ten or fifteen minutes, about something—but as our back was turned to his Worship during the oration, in conversation with a couple of friends, we did not hear the purport of the Orator's Speech.

The Tories who had voted against the motion then fled the Council

chamber, leaving the mayor without a quorum, and the meeting was necessarily adjourned. Anyone who had played on his five expulsions from the Legislative Assembly as Mackenzie had should have known what the opposition press would do with this performance. The *Patriot*, on November 28, announced that the flight of the Tories was all that had saved Gurnett from the stocks, and the *Courier* on the twenty-seventh began its account with the comment that the most indisputable of all adages is that "*There is no Tyrant so overbearing and tyrannical—so capriciously and brutally despotic, as your real thorough-going demagogue.*"

The violence of the meeting seemed to exhaust the Council. From then until the end of its term there was little municipal business conducted. The next five meetings were forced to adjourn because there was not a quorum. On December 15 the Council decided to accept a motion "that the question of the permanent appointment of Clerk of the Council be deferred until after the General Election next month" which is surprising, as the Reformers had a majority to back whatever candidate they wanted. It might almost seem that they realized they had little hope in the next election and that any nominee who was acceptable to them would be promptly unseated by the new Council.

Although inability to decide on a new city clerk showed the Reformers' complete disorganization by the end of their term, their most damaging failure was their financial policy. Mackenzie and his associates not only failed to establish a financial policy but also never really made any attempt to keep payments up to date, to make sure collections were made, or even to prepare proper financial reports. Mackenzie's personal life and business career show that he never was able to keep track of money and, in spite of the fact that there were some very successful merchants on the Council and on the Committee on Finance, his civic accounts were as confused as his personal ones. In part, this was the result of his own philosophy of civic financing. When the Incorporation Act had been passed, he had strongly attacked the clause allowing future Councils to borrow against five years' revenue, failing to realize that in order to carry out some of the more expensive public works long-term borrowing would be necessary. Here he was merely reflecting in the municipal sphere the same Reform weakness which Aileen Dunham has pointed out so clearly in provincial policies: "The reformers failed, however, to consider that debts incurred in public improvements are themselves assets, and, if judiciously incurred, ultimately carry their own remuneration. In opposing public enterprise the radicals set themselves against the spirit

of the community and consequently suffered in the estimation of the people."⁴⁵

At the end of their term, the City Council was faced with the necessity of paying the remainder of the overdue loan (£500) to Truscott, Green & Co., which had been put off to January 28, as well as an additional £500 due the Home District for the Market and other debts. With virtually no cash on hand, all it could recommend was borrowing against the future revenues. In the end the Council was only able to raise £850⁴⁶ from Truscott, which did little but extend the loan under a new note. It left a net city debt of £1727.9.4, a small portion of which was covered by uncollected assessments. The new City Council did what it could to pay the 1834 debts, but it was hampered by its own expansion programmes, and in some cases it felt the debts represented little more than Reform patronage. Mackenzie did not get his salary until April 15, 1836, when there was again a Reform Council in office. He never did have his full printing bill paid since £17.10.0, the final sum due, was transferred out of accounts payable on February 5, 1838, after the Rebellion had failed.⁴⁷

VIII

In spite of the virtual breakdown in civic government, Reform campaigning for the January election in Toronto began as early as November 25. To provide themselves with a platform the Reformers held a public meeting at the City Hall on January 8 ostensibly to draw up a petition for the city to send to the legislature, requesting revision of the Act. There were sixteen clauses, many of which merely repeated Reform demands which had been made a year earlier when the Act was being debated: secret ballot, election of the mayor by the people, revised assessment, different borrowing terms, and a more liberal franchise. The Reformers by this time had also chosen their slate, which was very much the same as before.

Meanwhile Mackenzie himself was conducting a rather strange campaign. After promising to run in St. David he evidently changed his mind and held a public meeting on January 5 at which his supporters voted thanks "for the faithful discharge of his arduous duties during the period of his office."⁴⁸ The *Correspondent and Advocate* later stated with some disgust that "he told the citizens in the most plain and explicit terms that altho' the liberal party had inserted his

⁴⁵Aileen Dunham, *Political Unrest in Upper Canada 1815-1836* (Toronto, 1963), p. 137.

⁴⁶Journal of the City Council, Jan. 31, 1835.

⁴⁷Cash Book, Feb. 5, 1838.

⁴⁸Scadding and Dent, *Toronto Past and Present*, p. 163.

name on their ticket, and altho' he was most anxious, that the ticket should carry a majority in the new Council, he felt it to be his duty not to deceive the Ward of St. David, and that if elected he would not sit."⁴⁹ He also sent out 500 circulars to his friends stating:

CIRCULAR TO ALL PERSONS INDEBTED TO THE SUBSCRIBER

Sir,—Having retired from the management of a periodical press and resolved to decline coming forward as a Candidate for a seat in the City Council at the ensuing Civic election, I am very desirous of giving my undivided attention to the business of the Country as a member of the Provincial Legislature.

But Mackenzie was too mercurial to stick to his promise of staying out. Very soon the *Patriot* was able to announce that he had decided to run again, and was actively campaigning for his own election, all promises to the contrary. Naturally the Tory press made great fun of Mackenzie's antics. The *Patriot* reported on January 6 that Mackenzie had said "*I will never be Mayor, Alderman, or Common Council-Man again, so help me God! . . . Electors of St. David's Ward!—Will you permit this man to break his voluntary oath! Remember that accessories to crime are as culpable in the eyes of God as the principals.*"

The Tories also began their campaign early and had much the same slate of candidates. Certainly they had every reason for hope, in spite of their provincial defeat a few months previously. The platform the Reformers had brought forward in their petition was the same as the complaints they had made a year before, and obviously they had no more hope of getting a new Act through the Legislative Council than they had had in 1834. Also, the complete disorganization of the civic government in the autumn months, the failure to pass a single by-law since June, and the virtual lack of any tangible achievement was bound to play against the Reformers: especially as the taxes had tripled. Nor could Mackenzie really be considered an asset as candidate for re-election as mayor. He had neglected his civic duties to dabble in provincial interests, and there was no indication that he would not continue to do so. He had not even managed to hold his majority together in the Council, and as a judge had been less than impressive. The failure of the Board of Health during the epidemic could, at least to a certain extent, be blamed on him, and his carryings on in the stormier meetings must have seemed to many exactly like those of the Tory Legislative Assemblies in their less responsible moments.

Not surprisingly, then, the municipal voters on January 13 and 14 more than reversed the position of the parties. They returned 15 Tories and only 5 Reformers. Many of the defeats were of landslide

⁴⁹*Correspondent and Advocate*, Feb. 6, 1835.

proportions. In St. David's Ward Mackenzie received the lowest vote of anyone running in the riding, 69 compared with 123 for the lowest Tory aldermanic candidate. The Torontonians had obviously had enough of Mackenzie and his crew.

IX

To evaluate Mackenzie's career as mayor, one has to go back to his own warning in the *Advocate* of March 20, 1834, where he criticized the Act of Incorporation because it contained "the unnatural union of extensive patronage with legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the same body of individuals, without any adequate check to prevent the natural disposition of man to abuse power for his own advantage." Unfortunately he did not heed his own warning when he became head of the city government. His Reform administration in the city ended by mirroring many of the failings for which he had so strongly attacked the Tory-dominated Legislative Assembly and the Family Compact: misuse of patronage, appointment for purely political purposes, and using a majority virtually to maltreat the opposition. His handling of Monro and Gurnett was on the same level as his own expulsions from the Assembly. Anything else, however, was perhaps too much to expect, considering the vehement politics of the period. Thus, in spite of Mackenzie's innumerable attacks on the system, he can hardly be blamed for his own course, though his actions certainly disprove the contention of those who have seen him as something new and clean in politics. Furthermore Mackenzie must be given some allowance for having been forced to try to set up a new administration with no precedent, inadequate taxation powers, and untrained, and often inept, colleagues, while at the same time contending with the downright hatred of the Tories. But here the allowance must end. Basically Mackenzie failed to provide the city with the leadership, or programme, that it so desperately needed. Although the voters were fickle, and regularly switched parties every year prior to the Rebellion, Mackenzie's immediate successor, Robert Baldwin Sullivan, and to a lesser extent the next two mayors were able to show that it *was* possible to provide such leadership, and they went on to construct the paved roads and public sewers which were gradually to make Toronto a much more livable place.

William LeSueur felt that there are people who search for trouble and it seems as if Mackenzie belonged to this class. Here is part of the explanation for his failure as a mayor. Mackenzie loved to battle, a trait of personality that can be admirable in a newspaper editor, or in opposition, but one which can easily lead an administrator astray.

Instead of attending to his civic duties, he delighted in warring with his Tory opponents on the City Council—who admittedly reciprocated in full—fighting editorial battles about provincial politics, holding public meetings, and passing resolutions. But probably this zest for battle was only partially responsible for his failure to grasp the opportunities at hand. Aileen Dunham has stated that Mackenzie never had a decided policy throughout his life, but moved like a will-o'-the-wisp collecting miscellaneous complaints which happened to be prevalent at the moment.⁵⁰ Her interpretation is confirmed by the events of his mayoralty. For all his sometimes penetrating thoughts, the lesson that his administration in 1834 demonstrates is that he was constitutionally incapable of running the day-to-day business of government, or organizing his schemes and putting them to practical application. Here was a failing that was again to manifest itself when he bungled the very organization of the Rebellion of 1837. That Upper Canada had its difficulties with the Family Compact cannot be denied; William Lyon Mackenzie, however, was certainly not the solution to those problems.

⁵⁰Dunham, *Political Unrest in Upper Canada*, p. 106.

The Campaign for a French Catholic School Inspector in the North-West Territories 1898-1903

MANOLY R. LUPUL

MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT the Manitoba school question since Sir Charles Tupper failed to carry the 1896 general election on a platform of remedial legislation for that province's aggrieved Roman Catholic minority.¹ Some attention has also been given to the less dramatic North-West school question which held the national stage briefly in 1894, after Sir John Thompson's Conservative government refused to disallow the School Ordinance (passed in December 1892) establishing state control of public education in the North-West Territories.² Little, however, has been written about subsequent developments, particularly those in the North-West. Of these, perhaps the most interesting are the negotiations between the Roman Catholic Church and the governments at Regina and Ottawa over the appointment of a French Catholic school inspector. During a five-year period church efforts, on occasion, approached the heroic. Neither government yielded, however, and the church came away empty-handed, only to regroup its forces for the next encounter.

The inspectoral issue had its roots in a school law passed by the territorial Legislative Assembly in January 1892, transferring the

¹Even so, a definitive account of the Manitoba school question, including not only the crucial years 1890-96 but subsequent developments well into the twentieth century, has still to be written. For an outline of the principal developments, see C. B. Sissons, *Church and State in Canadian Education* (Toronto, 1959), chap. III.

²See M. R. Lupul, "Relations in Education Between the State and the Roman Catholic Church in the Canadian North-West with Special Reference to the Provisional District of Alberta from 1880 to 1905," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1963.

appointment and control of school inspectors from the Protestant and Roman Catholic sections of the Board of Education to the Lieutenant Governor in Council.³ Of the four inspectors appointed in March, only one, the Reverend David Gillies, was a Catholic. Frederick W. G. Haultain, leader of the Assembly's Executive Committee (Executive Council after 1897) and *de facto* premier of the North-West Territories, considered the single appointment fair, for there were only 44 Catholic and 286 Protestant schools in the territories at the time.⁴ The inspectors were paid annual salaries and were considered permanent officials of the government.⁵ On a tour of inspection in northern Alberta in April 1892, the Reverend Gillies gave Bishop Vital Grandin of St. Albert to understand that he was an officer of the government, not a Catholic inspector.⁶ Finding the dual role of parish priest and school inspector too exhausting,⁷ Gillies resigned in April 1894 and was succeeded by James Calder,⁸ a Moose Jaw teacher who later became Saskatchewan's first minister of education. The "real" motive for Gillies' resignation, Archbishop Adélarde Langevin of St. Boniface declared later, was his "failing health" and his "impression that there was a pressure in certain quarters to bring him to follow the Normal School course at Regina."⁹ But Charles H. Mackintosh, the governor, blamed the resignation on "the hierarchy objecting to his acting under the present ordinance." The move was "foolish" because Gillies was the "only" qualified candidate the minority could offer. Sir John Thompson agreed that "pressure from St. Boniface, in order to make a difficult situation more difficult," had brought about the resignation.¹⁰

Since 1894, then, Roman Catholic public and separate schools in the territories had been inspected by non-Catholic school inspectors. Early in 1898, when the Manitoba school question had reached a stalemate, Archbishop Langevin re-opened the North-West school question when he asked Haultain to appoint "a Catholic Inspector, subject to the approval of the Bishops concerned." Haultain replied in general terms, promising to present the archbishop's request to the

³*Ordinances of the North-West Territories*, 1891-92, No. 28, s. 5.

⁴Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Sir John Thompson Papers, Haultain to Thompson, unofficial, Nov. 28, 1893.

⁵Saskatchewan Archives (S.A.), Minutes of the Executive Committee, March 21, July 13, 1892.

⁶Oblate Archives, Edmonton (O.A.), Bishop Grandin's Journal, April 30, 1892.

⁷Archbishop's Archives, St. Boniface (A.A.St.B.), Gillies to Archbishop Taché, Dec. 26, 1893.

⁸S.A., Minutes of the Executive Committee, April 13, 1894.

⁹A.A.St.B., Memorandum of Archbishop Langevin, "How was kept the promise of the Hon. M. Haultain for the appointment of a catholic inspector in the North-West Territories," Nov. 9, 1901. Cited hereafter as Langevin Memorandum.

¹⁰Thompson Papers, Mackintosh to Thompson, private and confidential, April 14, 1894, and vol. 43, 401, Thompson to Mackintosh, April 24, 1894.

next meeting of the Council of Public Instruction, the administrative body consisting of the four-man Executive Committee and four non-voting advisory members (two Protestants and two Roman Catholics) responsible for education.¹¹ Late in August, Bishop Grandin directed Father Albert Lacombe (then in eastern Canada) to contact officials at the University of Ottawa regarding a suitable candidate.¹² Archbishop Langevin followed with an appeal to Prime Minister Laurier. Unless a bilingual school inspector were appointed soon, he declared, the French language would disappear in a region explored by Laurier's forefathers and evangelized by French-Canadian missionaries.¹³ Within two days Langevin informed Grandin that Charles Caron would be the minority's candidate for the inspectoral post: "Il n'est que tonsuré; mais il est aussi instruit que m. Gillies. Il ne lui donne pas le titre de *Révérénd!* C'est Monsieur Caron tout court."¹⁴ With the Assembly in session at Regina, letters to Governor Mackintosh, Haultain, Daniel Maloney (member for St. Albert), and Charles Boucher (member for Batoche) were hurriedly dispatched, each pressing Caron's candidacy.¹⁵

The government, Langevin told Haultain, had "always" given the minority to understand that a Catholic school inspector would be appointed as soon as the minority presented a competent candidate. Although he had been "too busy" to give the matter much attention after Gillies' resignation, he now had a candidate "well fitted" for the position. Caron came from Sherbrooke, Quebec, and knew "*English* better than French." He had completed the classical course, had taught for more than twenty years, and was "one time principal of a school in Montreal." Although "perfectly" qualified, he was "quite ready to undergo an examination if required. In case you should accept him as Inspector *pro tem.*, at least, I will send him a word to come at once." The tone of Langevin's letter makes it clear that he regarded the appointment a mere formality. His letter to Maloney was even more brusque: "There is no question of speaking in the House about it—try to get your personal friends, and all those who depend on Catholic voters, to join in that matter the Catholic members—Be kind and nice, but firm as a rock—*We must have it.*" If Gillies' resignation were raised, Boucher was instructed to say that Gillies knew only English and that the minority had a right to a bilingual inspector. Above all, there should be no delay on the pretext that Caron had not passed the normal school examinations in the terri-

¹¹A.A.St.B., Langevin to Haultain, n.d., and Haultain's reply, March 22, 1898.

¹²O.A., 22 août 1898.

¹³P.A.C., Laurier Papers, 4 sept. 1898.

¹⁴Archbishop's Archives, Edmonton (A.A.E.), 6 sept. 1898.

¹⁵The letter to Mackintosh has not been seen, but it is mentioned in *ibid.* The other letters are in A.A.St.B., Letter Book, 1895–1900, 232, 226, and 224, Sept. 7, 1898.

tories; he would do so after he was appointed. There was nothing to fear; Caron was well educated.

Bishop Grandin and Father Hippolyte Leduc, Grandin's chief administrative assistant who had attacked the 1892 School Ordinance in a bitter pamphlet released in 1896,¹⁶ had doubted Haultain would make the appointment,¹⁷ and their doubts were soon confirmed by Maloney. Haultain and several members of the Assembly "fully" admitted the justice of the minority's request, but they would not be "dictated to . . . as they knew of others qualified for the position." The minority itself was to blame for not having a Catholic inspector. After the church had "forced" Gillies to resign, ". . . there was no qualified man belonging to our Church to fill the position."¹⁸ Langevin advised Grandin to work for Maloney's defeat: ". . . on sent un pauvre diable sans influence qu'est sous la cause des Protestants."¹⁹ Langevin soon heard from Haultain himself. He was glad to learn of Caron's candidacy, but Langevin was "under a slight misapprehension" regarding the government's position:

We have never undertaken to appoint a Catholic School Inspector, except in the case of a vacancy, and such a vacancy does not exist at present. If such a vacancy should occur, other things being equal, I should incline to the appointment of a man possessing such special qualifications as you attribute to Mr. Caron. In all probability, within a year, our school work will have so increased that another inspector will be needed; in such an event, or in the event of a vacancy occurring in the meantime, I shall be only too glad to consider Mr. Caron as an applicant for the position.²⁰

Political developments unexpectedly intervened in the minority's favour. In September, after less than four months in office, Lieutenant Governor M. C. Cameron, Mackintosh's successor, died, and Amédée E. Forget, a Regina barrister who had sought the office earlier,²¹ was again a contender. Since 1876 Forget had held several important government posts, demonstrating in each his devotion to French Catholic interests. Accordingly, Archbishop Langevin wired Laurier immediately that Forget's appointment would be agreeable to the episcopate and important for the school question.²² To Forget, Langevin made it clear that "le premier fruit" of his nomination would be "un inspecteur français": "Je le demande au nom du patriotisme aussi bien qu'au nom de la religion."²³ The government acted quickly and

¹⁶H. Leduc, *Hostility Unmasked: School Ordinance of 1892 of the North-West Territories and Its Disastrous Results* (Montreal, 1896).

¹⁷O.A., Grandin à Langevin, 12 sept. 1898.

¹⁸A.A.St.B., Maloney to Langevin, Sept. 17, 1898.

¹⁹A.A.E., 26 sept. 1898.

²⁰*Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1898.

²¹Laurier Papers, Forget à Laurier, *privée*, 26 jan. 1898.

²²*Ibid.*, telegram, 27 sept. 1898.

²³A.A.St.B., Letter Book, 1895-1900, 288, *personnelle*, 28 sept. 1898.

Forget became governor on October 13. From Ottawa, Lacombe informed Grandin that Laurier was happy the appointment pleased the clergy.²⁴ Laurier also approved of Caron's candidacy, Lacombe said, but wished it known that he was not "seul maître" of the schools in the Canadian west. Local governments, except in certain exceptional cases, could not be controlled from Ottawa.²⁵

With a friendly incumbent in Government House, Bishop Grandin sent his coadjutor, Emile J. Legal, to see Haultain at Regina. Haultain and James A. Ross, the other resident member of the Executive Council, gave Legal to understand that, provided a suitable candidate were available, the government "espéraient pouvoir appointer un inspecteur parlant français & anglais" — and this, Legal added, "dans l'espace de 6 mois."²⁶ There was no definite commitment, however; nor was there any indication that the bilingual inspector would be Catholic and/or French. Early in 1899, at Legal's request, Laurier wrote Forget and was advised that a private word to Haultain would be well received. Ross favoured the minority more than Haultain, but both were disposed to name "un Inspecteur d'écoles catholiques," as there was a vacancy.²⁷ Archbishop Langevin also wrote Laurier to remind him of his promise to have "un inspecteur catholique et français" appointed in the North-West. With Forget and Ross in Ottawa to negotiate the territorial budget, Laurier had "une excellente occasion de faire admettre le *principe* de la *nomination* par ceux qui dépendent de vous en tant de manières." At Forget's request, he had withdrawn Caron's candidacy and was seeking another candidate, who should be named if Laurier found him acceptable.²⁸

En route to St. Boniface from an episcopal meeting in Calgary, Langevin dined at the governor's residence on March 11, with Haultain, Ross, G. H. V. Bulyea (a non-resident member of the Executive Council), and Dr. D. J. Goggin, the Chief Superintendent of Schools and Director of the Normal School at Regina. The government, he learned, was prepared to appoint "un inspecteur *catholique*, sachant le français," who should have "quelque chose d'équivalent à un certificat de première classe *professionnel*, et aussi, si possible, un degré universitaire."²⁹ The main problem was to find a suitable candidate.

Having dropped Caron's candidacy, Langevin asked Father H. A. Constantineau, Rector of the University of Ottawa, and Archbishop

²⁴A.A.E., 20 oct. 1898.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 3 nov. 1898.

²⁶Oblate Archives, Ottawa, Legal à Langevin, 23 déc. 1898 (microfilm).

²⁷Laurier Papers, Legal à Laurier, *personnelle*, 5 jan. 1899. Laurier's letter to Forget has not been seen. The account is based on Legal à Laurier, *privée*, 26 jan. 1899, in the Laurier Papers.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 2 fév. 1899.

²⁹A.A.E., Langevin à Grandin, 11 mars 1899.

Paul Bruchési of Montreal to find a replacement. Each presented his own candidate (Bruchési presented two) and, much to Langevin's surprise, both resented the division of responsibility. Bruchési, working on the assumption that the main consideration was a candidate satisfactory to the bishops, viewed the University's candidate as a challenge to episcopal authority. Langevin was dismayed: Bruchési, he wrote Grandin, did not realize that ". . . nous ne sommes pas les maîtres à Régina!"³⁰ The matter came to a head when Lacombe wrote Constantineau and requested a Bachelor of Arts degree for one of Bruchési's candidates. Embarrassed, the indignant rector replied that, even if the candidate knew both languages, held a normal school certificate, and was an experienced teacher (all of which he doubted), the arts degree could not be granted without submitting documents to the University Senate. The university would suffer if Protestant universities or the government could prove that Ottawa granted degrees without a rigorous display of competence. Moreover, with his own candidate's case well advanced, Constantineau criticized Bruchési for presenting still another candidate.³¹ Aroused by Constantineau's audacity, Bruchési "a menacé de rompre" with Langevin.³²

To complicate matters further, each of the three candidates—A. Bélanger (proposed by Constantineau), J. V. Desaulniers and G. Beaulieu (proposed by Bruchési)—lacked either adequate background, or professional training, or teaching experience. Bélanger held a B.A. degree from Ottawa, but had no normal school certificate. He had taught for three years in "the higher branches of a collegiate course . . . and . . . in the elementary departments of education."³³ The statement was vague and would not impress Haultain who had made it clear that the "main" part of the inspector's work was to inspect "ordinary public schools."³⁴ (In 1896 only 2 per cent of the territorial school population attended secondary school classes.³⁵) Yet Bélanger was without 'ordinary' public school experience.³⁶ In place of a normal school certificate, he submitted "an official recommendation" from Dr. J. A. McCabe, principal of the Ottawa Normal School, which, he said, was "worth any Normal School certificate." At the

³⁰*Ibid.*, 2 avril 1899.

³¹Lacombe's letter to Constantineau (25 mars 1899) has not been seen. The account is based on Constantineau's reply, A.A.St.B., 27 mars 1899.

³²A.A.E., Langevin à Grandin, 2 avril 1899.

³³Bélanger to Haultain, March 26, 1899, in Sessional Paper no. 8, unpublished sessional papers of the Council and the Legislative Assembly in the North-West Territories, microfilm no. 2.96, S.A. Cited hereinafter as Territorial Sessional Papers (T.S.P.).

³⁴A.A.St.B., Haultain to Bélanger, March 21, 1899.

³⁵*Report of the Council of Public Instruction of the North-West Territories 1896* (Regina, 1897), p. 13.

³⁶A.A.St.B., Constantineau à Langevin, 18 mars 1899.

same time, he admitted he had already embarked on "a private course of applied psychology and pedagogy" from Dr. McCabe and his vice-principal: "This is the complement of my experience and will correct any deficiency under which I might labor." His written English lacked polish and did not strengthen the application.³⁷

The first, and the more important, of the two candidates proposed by Bruchési also had his shortcomings. J. V. Desaulniers (the subject of Lacombe's letter to Constantineau) had studied in an unnamed college without university affiliation.³⁸ His professional qualifications were an "Academic Diploma, the highest award to teachers in the Province of Quebec, bearing the degree 'with distinction' for both French and English." He had taught for ten years, the last four as an assistant principal "in one of the highest Catholic Primary schools of Montreal—The Catholic Commercial Academy." Should the government "strongly urge upon the B.A.," he would do his best to pass "this examination before the Board of one of our Universities in a comparatively near future." However, he did not think he needed a degree because "the Examination papers for the Academic Diploma bear on the same subjects as for the B.A., together with Pedagogy." Desaulniers' written English was considerably better than Bélanger's.³⁹

Even though G. Beaulieu, Bruchési's second candidate, presented himself as "utterly qualified for the position," he, too, had his deficiencies. He possessed a law degree from Laval University and was a member of the Quebec bar. He held a first-class teaching certificate from the Jacques Cartier Normal School in Montreal.⁴⁰ A teacher in the fifth form at the Montcalm School in Montreal, he lacked elementary school experience.⁴¹ His reference to his teaching experience was brief: "I am teaching at present in one of the most important schools of Montreal." His written English was weak and pretentious: "I have been induced to apply for the situation by both religious and civil authorities of our Province, happy, however, I would be to devote my time and energy to the noble cause of education in the vast plains of the West."⁴²

Each of the three candidates was prepared to do Archbishop Langevin's bidding. Bélanger saw himself as Langevin's protégé and assured him he would exert every effort to be worthy of the position and of the archbishop's confidence. Beaulieu was as loyal: "De nouveau je proteste de mon entière soumission à votre Grandeur et vous réitère

³⁷T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Bélanger to Haultain, March 26, 1899.

³⁸A.A.St.B., Desaulniers à Langevin, 5 avril 1899.

³⁹T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Desaulniers to Haultain, April 8, 1899.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Beaulieu to Haultain, April 11, 1899.

⁴¹A.A.St.B., Beaulieu à Langevin, 6 avril 1899, and Letter Book, 1895–1900, 517, Langevin à Villeneuve, 14 avril 1899.

⁴²T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Beaulieu to Haultain, April 11, 1899.

le désir que j'aurais de travailler, dans le Nord-Ouest, aux chers intérêts de la religion catholique et de la nationalité canadienne-française." In praising his friend (Beaulieu), the more reserved Desaulniers also showed he knew what was expected of one who received the appointment: "Il serait prêt à mettre sa plume et ses connaissances tant légales que pédagogiques au service de la cause catholique et nationale."⁴³

On April 1, 1899, the minority was startled to learn that Duncan P. McColl, principal of the public high school at Regina, was appointed to the inspectoral staff.⁴⁴ Forget wrote Langevin that Haultain had found Bélanger's certificates "excellents mais insuffisants." The minority might be more fortunate in July when the next appointment would probably be made.⁴⁵ To Father Lacombe, the delay meant there was still time to obtain a baccalaureate for Desaulniers, whom he favoured, believing him to be, as he put it, "encore plus *smart* que Mr. Forget."⁴⁶ Negotiations with Laval University began on April 14 and four days later Desaulniers had his degree. Lacombe gave Langevin the following explanation: "Le document est obtenu simplement, sur notre demande, sans autre formalité. Mais c'est un secret entre nous. Il faut que notre candidat soit reconnu comme ayant obtenu le B.A. après avoir subi les examens voulus."⁴⁷ On April 24 Desaulniers informed Haultain he had obtained the B.A. degree, after passing his examination "before the Board of the Laval University."⁴⁸ Langevin followed with a recommendation to Haultain, placing considerable emphasis on Desaulniers' newly acquired degree. He also urged Frédéric Villeneuve (St. Albert), Charles Fisher (Batoche), and Benjamin Prince (Battleford) to support Desaulniers' candidacy in the Assembly now in session at Regina.⁴⁹

Haultain, suspecting Lacombe's ruse, told Villeneuve that Desaulniers' degree had "tout l'air d'un service qu'on veut rendre aux évêques" and declined to appoint him.⁵⁰ On May 13 Desaulniers, without explanation, asked Haultain to return his documents.⁵¹ Lacombe, who had counselled Desaulniers to withdraw, was not too disturbed. Bruchési's second candidate, Beaulieu, whom he termed "un vrai gentilhomme et très bien *posté*," was still in the running.⁵² Langevin, in turn, consoled himself by terming Desaulniers "un gentilhomme et un

⁴³A.A.St.B., 4, 10, 8 avril 1899.

⁴⁴*North-West Territories Gazette*, April 15, 1899, p. 1.

⁴⁵A.A.St.B., 11 avril 1899.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, Lacombe à Langevin, 14 avril 1899.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 19 avril 1899.

⁴⁸T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, April 24, 1899.

⁴⁹A.A.St.B., Langevin to Haultain, April 25, 1899; Letter Book, 1895-1900, 566, Langevin à Grandin et Legal, 24 avril 1899.

⁵⁰O.A., Grandin à Langevin, 11 mai 1899.

⁵¹T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, May 13, 1899.

⁵²A.A.St.B., Lacombe à Langevin, 18 mai 1899.

Chrétien bien vertueux" for telling Haultain he had no degree. Haultain has acted "fort malhonnêtement; ce n'est pas un homme bien recommandable."⁵³

All hope now rested with Beaulieu and no efforts were spared to get him appointed. First Villeneuve, then Laurier was contacted.⁵⁴ Laurier told Constantineau he could do little, as Haultain was "not a particular friend" of his. He would, however, write Ross, upon the latter's return from the District of Athabaska, where he and Father Lacombe were negotiating an Indian treaty.⁵⁵ Villeneuve and Prince informed Haultain that, after examining Beaulieu's application, they believed him to be "well qualified" for the position.⁵⁶ On Senator Dandurand's suggestion,⁵⁷ Legal saw Ross several times in Edmonton early in September. Ross expressed surprise that no appointment had been made and promised to look into the matter. In his report to Langevin, Legal for the first time noted the main reason for the delay. Villeneuve had learned from Haultain and Forget that the opening of many new schools had drained the territorial treasury. The government did not have the funds to meet the salary of a French Catholic school inspector.⁵⁸

Disturbed, Langevin wrote Haultain and insisted he had "promised" in February and in May that "a Catholic inspector knowing French" would be appointed in July. With Ross back, there was no need for further delay. Ross, in turn, was asked to "hasten the thing now." All obstacles mentioned by Haultain had been removed, "and anyhow, where there is a will there is a way." Langevin urged Forget to do his utmost: "Oserait-on se moquer de nous! Et cela en face d'un Gouverneur catholique et français!"⁵⁹ Forget and Haultain, in reply, attributed the delay to economic exigencies. Forget explained that the government's hopes for an increase in the federal subsidy had not been realized. The government, Haultain declared, instead of adding to its staff, was considering a "large" reduction.⁶⁰ Exasperated, Grandin criticized Forget sharply and revealed, for the first time, that Joseph Royal, the French Catholic governor of the territories from 1888 to 1892, had also left something to be desired: "Je crois que M. Forget comme M. Royal laissent faire les choses sans s'occuper beaucoup du

⁵³*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1895-1900, 599, Langevin à Lacombe, 22 mai 1899.

⁵⁴O.A., Grandin à Villeneuve, 25 juin 1899; Laurier Papers, Constantineau à Laurier, 10 juil. 1899.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, Laurier to Constantineau, July 11, 1899.

⁵⁶T.S.P., Sessional Papers no. 8, July 12, 1899.

⁵⁷A.A.St.B., R. Dandurand à Langevin, 2 août 1899.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 11 sept. 1899.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, Langevin to Haultain, to Ross, to Forget, all dated Sept. 18, 1899.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, Forget à Langevin, 21 sept. 1899; T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Haultain to Langevin, Sept. 28, 1899.

gouvernement. Je ne sais pour quoi ces personnages portent le titre de gouverneur."⁶¹

Although the government could hardly expect the frustrated church authorities to accept its explanations at face value, its financial position was serious. Despite the large influx of settlers since 1896 (the first fruit of Sir Clifford Sifton's energetic immigration policies), the federal grant in 1899 (\$282,879) was just 53 per cent of the amount requested (\$535,000), the lowest percentage since 1892-93. Moreover, the size of the grant had not changed since 1897.⁶²

Clearly, then, it was the federal government that was frustrating the minority's plans. Accordingly, Archbishop Langevin appealed to Laurier's faith and patriotism to furnish from the public treasury the twelve hundred dollars needed for the inspector's salary.⁶³ When Laurier said nothing, Legal, in Ottawa late in November, saw Laurier and gave him a memorandum on the subject.⁶⁴ From Regina, early in the year (1900), Ross gave Laurier the territorial government's position on the question: "When a new appointment is made we will keep in view the suggestions made by the French Roman Catholics but must submit that at present when we are unable to keep up the necessary liberal school grants, it is a bad time for them to press us for an appointment."⁶⁵ The minority's pressure, however, did not abate. On January 12 Legal wrote Haultain again and blamed Regina, not Ottawa, for the delay: "We managed in such a way that the Government at Ottawa was willing to supply the necessary sum for the salary. But even now the appointment has not been made & I do not [know] what will be the next objection."⁶⁶ When Langevin advanced the same line, Haultain countered that the territorial government "had no indication of any move on the part of the Federal Government to increase our grant in any way, and the object of my proposed visit to Ottawa is to call the attention of the Government to the very serious financial condition we are in." He suggested a meeting in Winnipeg during a stopover on his way east.⁶⁷ A meeting was arranged for February 2,⁶⁸ but none apparently was held. Legal could not understand the government's continued financial embarrassment. He wrote Langevin that Laurier had told him personally last November

⁶¹O.A., Grandin à Langevin, 5 oct. 1899.

⁶²C. C. Lingard, *Territorial Government in Canada; The Autonomy Question in the Old North-West Territories* (Toronto, 1946), Appendix, p. 258.

⁶³Laurier Papers, 28 oct. 1899.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 29 nov. 1899.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, personal, n.d. For evidence that the letter was written early in 1900, see A.A.St.B., Forget à Langevin, 31 déc. 1899.

⁶⁶T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Jan. 12, 1900.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, Jan. 17 and 25, 1900.

⁶⁸A.A.St.B., Haultain to Langevin, Jan. 30, 1900.

that he had written Regina offering the salary. Moreover, "on a songé à un autre [prétexte]": appointees to the inspectoral staff had to reside in the west; they could not be imported from eastern Canada.⁶⁹

Alphonse LaRivière, Member of Parliament for Provencher in Manitoba (where Langevin's episcopal see was located), saw Haultain in Ottawa on February 16 and learned that he would make the appointment if the federal government increased the territorial subsidy. As the government could not earmark funds for the purpose, LaRivière suggested to Langevin that he ask Laurier to enter into a special arrangement with Haultain when the subsidy was increased.⁷⁰ It is quite possible the minority's aspirations were now at the mercy of political considerations. The inspector's salary was not, after all, a major financial item. It is reasonable to suppose that had Haultain really desired to make the appointment, some way could have been found to do so. A lifelong Conservative in federal politics,⁷¹ Haultain, however, may have decided to embarrass the Liberals by forcing them to specify a sum for a Catholic inspector. With the scars of the last western school controversy still visible and another election on the horizon, Laurier would not wish to revive the school question by allocating funds to suit French Catholic interests. If Haultain had no intention of appointing a French Catholic inspector he was in a good position to delay indefinitely. He could always claim a shortage of funds, and any increase in the federal subsidy could always be disposed of on any one of the numerous projects which the growth of population required.

The longer the government delayed, the more impatient the clergy became. Legal sent Haultain a third letter on February 28, which was followed two weeks later by another from Langevin expressing satisfaction at the government's increased subsidy for 1900.⁷² The increase, Haultain admitted in reply, was "considerable" (the government granted \$424,879 out of the \$600,000 requested⁷³); he hoped it would enable the government "to perfect our establishment in our Educational Department, as well as in other directions." To Legal, he explained that his correspondence with Langevin on "all" matters precluded an earlier reply. As soon as finances permitted, the government would be "perfectly willing . . . to take into consideration the desirability of appointing a man who, in addition to other necessary qualifications, should possess the very useful qualification of being

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 10 fév. 1900.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 17 fév. 1900.

⁷¹Lingard, *Territorial Government in Canada*, 117n.

⁷²T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Feb. 28 and March 15, 1900.

⁷³Lingard, *Territorial Government in Canada*, Appendix, p. 258.

able to speak French and other things being equal, would be pleased to be able to appoint a Roman Catholic, in deference to the sentiment of a large and important class of school rate-payers in the Territories."⁷⁴ Exasperated, Langevin wrote Grandin of the premier's letter: "C'est fabuleux." Having promised formally to appoint an inspector, Haultain now spoke vaguely of perfecting departmental personnel: "Est-ce de la sottise! Est-ce préméditation!"⁷⁵ To Haultain himself, he termed the letter "rather mysterious and almost discouraging."

You know the qualified candidate we have proposed; you have received a considerable increase to your subsidy; what reasons can you bring to refuse us what we ask for so earnestly and so justly?

It becomes burdensome for me, and perhaps for you also, to be always pressing, urging the matter. I expect to deal with a gentleman whose word of honor is sacred, consequently, as there is no more obstacle on the way, if nothing is done now, I will be justified with my venerable colleagues in considering it a denial of justice, and we will have to act consequently.⁷⁶

Legal, although equally peeved, issued no threats. He knew "positively," he told Haultain, that "... the salary of a new inspector has been offered by the authorities at Ottawa, and if the federal aid to the Government of the Territories has been increased, it is partly with that end in view."⁷⁷ Haultain ignored Legal, but, in a strong letter, gave Langevin to understand that the government would not tolerate church interference in the conduct of territorial affairs: "We do not contemplate any immediate addition to our staff of Inspectors and although you have pointed out that we have obtained some financial assistance from Ottawa the question of our inability to indulge in further expenditure in any direction is one upon which we must exercise our own judgment."⁷⁸

Relations between church and state were near the breaking point. The next step, Langevin confided to Grandin, was "une lutte sur les journaux," but for that he had "ni la capacité ni le courage."⁷⁹ In the Assembly, Charles Fisher requested in April that the government state its intentions on the question. Haultain quoted from his previous correspondence with Bishop Legal (March 23),⁸⁰ and, as no one pursued the matter, the minority's campaign was momentarily checked. In June Langevin asked Grandin to press Beaulieu's candidacy with Forget and the minority's friends in the Assembly, as it

⁷⁴T.S.P., Sessional Paper no. 8, Haultain to Langevin, March 23, 1900, and Haultain to Legal, March 23, 1900.

⁷⁵A.A.E., 26 mars 1900.

⁷⁶A.A.St.B., Letter Book, 1895-1900, 912, March 27, 1900.

⁷⁷April 5, 1900, copy enclosed in *ibid.*, Legal à Langevin, 5 avril 1900.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, April 10, 1900.

⁷⁹A.A.E., 14 avril 1900.

⁸⁰*Regina Standard*, April 11, 1900.

appeared a July appointment was imminent. But no letters were sent, and on June 30 A. M. Fenwick of Moose Jaw became the second Protestant teacher within a year to join the inspectoral staff.⁸¹ Legal was amazed: "Voilà comment il [Haultain] utilise l'augmentation de l'allocation fédérale. On ne peut y mettre plus de désinvolture."⁸² Langevin wrote Forget and threatened to place the whole matter before the public.⁸³ In a sarcastic letter to Haultain, Langevin expressed shock and disappointment at the recent appointment and wondered why news of the vacancy had been withheld. The minority's candidate could not have been the reason, for the government, or "at least" Haultain, had "previously admitted" that Beaulieu had "all" the necessary qualifications:

As for the question of money, you have, as you rightly said, to exercise your own judgment upon indulging in further expenditure; but I hope you will not find fault with me. Hon. and Dear Sir, if I recalled to your souvenir [*sic*] the very kind offer of the Head of the Federal Government in that respect. But, perhaps there was no question of an additional inspector, though in this case it seems to me that we have a certain right even to have a representative among the ordinary staff of inspectors, on account of the disadvantage under which our schools labour when no french speaking inspector visits them.

Perhaps also you did not find *other things equal*, and then you left aside a poor Roman Catholic candidate! There may be also other reasons that I do not know, and I would appreciate very much any information that you would judge proper to send me as an act of kindness on your part.

The minority had experienced "no strict injustice." Still, there was "every appearance of a lack of that real good will and that spirit of fair play," which he had "always" supposed Haultain to possess.⁸⁴

Haultain, in reply, did not equivocate: "... none of the gentlemen who applied for the position of Inspector ... possessed the qualifications which are considered necessary. ..." Another vacancy existed, however, and if the "Church authorities" were "really anxious" to have "a Roman Catholic and French speaking Inspector," they might use their "undoubted" influence toward "inducing" qualified teachers to come west and "earn their promotion in the same way as other people are obliged to do." The minority had a number of "large and important" schools in the territories, "all of them sufficiently well to do to be able to afford to engage really first class teachers." Increased subsidies were "simply" the result of general territorial growth and had not been specified either "directly or indirectly" for the object Langevin suggested. He wished to assure the archbishop that he had "never" been actuated by "even an appearance of a lack of goodwill

⁸¹A.A.E., 18 juin 1900; *North-West Territories Gazette*, July 14, 1900, p. 1.

⁸²A.A.St.B., Legal à Langevin, 19 nov. 1900.

⁸³*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1900, 478, 23 nov. 1900.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1900.

and of fair play" toward the minority. On the other hand, a candidate could hardly expect an appointment "simply" because he was a Roman Catholic and spoke French.⁸⁵ Laurier, too, made it clear that Haultain and Ross were "tout à fait" disposed to make an appointment, if the candidate were "parfaitement compétent." Differences regarding competence would disappear if the Regina authorities were offered a candidate familiar with schooling in all parts of Canada.⁸⁶

Haultain had finally made it clear that the lever of federal power would be no more effective in the territories than it had been in Manitoba in support of the minority's educational interests. "Il faut," Langevin wrote Legal, "*passer par Régina: par les mains de Goggin pour être acceptable. C'est révoltant.*"⁸⁷ (Later in the year, in a memorandum on the question, Langevin remarked pointedly: "If it is required that the candidate to the inspectorship be *residing in the Territories* and acquainted with the *Normal training* given in Regina, why was not this condition specified at the very beginning!"⁸⁸) For most of the year (1901), the minority made little progress toward its goal. Two candidates—Lucien Dubuc, a young Edmonton lawyer with a B.A. degree but no teaching experience, and a Mr. Vendôme from Quebec, "un savant et un bon catholique"—were considered and rejected, the former for his political ambitions and the latter because of his weak English.⁸⁹ In April, after an unsuccessful trip to eastern Canada, Langevin revived Bélanger's candidacy and asked Legal to find him a teaching position in Alberta to meet the government's residence requirements.⁹⁰ The separate school trustees in Edmonton agreed to co-operate and Langevin approached Bélanger, noting that he could not avoid the normal school "du fameux Goggin, sorte de faux-ministre de l'instruction publique, âme damnée de Haultain, premier ministre."⁹¹ Bélanger, however, was no longer interested. He was unwilling to exchange the security of a recent appointment at the University of Ottawa for the uncertainties of the territorial position.⁹²

No further steps were taken until November 9, when Langevin, in a last major effort, drew up a memorandum intended for the directors of selected Catholic teacher training institutions in eastern Canada. In it he reviewed the minority's unsuccessful negotiations at Regina

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1901.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, Laurier à Langevin, 12 jan. 1901.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1900-1, 173, 24 jan. 1901.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, Langevin Memorandum.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1900-1, 173, Langevin à Legal, 24 jan. 1901; Legal à Langevin, 30 jan. 1901.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1900-1, 321, 3 avril 1901.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, Legal à Langevin, 12 avril 1901; Letter Book, 1900-1, 389, Langevin à Bélanger, 16 avril 1901.

⁹²*Ibid.*, Bélanger à Langevin, 23 avril 1901.

since 1898, listed the inspector's qualifications, and appealed for "a good Catholic well recommended by his Bishop & his parish priest ... a gentleman really competent and that [*sic*] will be entirely devoted to the prosperity of the Church!"⁹³ To circumvent the difficult residence requirements, he told Laurier that a satisfactory candidate should be placed on salary immediately, on the understanding he would assume no responsibilities until he had acquainted himself with the territorial school system.⁹⁴ On December 18, three days after Langevin and Legal had interviewed him, Langevin informed Laurier that L. E. O. Payment of Ottawa, a law student at Laval, would be the minority's next candidate. If Laurier found him satisfactory, Haultain could not refuse to name him, as "... rien ne lui manque, ce nous semble."⁹⁵ On December 23 Laurier agreed to forward Payment's application to Regina. Payment also secured the aid of Principal McCabe and two Members of Parliament, Frederick D. Monk, leader of the Conservative party in Quebec, and Rodolphe Lemieux, Laurier's future solicitor general (1904). The minority's strategy was the same as ever. Laurier was to impose the nomination on Haultain "comme condition de l'octroi d'une partie des subsides." To avoid counterplans, the minority would delay the application until the federal session had begun.⁹⁶

Payment sent a copy of the application (a well-written, imposing document) to the archbishop for approval. He held a B.A. degree with the "highest honours" from the University of Ottawa. He had attended Prescott Model School in Ontario in 1887 and, on graduation, had received a strong recommendation from the principal. He had taught for more than a year in Ontario, and his work, according to a trustee's testimonial, had met with "the satisfaction of all concerned." The trustee described him as "a faithful, energetic, capable and inspiring teacher." From Ontario, Payment went to Manitoba, where, after teaching several months on an interim certificate, he attended a session at the normal school in Winnipeg, then (1890) under the "distinguished principalship" of D. J. Goggin. A letter from Goggin to Payment's father was enclosed; Payment had been judged "Excellent in every respect." Payment's professional training totalled six months. In Manitoba he had taught a year in "the Protestant Separate Schools," followed by three years in the public schools. During five and a half years at the University of Ottawa, he had held "a professorship of Mathematics, to which later was added that of Professor of

⁹³*Ibid.*, Langevin Memorandum.

⁹⁴Laurier Papers, 8 déc. 1901.

⁹⁵A.A.E., Legal à Grandin, 15 déc. 1901; Laurier Papers, Langevin à Laurier, 18 déc. 1901.

⁹⁶A.A.St.B., Payment à Langevin, 23 déc. 1901.

History, Geography, and Drawing." He had "ten and one half years" of teaching experience. He possessed "equal facility" in French and English and was the "Murray gold medallist" in English at the University in 1899. References from a trustee in Manitoba and the rectors of Ottawa (Father Constantineau) and Laval (the Reverend O. E. Mathieu) accompanied the application. He was applying, he said, at the "earnest sollicitations [*sic*]" of Langevin, Legal and Bishop Albert Pascal, the Vicar Apostolic of Saskatchewan.⁹⁷

The modest application, calculated to impress, left out some pertinent details, however. Payment, a crusader on behalf of Catholic educational interests, had discussed the school question in Manitoba's newspapers in 1892 and was anxious to resume the role of a literary and legal knight errant in the Canadian west. If he were appointed, he told Langevin, he would establish Catholic normal schools, hire qualified and devoted teachers, and organize an educational journal to defend Catholic rights. He had already discussed his programme with the Reverend N. Dubois, principal of the Jacques Cartier Normal School in Montreal. Payment thought Langevin should contact Napoléon A. Belcourt, Member of Parliament for Ottawa, who had "des sympathies toutes spéciales" for Payment and much influence with Laurier.⁹⁸ Laurier was less sympathetic to Payment because the latter's brother, a former mayor of Ottawa, was disliked by the prime minister "au suprême degré."⁹⁹

Langevin, pleased with the application, asked Payment to consult Monk and Lemieux about the admission that it was solicited by the clergy. The reference to legal studies might also be omitted: "Ils [Haultain and Goggin] auraient peur de se donner un maître."¹⁰⁰ Mindful of the Desaulniers incident, Langevin warned Grandin that Legal, not Lacombe, should advise the new candidate. Grandin should also ask Archbishop Diomède Falconio, the Apostolic Delegate in Ottawa, to use his influence with Laurier.¹⁰¹ Grandin, by now deeply pessimistic,¹⁰² wrote the delegate,¹⁰³ only to learn that Laurier found Payment's qualifications inadequate. Payment was pursuing legal, not pedagogical, studies, and he intended to join the bar as soon as possible. The minority had to propose a better qualified Catholic for the position.¹⁰⁴ Langevin now asked Laurier to persuade Haultain to

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, Payment to Haultain, n.d., 1902.

⁹⁸Langevin did as advised: *ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 157, Langevin à Belcourt, 14 jan. 1902; Belcourt à Langevin, 18 jan. 1902.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, Payment à Langevin, 8 jan. 1902.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 140, 9 jan. 1902.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1899-1902, 678, 9 jan. 1902.

¹⁰²O.A., Grandin à Langevin, 29 déc. 1901.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, Grandin à Falconio, 15 jan. 1902.

¹⁰⁴A.A.E., Falconio à Grandin, 29 jan. 1902.

make the appointment. It was "impossible" to find a better candidate than Payment.¹⁰⁵ Legal, in turn, appealed to both the delegate and Laurier. Although the School Ordinance sanctioned the principle of public and separate schools ("un double système"), the regulations of the Council of Public Instruction undermined the principle by allowing Protestants to inspect Catholic schools. Similarly, even though the law permitted the teaching of French, the parsimonious nature of the regulations and the illiteracy of the inspectors in French limited the benefits of the provision. It was "parfaitement en droit" to say that the first qualification of a school inspector should be knowledge of French as well as English. Payment's legal studies only rendered him more competent for the position. The ill will of the territorial government was so evident that Laurier had "parfaitement le droit" to impose the candidate on Regina, especially as Payment had the confidence of the western hierarchy.¹⁰⁶

Payment's case, however, was beyond the reach of protests and appeals. When Langevin advised Lemieux that "Sir Wilfrid a besoin d'être fortifié: il est trop délicat vis à vis du Premier du Nord-Ouest," Lemieux replied that Laurier disapproved of Payment, but would be pleased to recommend "tout autre candidat qu'il jugera plus acceptable."¹⁰⁷ Villeneuve's ill-timed personal appeal to Laurier (sent at Langevin's request), suggesting that Laurier use the lever of provincial autonomy (then gaining momentum in the territories) to persuade Haultain and A. L. Sifton, the territorial treasurer, to reconsider their negative attitude toward Payment's appointment, brought the curt reply that Haultain and Sifton were no longer in Ottawa and that, in any case, the minority would experience no difficulty if it presented an acceptable candidate.¹⁰⁸

Legal blamed Laurier for the failure to obtain the appointment. Although a highly placed French Catholic, he was of little or no use to the church: "Que ces bons protestants et fanatiques du Nord-Ouest et du Manitoba et d'Ontario font bien de profiter de la présence d'un M. Laurier qui est toujours prêt à sanctionner ce qu'ils désirent et complotent contre les catholiques! Et quelle humiliation de se faire ainsi souffleter par l'un des nôtres!"¹⁰⁹ Langevin, too, condemned Laurier: "Voilà comment les intérêts catholiques et français sont soignés par un catholique et un Canadien-Français."¹¹⁰ Payment agreed

¹⁰⁵Laurier Papers, 12 fév. 1902.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, Legal à Falconio, 15 fév. 1902; Legal à Laurier, 16 fév. 1902.

¹⁰⁷A.A.St.B., Letter Book, 1901-2, 302, 20 fév. 1902 et réponse 27 fév. 1902.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 65, Langevin à Villeneuve, 24 déc. 1901; Laurier Papers, Villeneuve à Laurier, *personnelle*, 3 mars 1902, et réponse, 6 mars 1902.

¹⁰⁹A.A.St.B., Legal à Langevin, 8 mars 1902.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 439, Langevin à Payment, 18 mars 1902.

—"L'ennemi, c'est lui"—and went on to give Langevin three reasons for Laurier's opposition to his appointment. First, Payment had told Laurier he was only concerned to have the principle of Catholic education and separate schools recognized in the West and would therefore hold the position only until another candidate could qualify. He had also criticized Manitoba's textbooks, and Laurier was afraid of the political repercussions following the religious dissensions which his appointment would create, especially as Payment was intent on claiming Catholic rights. Finally, he had openly opposed Laurier's politics in Quebec City.¹¹¹

Although thwarted again, Archbishop Langevin would not concede defeat. He wrote Principal Dubois and asked that L. L. Legault, a teacher at the Montcalm School in Montreal who had earlier shown an interest in the position, submit his application.¹¹² With Legault still interested, Langevin advised him on procedure and in the process revealed how little he appreciated political realities. The Regina authorities, he said, would accept no one who had not passed through their Normal School, and they would not yield unless Laurier, who could force their hand "en les prenant pas la famine," agreed to impose a man of his own choice.¹¹³ Next, as in 1899, Langevin resorted to personal contact. En route to St. Boniface after an episcopal meeting at St. Albert, he dined with Forget, Haultain, and Sifton at Government House on April 14 and learned that Haultain was not even aware of Payment's application. "A-t-il oublié? M. Laurier a-t-il oublié aussi ou omis?" he asked Monk.¹¹⁴ To render himself "aimable," Haultain had spoken of his French Huguenot origins on his father's side and his French Catholic origins on his maternal grandmother's side. Langevin found Sifton "dur, mordant et aigre; il m'a fait l'impression d'un Ontarien mal lèché et peu civilisé." The minority, Langevin concluded, would have to obtain an inspector from the ranks of its own French-speaking teachers. The minority also needed to increase its representation in the Assembly. Catholic leaders, he told Legal, had to summarize their objections, study their voters, and alert the faithful to support only candidates who favoured Catholic demands.¹¹⁵

Though Payment was still willing to come west and Langevin was willing to try to negotiate a double exchange (Payment's credentials for a Manitoba teaching certificate, followed hopefully by a territorial certificate), Payment would only come if the position were definitely

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, *personnelle*, 21 mars 1902.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 437, 18 mars 1902.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, Dubois à Langevin, 26 mars 1902; Letter Book, 1901-2, 520, Langevin à Legault, 31 mars 1902.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 539, 18 avril 1902.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1899-1902, 795, 15 avril 1902.

offered.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile Legault and Lemieux saw Laurier, who forwarded Legault's papers to Haultain with a supporting letter,¹¹⁷ where the matter ended. On June 18, on Father Lacombe's advice, a new candidate, M. J. O'Connor of Ottawa, submitted his credentials to Langevin. A University of Toronto graduate in arts and law with "First Class Honors," O'Connor claimed to hold "every grade of teacher's and Inspector's certificate that is issued in Ontario." He had twelve years' teaching experience in public and separate "Schools and Colleges" and had held the positions of principal and professor of French (and English) at various institutions. He enclosed an impressive number of references, including testimonials from Archbishop Duhamel of Ottawa and Father Lacombe, but admitted to having "misaid" two of his "best" from the Archbishops of Toronto and Kingston. He was concerned that Haultain "take care" of his documents, as they were his "'stock in trade.'" A lawyer with his "heart" in "Catholic Education," O'Connor was thirty-eight, married, and had six children. The application was not modest and it was apparent the candidate had moved about considerably.¹¹⁸ In forwarding O'Connor's application to Haultain, Langevin admitted he did not know the candidate "personally," although he was "well recommended." Having been "so unsuccessful until now," he did not "dare to insist." With Haultain in England, Bulyea gave the standard reply: there was no immediate vacancy and an additional appointment would necessarily depend upon the available funds. O'Connor, meanwhile, should enter the teaching profession in the territories.¹¹⁹

Although four candidates—Payment, Legault, O'Connor, and one Letourneau (a student at the Jesuit College in St. Boniface¹²⁰)—were anxious to become inspectors, Langevin, at mid-year 1902, was powerless to press their candidacies because none had taught in the territories. As a result, the issue lay dormant until late in 1903, when L. L. Kramer, a Regina teacher, volunteered his services after learning that Langevin had referred to him earlier as a prospective candidate. Kramer did not have a university degree, but thought Ottawa might be "induced" to grant him one. He was, he told Langevin, on a "friendly footing" with educational officials in Regina, and, if appointed, would do "everything" in his power "to watch over and further the interests of our Catholic Schools."¹²¹ Langevin was definitely

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, Payment à Langevin, 25 avril 1902; Letter Book, 1901-2, 619, Langevin à Payment, 29 avril 1902; File "Ecoles 1903-1915," Payment à Langevin, n.d.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, Dubois à Langevin, 4 mai, 1902.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, O'Connor to Langevin, June 18, 1902.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1901-2, 857, June 22, 1902; Bulyea to Langevin, July 3, 1902.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1899-1902, 866, Langevin à Legal, 25 mai 1902.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1903.

interested,¹²² and Kramer submitted his application. His qualifications included a first-class non-professional teaching certificate, normal schooling under Principal McCabe, and seventeen years' teaching experience in Ontario and the North-West. Testimonials from an inspector, a trustee, a headmaster, and a "pastor," all from Ontario, were submitted.¹²³ When Langevin asked whether he could examine the children of French-speaking Catholics in French, Kramer admitted he could not, but intended "to take up the study of that beautiful language after New Years [*sic*]."¹²⁴ The admission was apparently sufficient, for Langevin terminated negotiations immediately. Even if Kramer had met the linguistic and academic criteria, however, it is doubtful whether an appointment would have been made. Because of the heterogeneous population and the diverse academic and professional backgrounds of the teachers, James Calder, Deputy Commissioner of Education since 1901, concluded in 1903 that, if the schools were to secure and maintain any degree of uniformity and unity of purpose in the territories, they would do so "only . . . through our inspectors."¹²⁵ A French-speaking Catholic school inspector who placed the interests of the bilingual Catholic clergy above the unilingual interests of the territorial government would hardly have been acceptable at Regina.

Kramer was the minority's last candidate during the territorial period. Failure to obtain the appointment of a French Catholic school inspector was, of course, a bitter disappointment to the Catholic leaders. The fact that the territorial government rather arbitrarily added to the qualifications which candidates had to present did not help their cause. It is difficult to say whether the government seriously intended to make an appointment. There is some evidence that the government was slightly piqued by the earlier resignation of the Reverend Gillies. It is also possible that the Conservative Haultain may have realized the predicament of the Ottawa Liberals and wished to embarrass them. Certainly the cost of a French Catholic school inspector would not have sent the government in Regina into bankruptcy! It is also possible that Haultain saw the minority's campaign as a useful lever to obtain additional financial concessions from the federal government. It is reasonably clear that, if the territorial government did intend to make the appointment, it became less enthusiastic as immigration from continental Europe increased. In view of the

¹²²*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1903-4, 529, Langevin to Kramer, Nov. 28, 1903.

¹²³*Ibid.*, Kramer to Langevin, Dec. 3, 1903.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, Letter Book, 1903-4, 607, Dec. 9, 1903, and Dec. 11, 1903.

¹²⁵*Report of the Department of Education of the North-West Territories 1903* (Regina, 1904) p. 21.

many nationalities settling in the North-West, the government was apprehensive about setting precedents.

The minority, too, must bear some of the responsibility for the government's failure to make the appointment. Catholic claims to the contrary, the candidates presented by the church lacked either adequate academic background, professional training, or teaching experience. Once the residency qualification was introduced, the minority's cause was doomed. The larger Catholic schools were staffed by teaching sisters and the one-room elementary schools offered little incentive for ambitious French-Canadian male teachers in Quebec. The Catholics had only two high schools in the territories (at Calgary and Edmonton), and there is some evidence that very few Catholic pupils attempted high school studies¹²⁶ preparatory to teaching in the elementary grades. The local source of French Catholic teachers therefore was quite inadequate—a fact which ultimately spelled defeat for the minority's bid to obtain a French Catholic school inspector in the Canadian North-West.

¹²⁶The Lacombe separate school in Calgary and the St. Joachim separate school in Edmonton enrolled no high school pupils in 1896 (*Report of the Council of Public Instruction 1896*, Appendix D, p. 79). Lacombe enrolled its first high school pupil in 1898, St. Joachim in 1901. In 1903 Lacombe enrolled thirteen Catholic pupils in Standard VI (Grade X) and three in Standard VII (Grade XI) and St. Joachim seven in Standard VI. J. F. Weber, o.s.b., "Report on Separate Schools," n.p., n.d., mimeo., p. 11, in St. Thomas More College Library, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

Canada Exhibited, 1851-1867

AUDREY SHORT

THE STORY OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION in the first four world fairs has never been told. Yet a study of the efforts of the British North American colonies in these exhibitions highlights some of their attitudes and aspirations in the mid-nineteenth century. The first industrial displays—at which the leading nations of Europe were eager to compete—provided a showcase in which Canada could present her wares and measure her potential in the fifteen years before Confederation.

The incentive to use exhibitions as a mode of publicity was shared by all the British American colonies. They all needed capital, trade, and population. They were united in their indignation at the ignorance displayed about them abroad and in their resentment of what they felt was England's slight appreciation of their loyalty and value. They hoped that the exhibitions might show Britain and the world their true worth. Thus the colonies' domestic frictions were obscured for the time being in the light of a common wish to do themselves credit in the Canada court of the exhibition halls. From 1851 to 1867 they showed a collective pride in reporting British American prize winners in the international competitions, and a growing spirit of collective response to what the *Canadian Statesman* in 1855 called "Canada against the World!"

Canada and the Maritime provinces showed abroad the typical resources of an underdeveloped country with an agrarian economy, small population, and little industry. Minerals, woods, furs, feathers, and machine tools were the successes of the fairs. British North American producers were well aware of their limitations, and at first proved reluctant to send their produce, convinced they had nothing worth while for international display. But colonial leaders accepted the challenge of the Colonial Office request to exhibit in London and Paris. If enterprise could bridge the technological gap, government officials and the legislature were determined to try.

The Board of Arts and Manufacturers, intimately connected with exhibition arrangements after 1857, continually urged producers to make an effort. No one, they said, expected from Canada the highly finished productions of Britain or France. But it "would be wise to display what we have done and can do, in order to advertise the country," and call the attention of intending immigrants, traders, and investors "to its capabilities and the field of enterprise which it represents." If British Americans were "disgusted at the ignorance displayed in Europe respecting our resources, climate and geography," the remedy was apparent. Exhibitions could win for Canada "an honourable and striking position among the nations of the earth . . . establish a reputation scarcely yet won, however much it may be deserved."¹ It was this spirit which caused the sponsors of exhibition participation to call it an "important and patriotic undertaking."²

The Province of Canada's entry on the world scene began with the Great Exhibition of 1851.³ In response to Governor General Elgin's urging, the provincial legislature voted £2000, a sum they thought "justified by the importance of the occasion and the great public anxiety that the Colony should be creditably represented abroad."⁴ A large and distinguished commission was gazetted in August 1850. Headed by Francis Hincks and E. P. Taché it included members of the Legislative Council and the mayors of Toronto and Montreal.⁵ Commissioners William Logan and Frederick Cumberland co-ordinated local committees and collected exhibits through the Mechanics' Institutes and Agricultural Associations which had had considerable experience with agricultural fairs.

The results of this first province-wide effort were shown for three days at a grand Provincial Industrial Fair in Bonsecours Hall, Montreal, in October 1850. Everyone seemed pleased and surprised. Though "some had said they would not receive two cartloads of stuff and that not forty persons would go to see them," twelve thousand visitors turned out to see the numerous exhibits. The quality and variety displayed was admitted by the *Montreal Gazette* "to convince all that

¹*Journal of the Board of Arts and Manufactures for Upper Canada*, Dec., 1861, pp. 310, 311; Aug., 1866, p. 197.

²John Leeming, Secretary of the Committee for the Great Industrial Exhibition, *To the Public of Canada*, n.d.

³The most useful general source for all the exhibitions is Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Agricultural Department, R.G. 17, II-5-9, International Exhibitions, Copies of Reports, 1851-1867.

⁴Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, Special Committee on the Great Industrial Exhibition, 1851, Report and Copies of dispatches and their Enclosures from her Majesty's Secretary of State, having Reference to the said Exhibition, in Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, LIX (1850), App. 1.

⁵*Canada Gazette*, no. 476, Aug. 3, 1850, lists all twenty-two names.

Canada and its resources are not known even to its inhabitants." Speeches by local dignitaries were published in pamphlet form, as was the prize list of awards for farm products, woods, minerals, fine art, and manufactures, "particularly those of novel uses combining cheapness with beauty of design."⁶ The fair closed with a splendid dinner hosted by the Mechanics' Institute and the announcement of a governor general's prize of £100 to be awarded to the most successful Canadian competitor at the Great Exhibition of 1851.

In the Crystal Palace the flags of the Province of Canada, Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, and Halifax flew with those of other cities, as seventy-two states and territories of the world met for the first international exhibition. The Canada court—"located at the right hand of Britain" the *Globe* proudly noted on May 8—was designed by the German architect, Gottfried Semper.⁷ Here Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland had a collective display grouped round a timber trophy two stories high. Six million visitors enjoyed the expected local colour: a sleigh in which, the *Catalogue* informed them, "fur-wrapped Canadians dash over the snow under brilliant winter skies;" Indian and Eskimo articles, and a painting of caribou stalking in "wild romantic country."⁸ But the central purpose of the display was to win immigrants⁹ and investment for British America, and exhibits covered a wide range. Juries of international experts awarded prizes for the agricultural implements and superb furs shown by the Hudson's Bay Company under the name of their governor, Sir George Simpson. A young boy, caught by the excitement of the new railway age, sent a remarkable model locomotive. Provincial Geologist William Logan, a juror in 1851, showed his highly praised mineral collection and wrote a learned description for the *Catalogue* to promote the industrial potential of Canada's raw materials. Nova Scotia bravely announced her mineral display as illustrating the proposition that the colony "is capable of supplying the whole British Empire with steel and charcoal iron."¹⁰ The jury cheered them on with a medal for the Acadia Iron Works. One recent immigrant fought hard for his place in the Canada court. This was "Father" Henson, an American fugitive

⁶The provincial fair was reported in the *Montreal Gazette* on Oct. 18, 19, 21 and 22, 1850. See also C. D. Day, *Address Delivered at the Provincial Industrial Exhibition, Montreal* (Montreal, 1850), and Montreal, Provincial Industrial Exhibition, 1850, *List of Prizes* (Toronto, 1850).

⁷Nikolaus Pevsner, *Mathew Digby Wyatt* (Cambridge, 1950), p. 52.

⁸*Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, 1851: Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue* (London, 1851), pp. 956-71.

⁹Typical of the information published for all the exhibitions was *A Few Words on Canada*, a booklet stressing the comforts and independence awaiting the skilled artisan who emigrated.

¹⁰1851 *Catalogue*, p. 970.

slave. His black walnut wood samples were sent by mistake to the United States section. When the American Commissioner, Edward Riddle, refused to let them go despite Henson's protests, the negro ordered painted in white letters on the boards: "THIS IS THE PRODUCT OF THE INDUSTRY OF A FUGITIVE SLAVE FROM THE UNITED STATES WHOSE RESIDENCE IS DAWN, CANADA." As word spread through the Crystal Palace, "gentlemen began to gather, laughing at the wrath of the Yankee," who quickly had the boards transferred to the Canadian stand.¹¹

In reporting the Exhibition for home readers, British American journalists made clear their distaste for the United States and the irritations of a small country with a rich and occasionally covetous neighbour. Well aware that most Europeans dismissed Canada as "les Etats-Unis sous pavillon anglais,"¹² Canadian reporters pounced with glee on the sparse American exhibit. Before the numerous awards to the United States were announced, the *Globe* reported that "the Americans with all their bombast are cutting the worst figure in the Exhibition," and they would "be surprised if Canada did not show the stars and stripes her heels in the race."¹³ The *Montreal Gazette* detected among Americans "the greatest envy that Canada a poor mercantile colony that they seem to look down on had fairly beaten them in this Great Game."¹⁴

The real triumph for the Canada court in 1851 was the interested surprise with which Exhibition visitors viewed the quality and variety of colonial civilization. Queen Victoria expressed "great astonishment that Canada should be able to make such a display," the *Globe* told its readers.¹⁵ The Prince Consort particularly admired Perry's fire engine which, in trials at the Serpentine lake, threw water higher than any other in the Exhibition and won the governor general's prize. Some tapestry chairs, embroidered by Montreal ladies as a gift for the Queen, embarrassed Commissioner Logan who thought them crudely colonial, but the Queen was pleased. She wrote in her journal that "Canada made an admirable show, fine furniture, pretty sledges, and a very good and novel kind of fire engine."¹⁶ Several "gentlemen of standing" were heard to say that they had been opposed to colonies and would have been glad to get rid of them, "but now saw that Canada was an example to England and a credit."¹⁷ A two-penny *Guide* advised working men not to miss the lesson of the Canada courts where modern science and skill had subjugated nature with a

¹¹Father Henson, *Story of His Own Life* (Cleveland, 1858), pp. 189-90.

¹²*Démocratie Pacifique*, 7 sept. 1851, p. 3. ¹³*Globe*, May 8, 1851, p. 2.

¹⁴*Gazette*, June 14, 1851, p. 2.

¹⁵*Globe*, July 17, 1851, p. 3.

¹⁶Queen Victoria's Journal, quoted in full for specific dates in C. R. Fay, *Palace of Industry 1851* (Cambridge, 1951), p. 51.

¹⁷*Montreal Gazette*, May 28, 1851, p. 7.

rapidity unknown in any past age of the world.¹⁸ Sometimes the wonder was mutual: assurances of praise from a Paris newspaper were welcomed incredulously by a French-Canadian guard who begged the reporter for a copy of the article to send home.¹⁹

The Commission of the Canadian Legislative Assembly was frankly delighted with the results of their venture abroad. Out of 244 exhibitors, 69 received awards and publicity for their products in exhibition reports published by France, Austria, the Zollverein, and Spain. British merchants had shown "high consideration and attention and a strong desire . . . to embark in the trade of many productions hitherto disregarded." Best of all was "the increased energy and feeling of self reliance and of pride which may fairly and will naturally be incited by the knowledge that Canada holds no inferior place among the nations."²⁰

Before the Paris Exhibition of 1855 Canada competed in a smaller world fair held in New York in May 1853. Some Canadian manufacturers thought the fair a humbug, but the government, anxious to facilitate reciprocity negotiations, sent down a display under the auspices of the Agriculture Department with W. Antrobus Holwell as commissioner. The province received flattering notice from the British commissioners²¹ and the New York press. Commissioner Holwell reported trade advantages obtained in New York to be "real and substantial," even if not "immediately obvious or perceptible."²²

Napoleon III's Exposition Universelle of 1855 gave French Canadians an opportunity "to show La Grande Nation what we can do."²³ To ensure a good show Ottawa offered assistance to the four other colonies.²⁴ Then, with William Logan and Joseph Taché, M.P.P., as commissioners and legislative funds of £10,000, Canada embarked on her greatest transatlantic effort.²⁵

¹⁸*Working Man's Guide to the Exhibition* (London, 1851), p. 45.

¹⁹*L'Événement*, 22 mai 1851, p. 3.

²⁰Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, First report of the Commissioners appointed to conduct the representation of Canada, at the Great Exhibition of all Nations in London, in Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, X (1851), App. KKK.

²¹New York Industrial Exhibition, *General Report of the British Commissioners*, Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty, 1854, pp. 2, 3.

²²Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, Supplementary report of Mr. Holwell to the Honble. John Rolph, Minister of Agriculture, in Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, XIII (1854), App. I.I. Also see R.G. 17, II-5-1, nos. 159, 184, 191, for correspondence about New York.

²³*Montreal Gazette*, June 9, 1855, p. 2.

²⁴R.G. 17, I-2-5, Thomas D'Arcy McGee to the Hon. Provincial Secretaries, Oct. 20, 1866.

²⁵The four main sources for 1855 are: a Minute book of the Provincial Committee of Quebec for the Exhibition, in R.G. 17, II-5-1; *Canada Gazette*, Oct. 19 and 21, 1854; Canada, Executive Committee of the Paris Exhibition, 1855, *Canada at the Universal Exhibition of 1855* (Toronto, 1856); *Reports of the Juries for the Exposition Universelle of 1855*, English translation (Paris, 1856).

In Paris, full advantage was taken of the colony's special relationship with France to put forward her interests in the best possible light. *The Times* had reported that Canada was preparing an astonishing collection. The first cause for British astonishment came when the colonists, finding themselves in the Annex "with what are termed Britain's raw products," determined to prove themselves not so raw after all. An earnest group of officials were ready to wait upon the Emperor if necessary. He "would see that Canada, daughter of France, would get all the space we wanted."²⁶ When the space was granted the commissioners went to great trouble to advertise the Canadian display. The average Frenchman's awareness was typified by the man who buttonholed a commissioner to ask: "Le Canada c'est au Pérou n'est-ce pas?"²⁷ To attract the attention of scientists and engineers, Assistant Geologist Thomas Sterry Hunt read papers before the Institut de France, the Académie des Sciences, and the Imperial Geological Society. Joseph Taché made it his special task to supply French authors with information about Canada to be used in their works on the Exhibition.²⁸ Through his exertions the colonies obtained press notice in France, England, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium.

Since little was expected of colonies in the mid-nineteenth century, there were few critics of the Canadian display. What struck European visitors to the Exhibition was the material progress of the "phoenix countries" and the speed with which it had been accomplished. Emphasizing the point, a Canadian prize essay said in 1855 that "if in England, France or any of the States of Europe upward of a million of the working class had within a short space of time . . . raised themselves to a comparative affluence and independence the example would be a matter of wisdom and instruction."²⁹ The reporter of the agriculture jury expressed a representative view: "one of the most remarkable results of 1855" was Europe's acquaintance "with the prodigious increase of a colony which the power of agriculture has raised to so high a degree of prosperity." An Austrian engineer approved models of the Lachine Canal and Victoria Bridge as evidence of great recent progress. A wood products juror thought no nation showed more skill than Canada in the cutting and shaping of timber; Canadian venetian blinds and a sewing machine, "extraordinary for quality and cheapness," were selected for inclusion in *Remarkable Objects at the Expo-*

²⁶*The Times*, June 14, 1850, p. 4; *Montreal Gazette*, July 9, 1855, p. 3.

²⁷Quoted in Bernard J. Harrington, *Life of Sir William E. Logan, Kt.* (London, 1883), p. 303.

²⁸Charles Robin, *Histoire de l'Exposition Universelle* (Paris, 1855), pp. 22-4. Baron de Brissé, *L'Album de l'Exposition de 1855* (Paris, 1855), pp. 101-2.

²⁹J. Sheridan Hogan, *An Essay to which was awarded the first prize by the Paris Exhibition Committee of Canada* (Montreal, 1855), p. 1.

sition. Exhibition juror Henri Tresca of the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers thought the exhibit proved Canadians to be intelligent and enterprising, and Canada a land of the future,³⁰ while the *Christian Observer* was moved to announce that "Canada is rising up into a great nation."³¹

From Britain too came some of the longed-for appreciation. In assessing for the House of Commons the performance of the colonies abroad, a commissioner concluded that "the Exhibition of 1851 brought favourably into notice the great resources of Canada—increased confidence in the security of sums invested in its public works and facilitated the introduction of capital into the colony. The display at Paris cannot fail to fix on broader and firmer foundation . . . confidence in the intelligence and public spirit of its inhabitants."³² The French said flattering things about the Exposition making possible an estimate of the true value of "les quelques arpents de neige cédés à l'Angleterre avec tant d'indifférence coupable par le gouvernement de Louis XV."³³ All these plaudits were duly noted and quoted at home. At the close of the fair William Logan, Thomas Hunt, and Joseph Taché were chevaliers of the Legion d'Honneur. The mineral exhibit made Canada "the only instance of a colony awarded a grand medal of honour, a distinction equalled but not exceeded by Sweden, Denmark, Lombardy, Piedmont and Bavaria."³⁴

The creator of the mineral exhibit was William Logan, the first native-born Canadian to win international recognition in the scientific field. By 1867 he had won so many awards for himself and Canada that the *Montreal Gazette* suggested he take the maple leaf for his coat of arms. An 1851 jury, including Michael Faraday, the head of the Austrian Imperial Mining school, and the Inspector General of Mines in France, had declared Logan's first geological collection to be "superior to all countries that have forwarded their products to the Exhibition." For his work at the first four fairs he received the Royal Society's gold medal and a knighthood from Queen Victoria. Among innumerable tributes from fellow Canadians was a silver fountain with an inscription honouring his displays abroad "which largely contributed to making known the natural resources of his native country."³⁵ To Logan the true value of the triumph of "my map and

³⁰Henri Tresca, *Visite à l'Exposition Universelle de Paris, en 1855* (Paris, 1855), p. 66.

³¹*Christian Observer*, June 6, 1855, p. 4.

³²Great Britain, House of Commons, Command Papers 1852-1899, *Report on the Paris Universal Exhibition* (1855), Pt. I, p. 200.

³³Le Comte Jaubert, *La Botanique à l'Exposition Universelle de 1855* (Paris, 1855), p. 67.

³⁴*Journal of the Board of Arts and Manufactures for Upper Canada*, March, 1861, p. 58.

³⁵Harrington, *Life of Logan*, p. 269.

minerals" came in 1856. In voting funds to continue the Geological Survey, House members, with a unanimity the *Toronto Leader* noted as rare,³⁶ rose in appreciation of the prize results attained through the Survey when "Canada commenced taking stock of her treasures."³⁷

The most topical exhibits from British America in the London Exhibition of 1862 concerned the Ottawa Parliament Buildings, the railways, and British Columbia and Vancouver then in the glow of their brief gilded age. A column of Arnprior marble represented the new legislature. The railways aroused considerable press comment. While a Frenchman admired the aesthetics of a Grand Trunk model carriage, the *Companion to the Almanac* commented on the vast advance since 1851: Canada had more track in proportion to population than any other nation in the world.³⁸ To glitter in London, the legislature at Victoria was rumoured to have voted a fantastic £ 80,000. Informative literature held out the lure of a safe 12 per cent return for capital invested in the gold fields. The colonies offered assisted passage for females and noted a desperate need for skilled immigrants, especially Italian and Spanish wine and fruit growers, since "almost everything eaten, drunk, worn and used was imported."³⁹ West coast efforts were sniffed at as extravagant by Canada and Nova Scotia, unable to vote vast sums for display.

The British American colonies were united however in their determination to strike again at the goliath of world ignorance, which a legislative commission in Canada believed was still the greatest hindrance in attracting immigration.⁴⁰ Nova Scotia smarted from press reports of the recent tour of the Prince of Wales when journalists in "directing world attention to us caused unfortunately the least reliable of all descriptions." The colonists' grievance was that foreigners thought of them as backward and uncivilized so that, as one commissioner put it, Exhibition visitors expected to see bear grease but were incredulous about the eau-de-cologne.⁴¹ In this mood British patroniz-

³⁶*Toronto Leader*, May 2, 1856, p. 3.

³⁷William Logan's scrapbook of press cuttings is now in the Baldwin Room of the Toronto Public Library.

³⁸"North American Group," *Companion to the Almanac . . . for 1863* (London, 1863), pp. 54-8.

³⁹British Columbia and Vancouver's publications in 1862 were: *Industrial Exhibition*, n.d.; *Resolutions Adopted at a Public Meeting held at the Court House, Victoria, February 12, 1861*; *Circular Respectfully Addressed to the Inhabitants of British Columbia* (New Westminster, 1861), 20 pp., *Catalogue of the Vancouver contribution with a short Account of Vancouver Island and British Columbia* (London, 1862). The rumour of Victoria's expenditure is in *Report of Nova Scotia Commissioners for International Exhibition, 1862* (Halifax, 1864), p. 22.

⁴⁰Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, Report of the Select Committee appointed to consider the Annual Report of the Chief Emigration Agent at Quebec for the year 1859, in Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, 1860.

⁴¹*Report of Nova Scotia Commissioners, 1862*, p. 19. From Nova Scotia for 1867: *Cata-*

ing was sharply resented. When the Royal Commission for the International Exhibition of 1862 ordered Canadians to cut down the height of their timber trophy, Commissioners Logan and Brown Chamberlin made their refusal a point of national honour: "Notwithstanding the exertions of Canada to promote the Great Exhibitions of 1851 and 1855, the greatest dependency of the British Crown—save India—has been granted a site in the rear of all the others. . . . It might become difficult to persuade the Canadian public that the same consideration has been extended to them as has marked the intercourse of Her Majesty's Commissioners with independent countries."⁴² The sixty-foot symbol of Canadian independence remained on display throughout the Exhibition.

To enlighten prospective emigrants there were several new publications in 1862: Alexander Galt's *Canada from 1849 to 1859* was available in French and German. A placard in the Canada court promised emigrants a free hundred acres. Commissioners answered enquiries, made speeches, and sent sample products to William Wagner, emigration agent in Berlin, to prove "Canada is not a wilderness." Prince Edward Island Commissioner Edward Haszard, irritated at the ignorance about his colony, hurriedly wrote a descriptive pamphlet.⁴³ It did not help much. One British journalist wondered why Prince Edward Island, being so small, had not been incorporated into its neighbours long ago?⁴⁴

Still, the comments of most British visitors and press were kind in 1862, and it seemed possible to discern the beginnings of an appreciation of the empire. Joseph Howe wrote that he hoped he lived to see the day "when the outlying Provinces of Empire will as freely send their contingents for the defence of these Islands as they have this year sent their treasures to your Crystal Palace, and their cheerful contributions to your manufacturing towns. . . ."⁴⁵ In an official letter of thanks the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated his belief that foreigners had found in the colonial department "more to

logue of the Nova Scotian Department with introduction and Appendices (Paris, 1867), 66 pp.

⁴²William Logan to F. R. Sanford, Secretary of the Royal Commission for the International Exhibition of 1862, July 23, 1862 (copy), P.A.C., M.G. 29, B 13, Brown Chamberlin Papers, vols. 5-7.

⁴³E. Haszard, *Prince Edward Island a British Colony* (London, 1862). For New Brunswick in 1862, see J. W. Ellis, *New Brunswick as a home for Emigrants* (London, 1862), 38 pp., and D. R. Munro, *A Description of the Forest and Ornamental Trees of New Brunswick* (St. John, 1862). For Canada see O. G. Bishop, *Publications of the government of the Province of Canada, 1841-1867* (Ottawa, 1963), *passim*.

⁴⁴*Companion to the Almanac for 1863*, p. 58.

⁴⁵Joseph Howe to C. B. Adderley, Dec. 24, 1862, quoted in Isaac Buchanan, *Relations of the industry of Canada with the Mother Country and the United States* (Montreal, 1864), p. 392.

excite their admiration and wonder than [in] the mother country displays."⁴⁶ At the closing ceremony the Duke of Cambridge remarked on the magnificent display made by the colonies, and colonial representatives advancing to receive their awards were loudly cheered.⁴⁷ But an enthusiastic suggestion by colonial commissioners that the exhibits might form a nucleus for a London museum of colonial products received a tepid reception from the imperial government and came to nothing.⁴⁸

Canadian and Maritime delegates took part in the growing number of international conferences which developed naturally from these exhibitions since they provided a meeting place for men of similar interests. The Protestants were among the first: William Miller of Halifax attended the first world Y.M.C.A. Congress held in Paris in 1855.⁴⁹ In 1867 Nova Scotia Commissioner Dr. David Honeyman joined in the services and activities of clergymen from several different countries⁵⁰—a tradition begun in London in 1851. The delegate from Canada West to the second ophthalmological congress in 1862 was William Beaumont, a distinguished surgeon and member of the Medical Board.⁵¹ Chief Inspector of Customs R. S. M. Bouchette was present at the 1867 International Conference on Weights, Measures and Coinage to keep the Canadian government informed of results.⁵²

By the time the second French Exposition Universelle opened in Confederation year, Canadians had had plenty of experience and a good deal of success. Indeed, two years earlier in an exhibition at Dublin, Canada's mineral collection had promoted a sale of Crown lands with a value greater than the cost of display at the fair.⁵³ But this year in Paris the colonies, suffering from the end of Reciprocity and Civil War prosperity, sent fewer exhibits.⁵⁴ Neither Prince Edward

⁴⁶London *Daily News*, July 15, 1862, p. 3.

⁴⁷*The Times*, July 12, 1862, p. 4.

⁴⁸Sedgewick Howper to the Canadian Commissioners, July 7, 1862; Brown Chamberlin to the Provincial Secretary (copy), July 26, 1862, Chamberlin papers.

⁴⁹Young Men's Christian Association, Occasional Paper no. III, *Report of the General Conference held in Paris, August 1855* (London, 1856), p. 122.

⁵⁰V. M. Skinner, *The Standard of the Cross in the Champ de Mars* (London, 1867), pp. 164 and 222-23.

⁵¹Société Universelle d'Ophtalmologie, *Compte rendu des séances préparatoires tenues à Paris du 10 au 13 octobre 1861* (Paris, 1861), p. 27.

⁵²France, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Correspondence Commerciale des Consuls, Québec 1867-janvier 1868, Vol. 4, F. Gautier au Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, 4 mars 1867.

⁵³The Dublin Exhibition of 1865 is reported in the *Journal of the Board of Arts and Manufactures for Upper Canada*, March-Dec., 1865, pp. 93, 277-8, 284, 315, 327, and March, 1866, pp. 34-5.

⁵⁴For a comprehensive report on the Exhibition: Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1867-68, XXX, Pt. I, 1, *Reports on the Paris Universal Exhibition 1867* (London, 1868).

Island, nor New Brunswick, nor the west coast colonies were there. Some gentlemen at Red River contemplated exhibiting but did not do so.⁵⁵ Bouchette had instructions to take advantage of every opportunity for trade with Exhibition countries.⁵⁶ Chief Commissioner of Immigration J. H. Daly too was sent to Paris to make sure every effort was made.⁵⁷

In 1867 Canada showed the world the men who had built her into a nation. "Canadians are appearing in large numbers to see the Exhibition," remarked a reporter, noting William Cunard, Gordon Brown, and C. J. Brydges among others. Dr. Egerton Ryerson and P. J. O. Chauveau, whom a jury called "representative civil servants who held in their hands the future of their countries," were both in Paris to receive medals for school texts and materials used in the province. Numerous French-Canadian pilgrims on the way back from Rome, including the Bishop of Montreal, were complimentary about the Canadian department. D'Arcy McGee, present in his capacity as exhibition commissioner, had paused in London authorized to advise Canadian delegates in establishing the union of British North American provinces.⁵⁸ Several Fathers of Confederation came across the channel—many were members of exhibition commissions at home. George-Etienne Cartier, Galt, McDougall, and Howland were there, as were Tupper and Adams G. Archibald of Nova Scotia, Mitchell and Fisher of New Brunswick. McGee hoped that Sir John A. Macdonald would visit the Exposition on the way home from England⁵⁹ but he could not find the time. A triumphant climax came with the victory of the New Brunswick working men over the gentlemen oarsmen of England and France in the Paris regatta. The press at home was elated. One journalist joyfully visualized British aristocrats hunting up the location of St. John, New Brunswick. It would do John Bull good to have the starch taken out of him occasionally. And "the people of Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec in any future aquatic contest could count on St. John's boys to uphold the honor of the Dominion."⁶⁰

In the four international exhibitions from 1851 to 1867 the British

⁵⁵James Ross to D'Arcy McGee, March 23, 1866, and H. C. Thomson to J. C. Taché, Jan. 7, 1867, Letters Received, R.G. 17, I-1. This file together with Letters Sent, R.G. 17, I-2-5, and Executive Council, R.G. 1, E 8, Vols. 90 and 91, contain MSS sources for the Exhibition. There is also a brief report in Canada, Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, No. 3, A. 1867, p. 57.

⁵⁶Correspondence Commerciale, Gautier au Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, 4 mars 1867.

⁵⁷London *Daily News*, May 3, 1867, p. 3.

⁵⁸R.G. 1, E 8, Vol. 91, Order-in-Council No. 976.

⁵⁹Josephine Phelan, *The Ardent Exile* (Toronto, 1951), p. 271.

⁶⁰*St. John Journal*, quoted in the *Toronto Weekly Leader*, Aug. 2, 1867, p. 3. *True Humourist*, July 13, 1867; *Morning Freeman*, Aug. 8, 1867.

American colonies had shown what Peter Waite has called their most pervasive characteristic, their passionate desire for a place in the world.⁶¹ Though the hoped for victory over world ignorance about Canada was not yet won, there had been greater publicity than ever before. Twenty-five million visitors attended the fairs. Canadian resources and capabilities were mentioned in exhibition reports published by every important country. And to Canadian commissioners, achieving the goal of "a more just appreciation of our resources among our own population," had been worth all the effort involved. In 1867 the prizes awarded prompted the *Montreal Gazette* to comment: "In our field we can win with the finest." Certainly such confidence was a good omen for the new Canadian nation in Confederation year.

Most important of all, the exhibitions provided the colonies with an opportunity to take their first steps on the international scene. Here Canada displayed one of the most salient characteristics of its history in the next half century: the dichotomy of a yearning for a closer (but equal) connection with the United Kingdom and an incipient nationalism prompting it to stand alone.

⁶¹P. B. Waite, *The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867* (Toronto, 1962), p. 327.

Canada 1967: Nation or Subsidiary?

H. CLARE PENTLAND

THESE ARE ALL NEAR-TOPICAL STUDIES.¹ All are by economists, and deal with Canada's centennial problem as economists see it. To many political scientists and historians, French-English relations is Canada's centennial problem. To economists, on the other hand, the problem is Canada's relations with the massive entity of the United States—and some would argue that French-English tension is mostly a derivative of American pressure. The three works reviewed in this article, in their various ways, are addressed to the American problem. I have called them "near" rather than exactly topical because of signs that Canadians may have decided Canada is worth preserving and that they are going to preserve it. These books all fit a slightly earlier, querulous mood of a nation not sure that it wanted to exist. But their analytic and introspective qualities are still timely, and their information timeless. On the other hand, if Canada really decides to be a nation it will have to reject all three theses: Crispo's, that there is no particular reason for preferring national over international unions; Safarian's, that foreign is about as good as native ownership; and Dales', that we should let Americans do the manufacturing and devote the small remaining Canadian population to primary industries.

Of these books, Crispo's volume on international unionism is the most readable and most deserving of a wide readership. It is a substantial contribution to the extraordinarily sketchy and turgid literature of Canadian unionism. It provides a clear coverage of every important aspect of American unionism in Canada—history, structure, politics, and so on. And it treats this touchiest of subjects in a way likely to displease the smallest number, for everyone can find his view expressed, though the opposite view is set out a few pages over. This eclectic method has its defects: Crispo is broad rather than deep, and his looseness some-

¹John Crispo, *International Unionism: A Study in Canadian-American Relations*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada. 1967. Pp. viii, 327. \$8.60.

A. E. Safarian, *Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry: A Study of Company Policies and Performance*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada. 1966. Pp. xiv, 346. \$8.95.

J. H. Dales, *The Protective Tariff in Canada's Development*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 166. \$2.25 paper.

times entraps him. This happens most often when Crispo accepts uncritically the claims of international or American unionism—an attitude to which he is perhaps predisposed by the view that our union structure, quite different from any other in the world, is somehow “natural” for North America.

There is, for instance, the persistent myth that Canadian workers were too weak or child-like to organize themselves and that the American unions organized them. I know of little historical evidence for this idea, and it flies in the face of the evidence that workers organize themselves and produce their own leaders when the time is ripe (though they get a charter from whomever is handy). Nevertheless, Crispo tells us that “international unions . . . were instrumental in introducing a labour movement to Canada earlier and on a firmer basis than would otherwise have been the case. . . . they provided the basis for a viable Canadian trade union movement. This would doubtless have come in time, but it would have been delayed for decades” (p. 303). The delay, if any, would have been more like six months. Indeed, considering the weakening divisiveness that American unionism has repeatedly introduced into Canada, it could be argued that Canadian unionism would have progressed faster on its own.

Also owing more to conventional wisdom than evidence is the view that the American connection has greatly increased the bargaining strength of Canadian workers. International unions have made Canadian workers want more, have much increased their ability to get more (p. 303),² and have thus goaded Canadian employers to greater efficiency (p. 306). At the same time, however, international unions have acted predominantly as a restraining force, setting their “cooler heads” against the excessive aggressiveness of Canadian union members (pp. 224, 304)!

Then, while Crispo discusses frankly the need of the Canadian labour movement for rationalization, and the obstacles which the presence of American unionism raise to it, he hardly does justice to the case for establishing the national labour movement which could accomplish it. Instead (convinced that national unionism will not happen) he talks about possible union mergers in the United States that would allow Canadian districts to carry out parallel mergers, and of joint union councils as a partial substitute for organic union. Generally, however, *International Unionism* offers a balanced and full, if not profound, coverage and is already indispensable to a knowledge of Canadian unionism.

Even more than the debates on international unionism and the tariff, the debate on foreign investment has been one in which participants, particularly those who advocate unlimited foreign investment, do not hear what opponents are saying. A study, then, with the definitive title, *Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry*, by an able scholar who has been willing to conduct an extensive investigation of some of the questions raised about foreign investment, and to report his findings in the most careful terms, ought to be a contribution of the first magnitude. Unfortunately, it turns out to be of much smaller importance: first, because it addresses itself only to peripheral questions; second, because so far as these questions matter, the high quality of the analysis can only compensate in part for the defects of the basic data.

The first question about foreign investment, surely, is whether it is desirable

²On the question whether Canadian unions get financial help from the United States, or give it, I think Crispo did as well as one could with the unsatisfactory 1962 Report under the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act. However, the 1964 Report, a more sophisticated document, indicates that with all possible allowance for overheads, the flow of union funds is still from Canada to the United States.

or necessary—points which some consider self-evident but which have been by no means demonstrated. The historical record since 1913 shows no clear relationship between the flow of foreign capital and Canadian growth and, if anything, suggests that Canada grows best when imports of capital are least. And while the pre-Keynesian economic model that advocates of foreign investment seem to be using contemplates that Canadian investment will rise to the total of retained domestic and imported savings, more recent theory suggests that whenever an economy is operating below its general and savings potential (Canada's frequent experience), imported capital is not only unnecessary but will further depress the economy.³ If Canada's investment does threaten to exceed its savings capacity, the appropriate course, in place of turning to foreign capital, would seem to be to increase Canadian savings: first, to contain the inflationary situation implied, and, secondly, so that a modest curtailment of current consumption will allow Canadians to have increased consumption in future and to own their economy. Safarian does not mention any of these things and seems simply to accept the view that foreign ownership is necessary.

Even within this assumption it is possible to consider whether foreign ownership limits access by Canadians to management posts and directorships, restricts Canadian exports, increases imports, hinders development of research in Canada, prevents specialization and efficiency; and it is these questions that Safarian pursues. The vehicle is an elaborate questionnaire sent to 1500 foreign firms (with another questionnaire to a control group of Canadian-owned firms). The data problem is the considerable chance that the 280 usable replies (many of these did not answer all questions) constitute an unrepresentative sample of the best behaved firms (from a Canadian viewpoint). The respondents do represent a much larger proportion (40 per cent) of foreign-owned assets in manufacturing and mining, but this establishes another bias, in favor of big firms. Despite these defects, Safarian has chosen to show his results for what may be made of them. But readers should keep in mind the limitations of the data which the author most scrupulously points out.

So far as the results are relied on, what do we learn? That foreign firms are in fact a very mixed bag: many do employ Canadians, export (raw material producers, of course, were set up to do so), are efficient, conduct research—while others are deficient in some or all of these. That many foreign firms claim substantial autonomy from their affiliates—though one suspects that this autonomy would disappear overnight if the subsidiary managers wanted to rationalize their Canadian industries and suppress the trademarks and lines of products of the parents. That foreign parents have a most persuasive argument for retaining 100 per cent ownership and unquestioned control of Canadian subsidiaries (pp. 230–34) which convinces me that Canadians must insist on 100 per cent (not just 51 per cent) native ownership. That costs in small Canadian subsidiaries differ surprisingly little from those in large foreign parents (which may encourage Professor Dales in his view that economies of scale do not exist) but that comparative efficiency rises with size of firm (which may discourage him). That Canadian-owned firms

³In a cautious footnote (p. 244), Safarian concedes this depressing effect in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, but ascribes it uniquely to monetary policy. Canadians distressed by the cost of "buying back" their country may be surprised to know that the potential G.N.P. foregone by them from 1957 to 1963 in consequence of unfavourable economic policies (including the encouragement to import foreign capital) was as much as the whole of foreign direct investment as it stood in 1957.

as a group are clearly "superior" to foreign ones in only two respects: the proportion of Canadians in their managements and directorships, and their willingness to buy components and supplies in Canada rather than outside it.

Safarian's concern is that we conduct our affairs so as to ensure that foreign ownership harms Canada as little as possible in respect to the matters he has examined and, until Canadians are prepared to grapple with the basic problem, this is a pertinent interest. I think the author is right to suggest that the trickiest questions posed are those about "The Transfer of Knowledge" or "know-how." Contrary to what might be supposed, this rarely has to do with technical or other knowledge revealed to foreigners but denied to Canadians. What it has to do with is patent monopolies, monopolies of financial power, and monopolies of political influence and of market differentiation. To deal effectively with these will indeed require bold and intelligent action.

Professor Dales commands expertness in both economic history and economic theory, a combination by which he and others have produced enlightening studies. However, the present set of essays is more irritating than enlightening because the tools are used more to prosecute than to examine a case. Dales has developed a ferocious hostility to the Canadian tariff and everything which he connects with it: the National Policy, Canada's secondary manufacturing industries, our grossly excessive (in Dales' view) immigration, Canada's failure to close the gap between its per capita G.N.P. and that of the United States and, therefore, the lower Canadian "quality of life" (per capita G.N.P.). A comparative method is used in the sense that the United States is made the measuring rod of Canadian performance, and the rest of the world intrudes only as supplier of unlimited immigrants.

The essays deal heavily in international trade theory. Dales accepts the traditional conclusion of trade theory, implicit in its assumptions, that the Canadian tariff has led to misallocation of resources and a lower Canadian standard of living than would otherwise have been possible. But he tears into the theory for not contemplating the case (Dales says) in which factors of production are internationally mobile. Inserting this modification, the seemingly contradictory conclusions are reached that the burden of the Canadian tariff is greater than previously supposed, but that it has substantially increased (NOT decreased) total Canadian G.N.P.—at the expense of a faster rise in per capita G.N.P. The following mechanism is proposed: (1) protection created an inefficient but populous Canadian secondary manufacturing sector; (2) labour for this sector was acquired, not at the expense of supposedly more efficient primary industries but from the inexhaustible supply of immigrants attracted by Canadian wage rates and barred from the United States; (3) Canadian immigration has been kept at such a level as to preserve the Canadian-American differential in per capita income; (4) because of this differential, many native Canadians emigrate to the United States but are replaced by immigrants—a "replacement" rather than "displacement" theory. It seems to take Dales by surprise that the villain of his analysis turns out to be a liberal immigration policy, and he keeps on insisting that the tariff is the root evil. He is convinced that Canada is at a comparative disadvantage in secondary manufacturing, and he denies that economies of scale or external economies are relevant to the question. Oddly enough, the author's objections to protection do not extend to the American tariff, on the ground that since 1890 (what about before 1890?) American manufacturing has been capable of meeting any competition and its protection is superfluous. For a wide range of American manufacturers I suggest that this just is not so, and even when an established American manufacture is the low-cost producer, the American tariff still helps it

by preventing development of a potentially more efficient outside (perhaps Canadian) competitor.

It is in this context of change over time that I feel these essays are most open to criticism. Considering that economic history arose to point out differences in stages of development and to set against the immediate conclusions of classical theory the prospect that a weak manufacturing country may in time become a strong one, it is not really appropriate for an economic historian to dismiss the infant industry and infant economy arguments out of hand—especially since a surprising number of industries and economies (including the United States') have turned the trick. Nor should it be ignored that nineteenth-century Canadians built up manufacturing with the aid of protection precisely to escape the low and uncertain incomes, the "non-quality" lives, of hewers of wood and carriers of water. To a depressing extent, primary industries are still unrewarding: the comparative advantage which Dales attributes to them (p. 99) seems to be mostly the "advantage" of low pay. And when rationalization of primary industries makes reasonable pay levels possible, very few people are employed. If Dales will not have us in manufacturing—despite the economic advantage in a harsh climate of year-round production indoors—it seems we must either emigrate en masse to the United States or invent a superpill that will take care of present as well as future generations.

Canada

Painting in Canada, A History. By J. RUSSELL HARPER. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. x, 443, 378 illus. \$20.00.

THE POPULAR IMAGE OF CANADIAN PAINTING is a crudely executed canvas depicting a rocky northern Ontario landscape under solid grey clouds. That romantic vision without people belonged to a very short period—two decades—of our history; it was created by a few painters, the Group of Seven, working in Toronto. They experienced a transformation in critical estimation from vociferous outrage to unreflective acclaim and have been made to dominate the Canadian scene to the extent that prior and later accomplishments have been seriously obscured or virtually eliminated. One derivative and localized style has been frequently mistaken for the whole or the only meritorious period in Canadian painting. But the history of painting in Canada began almost at the moment of first settlement in the seventeenth century and has continued to develop under a series of complex influences directly reflecting the growth of the country. This rich and varied subject has been traced by Mr. J. Russell Harper in the most comprehensive survey of Canadian painting yet published.

The author, Curator of Canadian Art at the National Gallery of Canada before his appointment as Chief Curator of the McCord Museum, McGill University, has written a book of major significance. The Canada Council, in co-operation with the University of Toronto Press, commissioned this new perspective on the history of painting in Canada as a centennial project. (Les Presses de l'université Laval have published it in French.) Mr. Harper's aim was "to write a history that presents for the general public an accurate, documented survey of Canada's considerable aesthetic achievement in painting, one that also incorporates the scholarship and research that has been done to date." He has also presented a

considerable achievement to the public and to scholars. Although future historians will elaborate details, secure presently missing information from the first three centuries, and rewrite with greater perspective the chapters covering the last three decades, this volume will remain a pivotal study in Canadian art. *Painting in Canada* replaces all previous accounts of the subject by virtue of the balance of material, new information, and wealth of reproductions; it should stimulate more research and encourage the expansion of university studies in Canadian cultural history.

Although it is known that about 4000 painters were active in Canada prior to 1900, many aspects of early art in this country are still shrouded in mystery. It is noted in the chapter on Ontario's pre-Confederation art that "there are eloquent indications that much remains undiscovered, for a steady stream continuously comes to light of previously unknown mid-nineteenth-century painting with genuine interest and merit." The emergence of the so-called "national" style still awaits detailed analysis and the appearance of recent postwar movements should be documented now while memories are fresh and records are readily accessible.

The text is based upon years of research and discussion and an indefatigable curiosity about Canadian art, its documents, and its varied sources. The material is divided into four main parts: The French Colony 1655-1759, The English Colonial Period 1759-1867, The New Dominion 1867-1910, and Nationalism and Internationalism after 1910. Within the first three sound divisions the chapters identify and examine the major characteristic of each period in considerable detail and are enlivened with intriguing anecdotes. The fourth part should have been limited to the Group of Seven, and their contemporaries and immediate successors. Art in Canada since the beginning of the last war has undergone such radical transformations that the last three decades require separate examination. However, it is precisely in the area of contemporary art that the author is on uncertain, although not unfamiliar, ground. He ends this otherwise admirable volume with this sentence: "Only with the passage of time, only when thought has been clarified and evidence sifted and weighed, will we have a sure judgment of the esoteric painting of the present."

The twenty-eight chapters with descriptive or evocative titles ("British Army Topographers in Eastern Canada," "The Lure of the West") are richly illustrated by 308 black-and-white reproductions and 70 colour plates. Their quality is generally adequate although cropping has subtly transformed the spatial conceptions and form relationships of a few works. Wherever possible important but lesser known paintings replace commonly reproduced ones.

A new sense of Canadian art, particularly of the first three centuries, emerges as even minor artists are treated seriously as valued recorders of people and places. *Painting in Canada* is, in part, a vivid visual documentary justifying the author's desire to approach art as "an integral part of the life of an expanding nation." The introduction of reproductions other than paintings—a piece of sculpture, newspaper columns, illustrative prints, and a caricature—provides curious insights but in this context they are not appropriate when not consistently used. Nevertheless those items indicate that peripheral documents can be imaginatively exploited to provide additional commentary in this volume—drawings by painters would have enriched the contents as a new and quite relevant dimension.

Visually a remarkable series of images is presented: Pierre Le Ber's posthumous portrait of Marguerite Bourgeoys (1700), Thomas Davies' *A View on the River La Puce* (1789), the undated, anonymous portrait of Mrs. Charles Morrison, *Les Ruines après l'incendie du Faubourg Saint-Roch* (1845) by Joseph Légaré, Théophile Hamel's moving portrait of Mme Marc-Pascal de Sales Later-

rière, the three-masted schooner *National* in a violent sea by Alexandre-S. Giffard, William G. R. Hind's fantastic *Foot of Rocky Mountains* (1862) and his timeless *Self-portrait* among many others.

The works reproduced in the last five chapters do not have an impressive visual impact. This is a matter of the choice and use of images. The techniques employed to unfold a steady development or introduction of a new tradition do not function for contemporary and near contemporary periods of rapid change. Eighteen illustrations accompany the chapter on regionalism in the 'thirties: eight are from the 'forties, one is dated 1951, four bear dates of the period, and the remainder are undated. As the text moves closer to our times the multiplicity of styles and the various still active traditions compound the difficulties of clear presentation, but our close artistic dependency upon the United States should have aided in clarifying contemporary problems.

Regardless of the weaknesses in the last few chapters Mr. Harper has clearly demonstrated that Canadian art deserves the attention of scholars and that studies such as this will enrich our self-awareness.

York University

RON BLOORE

Histoire du Canada. By ROBERT LACOUR-GAYET. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard. 1966. Pp. 605.

IT WAS A HAPPY DECISION, one most fortunate for Canadian historical studies, that led the Librairie Fayard to invite M. Robert Lacour-Gayet to write a history of Canada for the centennial year of Confederation. Diplomat, traveller, observer, man of letters, historian, he was richly endowed by training, experience, and an affection for Canada to discharge the task. His book, in consequence, allows the reader to follow the history of Canada as elaborated by its historians, English and French, and as interpreted and illuminated by a narrator at once informed, sympathetic, and detached. Indeed, the result is the first *complete* history of Canada, because no French-Canadian historian, except the legalistic Chapais, and no English-Canadian historian except Lower—the latter by intuition rather than study—has recounted the whole of Canadian history with equal concern for the English and French comprehensions of that history.

M. Lacour-Gayet, then, has written a summary of the results of Canadian historical scholarship to date. His volume is a recapitulation, but one fortified by a reading of printed sources, and enriched by character sketches—that of Durham is remarkable, by comments and parallels from European experiences, and by judicious modifications of overstated Canadian views. It cannot be said that the writer adopts or even emphasizes any particular historical interpretation or viewpoint. He has, rather, brought Canadian historians from one extreme to the other into a collective harmony that might surprise that somewhat discordant fraternity.

Because M. Lacour-Gayet's book is, "another one-volume history of Canada," there will be some disposition not to give it the attention it deserves. Not to do so would be an error for two reasons. One would be that very possibility of community of historical thought between French and English that the book imposes. The other is that while the writer is always sensitively conscious of the ethnic divisions and regional variations of Canadian society, he is equally aware of the curiously persistent unity of destiny, if not of sentiment, in the various elements subsumed under the name of Canada.

Finally, the book is more than a good history Prepared and written at the

time of the Quebec "revolution" and the bewildered self-probings of English Canada, the volume is a remarkably sensitive and faithful reflection of the contemporary mood of Canadians, at once doubtful and assertive.

The *Histoire* is a gracious "centennial" project for which Canadian thanks are due R. Lacour-Gayet.

W. L. MORTON

Trent University

The Canadians, 1867-1967. Edité par J. M. S. CARELESS et R. CRAIG BROWN.
Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1967. Pp. xx, 856, illus. \$9.95.

UN MOYEN CLASSIQUE D'APPRÉCIER LA VALEUR D'UN OUVRAGE est de se demander s'il atteint le but pour lequel il a été écrit. J. M. S. Careless et R. Craig Brown donnent dans leur introduction comme "the purpose of this book, to describe and assess the developments of a century in Canada, as its citizens stand at the hundredth birthday of this Confederation." Je crois qu'ils y ont réussi en bonne partie.

L'ouvrage est divisé en deux sections : une première dans laquelle onze historiens ont synthétisé et interprété les événements qui se sont déroulés au Canada de 1860 à nos jours et une seconde, dans laquelle dix-neuf auteurs ont exploré chacun un arrière-plan ou un champ d'activité. Pour comprendre que les quelque 380 pages de la première partie constituent une bonne histoire moderne du Canada, il suffit d'énumérer les noms des auteurs des chapitres: Donald Creighton, George F. Stanley, W. S. MacNutt, John T. Saywell, H. Blair Neatby, Roger Graham, W. L. Morton, Kenneth McNaught, C. P. Stacey, William Kilbourn, et Laurier L. LaPierre. Evidemment, dans la plupart des cas, les auteurs ne faisaient que reprendre sous une nouvelle forme des travaux de plus grande envergure consacrés aux époques qu'ils avaient à étudier, mais il semble bien que c'est la première fois qu'on a par William Kilbourn un chapitre sur la décennie commençant en 1950, et un autre sur celle de 1960 par Laurier L. LaPierre. Ce dernier chapitre est dominé par le Québec et par les Canadiens français ou pour reprendre une distinction de Michel Brunet restée célèbre et référant au titre de son ouvrage de 1954, il est beaucoup plus "canadien" que "canadian." On accusera peut-être l'auteur d'avoir trop vu les événements sous l'éclairage du Québec qu'il habite, mais il semble bien que, depuis quelques années, dans quelque province ou quelque milieu que ce soit, il n'est pas seul à posséder cette vision.

La seconde section était plus difficile à construire. Il était dangereux que des chapitres fassent double emploi et que les auteurs reprennent l'étude de quelques événements de la section historique ou même pénètrent dans les autres champs de leur section. Les Canadiens auxquels on a fait appel pour la seconde section représentent un riche éventail des spécialistes des sciences de l'homme au Canada au sens très large de l'expression: John Porter, Roderick Haig-Brown, O. J. Firestone, Eugene A. Forsey, K. W. Studnicki-Gizbert, Wilfred Kesterton and John S. Moir, William Carleton Gibson, George E. Flower, John S. Moir, Jack Batten, Norman Pearson, Louis Dudek, Jean Basile, Thomas Hendry, Hugo McPherson, Norman Ward, Albert Rose, George F. G. Stanley, Gérard Bergeron.

Un examen attentif de chacun des articles permettrait de formuler bien des remarques et de signaler des oublis. On reste surpris par exemple que Jean Basile puisse parler de la littérature française au Canada sans signaler Roger Lemelin et regarde comme "didactic novels of Lionel Groulx" *Rapailages* et *Chez nos gens* (p. 664) qui ne sont en réalité que des récits de la terre. Par ailleurs, il convient de signaler qu'en une vingtaine de pages, Norman Ward a réussi une bonne synthèse de la structure gouvernementale canadienne.

L'ouvrage est orné d'excellentes illustrations reproduisant quarante-trois sculptures et tableaux canadiens formant une sorte de galerie d'art canadien de 1867 à 1967, de Cornelius Krieghoff à Kazuo Nakamura. L'index est excellent et il sera fort utile, car il se peut que certains lecteurs n'aient pas le courage de parcourir d'un trait un ouvrage dont la présentation est un peu lourde ou sentent le besoin d'y revenir en fonction seulement des sujets qui les intéressent.

Bibliothèque de la législature
Québec

JEAN-CHARLES BONENFANT

The Clear Spirit: Twenty Canadian Women and Their Times. Edited by MARY QUAYLE INNIS. Toronto: For the Canadian Federation of University Women by the University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. xvi, 304, illus. \$6.00.

WHEN THE TUMULT AND THE PRESS-AGENT GIMMICKRY of the Canadian centennial die, a few enduring and meaningful monuments will remain. Among them will stand this collective biography of twenty famous Canadian women. Mary Quayle Innis has assembled a group of essays by fifteen authors on twenty individuals whose careers span the history and the geographic breadth of Canada. The general theme of this collection is clear: women on the frontier. This amazing unity in diversity is a tribute to the judgment of the editor. The nature of the frontier is a changing one ranging from the physical frontier of settlement to the frontiers of knowledge and, too often, of establishing a role for women in occupations traditionally reserved for men. The biographies include studies of the beginnings of settlement (Mme de la Tour, Mère Marie Guyart de l'Incarnation, Catherine Traill and Susanna Moodie in the bush); and of the pioneers of literature (Pauline Johnson, Laure Conan, Lucy Maude Montgomery, Mazo de la Roche), of journalism (E. Cora Hind), of medicine (Maude Abbott), of public affairs (Adelaide Hunter Hoodless, Emily Murphy *et al.* of the famous "persons" case, Agnes McPhail, Margaret McWilliams), of art (Emily Carr), and of geology (Alice Wilson).

Inevitably, a book such as this is uneven in quality but the defects of some parts do not detract from the value of the whole. Mrs. Innis might have summoned her contributors to Toronto for a fast course in historical method and writing in order to smooth out some of the problems of presentation. Most of the contributions are professional and in many cases they reveal clear personal insights into the character of their subjects.

Some suffer from lack of sources. Ethel Bennett's life of Mme de la Tour is burdened with efforts to overdramatize the dramatic enough life of this New Brunswick pioneer by overuse of such indications of uncertainty as "no doubt" and "there is little doubt." By contrast Mère Marie Immanuel uses judiciously letters of Mère Marie de l'Incarnation who established the Ursuline order in New France.

Style is a problem for a few authors. For example, Ruth Howes quotes copiously from the letters of the son and daughter of Adelaide Hunter Hoodless, pioneer of women's movements in Canada, rather than using the information they contain. Also, *Lady Aberdeen's Journal* is an important source but we need not be told that Lady Aberdeen stopped in Hamilton on October 26, 1893, "to talk to Mrs. Hoodless." As one of my professors would say: "A good workman removes his scaffolding." At another extreme, Kennethe Haig's study of E. Cora Hind, agricultural writer for the *Winnipeg Free Press*, although a fascinating life, might

be criticized in parts for an infelicitous purple prose style: "A painting of her hangs among the agricultural great in the Royal Winter Fair Building of Toronto, her sapphire blue eyes still scanning the scene, her brown hair piled high, intelligence in every line of her face."

The lives of literary figures present special problems as these women spent much of their lives creating imaginary worlds. Biography is not literary criticism and the distinction might have been drawn more clearly. While it is of some significance that Laure Conan's reputation has breached the frontier of language (another field to pioneer) in the form of a doctoral thesis at the University of Toronto, we might have been spared Elizabeth Waterston's superficial Freudian analysis of Lucy Maude Montgomery, presented as commentaries upon such pseudo-profound truisms as "girls may feel unconscious jealousy of boys," or "the adolescent longs for yet dreads the coming of physical passion," drawn from the less-than-immortal pages of R. E. Muss, ed., *Theories of Adolescence*.

In summary, this book will perform a useful service on the shelves of library reference sections and elsewhere. Young women interested in journalism, art, geology, medicine, or public affairs should be guided to the inspiring lives of women pioneers in these fields. Those interested in creative writing should look elsewhere.

J. A. BOUDREAU

San Jose State College

A History of Canadian Political Thought. By G. P. DE T. GLAZEBROOK. Toronto/Montreal: McClelland & Stewart. 1966. Pp. viii, 300. \$10.00.

IT HAS BEEN SAID OF THUCYDIDES that he never sacrificed thought to language, though occasionally language to thought. This is the first and the great virtue of Professor Glazebrook's book. If the prose is occasionally pedestrian, it is the matter being conveyed that accounts for it. The writing has classic finish; it is satisfying to read history of such limpid clarity, stated always with coolness and often with an enviable detachment. So with the more reason the book can stand or fall on the basis of what it is, not on what it may appear to be.

It must be said at once that it is not a history of Canadian political thought in the line, say, of R. G. Gettell's *History of American Political Thought*. It is not really about political thought at all, not, at least, as this expression is conventionally used. It is rather a book about the Canadian as a political animal, as Professor Glazebrook says. His aim is "to describe and explain the opinions of Canadians on the form and operation of government, on the character of the state, on political society." That overstates what the book in fact does. It is description, rather than explanation that is its main theme. *A History of Canadian Political Life* might have been a better title; *thought* evokes a rather different stereotype. Indeed, this fact raises difficulties.

One ought to avoid misleading titles if possible. How many students have shied from W. P. M. Kennedy's *Constitution of Canada* because they thought it was another, not very slim, but just as dreary, book on Canadian civics? This reviewer had the same illusion about *A History of Canadian Political Thought* that most readers will derive from the title: that it is a history of Canadian political philosophy. Perhaps we do not have any political philosophy. But it would have been exciting to see the matter explored, and by so discerning an historian.

Failing that, Professor Glazebrook has given us in effect a history of Canada with the immediacy of political events sanded off, leaving the grain of our political

history articulated and visible. This is interesting, and more so when Professor Glazebrook allows his own views to obtrude more conspicuously into the descriptive analysis he is using. We need more personal reflections on our political history like Professor Glazebrook's on Chanak: "It is unfortunate that the Chanak affair has so often been dressed up to look like the Declaration of Independence. Its handling on both sides of the Atlantic more closely resembled Alice in Wonderland" (p. 294). Or on the Acadians: "To expel a population forcibly is not a policy, it is an admission of failure, just as Louis XIV's virtual expulsion of the Huguenots was an admission of failure" (p. 23).

There are many such good things: but the form of the book seems not to be designed to garner the best of what Professor Glazebrook has to say. Would it not, perhaps, have been more sensible to have a series of reflective essays? Covering the whole ground of Canadian history weakens the book: the description of the seigneurial system is an echoing of W. B. Munro; in the topical analysis used after 1867, Professor Glazebrook is obliged to repeat the same ground in virtually the same words (pp. 240 & 254 on Duplessis in 1939, for example). And although Professor Glazebrook has clearly done fresh research—which shows frequently to advantage—the book leaves a trail of hopes unrealized. One would have liked analysis of Papineau, McGee, Blake, Tardivel, Ewart, Bourassa, Loring Christie and others, or, reflections on the ideas of John A. Macdonald and George Cartier along the lines of the articles by T. W. L. MacDermott or J. I. Cooper.

There are but few palpable errors, a tribute to Professor Glazebrook's capacious mind and to his formidable readers, Alexander Brady and Eugene Forsey. One might note, however, that the *mandement* of Mgr. Lartigue was issued on October 24, 1837, the day after the Assembly of the Six Counties; thus, before the battle of St. Denis, not after, the Church had made its position known (p. 100). The issue of patronage in 1843 (p. 114) was more serious than jobs: it was a question of honest and effective administration of policy, for which see J. H. Aitchison's doctoral thesis or, for that matter, Cartwright on the 1870's. The C.P.R. was promised to British Columbia ten years from 1871, not 1870 (p. 183).

But to list other small errors is picayune and irrelevant. The real question is, what is the purpose of the book? In the case of a book like McInnis' *Canada: A Political and Social History* the purpose is obvious. Professor Glazebrook's book can be described as the same thing at one remove, that is a long essay on the history of Canadian political life. And while of considerable interest and value, one wishes, idiosyncratically perhaps, that it were different than in fact it is. An admirer of the work of Professor Glazebrook may admit to wishing a good book were still better.

P. B. WAITE

Dalhousie University

France et Canada français du XVI^e au XX^e siècle: Colloque de Québec, 10-12 octobre 1963. Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1966. Pp. 322. \$7.00.

THIS SOMEWHAT BELATED VOLUME is a record of a 1963 Laval symposium organized by Claude Galarneau which was conceived as a joint interdisciplinary examination of the common problems of economic and social history by French and French-Canadian scholars. In the event, French participation was less full than planned; and in the discussion it was soon made evident that in the chosen period France and French Canada were in very different stages of development.

The symposium also suffered from French ignorance of Canadian history and French-Canadian preoccupation with it, so that methodology alone offered a common ground for the participants.

The economic history sessions were devoted to agricultural price movements and industrial investment patterns, to agricultural equipment and yields. Ernest Labrousse of the Sorbonne dealt with French agricultural prices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while Jean Hamelin and Fernand Ouellet of Laval discussed the history of American investment in the exploitation of the Laurentian Shield. Alfred Dubuc of Montreal provided the commentary. The second session was devoted to reports by Hamelin and Ouellet on agricultural yields in the seigneuries and in the Townships from 1700 to 1850, and to a discussion of pre-machine agricultural equipment in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries by Robert-Lionel Séguin. A third session featured a comparison of the French mediaeval and the Canadian seigneuries by Roland Sanfaçon and Fernand Ouellet of Laval.

The two sessions devoted to intellectual history were of more general interest. Alphonse Dupront of the Université de Paris discussed methodology; Robert Mandrou of the Ecole pratique des hautes études and Luc Lacourcière of Laval dealt respectively with the influence of peddler's literature on the French peasant mentality and with oral tradition in Quebec. In the second session Jean-Charles Falardeau and Fernand Dumont of Laval used French-Canadian novels and historical works to determine the prevailing ideology of French-Canadian society in the nineteenth century.

The contributions of Hamelin and Ouellet, since developed at greater length by the latter in his admirable *Histoire économique et social du Québec* (Montréal, 1967), and of Lacourcière, Falardeau, and Dumont will be of interest to all Canadian historians.

MASON WADE

University of Western Ontario

Le Bourreau au Canada sous le régime français. By ANDRÉ LACHANCE. Québec: La Société Historique de Québec. 1966. Pp. 132, map. \$2.50.

THIS UNPRETENTIOUS WORK is a scholarly study of one important aspect of society under the French régime. The author, quite properly, has examined more than just the public hangmen and their role; he also discusses, in general terms, the administration of justice and the incidence, nature, and purpose of torture as used in criminal trials. He then gives brief character sketches of the men who held the office of hangman and describes the hostile attitude of the colonists towards them. There are two appendices: a brief study of the incidence and nature of crime at Quebec, and an abstract of the important *ordonnance* of 1670 on criminal law.

The author notes that two of the hangmen were common criminals, one was an Englishman who proved to be incompetent, one was insane, another a negro imported from Martinique, for whom a negress was imported to prevent him succumbing to loneliness, but in vain, and that for years at a time the colony lacked a *maître des hautes œuvres*. The officeholders had a miserable life, being treated as pariahs, and having to endure continual abuse from the commonalty.

All of this is very useful to the social historian. When, however, the author discusses the administration of justice in general, and the use of torture in particular, he makes the serious mistake of judging the concepts and practices of

the old régime by present-day standards. Had a comparison been made with the usages of the same period in Europe and the other European colonies, the administration of justice in New France would likely have appeared in a less unfavourable light.

In his preface Professor Marcel Trudel states that M. Lachance intends to continue his investigations and produce a much more extensive study of the subject. He has made a good beginning and his future work will be awaited with keen anticipation.

W. J. ECCLES

University of Toronto

The Town of York, 1815-1834: A Further Collection of Documents of Early Toronto. Edited with an introduction by EDITH G. FIRTH. Toronto: The Champlain Society for the Government of Ontario, University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. lxxxviii, 381, map, illus. \$7.95.

THE APPEARANCE OF THIS SECOND VOLUME of early Toronto documents brings to completion a labour begun more than a decade ago by Miss Edith G. Firth, head of the Canadian History and Manuscript Section of the Toronto Public Library. The first volume, entitled *The Town of York, 1793-1815*, appeared in 1962 and was widely recognized as one of the best in the Ontario Series. The present work exhibits the same careful scholarship and detailed knowledge of the subject and its available source materials. The decision to conclude with the year 1834, as the editor explains in the preface, is not entirely satisfactory, and was dictated more by reasons of length than by the fact that the Town of York was then transformed into the City of Toronto. To carry the story up to 1837 or later, which would have been more suitable for some sections, particularly those dealing with politics and economics, would have necessitated the elimination or drastic curtailment of many items included in the present volume. It is open to question whether such a change would not have been wise.

As the capital of Upper Canada, York was in many ways the directing force of the province, not only in political but in social, economic, and religious affairs. The typical problems of the local or urban historian are complicated here by the dominant place of York in a scattered and largely rural population. The recurring dilemma of the editor is how far to cast the net—how much to introduce, in Introduction and published documents, of outside affairs which were connected with matters of importance to York. As the centre of government York was deeply affected by such things as the controversies arising over the Alien and Clergy Reserves questions, by the introduction of religion and national background into politics, and by the rise of the Reform movement throughout the province.

Miss Firth has made her selections and judgments with care and intelligence. Pertinent matter has been gleaned from letters, diaries, and other writings: the large number of newspaper extracts included illustrates the value of even the most partisan publications, if used with care. The Introduction is a scholarly and very readable essay of 71 pages based on the documents that follow, supplemented by other sources where necessary to round out the account. No exception can be taken to Miss Firth's statement that the leadership of the opposition forces was less centralized in York than was that of the tories, who had a natural leadership in the Family Compact. Nevertheless, the York reform leaders had widespread influence through their political organizations and their newspapers, as well as by such speakers and organizers as William Lyon Mackenzie. Beginning

in 1827, with the decision to petition the British government to disallow the Alien bill, the opponents of the government organized in York a series of central committees, constitutional committees, political unions, constitutional societies, and other associations, which gave temporary leadership and unity to the ephemeral local organizations in other parts of the province. There was not just one Central Committee, as indicated by the editor, but a number of successive ones whose membership overlapped to a considerable extent. It is not surprising that these Central Committees were confused, even by contemporaries, since a hard core of the same radicals was active in all of them. This important aspect of York's history receives only passing mention, in one of the documents and in the Introduction, although it constituted the first tentative experiments since Gourlay's time to develop a party organization in opposition to the government's natural party system.

An extensive bibliography and numerous footnotes are included. Many of the latter consist of brief biographies of persons mentioned in the text. These will be found very useful for quick reference, although in some instances limitations of space or other considerations have caused the omission of significant details. The editorial work has been done so carefully that errors appear to be few. One slip noted appears on page 217, where the Reverend William Proudfoot declares in his diary that Methodists are "Armenians"! Perhaps this is a typographical error; if not, an indication should have been given that this was the minister's own spelling of the word "Arminians." All in all, this work is a valuable addition to the publications on Toronto and Upper Canada, and a most worthy successor to other volumes in the Ontario Series.

FRED C. HAMIL

Wayne State University

Montreal, Island City of the St. Lawrence. By KATHLEEN JENKINS. New York and Toronto: Doubleday. 1966. Pp. xvi, 559, illus. \$6.75.

KATHLEEN JENKINS' NEW BOOK on the history of Montreal is a broad and sprightly survey of the city and its people. This volume covers Montreal's history from its establishment as a mission in 1642 down to the present. The author offers no new insights or interpretations of any of the city's history, however, and though the book brings together a great deal of material, it is thus of limited value.

Two of the most important themes in the history of Montreal are commerce and French-English relations. Montreal's place as the major Canadian commercial metropolis has given the city an overwhelming importance in the economic development of Canada. Montreal has usually had a longer reach, greater capital, and more powerful and more aggressive entrepreneurs than its closest rivals. Miss Jenkins touches upon some aspects of the economic expansion of Montreal without ever developing the metropolitan theme. Nor does she examine satisfactorily the political and social problems that have arisen in Montreal as a result of the presence there of French and English. The division of the city into two communities, by language and religion, or four, if the Irish and Jews are also considered, has meant that Montreal has often been the cockpit of racial tensions and violence in Canada. But these problems are minimized or skirted by the author who is much more concerned with covering political, social, or military events year by year and with depicting the growth of happy community harmony in Montreal. The book has a useful basic bibliography which omits important relevant books and articles by Adair, Ouellet, Eccles, Massicotte, Cooper, and

Hamelin among others. But, with these limitations it provides the reader with an informed historical tour of Montreal and it is a welcome addition to the slowly growing body of Canadian urban history.

G. J. J. TULCHINSKY

Queen's University

Les Journeaux du Québec de 1764 à 1964. By ANDRÉ BEAULIEU and JEAN HAMELIN. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval; Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1965. Pp. xxvi, 329. \$10.00.

THE MOST SERIOUS OBSTACLE to historical research in Canada is the lack of detailed guides to manuscript sources, newspaper indexes, biographical guides, and even of a bibliography of published materials. A volume comparable to the *Harvard Guide to American History* would make both teaching and research in Canadian history infinitely easier.

One gap which is gradually being filled is that of newspaper bibliographies. In 1961 J. Russell Harper published his *Historical Directory of New Brunswick Newspapers and Periodicals*. André Beaulieu and Jean Hamelin have now compiled an admirable and extremely useful bibliography of all the newspapers published in Quebec since the first one, the *Québec Gazette*. The listing is according to place of publication, which may seem confusing, but the confusion is overcome by chronological and alphabetical indices. Each entry includes the date of foundation, frequency of issue, circulation (often at several dates), politics, the name or names of editor and contributors where possible, and the libraries where the newspapers are now available. The leading publications, such as *Le Devoir* or the *Gazette*, and even some less important ones, like the anti-clerical *Canada-Revue*, are given brief histories. There is a total of 2,293 entries.

Every research worker interested in the history of Canada and Quebec should be indebted to Beaulieu and Hamelin for this work of careful, patient scholarship. The time that they have devoted to the preparation of this volume will save the rest of us countless hours. One can only echo Jean-Charles Bonenfant's prefatory comment that "le résultat est magnifique."

RAMSAY COOK

University of Toronto

Henri Bourassa: Biographie, Index des écrits, Index de la correspondance publique 1895-1924. By ANDRÉ BERGEVIN, CAMERON NISH, and ANNE BOURASSA. Montreal: Editions de L'Action Nationale. 1966. Pp. lxii, 150. \$5.00.

HENRI BOURASSA was an amazingly energetic advocate of political and social causes. Whether speaking in or out of parliament, writing pamphlets, or composing editorials for *Le Devoir*, he was constantly occupied for almost a half a century in ardently pressing his point of view. Because of their sheer volume then, exploring his works is a formidable job. The three authors have collaborated to produce a bibliographical aid which should prove useful to any reader trying to find his way through the Bourassa literature.

The most ambitious but least successful section of the book is the index of the Bourassa writings compiled by Mr. Bergevin. The listing of all these works (except for those published as separate pamphlets) by the title and date under which they appeared in *Le Devoir* is an excellent contribution. Unfortunately

they are classified under sixteen major headings, each of which is subdivided into a great number of minor ones. Such a fine division demands a high degree of accuracy which is not always present; for example, the speech *De L'Association*, in which Bourassa explains the ideological basis for his outlook on trade unions, is not listed under the specific heading of *syndicalisme*. Moreover, the sixteen categories are arbitrarily chosen and do not correspond very well with the main themes in Bourassa's thought. Thus, articles dealing with *one* particular interest of Bourassa's—the equal rights of French with those of English—are listed under four of these headings. Within some of these categories the material is further subdivided so that there are no less than seven different places in the index where material on bilingualism can be found. To make matters even more confusing, a reference to an article is often repeated so that the reader must constantly check to see whether he has taken note of a particular article or not. What little help these divisions furnish is more than counterbalanced by the bother they cause. It would have been much more sensible simply to have divided all Bourassa's writings according to his three great interests: relations between Great Britain and Canada, relations between English and French Canada, and social and economic questions.

The other serious fault is that for the years from 1900 to 1910 many important speeches and articles have been overlooked of which the following are only some samples: a wide-ranging parliamentary speech given in February 1902 expressing Bourassa's views on education, industrialism, imperial relations, and colonization; a polemic with Tardivel in 1904 where he took his stand as a Dominion nationalist; a sketch of his labour outlook in a parliamentary contribution in 1907; a discussion of social problems at the Canadian Club in the same year; a major policy speech on provincial matters in the election campaign of May 1908. Thus the index is far from complete for this period.

The remaining parts of the book are very useful. Professor Nish provides an index of Bourassa's letters from 1895 to 1924 both by correspondent and subject. Miss Bourassa has written a simple outline of her father's life in which she has paid particular attention to the chronology of the important speeches and pamphlets. Reading it is an excellent way of beginning a study of the political life of Bourassa.

JOSEPH LEVITT

University of Ottawa

Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919. By RICHARD A. PRESTON. Under the Auspices of Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. xxii, 576. \$12.50.

THE IRONICAL QUOTATION MARKS in the title *Canada and "Imperial Defense"* suggest the intent of this enormous work and the subtitle, its scope: Britain's failure to control and commit the forces of the autonomous colonies to automatic participation in war. The old story of the victory of military status is demonstrated again with a wealth of detail. The myth of the existence of an imperial defence system controlled from London was the outcome of imperialist propaganda, colonial assent to British leadership in World War I, and the acceptance of the myth by soldiers and historians, a notion reinforced by the study and accessibility of British documents.

By contrast Dr. Preston, the W. K. Boyd Professor of History at Duke Uni-

versity, has studied the problem not simply from the centre but also from the periphery. He has investigated an enormous body of material—in Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, as well as British archives, examined appropriate government statements and documents, and read available monographs and magazine articles. The result is the most thoroughly documented and comprehensive account of the command systems, the training, and the personalities involved in the evolution of "Imperial Defense" from 1867 to 1919. The Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center is to be congratulated on this their latest publication.

After a brief survey of defence co-operation in North America before 1860 and a chapter on the defence of Canada during the American Civil War, the focus largely turns on Canada. Canada was the pioneer among the self-governing colonies in shedding British peacetime military control and working out modes of military co-operation with Britain. Dr. Preston has made such a great contribution to our understanding of many of Canada's military problems as virtually to re-write the country's military history from 1867 to 1914. Valuable new light, for example, is thrown on the commands of the general officers commanding from their correspondence with the old Duke of Cambridge. Moreover he illuminates his analyses by making valuable comparisons, contrasts, and relationships between Canada and the Australasian colonies. After the Colonial Conference of 1887, for example, the Canadian military system became the model for Queensland and New Zealand; and from 1905 to 1907 the Australian General Staff received Canadian intelligence diaries, for the Canadian General Staff like the Australian had been set up in 1904. In Canada the frequent acrimony between British and Canadian authorities before 1904 was succeeded by a decade of relative harmony.

In contrast to the three-fifths of the book allotted to an analysis of Canadian defence problems, one-fifth is devoted to those of Australia and New Zealand—largely naval. By 1909 nationalist pressures and new strategic realities were forcing the Admiralty to agree to the creation of an Australian fleet unit under peacetime colonial command. Finally a fifth of the book is devoted to British military developments and theories as they concerned the defence of the self-governing colonies and the utilization of their forces in an overseas war. The book concludes with a long chapter, "Commonwealth Defense Co-operation Matures in War." The mere reference in the last paragraph of the book and on the blurb to military co-operation providing a model for the United Nations was disappointing. One would have liked to see the idea sketched in a short epilogue.

It is unfortunate that a book containing so much that is new and so rigorously interpreted from a strategic point of view should espouse such an intense autonomist predilection. One function of the historian is surely to be fair to the position he disagrees with or is unsympathetic to. Most historians can see today that the often unlovely characteristics of late nineteenth-century British imperialism were motivated in the last analysis by fear of Britain's possible decline.

Dr. Preston twice observes that the realization that Britain regarded Canada as "expendable" in a possible Anglo-American war made it difficult for Canada to take seriously the defence preparations against the United States. One unanswered inference of Canada's expendability is that membership in the British empire was of little consequence to Canada, to which the fate of the Spanish empire in 1898 should be a sufficient answer. Furthermore, in spite of the generally harmonious relationship on defence matters reached by 1914 between British and colonial military authorities, the emphasis on the bitterness of the quarrels in this book makes one wonder why the colonies did not stay out of World War I as Ireland did out of World War II. Their magnificent contribution in the war would

indicate either that the conflicts were not as serious as described or that the study of the military relationships apart from the total historical situation has resulted in some distortion. The use of A. Gordon Dewey's too much neglected *The Dominions and Diplomacy* (1929) would have provided a useful corrective.

Nevertheless we must all remain grateful to Dr. Preston for examining the problems of Commonwealth defence as a whole and reminding us that the military history of the countries of the Commonwealth has only just begun.

NORMAN PENLINGTON

Michigan State University

Great Britain

English Humanists and Reformation Politics under Henry VIII and Edward VI.

By JAMES KELSEY McCONICA. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1965. Pp. xii, 340. \$7.50.

ERASMUS VISITED ENGLAND six times between 1499 and 1517, spending, in all, nearly seven years there. He himself spoke only tourist English. But of late there have been some very welcome and attractive attempts to "English" him: three American paperbacks of selections; Craig Thompson's masterly translation of all the colloquies; Mrs. Phillips' versions of essays from the adages. And a new *In Praise of Folly* is promised by Penguin Classics. All this has involved reassessment of Erasmus' influence in England, and now comes a good and important book on that subject by a scholar from Saskatchewan, James McConica, an Oxford pupil of Professor Trevor-Roper—the book springs from a 1962 D.Phil. thesis. Dr. McConica writes clearly and elegantly, with some telling phrases—among them this description of Erasmus: "less of a philosopher or theologian than a prophet: one perhaps whose coat of hair was a doctoral gown and whose wilderness a salon, but a prophet none the less."

Dr. McConica is concerned to put the "ideas" back into the 1530's—to challenge those historians who have discussed or "explained" the English Reformation as an act of state by careerist politicians, or a by-product of the divorce, or a chapter in administrative history, or a series of spontaneous happenings without intellectual fibre. He is also arguing with the historians of ideas who twist the 1530's by reason of their obsession with possible Lutheran or Zwinglian influences, or destroy the distinctive character of the decade by thinking of it in terms of "catholic" and "protestant." He wishes to stress what lay behind the events by looking at the English "domestic tradition of humanist reform" which, he argues, was continuous from the "pre-reform" down to the Elizabethan settlement. (The title of his thesis was "The Continuity of Humanist Ideas During the English Reformation to 1558.")

The argument may be summarized as follows. After 1500 English humanism (previously dependent upon Italian immigrants) became more domesticated. There was a growing community of English humanists, with patrons in the City of London and in the court (Lady Margaret Beaufort, and then Catharine of Aragon). Publications from English presses demonstrated this development, and

by the 1520's humanist influence at Oxford and Cambridge was strong, especially in extra-official studies (as we can see from college library inventories, private letters, and booksellers' lists). By the time of the meeting of the "Reformation" Parliament in 1529 there was a scholarly, humanist community and consensus in English intellectual circles, a tradition of evangelical, reforming humanism correctly described, so Dr. McConica argues, as "Erasmianism": and to its characteristics he devotes a separate chapter. The tradition continued. For three or four years (1529-32) there was a marked optimism and unanimity, a "brief summer" of confidence and co-operation, future party alignments as yet indistinct, under a King himself devoted to Erasmian reform. Then came a split: between the conservatives, who were to develop a tradition of "recusant humanism," and the moderates, who rallied to the "Supreme Head" in the hope of realizing in England the Erasmian dream. After 1531 (organized by Cromwell) Erasmian thought became government policy—a positive doctrine for the English Reformation. The Henrician *via media* of the 1530's was a fulfilment of the Erasmian tradition: this can be traced in government injunctions and formularies, and in the flood of printed books, especially the English versions of works by Erasmus. (In this chapter, "Official Erasmianism: The Work of Cromwell," Dr. McConica gives a year by year survey of these Erasmus items, utilizing some of the researches of another Canadian scholar, Dr. E. J. Devereux, who prepared a thorough list of works of Erasmus in English, with full bibliographical detail, for his 1967 Oxford D.Phil.) By 1540 England was an "Erasmian polity." And the Erasmian spirit did not end then; it found a new patron in Catharine Parr, and showed itself in such things as the 1544 litany, the 1545 primer, the letters of Roger Ascham, and the education of Edward VI. When Edward came to the throne in 1547 the central tradition of Erasmianism was safe, and it could shape into a moderate position between newer and rival orthodoxies: a moderate Protestantism. The 1549 prayer book is best considered in Erasmian terms: and even the interest in "dogmatic Protestantism" (Zwingli and Calvin are named) "seems an aspect of the earlier Erasmian tradition." This was carried over to the Elizabethan *via media* in such men as John Jewel. In sum, then, "the main current of English thought has been revealed as continuously Erasmian, shaping under Edward VI into a moderate Protestantism."

Anyone who has tried to train students to catch the particular flavour of the English Reformation will appreciate the value of Dr. McConica's work. His main thesis I believe to be correct. But the bare summary will have revealed some of the difficulties. Perhaps because of the thesis origin of his work, Dr. McConica overstresses (rather than overstates) his case. He is desperately eager to attach the label "Erasmian" to everything and everybody he approves. Thus contours are flattened: there is, as it were, a strong and unvaried frontal lighting, with no depth, no play of light and shade. We read of the "Erasmian note," "strain," "flavour," "tone," and so on, until we rebel. There are too many phrases like "moderate Protestantism," "more radical but still essentially Erasmian," "the Erasmian tradition of English humanism continued without much real alteration," or—a description of the education of Edward—"humanist and mildly Protestant, with the Erasmian tinge of the Melancthon party which was coming to characterise the new generation." This is not precise enough.

One wonders, in fact, whether the term Erasmianism can be used with any but the vaguest historical bite. "Erasmianism," Dr. McConica writes, was a "blend of humanism and reform which was the joint manufacture of More and Erasmus, swayed undoubtedly by the fervent genius of Colet"; and More was "the greatest English Erasmian." This conceals the many differences between the three "Oxford

Reformers" on points which were central to the Reformation (the matter of vernacular scripture, for instance). However, even assuming a unity, even granting the validity of a noun such as "blend" to describe this "Erasmianism" (humanism blended with piety, or what not), surely it is going too far to use the word "creed." At one point the author talks of "the Erasmian gospel, undogmatic yet definite and discoverable." At another, of "a body of doctrine at once apposite and ill-defined"—can one agree with any more than the second part of that? Can the word "Erasmian" be employed to mean anything more than a friend or reader of Erasmus who shared many of his preoccupations and some (at least) of his positive ideas?

The book, being built up of blocks of bibliographical and biographical material, is a work for the desk rather than the armchair. It is necessary reading for its information about (among others) More (and his Tudor editors and reputation), Cecil, Cromwell, Lupset, Elyot, Taverner, and Marbeck. (Cranmer is rather underplayed, perhaps.) The careful index is an excellent help.

Perhaps one of the characteristics of "Erasmianism" is a certain sort of sense of humour—sense of humour being a quality which explains many a theological difference!

H. C. PORTER

Selwyn College
Cambridge

Proceedings in Parliament 1610. I. The House of Lords; II. The House of Commons. Edited by ELIZABETH READ FOSTER. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [Montreal: McGill University Press]. 1966. Pp. lxx, 366; xxii, 422. \$17.50.

THESE VOLUMES ADD GREATLY to the information hitherto available to the historian and student for the study of the fourth and fifth sessions of the "Long Parliament" of James I.

The main source for the parliamentary politics of this period has been S. R. Gardiner's *Parliamentary Debates in 1610*, published in 1862. Gardiner's volume was restricted to debates in the Commons and while it marked a significant advance for Jacobean studies of that era, it is, by modern standards, very narrowly based. Since that time much new parliamentary material has become available, and Professor Foster's decision to produce the proceedings of both Houses in twin volumes has resulted in a major contribution to seventeenth-century parliamentary studies.

It is particularly enlightening for scholars to possess the record of the House of Lords, since the attitudes expressed there throw into sharper relief the projects and policies then entertained in the Lower House. The prevailing tension between James and the Commons centred on financial policies, and in particular on the possibility of a bargain being struck between James and his subjects whereby the ancient and obsolete feudal dues would be abolished in exchange for a guaranteed annual income for the king. But amid all the talk of profit and loss and constitutional precedent, religious animosity intruded from time to time in a kind of ominous counterpoint. In this connection the attitude of the bishops is particularly significant. Their alliance with the crown was all too evident, and the fulminations of men like Bancroft must have served to demonstrate to many a member of the Commons that political or financial opposition to the crown

necessarily involved a collision with the bishops. On one day we find Bancroft attacking the bill against pluralities and non-residence and characterizing the religious policy of the Commons as one which would permit "every ignorant ass" to interpret scripture "according to his hot humours"; on another we encounter him lecturing the Commons on their delinquency with respect to the king's financial needs and referring to James as "our terrestrial God." The assassination of Henry IV served to increase the prevailing tension of the summer of 1610 and Bancroft did nothing to dispel it by his introduction of a particularly blood-thirsty bill for the punishment of Englishmen who might have similar ideas with respect to James. All this must have forced more and more men, whatever their theological underpinnings, to choose between their political beliefs and support of the bishops. The nature of their choice is indicated by the fact that Lord Saye found it necessary, in June 1610, to deny the charge of the Bishop of Lincoln that the Commons "loved not the Bishops."

For all that, the reader does not get the impression of a House of Commons standing in awe of either bishops or king. The picture is rather of a highly articulate and self-conscious body, well aware of their heritage, their power, and their possibilities. In this connection Professor Foster makes the important point that, contrary to the general opinion, when the parliament men appealed to mediaeval precedents, they did so with a precision which, more often than not, withstands the scrutiny of modern scholarship.

The Great Contract was the major issue of the two sessions, and as historians, to their sorrow, have long known, additional documentation on a subject raises at least as many questions as it answers. The Commons, mindful of the risks involved in supplying the king with a fixed income and not too anxious to release the crown from the financial box in which it found itself, were probably never very enthusiastic about the Contract. One would like to know more, however, about the activities of the powerful interest groups who stood to lose by the abolition of the feudal tenures and their attendant institutions, particularly in the interval between the two sessions when the Commons appear to have set their faces much more definitely against it.

This reviewer regrets the decision of the editor against the incorporation of already published material as well as her apparent self-denying ordinance against political commentary and analysis in the footnotes. The world of seventeenth-century scholarship will, however, be grateful to Professor Foster for a valuable and highly professional piece of work.

J. R. MACCORMACK

Saint Mary's University

'The Most English Minister . . .': The Policies and Politics of Palmerston. By DONALD SOUTHGATE. London and Toronto: Macmillan, 1966. Pp. xxx, 647. \$9.00.

"THIS IS NOT A BIOGRAPHY." The material for a definitive life is so vast that it may never and cannot yet be written. "The limited purpose of the work . . . is to present a study of Palmerston, with some attempt at assessment of his foreign policy, and, it is hoped, some degree of understanding—enough, perchance, to shake certain stubborn misapprehensions of the kind not held, in general, by scholars, but surviving after the manner of secondary folk-legend through the medium of the school text-book of former days. It is an attempt, within the limits

of the published information, to make some sense of Palmerston's career, not only by considering his conduct of foreign affairs, but by explaining, or at least reiterating, his political pre-eminence in the '50s." This is not only a limited purpose, it is an odd one. There exists already a big biography of Palmerston by H. C. F. Bell, expensive, prewar and not very accessible, but solidly based on the most important of the relevant manuscript materials. Dr. Southgate makes no effort to show that it is unreliable or inadequate. He just finds it "intensely irritating," apparently because of its style.

The book under review contains unusually few mistakes. A great number of published sources have been consulted and well used—though there are exceedingly few citations of Bell. For Palmerston's foreign policy after 1846 Dr. Southgate provides the best available narrative. But there is almost no fresh thought. Nor is there much perspective, and what there is is marred by an attempt to exploit the coincidence of the centenary of Palmerston's death with Churchill's. It is not made clear what these "stubborn misapprehensions" are and in which school textbooks they are to be found. Palmerston's political pre-eminence is certainly reiterated rather than explained. Dr. Southgate is disappointing, especially for the author of *The Passing of the Whigs*, on such matters as Palmerston's views on parliamentary reform and his relations with the press, and these are areas where his bibliography is incomplete.

Reviewers are often criticized for not reviewing the book before them and airing their own views instead. But I cannot think that many readers will prefer to a full and original biography a less full but still long and wholly derivative work which is not (quite) a biography. I am afraid some will even find Dr. Southgate's style as irritating as Professor Bell's. It is hard not to wish that all the learning, labour, and scholarly care which have gone into the present work had been devoted to some enterprise more likely either to advance or to popularize research.

Sidney Sussex College
Cambridge

DEREK BEALES

A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War.
By OLIVE ANDERSON. London, Melbourne, and Toronto: Macmillan. Pp. xii, 306, illus. \$7.15.

AS A SURVEY OF THE ENGLISH STATE working under the pressures of the Crimean War, this book is frequently interesting and suggestive. Very much in the *Age of Equipoise* style, Mrs. Anderson shows the difficulty of generalizing about the England of Palmerston and Russell. The treatment of economic policy is particularly striking. Here, scholars have often seen decisive proofs of England's commitment to the principles of economic liberalism. Mrs. Anderson sees nothing of the sort. Economic liberalism was a fair-weather doctrine which had to yield to the necessities of warfare. Most of the Pittite expedients which men condemned in theory were revived in practice: additions to the debt, foreign subsidies, economic blockade, and even the sinking fund. The Bank Charter Act came under heavy fire and respectable authorities considered suspending cash payments. It is arguable that the survival of the gold standard owed more to the shortness of the war than to the monetary virtue of the English public. Where, as in the matter of commercial blockade, the violation of orthodox principles was less brazen than

in the Napoleonic wars, the explanation lies not in doctrine, but in the government's pragmatic assessment of naval, commercial, and diplomatic realities.

Less persuasive, perhaps, but certainly worthwhile is the discussion of mid-century radicalism. Ignoring familiar movements, Mrs. Anderson deals mainly with Urquhart's National League. The League with its programme of reviving the true and ancient constitution, free from the perversions of party government, ministerial influence, and electoral corruption, reveals an anachronistic strand in nineteenth-century radicalism not unlike eighteenth-century *patriotism*. The objection to the author's argument lies partly with Urquhart himself. He was an obsessed crank, best known for his conviction that Palmerston was an agent of the Tsar. Twice a Conservative candidate for parliament, rejected by the radical electors of Sheffield and finally returned for the venal borough of Stafford, it is difficult to accept Urquhart as spokesman for the English radical tradition. Were the example only Bright or Roebuck! Still, the idea deserves consideration. Cobdett, for instance, resembles Urquhart in his zeal for the ancient constitution. Cobden and Bright with their old-fashioned independence, their fear of corruption and influence, and their utter inability to work within the party system might possibly be the heirs of the eighteenth-century country gentlemen. Could it even be that Cobden's vade-mecum was not *The Wealth of Nations* but *The Patriot King*?

When Mrs. Anderson comes to argue for 1854 as a landmark or turning point, she is less impressive. At times her claims are highly guarded and qualified, indeed, almost elusive, but generally her problem is one of excessive dogmatism. Her explicit claims for the period are very large indeed: it is in the Crimean War that the case for aristocratic leadership was discredited; it is here that the middle classes acquired their characteristic morale and confidence; and it is here also that the latter found a basis for co-operation with the respectable working classes. One might assert with equal plausibility that impatience with the aristocracy was much older than the Crimean War. Also, the collapse of Chartism and the emergence of the conservative craft unions may be the decisive events for co-operation between the middle and lower classes. Of course, Mrs. Anderson may be right. Her assertions are not extravagant or incredible. The basis for her research is simply far too narrow to support them.

F. A. DREYER

University of Western Ontario

Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-Century England. By W. J. READER. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson [Toronto: Ryerson Press]. 1966. Pp. viii, 248. \$8.00.

MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY cannot exist without the well-trained specialist, who generally maintains his standards and his interests by membership in a formal association. Richard Pares once suggested that the growth of the organized professions may be one of the most significant facts in modern history. He was observing their slight role in eighteenth-century British politics, where patronage and connection counted for so much more than education or merit. British society was not unusual; every pre-industrial society has been subject to the overwhelming influence of hierarchy and birth in determining who and who will not have status. But Britain in the nineteenth century was the first country to move simultaneously toward rapid industrial and democratic expansion. How did the professions keep pace? That is essentially the question which Mr. Reader pursues with a fine

consistency in this lucid and fully documented, if also rather conventional and limited study.

The physicians, the barristers, and the upper clergy monopolized what there was of professional life until the early nineteenth century. They made up a select group of gentlemen who had all been educated in the liberal arts. Having passed perfunctory tests in Latin, they had entered their profession with little better qualification than that they came of good families and were well recommended. Pressing against the Inns of Court and the Royal College of Physicians were the attorneys and solicitors, the apothecaries and surgeons, with claims for regulation of standards and recognition of their work outside of London. It was their initiative which lay behind the Apothecaries Act of 1815, the Anatomy Act of 1833, and the Medical Act of 1858. Then, in the 'fifties and 'sixties came the more sweeping investigation of the Civil Service and the schools, followed by reforms which placed greater emphasis on standards set by competitive examinations.

On these issues Mr. Reader makes full use of the wealth of printed sources in the Parliamentary Papers, in school registers, in periodicals, and in autobiographies. He shows not only the growing concern for adequate training to cope with technology and urban sprawl, the expansion of the professions to include engineers and managers, but he also describes the far-reaching impact of the Indian Civil Service examinations on preparation for the Home Civil Service. More interesting still is his discussion of the paradox that just as these reforms developed, so too did a conservative bias become more firmly rooted in the public schools and in the upper reaches of the older professions. By the end of the century the clergy, the barristers, and the physicians had failed to increase with the population; they maintained a static hierarchy within the professions, while the liberal, classical education of the public schools made only grudging concession to modern subjects, leaving their graduates with a condescending attitude to commerce and administration. The army and the empire provided them with careers, "hiding the facts of life from the British ruling class."

So brief a description hardly does justice to the finer qualities of the book, but it does point to its chief fault. The historian of Victorian England has long been aware of its general thesis, and Mr. Reader does not probe for new insights. On the schools and the empire he adds nothing new to the work of A. P. Thornton and Rupert Wilkinson. When commenting on "the scarcity of middle-class salaried employment . . . in mid-Victorian England," he dismisses the debate on this question between Musgrove and Perkins in the *Economic History Review* (1959-62). Nor is there any attempt to deal with a contradictory statement by W. L. Burn that the policy of *laissez-faire* "may well have been due to a lack of competent administrators . . ." (*Age of Equipoise*, p. 224). Mr. Reader does make the stimulating observation that the science of public health in provincial towns may have been promoted more by surgeons holding local office than by Benthamites like Edwin Chadwick. Yet he does not develop the point or relate it to the more comprehensive issue of motivation and method which has been raised in recent years by the articles of Oliver MacDonagh, Henry Parris, and Jennifer Hart. And finally, except for a few allusive quotations from Paul Vinogradoff, the book suggests no comparison with the professions in Europe or the United States during the nineteenth century. Mr. Reader's study will therefore appeal to the student of social history both for what it tells explicitly, and for its revelation of how much further such a book might have gone.

ALBERT TUCKER

York University

The Irish Struggle, 1916-1926. Edited by DESMOND WILLIAMS. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 193. \$5.00.

THIS BOOK OF FIFTEEN ESSAYS may be taken as a measure of the degree to which the 1916 rising and its aftermath have passed from controversy into history. The essays, for the most part, are written by academics concerned with history, and are based on talks which have been broadcast by Radio Éireann.

None of these writers suggests that the rising of 1916 and the war of independence can be adequately explained by social and economic causes. Patrick Lynch, who deals directly with the question, entitled his chapter "The Social Revolution That Never Was." Indeed, there have been few rebellions with which the masses have had so little to do, as the issues were decided by a contest between a Blanquist minority and the forces of the crown. Yet, if the class struggle was not much in evidence, the idea of class struggle had an important influence on the thinking of the citizen army which James Connolly had organized among the transport workers. Connolly who was, in a sense, a practising Catholic and a practising Marxist, shared Lenin's view of the war, and thought of the rising as a part of an international workers' struggle. In this he was less in harmony with the Irish temperament and the forces of Irish history than Padraig Pearse whose ideal was the legendary Cú Chulainn who fought against odds and cared only that his deeds lived after him.

Although Connolly has been claimed by Marxists and has become a minor figure in the folklore of world revolution, he gained his place in history, not as an Irish Lenin, but with Pearse as another Cú Chulainn. While concern for social ills often led Irishmen to nationalism, they never found it a cure for Ireland's poverty. What they found was adventure and a kind of posthumous glory which perhaps was what they were really seeking.

In retrospect, it is hard to conceive of the 1916 rising gaining anything else. As G. A. Hayes-McCoy points out in his chapter on the Anglo-Irish war, Pearse and Connolly, by standing on the defensive, ignored all the rules of insurrection. Yet very different were the tactics and strategy of Michael Collins whose policy of hiding terrorists among the civil population anticipated the methods of Mao Tse-tung. The problems this created for the reconstituted Royal Irish Constabulary are presented in a very interesting article by Richard Hawkins.

Of equal interest is Kevin B. Nowlan's discussion of the tension between the Dáil Éireann and its military forces, and the special role of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in keeping the army under control. There are several essays on the political aspects of this decade of which the best are Professor Nicholas Mansergh's discussion of Ireland and the Commonwealth and F. S. Lyons on the passing of the Irish parliamentary party. The cultural background of independence is described in two articles, while the Ulster question is discussed by Maureen Wall who points out that the Easter rising "was as much a revolt against the Irish parliamentary party as against British rule."

The general impression of these essays is that on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 rising, the origins of Irish independence provoked less controversy than the question of Canadian confederation has in its centennial year.

HEREWARD SENIOR

McGill University

Europe

The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages. By WALTER ULLMANN. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1966. Pp. xiv, 160. \$5.00.

EXCEPT FOR THE ADDITION OF A CRITICAL APPARATUS the three chapters constituting this book are essentially public lectures delivered at The Johns Hopkins University during the academic year 1964–65. They are therefore oriented to an American university audience which, though more sophisticated historically than a non-university group, would not naturally connect the Declaration of Independence with mediaeval political ideas and practice. While adding little to what he has said before, Professor Ullmann has used his unrivalled knowledge of mediaeval canon and civil law and political theory to suggest how man emerged from the Middle Ages as an individual with rights guaranteed by law universally respected as supreme.

The convincing argument of the first chapter is that up to the thirteenth century mediaeval doctrine and thought totally submerged the individual, allowing him no autonomous character. With rule divinely bestowed, the king possessed all political power and served as a father to his subjects who were to be grateful for his protection and to obey him. How royal paraphernalia and the throne became the symbol of kingly *majestas* is well known. Government was theocratic, descending downward rather than upward; its power was outside and above man, superior to him, a power over which there was no human control. During this time no doctrine or idea evolved which in any way supported the position that man had any political individuality. Man existed only for the sake of the whole society, as a vehicle for God's actions. Heresy was a crime against Christian society. The king was the full owner of all the property of his subjects, and he alone, as God's vice-regent, had true *dominium*. Fortunately in this period there emerged the concept of the supremacy of law, a concept that was to prevail in the western world. Because the whole society was important and because law addresses itself to the general rather than to the particular or the individual, law was elevated to where it was regarded as the "invisible Ruler of society, made concrete by the visible Ruler"; the "Ruler himself was the embodied idea of law."

The thesis of the second chapter is that by the late thirteenth century man had emerged as a full-fledged citizen and had acquired an individuality. This condition was achieved mainly by feudalism which, in its practical way, underlined the reciprocal obligations of lord and vassal and gave to the vassal definite rights guaranteed by a law which was considered by all through ingrained habit and repeated statement to be supreme. As feudalism became firmly entrenched in western Europe, it established the idea of contract and its guarantee of the rights of the individual. From this point on it is a familiar story of how the feudal law was naturalized and how it served as a bridge to the eighteenth-century doctrine of natural rights. What Professor Ullmann could have said, but does not, is that the feudal contract between two men was a private and individual affair. Feudalism was, in effect, a practical political and military institution which extricated man from his submerged position in society and saved him from the descending theocratic government under which all power was held by the king.

The last chapter deals with the naturalizing and humanizing developments of the late Middle Ages which contributed to such ideas as that man himself had natural reason, political capacity, and the right to protect his own interests.

Responsible for this political emergence of man were Aristotelianism, Dantean humanism, experimental science, and the new scientific politics of such men as John of Paris and Marsiglio. There arose ideas such as that secular power had jurisdiction over men not because they were Christians but because they were citizens, and that the individual was the instrument of nature. From here to the later Citizen Mirabeau and Citizen Danton is a natural step. One can therefore understand how in colonial America, where feudal ideas from England had so well prepared the way for the doctrine of natural rights, John Dickinson could say on the eve of the American Revolution: "The freedom of a people consists in being governed by laws in which no alteration can be made without their consent."

Professor Ullmann who well knows his way around the realm of theory and law increases significantly our understanding of how mediaeval man acquired his individuality and went on to become a citizen with accepted rights, among them the right to participate in government. When, however, he ventures into more mundane history, some of his arguments and statements are less convincing. Anyone familiar with communal history in the Low Countries, especially in Flanders, would not agree that communal development came there long after it came in northern Italy. The contention that feudal principles were not imposed from above is questionable. Feudal principles were the product of a give and take among the aristocrats who, though not all emperors, kings, or great princes, were certainly at the top of the mediaeval hierarchy and who imposed their feudal principles on society. Too often Professor Ullmann seems to equate common law with feudal law. That feudal law became a part of common law is true, but the English common law even early in its development was more than just feudal law, and later it came to embrace all sorts of law.

One regrets that Professor Ullmann, while correctly asserting that feudal principles paved the way for acceptance of the natural rights doctrine, makes no real attempt to explain why feudalism contributed so mightily to constitutional government in England but failed to do so in France. It is not enough to say that the "theocratic-descending thesis of government and law predominated" in France and Germany. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries this thesis also predominated in England. Why did it cease to predominate? This question can only be answered by condescending to look at practical politics. Professor Ullmann is too content to let theory of government account for form of government. It is questionable how thoroughly he understands feudalism when he writes that the equalizing effects of feudalism in England prevented the emergence of a caste, that feudalism "served for the tenant by knight service no less than for the tenant in socage or for the agricultural classes."

BRYCE LYON

Brown University

The Shape of Medieval History: Studies in Modes of Perception. By WILLIAM J. BRANDT. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [Montreal: McGill University Press]. 1966. Pp. xx, 177. \$5.75.

THE AUTHOR TELLS US that his major purpose is to define the word "mediaeval," that is to isolate the essential character of the Middle Ages. This he finds in a mode of perception dominant in and relatively peculiar to that period—indeed, two modes of perception, two ways of looking at the world, represented by two kinds of chronicle (mostly having to do with English affairs) characterized as

"clerical" or "aristocratic," as the case may be. His study is preceded by an introductory chapter on natural explanation in the works of Isidore of Seville, William of Conches, and Albertus Magnus, where the physical universe is seen as a field of discrete objects and change is viewed as inhering in the object itself. The clerical chronicler, heir to this tradition, could not perceive of causal processes; he recorded discrete actions, the fundamental connections between which he was incapable of seeing. Human action, like natural action, appeared as an endless series of events, frequently related but at the same time possessing a unique structure that kept them discrete.

This is not to say that the clerical chronicler was not interested in causes, but rather that, lacking the modern presumption of regular orders of causation, he had in his attempts to explain events too many choices and too few criteria. Unable to perceive the world in terms of causal processes he had no limits to impose on the kinds of relationship that might exist between different events, no way of selecting those previous events that bore on the present event to be explained. Hence the continual interruption of human affairs by non-human forces, the many tokens of the heavens that presaged unusual events. The aristocratic chroniclers, on the other hand, never made the attempt to explain at all; their narratives leave causal processes to one side, valuing the action sequence for itself, celebrating rather than explaining the actions they recount. The possibility of understanding human action in the modern sense could not exist for the aristocratic chronicler; "it was precluded by the way in which he saw the world" (p. 105).

Some of the characterizations of chronicles seem designed to strengthen the author's views and can be misleading. For example: "Another illustration is the notorious carelessness of medieval chronicles in the matter of dating. . . . The medieval casualness about dates clearly indicates that the chroniclers were not concerned about causal processes. They didn't know they existed" (p. 51). Compare this with the following from Galbert's account of the murder of the count of Flanders: "In the year one thousand one hundred and twenty-seven on the sixth day before the Nones of March, on the second day, that is, after the beginning of the same month, when two days of the second week of Lent had elapsed, and the fourth day was subsequently to dawn, on the fifth Concurrent, and the sixth Epact, about dawn, the count of Flanders. . . ."¹ This might suggest that the presence or absence of precise chronological data is related to factors other than a mode of perception which excludes causal processes—to careflessness or its opposite; to knowledge or its lack; to the chronicler's purpose and his subsequent method of presentation. Again: "If human beings were not intrinsically interesting to the clerical chronicler, then questions of motive also had no great importance. As a consequence, one can search through scores of pages of medieval chronicles without finding any interest in motivation at all" (p. 160). Compare this with the *Relatio* of Nicholas of Butrinto on Henry VII's journey to Italy: "Et ista fuit una causa . . ."; and again: "Et istud fuit suum motivum . . .," both from the same page.²

The number and type of the chronicles used by the author seem to have been dictated by the conclusions about modes of perception which he hoped to reach rather than the other way around. How Giovanni Villani fits in is hard to say. And to stick to chronicles alone seems overly restrictive. Marsiglio of Padua, whether one agrees with his analysis or not, demonstrates a considerable sophis-

¹Trans. James Bruce Ross, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p. 118.

²In E. Baluze, *Vitae paparum Avenionensium*, ed. G. Mollat, III (1921), 493.

tication about causal processes in his discussion of the historical development of the political authority of the papacy; and despite oversimplifications and inconsistencies, Petrarch's voluminous strictures on the papacy in Avignon, to be found in his letters, evince a mode of perception strikingly at variance with those which supposedly give to the period 1100 to 1400 its peculiar mediaeval character. The causal constructs of both these men have continued to dominate historical writing to the very present. It may be objected that they are not typical, that is not truly "mediaeval," but this would merely reveal that "mediaeval" has been defined before examining the evidence rather than after.

Despite the foregoing, this book is both interesting and stimulating—interesting, because it has subjected some well-known sources to a kind of analysis hitherto untried with fruitful results; stimulating, because the kinds of questions the author has put to his sources promise much for the future. If historical creativity consists not so much in answering questions as in asking the right ones, then this is a creative piece of work.

NORMAN P. ZACOUR

University of Toronto

The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. IV. The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Edited by E. E. RICH and C. H. WILSON. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1967. Pp. xxxii, 642. \$14.50.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS VOLUME and its successor (which will probably be published in 1969) is to cover the period of world economic development between the end of the Middle Ages and the Industrial Revolution. As Professor Rich points out in his preface (p. xxxi), the two volumes "are not intended as works of economic analysis, which would explain and discuss the reasons for the peculiar shape taken by the world economy which developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries," but rather as "a narrative of the economic situation in Europe," which may serve as a starting point for later analysis and explanation. The two volumes will eventually stand or fall together, for "there is neither chronological sequence . . . nor logical distinction between them. Much of the allocation to one volume or the other has been the result of the simple difficulties in getting the chapters written by specified times" (p. xiv). One appreciates the editors' problems in having to rush volume IV to press a mere nineteen years after it was first planned!

At first sight, the auguries for success are good. The small number of subjects treated, compared to the twenty-four chapters of the average volume of the *New Cambridge Modern History*, permits each contributor to make a reasonably detailed description of his subject. It seems clear that the two most important chapters, that by K. F. Helleiner on population and that by F. P. Braudel and F. Spooner on prices, could hardly have been compressed into less than the hundred or so pages that each occupies here. Not the least of the virtues of these two chapters is their stress on the tentativeness of the conclusions which they advance and on the deficiencies of the materials from which those conclusions are drawn. It is exceedingly difficult to quantify the history of a society which had virtually no grasp of over-all numbers and a huge diversity of often ill-defined weights and measures. Professors Braudel and Spooner struggle to reduce matters to terms of metres and grams of silver, but often the data simply do not exist for calculation. Even for prices of textiles, by far the most important industry

of the period, it is "difficult, if not impossible, to prospect" (p. 419). Nevertheless, Professor Helleiner tells us much of the way in which the population level fluctuated wildly throughout the period, and how it only began to achieve a certain relative stability towards the end of the seventeenth century, when, for reasons more of rodent ecology than of human progress, bubonic and pneumonic plague began to recede. Professors Braudel and Spooner have so much to tell us that it is difficult to reduce their argument to a single sentence; perhaps their most significant point is that the period under discussion reveals the gradual coalescence of a continent hitherto split up into a series of semi-autarchic economies in which movement of basic commodities like grain was exceedingly difficult and in which famine was therefore ever present, into an area with a common economic destiny which was to be realized in the nineteenth century.

The other chapters are by no means to be ignored. A. R. Hall summarizes the history of the scientific revolution with the elegance which one expects of him, stressing that it is only in the eighteenth century that it is possible to see a significant effect of science upon industrial techniques. J. H. Parry's chapter on transport and trade routes is evocative in its discussion of maritime exploration and commerce, although his section on land and river transportation inside Europe is far too short. E. L. J. Coornaert contributes a chapter on the chartered companies through which much of Europe's trade with the Americas, Africa, and Asia was carried on, while E. E. Rich writes on colonial settlement. G. B. Masefield's chapter on crops and livestock is the shortest in the book and seems to reflect the inexplicable shortage of detailed studies on the history of food, a history which, as Professor Braudel points out (p. 415), "has hardly begun to rise above the level of anecdotes." In his chapter on trade, society, and the state, which concludes the volume, C. H. Wilson restates his convictions about mercantilism. In describing the various trends in economic thought current in the early modern period, Professor Wilson has no peer. On the other hand, when he says of Colbert on p. 526 that "there is indeed a measure of truth in the contention that Colbert's mind never rose to the level of a general idea. Here was the perfect bureaucrat . . .," he is evidently talking nonsense. He should look at the series of *mémoires* written by the great *contrôleur-général* in the 1660's and published by Clément in his edition of Colbert's correspondence.

The critical apparatus of the volume is superior to that of the various volumes of the *New Cambridge Modern History*, although some contributors seem to share an old-fashioned dislike of footnotes. Bibliographies for each chapter appear at the end of the volume; there is a regrettable lack of uniformity in the citing of works—one bibliography does not even bother to state places of publication. But this is too negative a note to end on. While it is impossible to come to a final decision on the value of this volume until its companion has appeared, it seems clear that it amply fulfils the aims enunciated by Professor Rich in his preface, and that it will be essential reading for anyone concerned with the history of Europe in the early modern age.

University of Toronto

JULIAN DENT

The Imperial Loans: A Study in Financial and Diplomatic History. By KARL F. HELLEINER. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1965. Pp. x, 190. \$4.75.

THIS VOLUME is devoted to a small but important facet of Austro-British relations

during the last of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century. It is based almost entirely on previously unexamined documents in the Public Record Office and the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. The first two chapters are limited to a detailed discussion of the prolonged and frequently tortuous negotiations of the Austrian and British governments between 1793 and 1800 which ended in the granting of two loans to Austria, the first in 1795 and the second in 1800. The third and last chapter deals mainly with the protracted negotiations between 1815 and 1823 over the liquidation of these two loans.

As the author clearly points out, such diverse factors as the deplorable state of Austrian finances, the British balance of payments problem, the necessity of obtaining parliamentary approval for loans, the efforts of the British to use financial assistance as a lever to prod the Austrians into increasing the number of troops fighting the French, the lurking British feeling that a refusal to provide adequate financial support might encourage the Habsburgs to enter into peace negotiations with the common enemy, British irritation over the constant haggling and the frequent delaying tactics of the Austrian negotiators, and British indignation over what they construed as Austrian refusals to honour their financial obligations all wielded considerable influence over the negotiations of the loans. Those involved in the negotiations, "defending what they believed to be the vital interests of their country, felt absolved of almost all the rules that govern relations among individuals" p. 178). The same can be said about the long-drawn-out efforts of the British to induce the Austrians to repay the loans contracted in 1795 and 1800. When a settlement was finally reached in the fall of 1823 the Habsburg government wrote off all its obligations for a token payment of only £2,500,000.

The author has remained strictly within the narrow limits of his announced subject—so much so, in fact, that he has left gaps that should have been filled to clarify the general picture of Austro-British financial relations during the period under discussion. The most serious of these stems from his failure to say anything at all about the financial assistance rendered to the Austrians by the British during the important years between 1805 and 1815. A more adequate treatment of the financial situation in both Great Britain and the Habsburg monarchy during the revolutionary and Napoleonic era and in the years between 1815 and 1823 would also serve to make the author's account more lucid. Fortunately, two studies have recently been published which throw considerable new light on financial conditions in the Habsburg monarchy during part of this critical period: Alois Brusatti's essay on "Graf Philipp Stadion als Finanzminister," in *Österreich und Europa: Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag* (Graz: Styria, 1965), pp. 281-94; and Hellmuth Rössler's *Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, Napoleons deutscher Gegenspieler* (2 vols., Vienna: Herold, 1966). They were published too late, however, for Professor Helleiner to make use of them.

R. JOHN RATH

Rice University

Spain, 1808-1939. By RAYMOND CARR. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1966. Pp. xxx, 766, maps. \$12.75.

NAPOLEON'S INTERVENTION IN SPAIN provoked the collapse of a faltering enlightened despotism which a few short years before had provided Spain with a degree of political stability unparalleled since the sixteenth century. The failure of the old regime before the crisis of 1808 led to a painful search for the institutions

and principles of a new political order. The quest for that order under the impact of conflicting political ideas, economic change, and social unrest provides the theme for this impressive interpretation of modern Spanish history.

Immense in its scope this is a work which deals with virtually every aspect of the history of Spain since the end of the eighteenth century. As comprehensive as the interpretation is, it is the nineteenth-century search for political stability which forms the basis of this thoroughly researched study. The traditional problems of the era—liberalism, militarism, Carlism, federalism, and such—are discussed with insight and objectivity. Avoiding the tendentious explanations which have characterized much of the historical writing dealing with this period, Carr has shown that the struggle for political stability during the century was far more significant in social and economic terms than a simple conflict for power among generals and politicians. By placing the seeming anarchy of Spanish politics during much of the nineteenth century in a broader social and economic context, he has been able to provide a precise analysis of a turbulent and confusing period. The chapters on Spanish liberalism, for example, provide perhaps the most thorough and sophisticated analysis of this complex topic written in either English or Spanish.

Professor Carr's emphasis on the nineteenth century is especially welcome. Until recently few scholars writing in English have ventured into this uncertain terrain, and many Spanish historians have consumed their energies in vain polemical discussions about the period. Yet if this concern with the nineteenth century is one of the important strengths of the book, it is also one of its weaknesses. From the great generalizations of the early chapters on the old regime and the crisis of 1808 the reader is plunged abruptly into a discussion of nineteenth-century politics so closely made that virtually no statement or action of a political figure is allowed to pass without receiving due explanation. Unfortunately, generalization occasionally becomes lost in a maze of individual explanations.

It must be said that this is a complex and difficult book to read both in terms of organization and style. But whatever its shortcomings in this respect, it is a book which has to be regarded as the most significant work on Spanish history to have appeared in recent years. The number and range of the sources used are staggering. Even more so is the author's command of them. The level of interpretation and historical insight which characterize this work make it one which will not be easily superseded.

W. J. CALLAHAN

University of Toronto

The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890. By VERNON L. LIDTKE. Princeton: Princeton University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1966. Pp. xiv, 374. \$10.00.

PRE-WORLD WAR I GERMAN social democracy has repeatedly been treated by historians during the past decades, perhaps largely because its heritage of political democracy and commitment to the transformation of existing society inspired expectations of change in the otherwise crusty authoritarian Germany. Professor Lidtke now offers the first comprehensive political history of the German socialists under Bismarck's exceptional laws. Employing the tools of historical analysis, he skilfully uses nearly all the available published and archival sources of significance in Western Europe and the United States, and also draws upon published materials from East Germany for his narrative. He treats his subject chronologi-

cally and topically and presents it with literary clarity and skill. In my opinion, his book will become the standard work on the subject.

Emphasizing the time span between the Gotha programme of 1875 and the Erfurt programme of 1891, Lidtke contends that the social democratic party underwent a fundamental transformation in its relationship to the tradition of political democracy and socialist theory. To be sure, this trend toward doctrinal change began before the mid-1870's, but it received special impetus after 1878 when the Iron Chancellor resorted to Draconic measures against the socialists. Under the impact of legal suppression and the gradual influx of Marxist economic and political theory, the social democrats turned from the pursuit of political democracy, epitomized by the concept of the Free People's State (*Freie Volksstaat*), to the emphasis on economic theory and "ambivalent" parliamentary practice. On the one hand, in its theory the party gained assurance from Marx's writings that the economic transformation of capitalist society would prepare the road to revolution and socialism; on the other, in its practice the party's concomitant abandonment of political democracy as its primary political goal relegated it to quasi-reformist activity in the Reichstag of the Bismarckian empire and the state parliaments of Saxony and Hesse, since these constitutionally restricted bodies offered the only legal outlet for socialist political engagement.

In developing his theme, Lidtke carefully characterizes the positions of the so-called moderates and radicals in the Reichstag *Fraktion*, which, because of its constitutional immunity, assumed the leadership of the party when the socialist organization and publications fell victim to the exceptional laws. The moderates tended to view socialism as a movement with a broad appeal to all reform-minded elements in society; the radicals under Bebel's aegis expounded Marxist revolutionary goals and often purported to treat parliamentarism with disdain. Yet in the Saxon diet these very same radicals behaved like tame economic and social reformists, concerning themselves largely with local domestic issues. On the national scene they participated vigorously in Reichstag elections and at times in deliberations, although always with an eye to the agitational effect of their parliamentary activities. Much of the 'eighties is seen by Lidtke as a struggle between the moderates and radicals for supreme leadership in the party. The steamship subsidy crisis of the mid-'eighties, best traced through the unusually acrimonious correspondence between members of the *Fraktion* and the editorial staff of the *Sozialdemokrat* in exile, he interprets primarily in those terms. Throughout this fight Bebel's role looms especially and rightfully large in Lidtke's treatment. Siding with the radical minority in the steamship subsidy controversy, Bebel was soon to emerge as the unchallenged political leader of the party between 1887 and 1890. And it was precisely Bebel's fervent expectation of the coming economic collapse of capitalist society, presaging the revolution, and his keen realization that the party's political existence, if not his own position as a leader, depended on active socialist involvement in Reichstag elections and activities, which made both ambivalent or half-hearted parliamentarians and lukewarm revolutionaries of the social democrats.

In concentrating upon his theme, Lidtke at times unduly underemphasizes the limited illegal activities of the social democrats before 1890. However, his book provides us with a new, deft, and more adequate formulation of the traditional dilemma between revolutionary theory and reformist practice in German social democracy and the most thorough treatment of the political activities of the party during Bismarck's chancellorship.

GEORGE P. BLUM

Raymond College
University of the Pacific

Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability. By HARVEY LEONARD DYCK. London: Chatto & Windus [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin]. 1966. Pp. 279. \$9.25.

BECAUSE NO OTHER ASPECT OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY in the 1920's has been examined as often, Mr. Dyck has already been asked why one more book on this subject was necessary and useful. The answer hinges partly on the wealth and availability of the sources, partly on the ideological commitments of some scholars. The surveys by E. H. Carr and Lionel Kochan were helpful but based only on printed materials. Several works by East Germans were nearly worthless because of ideological bias (Klein, Norden); others were biased and lopsidedly reliant on the captured documents in Potsdam, but also concerned chiefly with the pre-Rapallo period (Rosenfeld) or too thin on the later years (Anderle). Although he was allowed access only to the Stresemann *Nachlass*, Gerald Freund wrote an excellent study of the years from Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin in 1926. When the Foreign Office documents were finally opened to scholars, Herbert Helbig and Kurt Rosenbaum contributed substantial monographs, mainly on Brockdorff-Rantzau. Hans Gatzke exploited a wide range of unpublished documents but kept Stresemann and problems of rearmament or military collaboration at the centre of his major studies; Zygmunt Gasiorowski and Josef Korbel concentrated on German-Polish relations. Thus most of the thoroughly scholarly studies have treated the lively pre-Locarno years, the outstanding and forceful personalities, or rearmament and Poland, but no one had written a detailed study of German relations with Russia for 1926-1932 on the basis of the exhaustingly numerous Foreign Office documents.

This explains why Mr. Dyck's book is welcome. He has analysed "the manner in which policy makers framed issues of external relations and perceived spectra of political choice, the criteria they applied in choosing from among alternative programs, and finally, the techniques they used to test, implement, reappraise, and revise those programs." The alternatives in the undramatic period between 1926 and 1930 were not easy to perceive, and the arguments were often subtle, but Mr. Dyck's synthesis, analysis, and exposition are exemplary. To the already expressed criticism that he has not examined the effects of party politics and pressure groups on relations with Russia, the author can answer that some industrial pressure groups do appear in his pages, and that for much of the time the political parties were not interested or were only interested during recurrent small crises. For instance, the Treaty of Berlin was approved by the Reichstag with only three negative votes, whereas Locarno aroused formidable opposition. Later, however, the Foreign Office suffered from stronger outside pressures and by 1931 "could no longer set the tone of German foreign policy; it was compelled to follow German public opinion, and it did so in a rather confused manner." This argument is not entirely convincing, and there are leads which may explain why.

Relations with Russia were eclipsed when Chancellor Brüning made the customs union with Austria his chief objective and, had it been achieved, Germany might have employed Stresemann's economic pressures for the sequence followed by Hitler. Thus, as Mr. Bennett's book on the financial crisis reveals (p. 79), in 1931 State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow envisaged the formation of an economic bloc with Austria, which would inevitably draw in Czechoslovakia and "then Poland with her unstable economic structure would be exposed to all kinds of dangers: we should have her in a kind of vise which might sooner or later put her in a state of mind to consider further the idea of exchanging political concessions for tangible economic benefits." This extravagant vision is significant,

because it indicated an entirely new strategy for German foreign policy, one less dependent on Russia for gains in eastern Europe and one which Hitler ultimately carried out far more masterfully than Brüning could. German public opinion relished this more active policy, but can hardly be said to have imposed it. The Foreign Office had already felt that Stresemann's way was inadequate.

If the rising tide of German nationalism, the increasing radicalism at both ends of the political spectrum, and the concentration on the customs union presage the alteration of policy toward Russia, the last pages of this very able monograph may require revision or could give way to a conclusion. The author has not summarized his own achievement or indicated where the interpretations in earlier works must be modified. But he and the publishers have given us a neat and full volume, which is unfortunately almost three dollars more expensive in Canada than in the United States.

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The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933. By F. L. CARSTEN. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1966. Pp. vi, 427. \$8.50.

IN HIS MOST RECENT BOOK F. L. Carsten, Masaryk Professor of Central European History at the University of London, has shown the same solid competence which marked his earlier studies of the origins of the Prussian state, and of German "parliamentary" institutions before 1789. His *Reichswehr and Politics* takes its place at once as an indispensable study of a central theme in the history of the Weimar Republic. The subject of military-civil relations between the fall of the Second Reich and the national socialist *Machtergreifung* has understandably attracted a good many historians—Gordon Craig, Wheeler-Bennett, Harold Gordon, Thilo Vogelsang, and Karl Dietrich Bracher among them. But Carsten is probably justified in claiming that his is the first study (it was first published in German) to survey the political role of the Reichswehr over the whole of the Weimar period, and at many points his analysis differs from that of earlier writers. His book is based on a wide variety of documentary sources, including material in the archives of Koblenz, Munich, Freiburg, and Potsdam, much of which has not been so successfully exploited before. The result is not only an analysis of the Reichswehr *and* politics but of politics *in* the Reichswehr. As Carsten points out (pp. 398-9), on the fundamental issue of the attitude to be adopted to the new state in 1919, strong differences of opinion led to groups and factions which did not end with von Seeckt's victory in 1920. The result is that Carsten's analysis gives a new meaning to the word "army" which we too often tend to use without precise definition.

The first part of the book deals with the formative phase of the republic, from the military and political collapse which undermined the foundations on which the existence and corporate feeling of the officers rested to the defeat of the Kapp Putsch. Carsten describes the check administered to Kapp and von Luttwitz as "a great victory for the republican forces," (p. 99) although it was accompanied by the dismissal of Reinhardt, "the only general who was prepared to defend the republic by force of arms" and his replacement by "a general who had refused to do so" (p. 92). The real victor in March 1920, in short, was von Seeckt, whose role dominates the second part of the book. With the defeat of the attempt at reconciliation between army and republic and the eclipse of the War Minister, von Seeckt soon became "the most powerful man in Germany" (pp. 153-4). That

power he did not hesitate to use in broad sectors of the political arena, following Groener's maxim of 1919: "politics must be conducted by a few only—tenaciously and silently" (p. 399). That was the meaning of the term *Überparteilichkeit*. Part Three is dominated by the figure of von Schleicher, whom Carsten sees exercising power without parallel (p. 389)—he was the prime mover in the fall of three chancellors and of the appointment of their successors, as well as the destroyer of the Prussian government, before he himself became chancellor. To Carsten the attitude of von Schleicher and of the Reichswehr leaders whom he dominated almost to the end is "almost incomprehensible," involving as it did "a total misjudgment of Hitler and his aims" (pp. 337–8). This judgment may not be exactly original. But the point is made with compelling force and convincing documentation.

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Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE AND ANN LIDDELL

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *T.B.R.* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

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Notes and Comments

THE CHAMPLAIN SOCIETY

SINCE 1905 THE CHAMPLAIN SOCIETY has provided an important service to students of Canadian history by the publication of diaries, correspondence, and various collections of original documents. Unfortunately, under the illusion that it is difficult to obtain membership, many Canadian historians are only familiar with the library copies of the Society. In actual fact this is not so, although there is usually a short waiting list which is taken care of as vacancies occur and in recent years by several small extensions to the total membership which has now been raised to 775. Any student of Canadian history interested in joining the Society should have no difficulty in doing so. The fee at present is \$15.00, payable in advance of the publication of each volume in the regular series; these normally appear once a year although at present there is a backlog of one or two volumes. In addition members receive a complimentary copy of all volumes appearing in the Ontario series and the right to buy copies of back volumes, if available. Applications for membership or for further information should be addressed to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer, The Champlain Society, 70 Bond St., Toronto 1.

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